The substantive part of clause (2) of Article 311 provides that " no such person as aforesaid shall be dismissed or removed or reduced in rank, except after an inquiry in which he has been informed of the charges against him and given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of those charges". What constitutes 'reasonable opportunity' has been considered by High Courts and the Supreme Court on a number of occasions. According to the prescribed procedures, the disciplinary authority should hold an inquiry, hear and weigh the evidence and consider the merits of the case before coming to conclusion. These constitute elements of a judicial approach and, therefore, in discharging its functions in disciplinary inquiries, the disciplinary authority acts in a quasi-judicial capacity. As a corollary, the requirements of 'reasonable opportunity' have been equated with the principles of natural justice (Joseph John's case, A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 160). Courts have freely applied these principles to departmental inquires and disciplinary proceedings against Government servants.

It has been held that for a proper compliance with the requirement of 'reasonable opportunity', as envisaged in Article 311 (2), a Government servant against whom action is proposed to be taken should, in the first instance be given an opportunity to deny the charge and to establish his innocence. The Supreme Court of India in the case of Union of India and others vs. Mod. Ramzan Khan - 1991 (1) SLR 159 has held that even though the second stage of the inquiry in Article 311 (2) has been abolished by 42nd amendment to the Constitution, the delinquent officer is still entitled to represent against the conclusion of the Inquiry Officer, holding that the charges or some of the charges are not established. It has thus been laid down that wherever there has been an Inquiry Officer and he has furnished a report to the disciplinary authority at the conclusion of the inquiry holding the delinquent guilty of all or any of the charges with the proposal for any particular punishment or not, the delinquent is entitled to a copy of such report and will also be entitled to make a representation against it, if he so desires, and non-furnishing of the report would amount to violation of rules of natural justice and make the final order liable to challenge hereafter. (Before the 42nd Amendment to the Constitution, it was necessary that such a person should be given an opportunity to represent, if he so desires, against the quantum of punishment proposed to be inflicted on him. This opportunity at the second stage has been now done away with by the aforesaid amendment to the Constitution).

In Khem Chand vs. Union of India (AIR 1958 SC 300), the Supreme Court explained the nature and scope of 'reasonable opportunity' in the following terms: -

"It is true that the provision does not in terms refer to different stages at which opportunity is to be given to the officer concerned. All that it says is that the Government servant must be given a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken in regard to him. He must not only be given an opportunity but such opportunity must be a reasonable one. In order that the opportunity to show cause against the proposed action may be regarded as a reasonable one, it is quite obviously necessary that the Government servant should have the opportunity to say, if that be his case, that he has not been guilty of any misconduct to merit any punishment at all and also that the particular punishment proposed to be given is much more drastic and severe than he deserves. Both those pleas have a direct bearing on the question of punishment and may well be put forward in showing cause against the proposed punishment. If this is the correct meaning of this clause, as we thing it is, what consequences follow? If it is open to the Government servant under the provision to contend, if that be the fact that he is not guilty of any misconduct, then how can he take the plea unless he is told what misconduct is alleged against him? If the opportunity to show cause is to be a reasonable one it is clear that he should be informed about the charge or charges leveled against him and the evidence by which it is sought to be established, for it is only then that he will be able to put forward the defence. If the purpose of these provisions is to give Government servant an opportunity to exonerate himself from the charge and if this opportunity is to be a reasonable one he should be allowed to show that the evidence against him is not worthy of credence or consideration and that he can only do if he is given a chance to cross-examine the witnesses called against him and to examine himself for any other witnesses in support of his defence. All this appears to us to be implicit in the language used in the clause, but this does not exhaust his rights. In addition to showing that he has not been guilty of any misconduct so as to merit any punishment it is reasonable that he should also have an opportunity to contend that the charges proved against him do not necessarily require the particular punishment proposed to be meted out to him. He may say, for instance, that although he has been guilty of some misconduct it is not of such a character as to merit the extreme punishment of dismissal or even of removal or reduction in rank and that any of the lesser punishments ought to be sufficient in his case."

To summarise;

The reasonable opportunity envisaged by the provision under consideration includes: -

1. an opportunity to deny his guilt and establish his innocence, which he can only do if he told what the charges leveled against him, are and the allegations on which such charges are based;

2. an opportunity to defend himself by cross-examining the witnesses produced against him and by examining himself or any other witnesses in support of his defence; and finally

3. An opportunity to make his representation as to or why the proposed punishment should not be inflicted on him, which he can only do if the competent authority, after the inquiry is over and after applying his mind to the gravity or otherwise of the charges proved against the Government servant tentatively, proposes to inflict one of three punishments and communicates the same to the Government servant
   (NOTE: - Clause (c) is no longer operative under the amended provisions of Article 311 (2) of the Constitution amended vide 42nd Amendment.)

The Supreme Court in Union of India vs. Verma (AIR 1957 SC 882) has summarised the principles of natural justice thus: -

"Stating it broadly and without intending it to be exhaustive, it may be observed that rules of natural justice require that a party should have the opportunity of adducing all relevant evidence on which he relies, that the evidence of the opponent should be taken in his presence, and that he should be given the opportunity of cross-examining the witness examined by that party, and that no material should be relied on against him without his being given an opportunity of explaining them. Hence the rules of natural justice are violated:

1. "Where the inquiry is confidential and is held ex-parte, or the witnesses are examined in the absence of accused officer.

2. "Where the accused officer is denied the right to call material defense witnesses, or to cross-examine the prosecution witnesses, or he is not given sufficient time to answer the charges, or the Inquiring Authority acts upon documents not disclosed to the accused officer.

3. "Where the Inquiry Officer has a personal bias against the person charged."

The provision to Article 311 (2) provides for certain circumstances in which the procedure envisaged in the substantive part of the clause need not be followed. These are set out below.

One of the circumstances excepted by clause (a) of the provision is when a person is dismissed or removed or reduced in rank on the ground of conduct which has laid to his conviction on a criminal charge. The rationale behind this exception is that a formal inquiry is not necessary in a case in which a court of law has already given a verdict. However, if a conviction is set aside or quashed by a higher court on appeal, the Government servant will be deemed not to have been convicted at all. Then the Government servant will be treated as if he had not been convicted at all and as if the order of dismissal was never in existence. In such a case the Government servant will also be entitled to claim salary for the intervening period during which the dismissal order was in force. The claim for such arrears of salary will arise only on reinstatement and therefore the period of limitation under clause 102 of the Limitation Act would apply only with reference to that date (Union of India vs. Akbar Sheriff). The grounds of conduct for which action could be taken under this proviso could relate to a conviction on a criminal charge before appointment to Government service of the person concerned. If the appointing authority were aware of the conviction before he was appointed, it might well be expected to refuse to appoint such a person but if for some reason the fact of conviction did not become known till after his appointment, the person concerned could be discharged from service on the basis of his conviction under clause (a) of the proviso without following the normal procedure envisaged in Article 311.

Clause (b) of the proviso provides that where the appropriate disciplinary authority is satisfied, for reasons to be recorded by that authority in writing that it does not consider it reasonably practicable to give to the person an opportunity of showing cause, no such opportunity need be given. The satisfaction under this clause has to be of the disciplinary authority who has the power to dismiss, remove or reduce the Government servant in rank. As a check against an arbitrary use of this exception, it has been provided that the reasons for which the competent authority decides to do away with the prescribed procedures must be recorded in writing setting out why it would not be practicable to give the accused an opportunity. The use of this exception could be made in case, where, for example a person concerned has absconded or where, for other reasons, it is impracticable to communicate with him.

Under proviso (c) to Article 311 (2), where the President is satisfied that the retention of a person in public service is prejudicial to the security of the State, his services can be terminated without recourse to the normal procedure prescribed in Article 311 (2). The satisfaction referred to in the proviso is the subjective satisfaction of the President about the expediency of not giving an opportunity to the employee concerned in the interest of the security of the State. This clause does not require that reasons for the satisfaction should be recorded in writing. That indicates that the power given to the President is unfettered and cannot be made a justifiable issue, as that would amount to substituting the satisfaction of the court in place of the satisfaction of the President. If however, the inquiry has been dispensed with by the President and the order of penalty has been passed by disciplinary authority subordinate thereto, a departmental appeal or revision will lie as stated in para 11.4 of this Chapter.

A summary of the principles laid down in the various decision of the Supreme Court on service matters is given below: -

1. Arts. 310 and 311 apply to all Government servants whether permanent, temporary, officiating or on probation (Dhingra's case).

2. Art.311 (1) and (2) is a proviso to Art. 310(1) (Dhingra's case).

3. The words 'dismissed', 'removed' or 'reduced in rank' have a special meaning, namely, the meaning which they bore as three major punishments in service rules, the difference between dismissal and removal being that dismissal ordinarily disqualifies for future employment and removal ordinarily does not [Satiate Chandler's case, (1953 SCR 655); Sham Llamas Case, (1955 SCR 26); Dhingra's Case, (AIR 1958 SC 36) and Khem Chand's Case (AIR 1958 SC 300)].

4. he right of a person to hold a substantive post till he attains the age of superannuation or is compulsorily retired is subject to a contract, express or implied, or to a service rule providing for its earlier termination (Dhingra's Case) and the same is true of a temporary post (Satish Chandra's Case, Hartwell Prescott Singh's Case. 1958 SCR 509, Balakotiah's Case, 1958, SCR 1052; and Dalip Singh's Case (1961 SCR 68).

5. The termination of service brought about otherwise than by way of punishment is not dismissal or removal within the meaning of Art. 311(2) (Satish Chandra's Case and Dhingra's Case). Dismissal or removal involves some imputation or charge against the officer which he can meet or controvert (Shyam Lal's Case).

6. If the Government has by contract, express or implied, or under the rules, the right to terminate the employment at any time, then such termination in the matter provided by the contract or the rules is prima facie and per se not punishment and does not attract the provisions of Art. 311 (Dhingra's Case and Shyam Lal's Case).

7. In principle, there is no distinction between the termination of service of a person under the terms of a contract governing him and the termination of his service in accordance with the terms of his conditions of service (Hartwell Prescott Singh's Case).

8. Even if the Government have the right under a contract or a rule to terminate the contract of service, the Government is not obliged or bound to exercise such right if it is of opinion that the conduct of the servant call for punishment; it may then dismiss or remove him but this can only be done by complying with the requirement of Art. 311 (2) (Dhingra's Case and Union of India Vs. Jeewan Ram, 1958, ASC 905).

9. In the absence of a contract, express or implied, or a service rule, the termination of service before the age of superannuation, or before compulsory retirement as permissible under the rules, or before the period fixed for temporary service has expired, is per se a punishment because it operates as a forfeiture of the servant's rights and brings about a premature termination of his employment (Dhingra's Case).

10. Whether a servant is 'punished' is to be found by applying one of the two following tests; (a) has the person been deprived of a right to hold the post? (b) has he been visited by any penal consequences, as for instance, a stigma on his name for misconduct or incompetency, or has he suffered a forfeiture of salary pension or other benefits? (Dhingra's case).

Wherever there has been an Inquiry Officer and he has furnished a report to the disciplinary authority at the conclusion of the inquiry holding the delinquent guilty of all or any of the charges with proposal for any particular punishment or not, the delinquent is entitled to a copy of such report and will also be entitled to make a representation against it, if he so desires, and non furnishing of the report would amount to violation of rules of natural justice and make the final order liable to challenge hereafter [Union of India and others Vs. Mohd. Ramzan Kahn 1991 (1) SCR 159].