During September 2001, I submitted copies of the following web-pages to the Chief Vigilance Commissioner, Central Vigilance Commission, to the CVO of MYBANK and to the CMD through the ED

1. The present text of the web-project, "My Encounter with Corporate Corruption in my Service"(all 7 chapters), which originally was intended as the "Preface" of my Project-Literature "Integrity in Public Life & Services", and

2. the "Foreword" prepared by me for the same Project-Literature presently titled as "Preface" in the web-project " How to Conduct/Defend Departmental Inquires".

The chapters were forwarded on 13.09.2001 to all addressees under cover of my letter the full text of which is given in the column to the right:

This serves to convey the auto-biographical sketch of my service-life and portrayed my crusade against corporate corruption.

I followed this by preferring eight complaints against listed officers and executives of MYBANK incorporating the voluminous tales of corruption and siphoning of Bank's funds in the day-to-day course and easy manner and how these atrocities remained suppressed over the years, trough implicit role of the top executives of the Bank. My complaint was sent with case dairy and list of documentary and oral witnesses. The complaints were forwarded by me between September, 2001 and January 2002. More details are furnished hereunder.

I summarised the gist of the complaints for quick understanding by way of the following "conclusions"

1. Corruption got embroiled in Delhi Zone of MYBANK since 1985. It made smaller beginnings in the first three or four years. The loaning powers of the Chief Managers were enhanced nearly two to three times in 1988/89 and Chief Managers were able to sanction up to Rs.38 Lacs per customer for working capital and term loan on spot. After this it gathered momentum in 1990 and 1991. It is embedded and top-to-bottom oriented. It manifested itself in the actions of the CMD, Personnel Division, Zonal Office, Delhi. When rampant corruption cases were exposed, the attitude (reaction) was to scuttle the findings and to cover/ignore corrupt and fraudulent deeds of those concerned. The system was designed to shield the corrupt and to patronise them.

2. There are 27 VLBs/ELBs in Delhi. But I could peep through the sad state of affairs deeply spread in 7 VLBs. But this is a good sample to indicate the intensely in-built malady that had set in the system in this part of the Bank. When I probed the rut that had set-in, in the system and published the truth in my reports, I was issued orders of "No further Entry" to Delhi branches and my job profile was revised and restricted to include only systems audit of administrative offices (Regional/Zonal offices), deleting audit of VLBs/ELBs from my purview

3. Zonal office administration intended as a watchdog institution to protect and preserve the branches was itself indulging in corruption at the top stratum. Instead of curbing corruption, it promoted corruption and taking the zone to the brink of ruin. If statistics of advances granted in the zone in the era from 1985 to 1994, which are now lying as NPAs are called for, the implications of this statement will be clear. If the latest zone-wise NPA position of MYBANK is called, you will find Delhi Zone at the top towering in stature.

How Systems were Corrupted and Made Non-Functional

4. The regulatory and control systems were made non-functional within the zone, to make it possible for corrupt CMs to thrive unhindered.

5. Branches were sending a number of audit returns to the Zonal Office. Detailed test audit of even a mere 10% of the accounts reported would have indicated the truth about these advances. In particular there were control returns as under:

   1. Monthly statement of credit facilities allowed by the CM to borrowers exercising his delegated powers.

   2. Monthly statement of sticky accounts.(irregular accounts)

6. Once in a quarter each VLB was visited for an on the spot study of the affairs in terms of development and audit by senior executives of the zonal office. Unless these executives decide to close their eyes, they had enough opportunities to visualize the happenings.

7. Once in a year or once in 18 months each VLB was subjected to detailed inspection by Inspectors of Head office, as it was done by me in respect of "M" Branch, New Delhi. Successive such inspections carried out between 1985 to 1991 of the relevant branches did not bring about the truth.

8. The CMD was more interested in protecting the culprits at the top layer of the Zonal office and closing a blind eye to the alarm bells raised by me. He made no efforts to safeguard the interest of the bank. His one interest was in protecting the culprits from exposure and punishment. Instead of appreciating my work for unearthing the truth, efforts were made to bully me and inflict harm on me. This was intended as a warning to others not to fall in my line, in addition to settling scores with me.

9. CMD never concerned himself with the degeneration that has crept in the system. The result that such frauds of huge magnitude could remain hidden without detection for years

10. When the CMD started patronizing corrupt executives two successive CVOs were not effective. Though personally honest, they were lacking either the will power or the capacity and courage to act against the wishes of the CMD. This resulted in a corruption spree carried out openly before the CVOs, who were helpless and mute spectators.

11. What pained me the most was that, after detecting a chain of frauds committed by the fraudulent customer M/s.National Wire Industries at "M" Branch, including floating spurious firms, presenting fictitious balance sheets forging signature & seal of certifying Chartered Accountant (Auditor), cheating three branches of MYBANK and three branches of 2 other Banks, all stretched over a long period from 1985 to 1992, I left Delhi for my next station/assignment on 06.l2.1992. The coterie of the Zonal Office was, as subsequently found out, waiting eagerly for my exit. They had also ensured that I will not come to Delhi again to inspect their branches. Then on the very next day, i.e. on 07.l2.1992, they made fresh bargain with the same "National Wire Industries" to provide them further loaning up to one Crore. The fraudulent account at "M-Branch" was transferred to "P-Branch" on 07.12.92, where fresh accommodation was allowed to "National Wire Industries", subsequently. The Branch also submitted a credit proposal to the Zonal office for sanction of credit limits in the name another group firm. Zonal office processed the proposal and approved for sanction of Rs.52 Lacs fresh limit and sought the content of the party for accepting the reduced credit limit. I do not remember the original limit recommended by the Branch. The party was also freely allowed in several accounts credit facilities of questionable nature in "S-Branch". These were detected by me in my 2nd investigation on the vigilance complaint from Finance Ministry. Frankly I did convey in my lengthy report of three parts, that in 1992, I confronted a Chartered Accountant behind the scam that occurred in MYBANK branches, but this time (in 1993) it is now our own Zonal Manager who is the scam-maker.

12. The vile borrower then committed "double jeopardy" and extended the same perfidy to those of the zonal office who favoured him bending all cannons of service ethics and morality. In company with the "friends from the Zonal Office" "National Wire Industries" first swindled fresh funds from the Bank, and they also simultaneously delivered a blow to the "helpers", and left them in the lurch failing to pay for the Bills under Letters of credit established in the "P-branch" in their favour, after clandestinely taking delivery of the material worth about Rs.20 Lacs from the transport carriers.