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Peace, Force & Joy |
Introduction The letters collected here in book form were published separately as the author completed each one. No more than three years have elapsed from the time the author wrote the first of these letters in February of 1991 to when he completed the tenth and final one in December of 1993, but during this time sweeping transformations have taken place in almost every field of human endeavor. If the pace of change continues to increase as it did over this period, a reader from coming decades will have serious difficulty in understanding the world context to which the author continually makes reference, and will hence fail to grasp many of the ideas expressed in these writings. I would recommend that these hypothetical readers of the future refer to a summary of the events that took place between the years 1991 and 1994, and that they seek an ample understanding of those times, of the economic and technological developments, the famines and conflicts, the trends in advertising and fashion. I would further suggest that they listen to the music of that period, that they view photographs of the architectural and urban landscapes, that they observe the overcrowding in the macro-cities, the vast human migrations, the deterioration of the environment, and the general way of life during that curious historical moment. Above all I would urge that they penetrate the fog of pronouncements and counter-pronouncements issued by the experts and formers of opinion: the philosophers, sociologists, and psychologists of that cruel and stupid age. Although these letters address a particular present situation, they are unmistakably written with an eye toward the future, and I believe that only from that future will it be possible to confirm or refute them. The collection of letters in this work follows no general plan; it consists rather of a series of occasional expository writings that one may read in any order. Nevertheless, we might classify them as follows: A. The first three letters focus on the experiences of the individual living in the midst of a global situation that is growing more complex day-by-day. B. The fourth letter presents the general structure of ideas on which all the letters are based. C. The remaining letters outline the author’s sociopolitical thought. D. The tenth letter presents guidelines for targeted action in light of the global process. Here is a brief summary of the principal themes in this collection of letters: First Letter: The situation in which we now happen to live; the disintegration of institutions and the crisis of solidarity; the new types of sensibility and behavior now beginning to take shape in today’s world; criteria for action. Second Letter: Change and related factors in today’s world and the positions commonly taken in facing this change. Third Letter: The characteristics of change and crisis in relation to the immediate environment in which each person lives. Fourth Letter: The foundation of the views presented in these letters regarding the most general questions of human life, needs, and basic projects; the natural and social worlds; the concentration of power; violence and the State. Fifth Letter: Human freedom, intention, and actions; the ethical meaning of social action and activism and their most common defects. Sixth Letter: The ideological foundation of Humanism. Seventh Letter: Social revolution. Eighth Letter: The armed forces. Ninth Letter: Human rights. Tenth Letter: The phenomenon of generalized destructuring; applying global understanding to minimum concrete action. The author has further explored the themes of the fourth letter, so important to the ideological underpinnings of all the letters, in the work Contributions to Thought, particularly in the essay entitled "Historiological Discussions," and also in the talk "The Crisis of Civilization and Humanism," which he presented at the Moscow Academy of Administration on June 18, 1992. The sixth letter develops the central ideas of contemporary humanism. In its dense concentration of concepts this writing recalls political and cultural writings such as the manifestos of the last half of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the Communist Manifesto or the Surrealist Manifesto, for example. The use of the term document in place of manifesto in the sixth letter reflects a careful choice of words intended to distance the present Humanist Document from the naturalism embodied in the Dewey-inspired Humanist Manifesto I of 1933, and from the social-liberalism of Humanist Manifesto II of 1974, endorsed by Sakharov and strongly imbued with the thought of Lamont. Although there are similarities between Humanist Manifesto II and the present Document regarding the need for an economic and environmental plan that will not jeopardize personal freedom, there are radical differences between them in both their political visions and their conceptions of the human being. The sixth letter deserves further comment in view of its extreme brevity in relation to the number of themes with which it deals. In it the author recognizes the contributions of various cultures to the development of humanism, as can clearly be observed in Jewish, Arabic, and Eastern thought. In this sense, this Document cannot be strictly placed in the Ciceronian tradition, as has usually been the case with Western humanisms. In recognizing historical humanism, the author has revived themes previously expressed as early as the twelfth century. I am referring to the goliard poets such as Hugh of Orlˇans and Peter of Blois, whose writings form part of the celebrated Codex Buranus (or Code of Beuren, also known as the "Songs of Bueren" and in Latin as Carmina Burana). Though Silo does not quote them directly, the following passages from his sixth letter recall their words: This is the great universal truth: Money is everything. Money is government, money is law, money is power. Money is basically sustenance, but more than this it is art, it is philosophy, it is religion. Nothing is done without money, nothing is possible without money. There are no personal relationships without money, there is no intimacy without money. Even peaceful solitude depends on money. We hear a clear echo of the phrase from the Codex Buranus, "...the Abbot in his cell is kept a prisoner by money..." in Silo’s phrase, "Even peaceful solitude depends on money." Or an echo of the line "Money receives honor, and none in want are loved..." in Silo’s "There are no personal relationships without money, there is no intimacy without money." The goliard poet’s generalization, "Money, it is true, makes the fool seem eloquent," appears in this sixth letter as, "...but more than this it is art, philosophy, and religion." And of money the poem says, "Money is adored, for it makes such miracles...it makes the deaf hear and it makes the lame walk." In this poem from the Codex Buranus to which Silo alludes there is an implicit background that will later inspire the humanists of the sixteenth century, in particular Erasmus and Rabelais. While the sixth letter presents the ideological foundation of contemporary humanism, I feel that an excellent way to provide an overview of this theme is to include here an excerpt from "A Contemporary Vision of Humanism," a talk given by the author at the Universidad Aut—noma de Madrid on April 16, 1993. There are two meanings normally ascribed to the word humanism. Frequently people use the word humanism to mean any tendency of thought that affirms the dignity and worth of the human being. Under this broad definition, humanism can be interpreted in the most diverse and contrasting ways. In its more restricted meaning, placed within a precise historical perspective, the concept of humanism is used to indicate the process of transformation that began between the end of the fourteenth and the beginning of the fifteenth centuries, and that, known as the Renaissance, was to dominate the intellectual life of Europe over the next century. One need only mention the names of Erasmus, Giordano Bruno, Galileo, Nicholas of Cusa, Thomas More, Juan Luis Vives, and Charles Bouillˇ to illustrate the range and diversity of historical humanism. Its influence continued throughout the seventeenth and greater part of the eighteenth centuries, giving rise to the revolutions that ushered in the Modern Age. The humanist current then seems to have slowly died out, until it was again rekindled toward the middle of this century in debate among thinkers concerned with social and political questions. The broad outlines of historical humanism are in rough terms as follows: 1. Historical humanism forms a reaction against the Medieval way of life and values. Thus begins a strong recognition of other cultures, particularly the Greco-Roman, in art, science, and philosophy. 2. It introduces a new image of the human being that exalts the human personality and the transforming capacity of human action. 3. It embodies a new attitude toward nature, which now becomes accepted as the environment of humanity and no longer simply as a lower world filled with temptations and punishments. 4. There is a birth of interest in experimentation and research on the surrounding world, and a growing practice of seeking natural explanations without the need to invoke the supernatural. These four aspects of historical humanism converge in the same objective: to galvanize a new confidence in human beings and in their creativity, viewing the world as the kingdom of humanity, a kingdom that can be mastered through a knowledge of the sciences. From this new perspective one finds expressions of the need to construct a new vision of the universe and of history. At the same time, the new conceptions of this humanist movement spur a reevaluation of the religious question in its dogma and liturgy as well as in its organizational structures, which so permeate the social structures of the Middle Ages. Humanism, as a correlate of the changing economic and social forces of the period, represents a revolutionary new force that is increasingly conscious and oriented toward questioning the established order. In response, the Reformation in the German and Anglo-Saxon worlds and the Counter Reformation in the Latin world attempt to halt the spread of the new ideas, reimposing the traditional Christian vision in an authoritarian way. The crisis spreads from the Church to the State structures. Finally the revolutions at the close of the eighteenth and in the nineteenth centuries bring to a close the age of empire and monarchy by divine right. Then, following the French Revolution and the wars of independence in the Americas, Humanism all but disappears, although it persists as a social background of ideals and aspirations that fosters economic, political, and scientific transformations. Humanism retreats in the face of concepts and practices instituted with the close of the Colonial period, the Second World War, and the bipolar Cold War alignment of the world. It is in this situation that we observe a reopening of debate regarding the meaning of the human being and nature, the justification of political and economic structures, the orientation of science and technology, and the general direction in which historical events are heading. The first signs of this renewed debate appear among Existential philosophers: Heidegger’s rejection of Humanism as simply one more metaphysics in his "Letter on Humanism," Sartre’s defense of it in his Existentialism and Humanism, and Luijpen in refining a theoretical framework in his Phenomenology and Humanism. Other noteworthy efforts were made by Althusser in the anti-Humanist position he presented in For Marx and by Maritain in appropriating humanism from its position as an antithesis of Christianity in True Humanism. Having traveled this long road to the most recent discussions in the field of ideas, it is clear that Humanism today must define its position not only as a theoretical conception but also in terms of social action and practice. The state of the humanist question must today be articulated with reference to the conditions in which the human being actually lives. Such conditions are not abstract, and it is therefore not legitimate to derive Humanism from a theory of nature, a theory of history, or a faith in god. The human condition is such that the immediacy of the encounter with pain and the need to overcome that pain are inescapable. This condition, common to so many other species, in the human being includes the additional need to foresee how in the future pain will be overcome and pleasure obtained. This human foresight is based on past experience and on the intention to improve present conditions. The work of human beings, accumulated in social productions, is transformed as it passes from one generation to others in the ongoing struggle to surmount the natural and social conditions in which they live. Humanism therefore defines human beings as historical beings, whose mode of social action is capable of transforming both the world and their own nature. This point is of capital importance, for if it is accepted one cannot then affirm any natural law, natural property, natural institutions, or finally a future human being the same as that of today, as though the human being were complete now and forever. Today the age-old theme of the relationship between the human being and nature takes on renewed importance. On reconsidering it, we discover this great paradox in which human beings appear as without fixed character or nature, while at the same time we become aware of one constant in them: their historicity. This is why, stretching the terms a bit, we can say that the nature of human beings is their history, their social history. Each new human being who is born, then, is not simply equipped genetically to respond to the environment as though identical to the first representative of their species, but is rather an historical being whose personal experience unfolds within an accumulating social landscape, within a human landscape. Yet we find in this social world that the intention we all hold in common – to overcome pain – is being negated by the intention of other human beings. What I am saying is that there are some human beings who naturalize others by negating their intention, converting them into objects to be used. The tragedy of being at the mercy of natural physical conditions impels human social effort and science toward new achievements to surmount these conditions. In the same way, the tragedy of being subject to social conditions of inequality and injustice impels the human being to rebel against this situation, in which we find not blind forces at work but rather the interplay of other human intentions. Those human intentions that negate the intention of others, that discriminate against other human beings, are to be judged within a wholly different context from that used to judge a natural tragedy, where there is no intention. This is why, in every act of discrimination, a monstrous effort is always made to establish that the differences between human beings are given by nature, whether physical or societal, that the differences at any rate are established by the interplay of blind forces, devoid of human intentions. So it is that racial, ethnic, sexual, economic, or other distinctions are made, and then justified by "laws," whether genetic or market. In every case, however, those who discriminate against others have to rely on distortion, untruths, and bad faith. To sum up the two basic ideas outlined above, which frame the state of the question for today’s humanists, first is the idea of the human condition as subject to pain, with the corresponding impulse to overcome this pain, and second is the definition of the human being as a social and historical being. The foundational Document of the Humanist Movement (see Sixth Letter p. 69) observes that we will pass from pre-history into a truly human history when the violent animal appropriation of some human beings by others ceases. In the meantime one cannot begin from any other central value than that of the human being, fully realized and free. This is synthesized in the following declaration: "Nothing above the human being, and no human being beneath any other." If God, the State, money, or any other entity is placed as the central value, this subordinates the human being, creating the condition for the subsequent control or sacrifice of others. As humanists we have this point very clear. We may be atheists or believers, but we do not begin with our atheism or our faith as the starting point for our vision of the world or for our actions. We begin with human beings and their immediate needs. As humanists, we state the fundamental problem as follows: to know if one wants to live, and to decide in what conditions to do so. All forms of violence – physical, economic, racial, religious, sexual, ideological, and so on – that have been used to restrain human progress are repugnant to humanists. Every form of discrimination, whether subtle or overt, is something that humanists denounce. The following issues, then, mark a clear dividing line between Humanism and anti-Humanism: Humanism puts labor before big capital, real democracy before formal democracy, decentralization before centralization, anti-discrimination before discrimination, freedom before oppression, and meaning in life before resignation, complicity, and the absurd. Because Humanism is based on freedom of choice, it offers a valid ethic; because Humanism believes in intention and freedom, it distinguishes between error and bad faith. This is how humanists define positions. We see ourselves not as having come out of nowhere, but as tributaries of a long process and collective effort. We are committed to our own times, even as we envision a long struggle that extends toward the future. We affirm diversity, in direct opposition to the regimentation imposed until now. This regimentation relies on explanations that it is diversity itself that places the elements of a system in dialectic, so that to exercise respect for every particularity will unleash centrifugal forces of disintegration. Humanists hold exactly the opposite point of view, emphasizing that it is precisely the subjugation of diversity in this time that is leading to conditions that will prove explosive for rigid structures. This is why humanists place the accent on an emerging convergence of direction, a convergence of intention, and why we oppose the idea and the practice of eliminating supposedly dialectic conditions within a given human group. Here ends our excerpt from this talk by the author. The tenth and final letter establishes the limits of destructuring, focusing among many possible areas on three forms of destructuring in which this phenomenon takes on special importance: the political, the religious, and the generational. The letter also warns of the resurgence of fascist, authoritarian, and violent neo-irrationalist trends. In illustrating the idea of combining a global understanding with initiating action in the minimum sphere of one’s immediate environment, the author makes a phenomenal leap of scale in which as readers we find ourselves back beside our neighbor, our coworker, our friend. The letter makes a clear proposal that activists reject the mirage of superstructural political power because such power has been fatally wounded in the ongoing process of destructuring. In the future it will no longer matter who is president, prime minister, senator, representative, or deputy. Political parties, unions, and labor organizations will continue to drift ever further from their human base. The State will undergo a thousand transformations, and global decision-making power will be concentrated in only the largest of corporations and international finance capital, until finally this whole system is overtaken by the collapse of the para-State. What, then, would be the value of an activism that strives to occupy what are only empty shells within a democracy that is merely formal? Clearly, actions must be proposed within the immediate environment of each person, since it is only from there, based on concrete conflicts, that real representation can be built. But the existential problems of the social base are not expressed exclusively as economic and political difficulties, and therefore a party that espouses a humanist ideology and instrumentally holds elected offices may have institutional significance, but will still be unable to meet the real needs of the people. It is from the social base and as a broad movement, decentralized and federative, that new power will be constructed. The questions that all activists need to ask themselves are not "Who will be the next president or prime minister, the next representative or deputy?" but rather "How can we organize our centers for direct communication, our network of neighborhood councils? How can we give participation to all the organizations of the social base, no matter how small, through which people express their work, sports, art, culture, and religiosity?" This Movement should not be conceived of in formal political terms, but instead as a process of converging diversity. Nor should the growth of this Movement be conceived of within the old mold of a gradualism that will supposedly gain space and social strata a little at a time. It should instead be proposed in terms of a "demonstration effect," characteristic of a multi-connected planetary society that is quite capable of reproducing and adapting a successful model in social environments that are very distant and different from one another. In sum, this final letter outlines a minimum type of organization and a strategy of action that correspond to the situation of today’s world. While I have limited my comments in this introduction to the fourth, sixth, and tenth letters in the belief that they have called for further references, citations, and complementary commentaries, I urge the reader not to overlook the many other letters, which do such a remarkable job of coherently tying together the broad range of contemporary humanist concerns, including, for example, human rights which are considered in the ninth letter, the current role of the armed forces treated in the eighth letter, the current state of activism discussed in the fifth letter, as well as each individual’s personal ethical choices and possible coherence amid today’s turbulent events which is considered in the third letter. J. Valinsky January, 1994
We invite everyone to
participate with us in putting into practice the moral principle that says:
"Treat others as you would like to be
treated." |
The Humanist
Movement's Distant Adoption Program for Kenya. |