democratic justification of "justice" is an interesting problem: almost impossible by itself on one hand, it seems mostly even undesired (because counterproductive to "ruling-by-judging"-structures) when carefully looked at: as soon as a person intends to "be judge" (and goes all along personal recruitment in courts, with studies and "qualification" and "evaluation" due to the "career" of a "public employee" judge), this person obviously is ready, able and willing to establish a hierarchy of violence (of "state power") among participants of each process at court. this is exactly the same for an elected judge: his/her income depends on elections rather than on recruitment departments and their exercising of power, but the hierarchy situation (i.e. antidemocratic situation) is the same: dictatorship is only the most obvious hierarchy -- the enemy of each democratic idea is hierarchy (and not just dictatorship). (how to "enforce" laws and court decisions without "power", i.e. "by force" or by violence ("if necessary"), with even a clear hierarchy of force and violence???) in other words: how could a person (or jury) "find" a verdict (decision etc.) "upon" = over a "case", another person, plaintiff(s), accused person(s), disputants, if not by evaluating him(her)self (or being evaluated by others) "higher" than "the others" in that process? (cf. hierarchy situation above) how, if not with readiness to (state) violence ("power" of state), could such a decision be "enforced"??? democratic problems in this context are: 1. compared to lynch justice and "institutionalized"/ritualized legal murder ("death penalty") or other consequences of "decisions" and "verdicts": be that "good" or "bad", (a polarity which always implies hierarchymaking, dependencymaking and destruction of democratic structures, often even of democratic thoughts) it always remains without democratic justification. 2. especially lynch justice would easily correspond to "local" (or "regional") democracy, where the equation democracy = majority (???) is attempted to be applied. Hitler came into power by majority elections, and the "average" majority of "elites" at that time felt perfectly comfortable with what happened: 3. being satisfied with ("good") environments and structures does not replace their democratic justification. 4. very understandable, "justice by computers" would be called inhuman and inadequate to human rights. However, "justice" in its form(s) so (far from history to now) excludes itself from democratic justification 5. attention: "the public" -- much as "majority" is not at all a "better", or a justification "at all"! if thought carefully, "the public" is a fourth or fifth power in state(s) rather to be carefully looked at than "controlled" by its owners or "the state". 6. moreover: looking up law libraries reveals that most constitutions in the world do not even contain an explicit equality amendment (or at least statement) -- very likely to avoid this democratic problem to be rationalized. 7. absence of monetary democratic constructs corresponds very much to the absence of one of the (now) most important possibilities of divison of power. 8. finally, a society recognizing (individual) human rights (i.e. of a human being rather than a church hierarchy, for example, oppressing its members again and legally then) can only have a society-based democratic justification when ensuring a democratic minimum of existence (and not only of "rights" to be "claimed", needing time and money to be claimed) to each individual.