PROLOGUE
Arrived Submarine Base, Pearl Harbor, on November 5, 1942, from Third War
Patrol. Commenced refit on November 6, 1942, by submarine Base personnel
and Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor. Completed refit December 5, 1942. SJ radar
installed, four twenty millimeter guns installed, alteration to boat
skids and dry docking to repair damage to major items. Training period
from December 6, 1942 to December 9, 1942. Readiness for sea on December
13, 1942. Not depermed nor wiped.
1. NARRATIVE
December 13, 1942
0900 VN Underway for Patrol area in company with escort. Made trim dive.
December 14, 1942
Made several practice dives and fired six inch guns and twenty
millimeter. Received an operational priority dispatch form Comsubpac in
code not held by this vessel necessitating our opening up. Each time six
inch guns were fired SJ radar failed to function.
December 15, 1942
1023 WX Sighted a plane (plane contact #1) on starboard quarter. He did
not see us.
December 16, 1942
0130 X Received Comtaskforce anode which apparently had been encoded
improperly. It now appears that this trip is going to be excessively
hot. Started exercising crew on deck in morning and afternoon and took
drag through boat fore and aft. Held several night battle surface drills.
December 21, 1941
2200 M Crossed Makin Mili line.
December 22, 1942
0914 L Radar contact seven miles coming in. Sight by lookout bearing
north. Submerged to 100 feet (Plane contact #2).
1047 L Surfaced and for first time cruised with floods open.
December 23, 1942
1100 L Crossed equator and passed to control of Commander South Pacific.
The crew have erected a sign "Dear Santa Claus, please bring us a fat old
Jap cruiser for Christmas".
December 24, 1942
Decided to increase speed in order to make landfall on Ontong Java prior
to dawn the twenty-fifth. We will make our landfall on the eastern side
of Ontong Java at LEUANIUA Island and work south then west from there,
because the northern group of islands do not appear to be important. The
southern passages and the south eastern portion of the lagoon seem to
hold the greatest promise of sighting enemy objectives. Time is too
short to hope to cover entire group. Made trim dive in afternoon and had
Christmas dinner at night.
December 25, 1942
0346 L Sighted first of islands of Ontong Java group bearing 276d T.
0437 L Estimated we were one mile off LEUANIUA sounding 930 fathoms. All
islands of these eastern group could be made out quite clearly although
they are entirely blacked out and visibility was decreased by rain
squalls.
0528 L Submerged on course zero then changed to 225 True. We took many
pictures of this group through periscope, some will be hazy due to rain
squalls.
All islands on the eastern and southern side of Ontong Java seem to be
correctly located on British Admiralty Chart BA 3199. There is no sign
of enemy activity. Several native houses were plainly visible on
LEUANIUA near the village and trading station. Several people could be
seen on the beach apparently swimming. The lagoon was entirely clear of
all shipping. There does not appear to be much surf to the eastward.
In the afternoon we continued around the southern edge and saw no sigh of
life. We had a good high periscope look into the entrances of KAVEIKO
PASS and KAVEINIU PASS of which the latter seem to be the best as noted
on chart. Very little surf was noted at KOLO Island where heavy breakers
are noted on chart. There was no sign of habitation on any of the
islands of the southern group. The largest breakers were noted on the
western side of KEHANGO Island.
There was nothing sighted that even resembled a target. While the trees
on all islands are heavy there are many places through which we could see
to the lagoon side of the island. The whole setup resembles Makin and if
there are Japs occupying them, they have not done any construction work.
1913 L Surfaced and decided it would be a waste of time to remain in this
locality another day and so informed Comtaskforce Forty-Two.
December 26, 1942
0830 L Arrived in our area.
0921 L Radar contact at 9 miles which increased to 13 miles and faded
out. (Plane contact #3).
0941 L Monoplane sighted by OOD heading in our direction, submerged to
140 feet. No explosions or strafing were heard. He may not have seen
us.
1045 L Started periscope patrol and headed for Buka passage.
1911 L Surfaced and headed for Buka passage.
December 27, 1942
0244 L Received orders to remain east of 156 E. Changed course to 090.
0538 L Changed course to head for Bougainville Strait.
0547 L Submerged in glassy sea.
0830 L Attempted to hear Bells radio broadcast on loop without success.
1925 L surfaced and continued course toward Bougainville Strait.
December 28, 1943
0543 L Submerged near Bougainville Strait.
1621 L Heard echo ranging at a great distance which faded out in a few
minutes.
1700 L High periscope look revealed a destroyer many miles away. This
was undoubtedly a destroyer patrolling the southern entrance to the
Strait. (Contact #1).
1853 L Destroyer faded out of sight bearing 200 True.
1930 L surfaced in a torrent of rain, visibility zero. Decided to run
north and south line during night.
DECEMBER 29, 1942
0400 L received message relative to rescue of personnel from Teop and set
course 320 T full speed.
0548 L submerged because we felt an undetected approach on Teop
essential.
1230 L Could not hear Belconnen on loop, raised radar mast and heard it
faintly, faded in and out.
1400 L raised radar message and got entire message from Belconnen
relative to rescue of personnel.
1919 L surfaced near Kieta Harbor and set course for Teop. Decided we
could get a boat into Teop tonight and would make attempt, if we saw
fires. Lt. Lynch, CBM Porterfield, and CMM Killgore, all volunteers will
go.
2117 L We were about to get boat ready when we received message not to
attempt rescue until thirty-first and stay clear. Changed course to
clear Teop by ten miles and decided to patrol north of Cape Henpan and
head south toward Queen Carola Harbor during day.
DECEMBER 30, 1942
0551 L Submerged ten miles northeast of Cape Henpan heading south.
1925 L Surfaced and headed north to round Cape Henpan and proceed to Teop
Harbor for periscope reconnaissance.
2135 L Sighted a flare bearing 162 T which lasted about three minutes.
This bearing placed it on Buka Island and it was powerful. Started SD
radar to see if we could get a contact from planes but no contact.
DECEMBER 31, 1942 - JANUARY 1, 1943
0542 L Submerged ten miles from Teop Harbor. Spent most of day
establishing position accurately. No sheets could be seen. Several
fires could be seen but none as described.
1939 L Surfaced three miles from Teop Harbor and immediately made
preparations to send one motor boat and one rubber boat to the Beach.
The two fires 200 feet apart were plainly visible and were invaluable in
maintaining position. The preparations were necessarily long as this was
the first time the boat had been rigged in the dark.
2148 L Boat left the ship but return with a broken rudder.
2229 L Rudder repaired and boat again cast off. Lt. Lynch in charge CBM
Porterfield coxswain, and CMM Killgore engineer. Equipment consisted of
the following:
(a) Small 2 inch landing compass, with radium pointer and index
mark.
(b) Tools sufficient to vent and purge fuel system and service water
system.
(c) 7 x 50 binoculars.
(d) 3 pistols, 2 tommy guns, 1 Springfield rifle.
(e) four days emergency field rations.
(f) Flashlights including penlight type.
(g) Two piece walkie-talkie.
(h) Tracing of chart on tracing paper.
(i) Life Jackets and rubber boat, two paddles.
(j) Food supplies sufficient for one man for six months were sent
in.
(k) Four six volt batteries (lead acid) these proved to be exactly
what Read wanted.
(l) Half of our medical supplies were sent in with a list and a
description of how to use each plus some brandy.
(m) Several cartons of cigarettes, tins of tobacco, matches, flints,
lighter fluid, cigarette lighter, dungaree trousers, shirts,
underwear, toilet articles, pipes etc., were donated by the crew
and officers. The Commanding Officer had to call a halt to these
gifts.
Lieutenant Lynch had been instructed that if we were unable to pick him
up the same night we would be at same point at 2100 L each night until
they were picked up. In the case he needed to be directed to the ship he
was to flash once with a penlight flashlight which would be answered by a
single flash. He was also instructed to be back at the ship not later
than 0430 L.
On board ship all twenty millimeter guns were manned and both six inch
gun crews standing by.
The trip in to the beach was marred by the boat running on the reef
caused by an error in judgment in coming right too soon, the signal fires
were so bright they distorted the vision. Great credit is due Lt. Lynch
and his crew for saving the boat and getting it off the reef intact
except for the rudder. They then proceeded to the beach and make no
signal until men on beach could be identified as natives and not Japs.
Mr. Read was contacted and was most grateful for the supplies. The
evacuees were brought from shore to our boat in native outrigger canoes.
Seventeen ladies, and three children plus one man were brought out first
and arrived at ship at 0300 L. A native acted as pilot.
0308 L Our boat again shoved off to make a rendezvous just inside the bay
with outrigger canoes which were to bring remainder of evacuees. They
did not venture out as far as planned at it was 0441 L before they
returned. This did not leave us much time to stow the boat, drain the
oil, remove the batteries and test prior to daylight. With the Nautilus
crew working like Trojans topside without any lost motion all gear was
stowed by 0535 L. All during this time the evacuees were being
entertained in the crews mess hall by officers and men not on watch where
a light supper was served.
0537 L Submerged to 100 feet and remained there most of the day. The CPO
quarters, Wardroom, one officer's stateroom and the Commanding Officer's
stateroom were used by the women. The men had to hot bunk with Nautilus
crew. However, I am sure most of them had the same bunk the entire time
and Nautilus crew slept on deck. The conduct of the crew during the time
the passengers were on board was of the highest, there was not a thing
that the men wouldn't do for the evacuees. The additional meals were
served on the Wardroom, CPO quarters and crews messroom.
Chief Commissary Steward Skipper is deserving of commendation for the
handling of this extra load as are the ship's cooks, mess cooks and mess
boys. Several of the evacuees had a long and arduous trip through the
brush followed by the Japs and needed medical care, another had Malaria
Fever, all were tended expertly by PhN1c Potts. Recommendations for
commendations and awards will be made the subject of a special letter.
1930 L surfaced.
JANUARY 2, 1943
0552 L Submerged and conducted periscope patrol. It is becoming
increasingly hot in the boat.
1913 L Surfaced and took a drag through the boat.
JANUARY 3, 1943
0529 L Submerged.
0618 L Sighted plane bearing 220 T, distance about 7 miles. (Plane
contact #4).
1905 L Surfaced.
JANUARY 4, 1943
Received message that Japs had landed at Teop January 1, 1943.
0234 L Sound reported echo ranging bearing 315 relative.
0247 L SJ radar contact 7850 yards bearing 341 relative at same time
sound heard screws same bearing.
0248 L Challenged and answered correctly.
0300 L Sight contact at range of 900 yards with PC boat.
0310 L Commenced transferring passengers who had been given light supper.
0349 L All passengers and baggage were off the ship. Went ahead standard
on all four main engines returning to operating area. It is reported
that two of the ladies who were widows kissed two of the Nautilus crew
good-bye. Decided not to dive unless we were forced down.
0635 L Plane sighted by lookout (Plane contact #5) on port bow heading
for us. Submerged to 100 feet and remained there until 1120 L in order
to give officers and men a rest.
1120 L Started periscope patrol.
1838 L Sighted flag on pole similar to markers for fish nets off coast of
Honshu.
1912 L Surfaced.
JANUARY 5, 1943
0105 L Saw gun flashes bearing 234 True at great distance.
0732 L Sighted plane and had radar contact two miles. Submerged and
remained there because we cannot enter our area anyway until PLUNGER is
clear.
1901 L Surfaced, position doubtful, no sights. Set course for
Bougainville Strait and when it was estimated we were due north, ran
north and south courses.
JANUARY 6, 1943
0555 L Submerged heading for Strait. Later on discovered we were too far
east and headed west remainder of day.
1927 L surfaced and headed west then south in order to patrol
Bougainville Strait.
JANUARY 7, 1943
0134 L Had a radar contact at 17,000 yards which later proved to be
island.
0540 L Submerged.
1920 L Surfaced and remained in vicinity of Bougainville Strait.
2312 L Sighted glow of light which went on and off intermittently bearing
in general direction of CHOISEUL.
JANUARY 8, 1943
During night we were set eastward and at 0550 L submerged east of
Bougainville Strait.
0710 L Sighted what appeared to be a ship and started approach. (Contact
#2). After an hour it was noted that all that could be seen was a lot of
palm trees and branched, no deck could be seen and astern there appeared
to be something like a bale of hay being towed. She was making an
estimated two knots and seemed too small for a torpedo. Screws could not
be heard.
0821 L At a range of about two hundred yards broke off approach and went
to 100 feet to clear.
1145 L Sighted biplane bearing 227 True, range 8 miles. (Plane contact
#7).
1943 L Surfaced and decided to patrol north of Bougainville Strait first
part of evening then head up towards KIETA. This part of area has been
unproductive for close to two weeks. Plunger apparently did not have any
luck here.
JANUARY 9, 1943
0309 L Sighted dark object bearing 325.5 True, later identified to be two
large merchantmen and destroyer escort. Started approach and SJ radar
immediately picked them up at 9,000 yards. Decided to attack last one in
column which was also the largest. Attempted to keep silhouette as small
as possible and remained between shore line and target.
0325 L The escort and second vessel in column had passed us and we had a
good setup on TDC using bearings from TBT and ranges from SJ. However,
escort now started searching in our general direction with searchlight.
Submerged immediately but just as hatch was being closed his light
trained on our bridge. We may have gotten under before he saw us,
however. (Contact #3) (Attack #1). The night was extremely dark and
only by training periscope on sound bearing and a lucky flash of
lightening in his direction permitted us to seen him. Bearing matched
perfectly with TDC.
0331 L Fired three torpedoes, eight second firing interval points of aim,
bow, amidships and stern. Two hits, his screws stopped immediately and
never started up again. As near as could be made out in darkness this
ship was similar to the 9,600 ton A.P. YAMATO MARU.
0336 L Echo ranging started and kept up the remainder of night. Depth
charge attack began and we were not able to see destroyer through
periscope, sound reported his screws louder so took deep submergence at
0249 L. Charges were not very close perhaps the closest was 900 yards.
Decided, because I could not see through periscope, to remain deep until
daylight. At daylight could see nothing at first then made several high
periscope looks and sighted destroyer and one merchantman on bearing of
pinging range about 16,000 yards, immediately changed course to head for
them because they both appeared to be laying to. At this time a heavy
explosion rocked the ship undoubtedly from a plane so went down to 100
feet to approach these targets.
1914 L Took high periscope look and nothing was in sight.
1030 L Sighted two destroyers and commenced approach. The appeared to be
searching area. By 1044 L one destroyer could no longer be seen and the
other was 4,000 yards away increasing range at 21 knots. Broke off
attack. (Contact #4).
1615 L sighted two single wing, single float sea scout planes, in
formation, course 315 True distance four miles. (Plane contact #8).
1939 L surfaced and decided to shift location headed north, then west in
order to dive near Cape Henpan.
JANUARY 10, 1943
0546 L Submerged heading for Cape Henpan.
1955 L Surfaced and headed for west side of Buka in hopes of contacting
destroyers reported inside reefs.
2156 L Sighted an unsteady white light on Cape Henpan 176.5 True.
2232 L Sighted what appeared to be a glow of searchlight or a flare to
right of Cape Henpan shore line bearing 193.5 True.
2300 L Radar contact bearing 100 relative turned out to be a rain squall.
2337 L Radar contact 060 relative, range 9,550 yards (Contact #5) Went to
battle stations and ordered full speed to try to close.
JANUARY 11, 1943
0006 L Had perfect setup on TDC. Enemy course 080 True, speed 25 knots,
range 14,000 yards fading out. We never got any close than 8,000 yards.
Broke off attack. Decided to remain in this vicinity in hopes he would
come back.
0552 L Submerged north of Cape Henpan.
1947 L Surfaced and patrolled most of night in vicinity of contact of
last night.
JANUARY 12 1943
0500 L Headed south in order to get good look in to Queen Carola Harbor.
0557 L Submerged. Took several high periscope looks into Queen Carola
Harbor and saw nothing.
1958 L Surfaced and decided to run south and then north during night
submerging west of Buka Passage in the morning.
JANUARY 13, 1943
Received information that Jap ships were in Choiseul Bay too late to do
anything now.
0550 L Submerged west of Buka heading for reefs off passage. Took
several high periscope looks into this anchorage could see nothing. At
1400 L decided to head north to round Cape Henpan and proceed to
Bougainville Strait. This apparently the best spot in our area. Buka
Passage according to evacuees can be used by small ships only because of
a sharp turn not shown on chart.
1951 L Surfaced and headed north at standard speed.
JANUARY 14, 1943
0442 L Radar contact bearing 325 relative, 9,400 yards. One small and
one large trace. Went ahead full and took course parallel to enemy
track. (Contact #6). At this time it appeared they must have suspected
something in our direction and challenged. Went ahead emergency speed on
order to increase range and gain position ahead. Bearing in mind we were
detected on a dark night during our last attack it was decided a surface
attack would be impossible. Kept going ahead drawing closer to his track
and at same time increasing range.
0540 L Had perfect setup on TDC and submerged when it was found we could
see him plainly in periscope.
0603 L Fired three torpedoes eight second interval at bow, amidships and
stern (Attack #2). Two hits heard and observed. Screws on tanker which
was of the KUROSIO MARU class, 10,385 tons were heard to stop, and he
lost rudder control temporarily.
0606 L Put quick setup in TDC on destroyer and fired one torpedo, miss.
He undoubtedly after witnessing hits on the tanker, changed course and
speed. All the while we were swinging right with full rudder in order to
gain a favorable stern tube shot at the empty tanker which by this time
was going ahead again only a slight list to port.
0608 L Fired both stern tubes at tanker. One of these torpedoes hit. We
now took another look at destroyer and found that she had run away and
was well ahead of tanker. By now we were reloaded forward and headed
once again for tanker but she was again making about 11 knots and soon
passed out of sight. When last seen she was down by the bow and had a
list to port, and the Commanding Officer agrees that an empty tanker is
difficult to sink.
0800 L Decided to spend the day heading for the eastern entrance to Buka
Passage.
1957 L Surfaced and headed east for longitude 156-10 then south for
Bougainville Strait to change scene of operations.
JANUARY 15, 1943
0540 L Submerged heading south.
1946 L Surfaced and decided to patrol on a line 140-320d True across
Bougainville Strait.
2228 L Had radar contact at 3,600 yards on starboard bow (Contact #7). A
wake was sighted by lookout at same time, then the conning tower of a
submarine. The submarine with decks awash went ahead about 18 knots. We
had immediately gone to battle stations and during the moment when a
decision had to be made whether to attack submerged or on surface, the
Commanding Officer ordered a depth of 38 feet. The diving officer
inadvertently flooded negative and we went to 60 feet before we caught
it. Unfortunately, the submarine was trimmed down so low that he could
not be seen through periscope. By the time we got up to 38 feet radar
had lost contact and could not regain.
2315 L surfaced and decided to change my tactics for the night and ran on
east and west courses remainder of night. From the Information at hand
it appears the enemy submarine had apparently seen us miles ahead in the
moonlight due to our large silhouette and had commenced a submerged
approach. Fortunately for us a rain squall had developed on our port
quarter which undoubtedly caused him to break off attack when he could no
longer see us through periscope, when he surfaced and ran away at high
speed.
JANUARY 16, 1943
0543 L Submerged north of Bougainville Strait heading south.
1227 L Sighted ship, range 6,500 yards. Started approach. (Contact #8).
Noticed that he was gradually changing course to his right which made our
position more favorable. Shortly before firing he started echo ranging.
1253 L Fired three torpedoes (Attack #3), all missed, he maneuvered to
avoid. He must have seen my periscope while I was putting in firing
bearings. The sea was glassy calm with a swill, the worst possible
periscope weather.
1254 L His angle on bow was five degrees starboard and it was now that we
realized we had run into a "Q" ship. Ordered deep submergence.
1256 L Depth charge attack began just as we heard his screws directly
overhead. Ordered 330 feet depth. This attack continued until at 1403 L
five depth charges were dropped as he was again directly overhead. This
man must have been the brother of the man who depth charged us last
patrol. He was good.
1437 L After a lull of one half hour started coming up slowly to
periscope depth. This "Q" ship had the general appearance of the HITARI
MARU except it only had three sets of goal posts, two forward of the
bridge and one aft. He was equipped with some means of projecting depth
charges, had echo ranging and listening gear and excellent
maneuverability. His charges seemed to jar us more than others have, yet
did not seem as close.
1549 L At periscope depth, nothing in sight.
1946 L Surfaced and decided to run northwest, then run south towards
Kieta Harbor.
JANUARY 17, 1943
0550 L Submerged heading for Kieta Harbor and later had a good look into
the Harbor, seemed all clear.
1950 L Surfaced and decided to run on courses 320 and 140 because these
seem to be courses being used to and from Bougainville Strait. We will
then early in the morning head for Buka Passage.
JANUARY 18, 1943
0300 L Received a message telling us to work around north of Buka and
west of Bougainville. Changed course accordingly. Later received a
message telling us to take over areas Love east and west where we are to
await orders relative to bombardment of VILA PLANTATION. It is
unfortunate that a date was picked when there will be a full moon, our
slow speed will not permit a very rapid departure from KULA GULF after
the bombardment.
2005 L Surfaced west of Cape Henpan and proceeded south on all main
engines in order to take position in our new area without delay.
2330 L Changed course to zero in compliance with a dispatch ordering us
to east side of Buka and Bougainville to operate with SWORDFISH and GATO.
JANUARY 18, 1943
0700 L While running on surface taking periscope looks sighted an object
believed to be SWORDFISH bearing 050 True. She disappeared in about two
minutes. Thought this was SWORDFISH diving.
0803 L Submerged because we can now run submerged to within ten miles of
our position and so far we are undetected.
1648 L Sighted fighter plane bearing 108 True, range 2 1/2 miles. (Plane
Contact #9).
1649 L Heard muffled explosions, sounded like depth charges at great
distance.
1818 L Heard the last of about 23 depth charges. We felt at the time
that GATO had probably mixed with our "Q" ship.
1930 L surfaced 9 miles northwest of our position. Ran to our position
than patrolled east and west line.
2337 L Sighted a ship bearing 77 True, angle on bow 30 port, range about
18,000 yards. Started approach. (Contact #9).
2345 L Radar picked him up at 10,500 yards.
2346 L Submerged when it was found target could be seen clearly through
periscope and we had good setup.
2349 L Target had apparently sighted us as we went down and was now
headed directly at us angle on bow zero making 26 knots. Went ahead full
to enable us to get in a stern tube shot with possibility of swinging
left and let him have it with the bow tubes.
2355 L Fired both stern tubes at a range of about 700 yards, one hit
heard and observed slightly aft of M.O.T. (Attack #4). At this time he
was identified as a MOGAMI class cruiser. As soon as he was hit his
screws could be barely heard turning aver and he came right a little.
All this time we were swinging left and he started firing with large and
small caliber guns at our periscope from his forward guns only.
2359 L Fired three torpedoes at a range of 500 yards, all torpedoes run
under and failed to explode. They probably had not come up to running
depth. This was heard to take because we thought we had an enemy cruiser
in the bag.
JANUARY 20, 1943
0006 L We heard several explosions on board the cruiser which were
definitely not depth charges and not gunfire. We were at this time
probably 200 yards away from him swinging left to get clear in order to
start another approach. He was still shooting at us, throughout the boat
said it sounded like a scrapper was being used on the hull. At about
this time we heard one screw start turning over and he drew away still
firing at us. He was still having trouble with his rudder, however and
was not making much speed. We started another approach on him but by
0032 L he was well clear headed away from us at a speed of 8-10 knots
zig-zagging.
0107 L Surfaced and headed on course 170 True in his general direction
for an hour in hopes he would break down again and we could make
submerged approach on him. A heavy oil slick was immediately encountered
fumes of which could be smelled in conning tower and we were in this oil
slick most of the night.
0135 L Received message that SWORDFISH had contacted convoy on course 200
True, speed 9 knots. This would have made convoy pass within 3 miles of
our 1830 L position, and at this time we were taking high periscope
observations and could not have missed anything within ten miles all
around. Convoy must have taken a course north or more to the west.
Visibility was excellent.
0549 L Submerged ten miles east of our position heading west.
1251 L Sighted plane heading south (Plane contact #10).
1323 L Sighted same plane heading north.
1328 L Plane was seen heading in our direction, went to 80 feet.
1337 L Another look indicated plane was searching closer, went to 100
feet and remained there two hours.
1930 L surfaced and started patrolling near assigned position.
2246 L Received message changing our assigned position and headed for it.
Upon arrival ran north and south courses.
JANUARY 21, 1943
0553 L Submerged and patrolled near latitude 5-45 S, longitude 156-30 E.
1430 L Commenced taking high periscope looks in order not to miss convoy.
1926 L surfaced and patrolled near assigned position.
2123 L Proceeded to new position at 14 knots.
2331 L Sighted a huge fore bearing 210 True. Looked like oil.
2356 L SD radar contact at six miles, (Plane contact #11) bright moon,
excellent visibility. Held on and he eventually increased range to 11
miles where it faded out.
JANUARY 22, 1943
0030 L Sighted a small object which probably was small antisubmarine
vessel in close to beach, and us in moonstreak (Contact #10). Bearing
changed rapidly indicating he was making high speed headed south. From
2356 L every few minutes we had SD radar contact from 14 miles down to 5.
Visibility was like day but the planes apparently did not see us.
0551 L submerged.
0715 L Sighted the single mast of what was later identified as small
antisubmarine vessel similar to our PC boats bearing 177.5 True (Contact
#11). Started approach and decreased range somewhat while he was
apparently stopped, listening.
0815 L He went ahead on a course of 200 True and was soon lost to sight.
Broke off approach. I doubt if our torpedoes would have exploded on such
a shallow draft vessel anyway.
1934 L surfaced and ran on east and west courses giving preference to the
area west of our position because we feel the Japs invariably make
landfall on Bougainville Island then head southeast especially during
periods of full moon while cut submarines to seaward would be silhouetted
in the moonstreak a good portion of the night.
JANUARY 23, 1943
0040 L SD radar contact 15 miles faded out at 16 miles. (Plane contact
#12).
0105 L SD radar contact 9 miles faded out at 12 miles. (Plane contact
#13).
0505 L SD radar contact 6 miles faded out. (Plane contact #14). This one
caused us a little uneasiness because we thought he was probably coming
in low, but he was never seen and caused us no trouble. He was picked up
again at 0521 L at 14 miles moving out to 17 miles where it faded out.
0548 L Submerged and ran on east and west courses.
1709 L Heard several explosions at a great distance.
1935 L surfaced and headed west during period of no moon.
JANUARY 24, 1943
0010 L Received SWORDFISH message relative to convoy, too late to do
anything about it. The message was originated at 0910 Z and if promptly
given to us we would have had a chance to intercept the convoy.
0602 L Submerged.
1939 L Surfaced.
JANUARY 25, 1943
0555 L submerged.
1929 L Surfaced.
JANUARY 26, 1943
0604 L Submerged on our line heading east and changed course to west at
1200 L.
1423 L Sighted large plane believed to be a bomber flying low bearing 125
True. (Plane contact #15). Believing that this plane may be patrolling
the route of a convoy coming in tonight changed course to east.
1930 L Surfaced and continued east for an hour.
2128 L Having received word that a major convoy was sighted changed
course to the southwest and want ahead 14 knots. No matter how we figure
there is no chance of our getting in on that convoy unless there are
stragglers, hence we took a course heading us a little north of GATO
position who will probably head south toward the Strait to intercept.
She is in perfect position.
JANUARY 27, 1943
0112 L Sighted what appeared to be GATO on our port quarter at a range of
about 7,000 yards.
0130 L Started patrolling on course 320 True then east then south.
0417 L Sighted what appeared to be GATO again.
0600 L submerged and patrolled east and west line.
1933 L Surfaced and took course to round Cape Henpan proceeding Adobe in
accordance with orders.
JANUARY 28, 1943
0609 L Submerged west of Queen Carola Harbor and headed east.
0745 L Had good look into Queen Carola Harbor, saw nothing.
0750 L Heard distant echo ranging and changed course to head for the
source. (Contact #12).
0803 L Sighted smoke bearing 158 True and shortly thereafter sighted
masts of a merchantman, started approach.
0838 L Sound room reported screws bearing 280 True.
0851 L sighted destroyer bearing 280 True. (Contact #13).
0852 L Fired 3 torpedoes at merchantman, two hits, both aft. (Attack
#5). From now on we concentrated on destroyer putting set-up in TDC; as
soon as destroyer saw torpedoes hit he started depth charge attack. At a
range of about 3,000 yards I saw one depth charge go over the side with a
splash and warned the crew to expect a depth charge. Shortly thereafter
came the explosion, followed by two more. These were very heavy
explosions and must not have been less than 2500 yards indicated 600
pound charges probably.
0906 L Destroyer started echo ranging and either saw my periscope or made
contact by echo ranging because at 0907 his angle on bow was zero, 2000
yards range and about 20 knots.
0908 L Angle on bow 5 degrees starboard but here we lost depth control
and I was ducked under so could not get range but did get bearing of
masts. We used generated range of about 1,000 yards, fired both stern
tubes, and ordered emergency deep submergence. (Attack #6). Both
torpedoes missed but must have scared him into changing course because it
was not until 0913 L that the inevitable depth charge attack began. This
attack shook us more than a little. Total of 12 depth charges. From
0913 L his echo ranging was continuous and accurate and his screws could
be heard clearly. By 1206 L could no longer hear his screws and came to
250 feet and started auxiliary machinery. Decided to remain at deep
submergence because we have many air leaks caused by previous depth
charging and whenever we come up from deep submergence many air bubbles
are noticed. We are so close to enemy air bases that it is not beyond
the realm of possibility that an airplane would spot bubbles and direct
destroyer to us. Practically all hands are just about to pass out from
the extreme heat and I have no further desire for trouble. 1457 L At
periscope depth not having heard echo ranging since 1345 L. On coming to
periscope depth noticed great amount of air bubbles as explained
previously, they seem to stop in 15 minutes.
1940 L surfaced and headed south.
2334 L Sighted light on port bow bearing 154 True. (Contact #14).
Closed this light until it was identified as Hospital Ship. He was
burning normal running lights and four lighted red crosses could be seen.
He also had a white hull.
2351 L Started maneuvering to keep him from seeing us. His course was
320 True, Speed 16 knots.
JANUARY 29, 1943
0226 L Sighted smoke bearing 345 relative and at 0227 radar contact
18,000 yards, 350 relative. Started approach.
0235 L Target made out to be large supply ship with destroyer probably of
the MINEKAZE class escort patrolling on his port or dark side.
0237 L At a range of 10,700 yards submerged to 38 feet and continued
tracking.
0247 L We had what appeared to be good setup on TDC.
0250 L Ordered 62 feet and make remainder of approach on periscope alone.
Sound had both destroyer screws and target screws.
0301 L fired our remaining two torpedoed forward and both missed target
but one hit the destroyer. The destroyer screws stopped immediately. We
now busied ourselves trying to get stern tubes to bear on cargo vessel,
but as soon as cargo vessel heard the explosion of torpedo on his escort
he changed course away from us and put full power and was enveloped in a
regular smoke screen.
0309 L We had heard several explosions, light surface explosions. A
careful look around indicated that the destroyer had sunk and was no
longer in sight.
0312 L Broke off attack on cargo vessel but could still see him and hear
his screws plainly.
0349 L surfaced after having come to 38 feet and established contact on
cargo vessel with SJ radar. We did not give chase because we haven't got
the speed.
0552 L Sighted two destroyers bearing 040 relative just as dawn was
breaking. (Contact #16).
0554 L Radar picked them up at a range of 12,400 yards, angle on bow at
this time was about 100 port. had no chance of intercepting.
0555 L Submerged heading for destroyers which could be seen through
periscope.
0608 L Broke off attack when it was certain they were not going to change
course in our direction. Their course 090 True, speed 21 knots.
1855 L surfaced.
JANUARY 30, 1943
0046 L Radar contact 7000 yards bearing 203 True. Lost contact in a few
minutes. (Contact #17). Believe this was probably a Jap submarine that
saw us and dived. This was a definite contact, visibility in direction
of contact poor, chalky and we did not see him.
0630 L Submerged. We have orders to proceed via Paint Box to Brisbane
whereas our initial orders called for Point Bud. Not having the position
of Point Box we will now have to verify whether Point Box and Point Bud
are the same.
1902 L surfaced and started surface running.
JANUARY 31, 1943 - FEBRUARY 4, 1943
No incidents worthy of discussion. Conducted several training dives,
otherwise ran on surface. Necessity for arriving at Calumbra Head at
dawn caused us to slow down considerably. On February 4, 1943 arrived
Brisbane, Australia.
2. WEATHER
Enroute PEARL to operating area weather was fine, sea moderate, rain
squalls averaged one per day. In operating area the heat was excessive
submerged because of inadequate air-conditioning. Weather was cool at
night on the surface. Sea conditions for running at periscope depth
were: whitecaps were present 16 days; the surface was smooth or glassy 7
days and ruffled the remaining 14 days. The sea contained a large
quantity of vegetable matter. The sky was too overcast for sextant
sights on only four nights.
3. TIDAL INFORMATION
Enroute PEARL to operating area currents conformed with the pilot chart.
Equatorial current and counter current were met at the latitudes shown on
chart.
Off SE point of ONTONG JAVA a set NW, drift 0.5 knots was found, dividing
at that point. The branch along the south coast disappeared at a
distance of 1 mile off the beach.
In BOUGAINVILLE STRAIT 5 miles N of OEMA no current was noticed, contrary
to pilot predictions. No relation of tide to currents noticed. East and
west coasts of BUKA and BOUGAINVILLE current was negligible. Currents
may be present however, when SE trade wind is blowing.
4. NAVIGATIONAL AIDS
Southern islands of ONTONG JAVA are accurately charted. Deep water was
found to within one mile off the east and south reefs.
The mountains of BUKA and BOUGAINVILLE islands are accurately plotted and
of great assistance in piloting near the coast. KIETA head land (as
shown on chart 1698A) was useful in piloting when near the coast as were
the well-charted islands south of KIETA and in BOUGAINVILLE STRAIT. SJ
radar gave echoes on mountains but SD ranges were seldom used because of
doubt as to the exact targets reflected. On approaching TEOP and TINPUTZ
Harbors, landmarks are not easily located at a distance of 5 miles. An
accurate tar fix is therefore essential. Closer than 5 miles, HORAN and
TEOP islands can be seen and used in the approach. Soundings of 860
fathoms were found 1 mile off TEOP beach.
Navigational aids on north end of CHOISEUL Island are lacking, mountains
are low and not accurately plotted and targets indefinite. Soundings 5-
10 miles north of CHOISEUL 1300-1700 fathoms.
A shoal has been reported to extend to 5 miles north of CAPE HENPAN and
this water was avoided. CAPE HENPAN appears as a sharp tangent at a
distance of 25 miles. PETAT and YAME Islands on west coast of BUKA
appear to have merged since charts were compiled.
Bubble sights, when taken from a plot of several sights taken in
succession, proved to be better than sights taken with ordinary sextant
against a poor horizon.
Advise navigator bring 2 duplicate charts of operating area. Dampness
ruins charts before the completion of normal patrol period.
5. DESCRIPTION OF ENEMY VESSELS SIGHTED (not transcribed)
6. AIRCRAFT SIGHTED (not transcribed)
7. SUMMARY OF SUBMARINE ATTACKS
Attack No. 1 Target: 1 AP Escort: 1 DD January 9, 1943.
Latitude 6-13 S. Longitude 156-00 E.
At 0309 L lookout sighted three vessels on bearing 325d T. Visibility
was reasonably poor so headed in on the surface. Determined course and
speed by radar ranges and TBT bearings. At 0325 target turned on a
searchlight and swept the horizon. Made quick dive. As last officer
closed the hatch the searchlight was seen to be on our conning tower.
Target was picked up in he periscope during a lighting flash which
silhouetted the 3 ships. The TDC seemed to have a good set-up. Fired
nearly straight shots from the bow tubes; one at the bow, MOT, and the
stern. Two hits were heard and seen through the periscope. Last sight
of target showed her to be a large AP similar to the YAMATO MARU of 9,600
tons with her stern very high. Minor explosions were herd on the sound
gear, but her propellers were not heard restarted. The escort commenced
depth charge attack and prevented further observation. Estimated targets
course 146, speed 10 knots.
Time Tube Gyro Track Run Depth Aim
033116 1 012 76 S 2200 8 BOW
033124 3 012 76 S 2200 8 MOT
033134 2 014 78 S 2200 8 Stern
Attack No. 2 Target: 1 A0 Escort: 1 DD January 14, 1943.
Latitude 5-13 S. Longitude 155-09 E.
At 0442 L made contact by radar on two vessels on bearing 107d T.
Developed contact by running ahead at full speed and closing the track to
2000 yards. As dawn increased the light, the approach and attack phase
were conducted at periscope depth. The vessels were made out to be a
tanker of the KUROSITO MARU type of 10,385 tons, and a destroyer escort.
Gained attack position desired at 0603 and fired three torpedoes a the
tanker and one at the escort. Two torpedoes hit the tanker and the
escort turned and ran away. Ship was swung with full right rudder and
the stern tubes fired with the best track possible under the
circumstances. One of these torpedoes hit. Last sight of the tanker
showed her listed to port about 15d, and down by the bow, but steaming
away on a northwesterly course. Estimated targets course 320d T, speed
12 knots.
Time Tube Gyro Track Run Depth Aim Target
060300 1 013 88 P 1740 8 BOW AO
060308 2 015 86 P 1700 8 MOT AO
060316 3 019 78 P 1680 8 Stern AO
060330 4 331 130 P 2510 8 MOT DD
060830 5 237 109 P 3050 8 BOW AO
060838 6 235 111 P 3040 8 Stern AO
Attack No. 3 Target: "Q" Ship January 16, 1943.
Latitude 6-31 S. Longitude 156-19 E.
At 1226 L picked up merchant ship on bearing 033d T, range 6500 yards,
large angle on the bow, on an estimated course of 110d T. Submarine was
maneuvered to close target. Next observation indicated a course change
to the right. At 1243 observation indicated attack would be possible.
Came to attack course 130d T,. Increased speed, and went 10 feet deep to
avoid making propeller wake in the glassy sea. Final observation
indicated a course of 210d T., speed 11 knots. At 1252 fired 3 torpedoes
at bow, MOT, and stern. All missed. The target apparently sighted the
wakes of the torpedoes in time to maneuver to avoid. The target headed
for submarine, and commenced echo ranging. The target turned out to be a
"Q" ship. She was similar to the HITATI MARU except she had goal posts
forward and aft, and an additional goal post forward of the bridge.
Time Tube Gyro Track Run Depth Aim
125230 4 1.5 101 S 1810 8 BOW
125238 3 0.8 100 S 1800 8 MOT
125246 2 1.0 101 S 1790 8 Stern
Attack No. 4 Target: MOGAMI Class Cruiser January 19, 1943.
Latitude 5-57 S. Longitude 156-00 E.
At 2337 L lookout sighted target bearing 077d T, range 9 miles. First
radar range at 2345 was 10,500 yards. At 2348 with range 8,000 yards
target turned left 25d and headed directly for submarine. Made quick
dive and opened track at best speed. Target was thought to be a
destroyer. Information from plot and periscope indicated a speed of 26
knots. At 2351 the angle on the bow indicated that ramming was not
imminent, and that the distance from the track might be great enough to
fire a stern tube. At 2353 started swinging left to increase run of
stern torpedoes and bring bow to bear with a reasonably good track of
target continued on her course. At 2355 fired the two stern tubes. At
that time the target appeared to be turning toward submarine again, and
had probably seen the periscope while getting firing bearings. One
torpedo exploded 30 seconds after firing and from its appearance was a
magnetic shot. The target swung more quickly to her right, probably as a
result of the explosion, and presented her broadside to the submarine at
a range of about 400 yards. The bow tubes were fired as quickly as
possible under the new situation, but the range was apparently too short;
they did not explode. Accurate information as to range could not be
obtained under the circumstances. The target more than filled the
periscope field. At 2400 changed course to the left with full rudder to
avoid ramming. At this time it was noted that the target was not a
destroyer, and that she was firing at the submarine with machine guns and
heavy caliber guns. The target's propellers were stopped for a short
time after the torpedo hit, but were restarted and she got away zig
zagging continuously on a base course of about south. Surfaced at 0107
and ran down track of target until 0230 hoping that she might have to
slow as a result of damage. The oil slick was about one mile wide and
continuous. Reversed course to avoid entering area occupied by another
submarine. From silhouettes provided it was determined that this vessel
was a MOGAMI class cruiser of 8,500 tons.
This attack took on the complexion of an engagement as the cruiser was
well aware of the presence of the submarine and was attempting to ram or
hit with gunfire. The damage of the one torpedo hit, mark 16 warhead
exploding magnetically, was apparently sufficient to make the cruiser run
away.
Time Target Target Range Bearing Gyro Track Run Depth Aim Tube
Course Speed
235500 246 26 890 172 213 91 S 650 8 BOW 5
235530 wheels turning too fast Stern 6
235830 340 12 500 324 330 90 S 490 8 BOW 1
235838 500 329 340 99 S 500 8 MOT 2
235846 500 325 333 92 S 500 8 Stern 3
Attack No. 5 Target: PALAO MARU class cargo vessel of 4,495 tons.
Latitude 5-11.5 S. Longitude 154-29 E. January 28, 1943.
At 0750 sound listener heard echo ranging on true bearing 160d T.
Changed course toward sound and at 0803 sighted smoke on bearing 158d T.
Conducted normal periscope attack. Masthead height was misjudged and
speed used was too slow. At 0852 fired 3 torpedoes in divergent spread.
Two hit; just prior to firing an escorting destroyer was picked up. Last
view of target showed her to be of the PALAO MARU class of 4,495 tons.
Quite heavily damaged in after part.
Estimated target's course 350d T, speed 12 knots.
Time Tube Gyro Track Run Depth Aim
085210 3 006 81 P 1800 5 BOW
085218 2 007 80 P 1790 5 MOT
085226 1 007 80 P 1780 5 Stern
Attack No. 6 Target: TOMOZURU class destroyer. January 28, 1943.
Latitude 5-11.5 S. Longitude 154-29 E.
At 0851 while attacking a cargo vessel picked up screws of her destroyer
escort on bearing 280d T. At 0852 fired at cargo vessel and changed TDC
set-up to destroyer. Two torpedo hits on cargo vessel caused destroyer
to change course for submarine. At a range of 2,000 yards and a relative
bearing of 200d the destroyer headed exactly for the submarine. Changed
course to left and fired down the destroyer's throat at 0908. Went to
test depth immediately. Destroyer was forced away from his course as the
first depth charges missed by 300 yards.
Estimated target's course 197d. Speed 23 knots.
Time Tube Gyro Track Run Depth Aim
090813 6 239 20 S 800 5 MOT
090821 5 241 22 S 780 5 MOT
Attack No. 7 Target: Cargo vessel and destroyer escort.
Latitude 6-27 S. Longitude 154-03 E. January 29, 1943.
At 0227 L sighted ship on bearing 170d T, distance about 10 miles.
Continued on course tracking by radar until the distance to the track was
3500 yards. Last part of approach phase was at 38 feet depth. At 0249
went to periscope depth and set attack course. Last radar range
indicated possible target change of course to the left. The target had a
destroyer escort which was keeping station on the port, or down-moon,
side. The visibility was too poor to obtain good periscope information
and the TDC set-up was in error. At 0301 fired the last 2 torpedoes on
board forward. At 0303 one of them hit the escort which sank. The
target turned and ran away in a large cloud of smoke.
Estimated target's course 326d T, speed 10.5 knots.
Time Tube Gyro Track Run Depth Aim
030100 4 08.9 89 S 1280 8 BOW
030115 3 09.3 90 S 1280 8 Stern
8. ENEMY ANTI-SUBMARINE MEASURES
The Japanese in the South Pacific seem to be using a heavier depth charge
than used off the coast of Honshu. All traffic is escorted in the
BOUGAINVILLE area. There is a merchantman which runs unescorted looking
for submarines during calm weather in the day time in the vicinity of
BOUGAINVILLE STRAIT. This ship is equipped with echo ranging and depth
charges and has excellent maneuverability.
It is believed that all Japanese shipping coming from the north makes a
landfall on BOUGAINVILLE island then heads southeast towards the strait.
Very few convoys will be encountered during periods of no moon, but when
there are convoys their speed is adjusted so as to arrive at BOUGAINVILLE
STRAIT at dawn. During periods of moon, the number of convoys arriving
increase with no set time of arrival at the strait except to arrive while
the moon is up.
Air coverage of Japanese convoys can be expected on clear moonlight
nights. The greatest anti-submarine measure for day time attack is the
glassy calmness of the sea in the BOUGAINVILLE STRAIT area which prevails
the majority of the time.
9. No minesweeping operations were noticed.
10. MAJOR DEFECTS NOTED
a. PERISCOPES
The optics of No. 1 periscope are slightly out of alignment giving a
double image at times and will not focus clearly. Focus is broad.
Periscopes Last overhauled at submarine base and lenses were coated
for night work. It is not known whether this broad focus is a by-
product of lens coating.
The upper limit switches are not satisfactory. No. 2 periscope has
on three occasions been hoisted to the extreme up position, and they
must both be carefully stopped prior to reaching the limit switches to
prevent jamming. The design requires changes. The type now used on
new construction submarines, or a type similar to the lower limit
switch would be satisfactory.
No. 1 periscope lowers at too high a speed. The dynamic braking
afforded by connecting the armature of the motor across R10 R11 in the
starting panel is inadequate. It is recommended that the value of
this resistance be decreased to permit more dynamic braking.
b. BOAT STOWAGE AND HANDLING
Modification of boat stowage and handling is imperative if
operations involving use of the boats are anticipated. Too much time
is consumed getting the boat in and out of the water. The following
will correct the unsatisfactory condition: 1. Change crane rigging to
conform to new construction. 2. Made holding down gripes
interchangeable. 3. Install long holding down bolts for gripes to
obviate any exact fits.
c. FORWARD DECK FIRING TUBES
This patrol has demonstrated that this ship will be sighted prior to
reaching an attack position on the surface at night. The Chief of the
Bureau of Ordnance has directed that the forward deck tubes of this
vessel not be fired when the bow planes are rigged out. Under these
circumstances the forward deck firing tubes are nearly of no value.
They should be relocated or angled further away from the bow.
d. GUN BATTERY
The plug and screw box on the forward deck gun requires renewal.
Numerous burrs have appeared and the screw area is pitted.
e. AIR CONDITIONING
Present plant consists of two 6 ton units cooling the air with one
radiator each in parallel with the supply air forward and aft. This
is inadequate for this vessel operating in waters as warm as those of
the south pacific area. Effects are covered in paragraph on health
and habitability.
f. BOW BUOYANCY LINE
This line ruptured at a silver soldered sleeve. The bulkhead blow
and check valve leaks permitting water to leak into the boat while
submerged.
g. IN-OPERATIVE LIQUIDOMETERS
Depth charging on 1-16-43 broke liquidometers on sludge tank, No. 5
auxiliary tank, and forward WRT tank.
h. ELECTRIC CABLE LEAKS
Electric cables leaked through stuffing boxes into the conning tower
and control room during deep submergence. These cables have leaked
on every depth charge attack. Re-making the stuffing box is not
sufficient. Re-design is necessary.
i. ANTENNA TRUNK
Antenna trunk flooded on depth charge attack. Repeated efforts have
failed to proof this trunk against depth charging close aboard.
j. DECK FIRING TUBE IMPULSE SYSTEM
Impulse systems to tubes 7 and 8 developed leaks into the sea. Tube
8 started a slow leak 10 days at sea. Tube 7 and tube 8 developed
serious leaks after depth charge attack. Tube 9 developed a slow
leak into the tube after depth charge attack.
k. SUBMERGED TUBES
The stop bolt lifting unit on tube 3 leaks into the tube from No. 1A
main ballast tank.
l. AUXILIARY MOTORS
Electric control apparatus has had an unusually large number of
grounds. The continued high humidity is believed the reason. The
steering motor panel will require re-wiring as the insulation is no
longer satisfactory. The magnetic brake circuit is open hand has
been rendered inoperative.
m. HULL VENTILATION
Inboard hull ventilation valves will not fully open. Developed
symptom after depth charging. Ventilation line in maneuvering room
cracked during depth charge.
n. FRESH WATER SYSTEM
The disposal of air conditioning condensate became a problem on this
patrol. It is recommended that a small pump be installed to force
this condensate into the wash water system of the ship. This method
will not increase the air pressure in the ship as would a means of
blowing if used.
o. SJ RADAR
Several hours operation of the SJ radar were lost as a result of the
following defects: 1. Leaky range unit; 2. Defective lobe switching
circuit; 3. Inability to replace inner wave guide, after lobe
switching units at bottom of radar mast were repaired, without
impairing watertight integrity of the hull; 4. Numerous tubes and
resistor failures.
p. PITOMETER LOG
The chain for raising and lowering the rodmeter of the pitometer log
was broken, preventing a proper housing of the rodmeter. This
occurred immediately after depth charge attack.
q. MAIN ENGINES
#2 Main engine - broken nipple on starting air line to governor. #4
Main engine - cracked liner, #1 cylinder, and broken injector spring
follower and damaged injector rocker arm, #12 cylinder. These
failures were repaired by renewals from spare parts on hand.
r. MAIN MOTOR COOLERS
the salt water lines to the main motor coolers are corroded and
leaking. Renewal of faulty sections has failed to correct this
deficiency. Cast iron spools should be installed in these lines to
reduce corrosion.
s. PORT GENERATOR ENGINE OUTBOARD EXHAUST VALVE
This valve leaked excessively on deep dives and operation was
difficult. Routine opening and closing of the valve on each four
hour watch has stopped the leak and made operation much easier.
t. REFRIGERATION
Electromagnet coil in solenoid valve failed, stopping freon to meat
box coils. Located by noting rising temperature. Repaired by
dismantling the spare unit and replacing the electromagnet coil.
u. AIR LEAKS
air leaks into MBT 1A stbd which gives a large bubble when tanks are
vented. Air leaks appear when coming to periscope depth from deep
submergence. Source not definitely located but believed to be caused
by the gas ejection air system of the guns, and leaky bow buoyancy
vents.
v. OIL LEAKS
Small oil patch was repeatedly noticed on the port side abreast of
the forward gun access trunk upon surfacing. Cause is believed to be
an oil leak from FBT 2F into MBT 2D and is then blown to sea through
the flood valve upon surfacing.
11. RADIO RECEPTION
Radio reception was generally good. Some fading and interference was
experienced when copying BELLS, but not to a harmful degree. 5600 kcs
was the best copying frequency in the Solomon area at night. An attempt
to copy BELLS submerged with the loop antenna failed. Distance during
attempt was 1200 miles. Coming up to 50 feet on a second attempt we were
able to copy BELLS successfully on 12330 kcs by using the SD radar mast.
The first attempt was a failure on 8370 kcs. Local time of each attempt
was 1230 and 1400 respectively.
Reception of messages concerning this vessel's operations is believed to
be complete. Communication discrepancies for this patrol are as follows:
1. Comsubpac's 150106 of December, an OP dispatch, was sent to us in
a code we did not hold.
2. Comsubpac's 150118 of December was encoded improperly, and only
after several hours work was the message finally broken down.
3. BELLS #971, 310200 of December could not be broken. Several days
later #987 came out as a correction of #971, but still the
messages would not break.
4. Comsubron Four's 122001 of January, BELLS #847 was received, but
could not be broken because we did not have the code in which it
was sent. (Nautilus carried all codes required by Comsubpac)
Las message sent was "Upstart"
Last message received was Sub 42 Serial 15,#971
The SD radar performance was excellent. Only four tube failures occurred
for the entire patrol. Ranges up to 58 miles was obtained on 5,000 foot
mountain peaks. 9 to 13 miles seemed to be the maximum reliable range
limit for a high flying plane.
The SJ radar performance for the first three weeks was disappointing.
Tube and resistor failures were numerous. The lobe switching circuit
failed completely and the range unit leaked. Through hard work radar
personnel finally got the radar working and kept it working.
Maximum ranges against 5,000 foot mountain peaks were about 60 miles.
Maximum ranges against a cargo ship, destroyer, tanker, and PC boat were
18,000, 13,000, 9300, and 7800 yards respectively. During the four night
attacks the radar was invaluable for tracking, especially when using
radar ranges and periscope or TBT bearings.
12. SOUND CONDITIONS AND DENSITY LAYERS
Sound conditions off the east and south coast of ONTONG JAVA were
excellent. Surf could be heard up to 8 miles.
In general sound conditions of BOUGAINVILLE Island were good. At
latitude 6-10 S, longitude 156-00E near BOUGAINVILLE STRAIT, encountered
density layer at 150 feet, which materially aided this vessel to evade
uncomfortable depth charging.
At latitude 6-31 S, longitude 156-19 E passed through density layer on
going to test depth. Density layer did not thwart severe depth charging
as the enemy seemed to make contact easily.
Average temperature of the water was 85 degrees F at the surface and
periscope depth. No temperature gradients were noted.
13. HEALTH AND HABITABILITY
Health and habitability factors were very low during this cruise because
of the extremely inadequate air conditioning plant installed on the
Nautilus. These factors were low enough to impair the efficiency of
personnel. Two cases of heat prostration were experienced and
sluggishness was evident and had to be guarded against. Nearly the
entire crew suffered from prickly heat and other forms of skin
irritation. The air conditioning plant of the Nautilus failed to keep
the temperature or humidity down to a reasonable figure on any day in the
operating area.
Temperatures and humidities were:
Highest room temperature submerged: 104 F in engine room
Highest humidity: 96% in Conning tower
Highest room temperature during evasion was 124 F.
Highest room humidity during evasion was 98%.
Average room temperature during evasion was 102.6 F.
Average room humidity during evasion was 90%.
Average temperature in boat during 37 days submerged (temperatures taken
at 1200 and 1600) was 94 F.
Average humidity in boat during 37 days submerged (humidity taken at 1200
and 1600) was 81%.
Battery temperatures:
Average at end of charge 123 F.
Average at start of all day dives 117 F.
Average at end of all day dives 107 F.
Highest battery temperature 129 F.
The conning tower, maneuvering room, engine room and control room were
particularly bad. The entire engineer and electrical force and after
torpedo room personnel lived in an average temperature of 96 F. (roughly
half the crew)
Salt and vitamin tablets were distributed daily.
14. MILEAGE
Distance traveled, Pearl Harbor to area: 3,220 miles
Distance traveled in patrol area: 4,364 miles
Distance traveled area to Brisbane: 1,170 miles
TOTAL 9,294 miles
15. FUEL
Fuel expended, pearl Harbor to area: 41,745 gallons
Fuel expended in patrol area: 47,643 gallons
Fuel expended area to Brisbane: 28,215 gallons
TOTAL 117,603 gallons
16. FACTORS OF ENDURANCE REMAINING
Torpedoes Fuel Water Provisions Personnel
8* 21,600 gal. 3,430 gal. 40 days 0
* All torpedoes carried inside the hull forward have been expended.
17. FACTOR WHICH CAUSED ENDING PATROL
Orders from higher authority caused ending of this patrol. However,
endurance of personnel was a minus quantity at the termination of the
patrol. Excessive heat and humidity reduced the efficiency of all hands
to a marked degree after about two weeks operation. The need for
additional air conditioning if this vessel is to operate in tropical
waters is apparent.
18. REMARKS
a. Evacuees were questioned as to Japanese activity in BUKA-
BOUGAINVILLE area and some valuable information was obtained most
of which will probably be obtained by Naval Intelligence.
Pertinent items are mentioned here, traffic in the past has
passed TEOP on an average of every other day, generally about 10
miles out, this traffic has decreased recently. BUKA PASSAGE has
a current of about 5 knots, large ships cannot use it, there
being a turn in the passage not shown on chart. Large ships
occasionally use the Harbor, however. There have been guns
placed at the east end of BUKA PASSAGE. There is an airdrome on
the north side of BUKA PASSAGE. Several of the evacuees would be
invaluable in case a raid on BUKA or BOUGAINVILLE were
contemplated. Mr. ARCHER in particular, volunteered to serve the
U.S. Navy in this capacity. He knows a great many natives and
for months has had them as lookouts and they made reports to him
from time to time.
b. After the Makin Raid this command suggested the use of motor
boats by submarines, this suggestion was concurred in and during
our last refit boats were installed. Experience gained in the
Teop operations indicates, that standard four inch boat compass
with cardinal and intercardinal points in radium markers should
be provided; the walkie-talkie should be of the same type used at
Makin, the one provided us now is too heavy and cumbersome; the
boat crane rigs entirely too slow and is too complicated, a
similar arrangement to new construction is suggested, if it is
contemplated that the power boats are to be used the boat island
covers should be left at the base, they serve no useful purpose,
gripes should be inter-changeable and gripe holding down bolts
should be three for four feet long so small adjustment of fit is
unnecessary; a pressure proof stowage should be installed in
location left vacant by forward marker buoy to hold crane gear.
The flooding of rubber boats caused by water pouring out of
limber holes was eliminated this time by flooding the boat down.
c. Experience during this patrol indicates that a submarine of this
type cannot make a successful surface night attack even on a dark
night. This means that the forward superstructure tubes are
practically worthless, in that they cannot be fired without the
rigging in of bow planes. These tubes should be angled outboard
more, if possible, to permit clearing bow planes. They should
not, however, be removed because in emergency the bow planes
probably could be rigged in while submerged, tubes fired and
negative flooded immediately. This action had been contemplated
on this vessel if opportunity presented itself.
d. The Sail Jig radar was installed last refit and proved invaluable
during this patrol, and will prove more so as this vessel gains
from experience. It was used on four different attacks, all
being successful except one which by luck missed target but sunk
his escort. Depth charging did not bother this equipment but
gunfire apparently did and for the first week or ten days FOX,
B.C. RT2c and LEE, H.G. RM1c worked night and day to get it in
operation. Too much credit cannot be given these two men for
their interest and devotion to duty displayed by them during this
cruise. It is recommended that a study be made with a view to
designing a Telescopic mast for this equipment to permit the
submarine to maintain periscope depth and still use equipment.
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