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Reforming the EU before enlargement - the need for a "European Social Model" - (NIC)On the 12th of December in Copenhagen begins a summit where the EU is expected to confirm the accession of ten candidate states in 2004. On the 19th of October, the Irish voted "yes" to the Nice treaty, paving the way for the planned enlargement in 2004. But what kind of Europe are the candidate countries about to join? Europe has evolved significantly since the days of Jean Monnet(1) and Robert Schuman(2) . These statesmen envisaged creating peace on the continent by integrating the economies of potential rivals to such an extent that another war would be financially impossible. In the words of the Schuman declaration(3) (Schuman, 1950), "The solidarity in production thus established will make it plain than any way between France and Germany becomes not merely unthinkable, but materially impossible". Beyond this, Schumann envisaged that "This production will be offered to the world as a whole without distinction or exception, with the aim of contributing to raising living standards and to promoting peaceful achievements." Unification was therefore conceived as a force for peace and stability in a continent ravaged by wars and genocide. The single market was merely to be a means to this end. The problem is that early on, the single market, or rather the free market, became an end in itself(4) . The distinction between the single market and the free market is an important one. For example, the Soviet Union was a vast single market, but most definitely not a free market. The single market is not inherently flawed, as long as the rules are enforced. A single market in the absence of enforceable rules leads to inequalities between member states. For example, France and Germany recently angered their smaller partners in the single-currency zone by threatening to breach the rules of the "stability pact", whereby national budget deficits should not exceed 3%. This is the very same stability pact, which had been insisted upon by the German central bank in order to keep the "less disciplined" economies in line (Black, 2002b)! These problems illustrate the dangers of a single market in the absence of a powerful federal government. But in many ways, the free-market is far more problematic. As shown on the other side of the Atlantic, self-regulation of markets leads to corruption and abuse. This is best illustrated by the downfall of Enron, WorldCom, Arthur Anderson etc. and the consequent loss of jobs, pensions and revenue for the ordinary citizens, employees and shareholders. Another suicidal trend is the privatisation of services, despite disasters such as the collapse of Railtrack, the privatised British rail operator. Similarly, the privatised British National Air Traffic Services are causing the worse flight delays in Europe (Moss, 2002). Other examples include the privatisation of the power-generating industry in Britain and Sweden, which led to a rise in the price of electricity for consumers! Proponents of market self-regulation are contradicted not only by the facts, but also by such prominent analysts as Joseph Stiglitz, Nobel Prize-winner in Economy and former director of the World Bank (Stiglitz, 2002). In his latest book, Stiglitz warns of the dangers of excessive liberalisation, whose proponents are more often influenced by ideology than proven success. Even the international financier George Soros(5) admits that not only are the markets incapable of self-regulation, but they are also "amoral". By "amoral", he means that the markets are incapable of providing the basic needs of mankind, such as health, culture, education, social services, policing etc. (Nora, 2002). The UN Human Development Index adds weight to this argument, showing that the top 10% earners in the USA grab 30% of total national income, a figure comparable to Turkey. Yet even the United States is not a true free market, as illustrated by recent plans to increase state subsidies to agriculture by 70% (Jarreau, 2002), state intervention to save floundering airlines, and illegal plans (under WTO legislation) to subsidise an ailing steel industry (Anonymous, 2002a). Unfortunately, the EU seems to be suffering from the delusion that the success of the American economy lies in unbridled capitalism, whereas in reality it relies on a great deal of protectionism. The EU planners tend to dismiss all the evidence and pursue the holy grail of deregulation, at the expense of democratic governance. For example, the fifteen member states agreed recently to a total liberalisation of the power industry. In doing so, they threaten what is left of the "European Social Model". True, the EU "Social Model" can boast achievements as the Europe-wide minimum wage, the protection of cultural minorities, and the redistribution of wealth to the poorer regions. But it is generally an illusion, because it is constantly overruled by the requirements of the single market(6) . For example, the Barcelona Convention, which contained agreements for basic services to be taken out of the people's hands, paved the way for privatisation of transport and communications (Cassen, 2002). Thus, the European Social Model needs to be resurrected rather than preserved. In reality, the "democratic deficit" extends well beyond the financial arena. For example, the unelected Commission still has disproportionate powers compared to the more accountable European Parliament. Secondly, there is no framework for submitting major changes to the national electorates. One laudable exception is Ireland, which organised a referendum on the Nice Treaty, a pathetic compromise attempt at reform that contained few democratic improvements on the existing model. The people used this rare opportunity to reject it. No matter, it was re-submitted to them in the same format, and they were asked to vote again, and would have been asked to do so repeatedly until they answered "yes". Now that they have chosen the "correct" answer, their decision is irreversible. The Nice Treaty contains no major improvements to address the democratic deficit. Most of the amendments presented in the treaty preserve the merely consultative role of the Parliament. The only major power of the Parliament is the ability to force a group resignation of the Commission, which led to the downfall of Jacques Santer's Commission. In important matters such as foreign, economic and security policy, the Parliament is merely informed or consulted. This does not leave much flexibility for the Parliament to be involved in the daily running of European affairs. The democratic deficit also extends to Eastern Europe, where none of the applicant countries have organised referenda on joining the EU. Beyond the democratic deficit, Europe also suffers from its lack of political strength in the world. Enlargement, far from consolidating what little influence the EU has in the world, risks diluting it further. One reason is the announced NATO membership of the new applicant countries, which will ensure that EU will find it difficult to develop an independent defence policy, and that its forces will be "subordinate to American whim" (Kilfoyle, 2002). For the same reason, the Bush administration is putting a lot of pressure on the EU to begin accession talks with Turkey, another NATO member, and staunch ally of the United States. In a similar vein, the European Rapid Reaction force was doomed from the start by agreements that Turkey should be involved, and that NATO should have a veto over its use of military equipment. Meanwhile, the UK's alignment with US foreign policy is almost total, and often puts Britain at odds with its European partners. Maybe it is time for Britain to realise that the "special relationship" with the USA is a one-sided affair. Without more commitment on Britain's part, the EU cannot have a coherent stance in World affairs, without the EU to defend the principles of international justice in the face of Bush's unilateralism, the United Nations will lose all credibility. EU foreign policy is no more independent than its defence. The International Criminal Court is a good example. The EU pushed very hard for the creation of this body, which is an essential component of international justice. Then, it betrayed its own stated ideals and caved in to American demands. Hence, in early October, the EU agreed to allow member states to make deals exempting US citizens from being tried at the ICC for war crimes (Black, 2002). International justice was the first victim, considering that a meeting of EU legal experts in September had concluded that the US demands for bilateral agreements were illegal (Zecchini, 2002). The deal also destroyed any hope of a common judicial policy for the EU: how can one have an integrated management of crime when some states will fail to submit war criminals to international justice? EU foreign policy weaknesses are also deleterious to the rest of the world, because they contribute to its unipolarity. As described by Peter Kilfoyle a British labour MP, "a unipolar World is a dangerous place. It is like standing on one leg - one is far more liable to lose balance than when one is standing on two, or even four legs. Increasingly, it is clear that there needs to be an effective counterbalance to this over-powering US hegemony."(Kilfoyle, 2002). The EU financed many reconstruction projects in Palestine (Kilfoyle, 2002), only to see them destroyed by Israeli incursions. The EU is unable to prevent such scandals because it has no effective foreign policy instruments, and essentially no more than a glorified satellite state of its more powerful ally. The war against Iraq is another example of the USA trying to drag European countries into wars their people do not wish. Governments like Tony Blair's have long since ceased to question American motives, and other European countries will follow suit if a coherent and independent Federation does not emerge in the old continent. In the case of Iraq, Europe could say "no", merely by exercising its vetoes at the Security Council and NATO. A strong EU could at least moderate the excesses of its American friend. In light of these shortcomings, the EU needs more than reform, it needs a structural revolution. The first step in this revolution is the drafting of a proper Constitution. According to the political analyst Dominique Rousseau (7), a Constitution is a radical change because of its implications; the difference between a Constitution and a Treaty is that a treaty is agreed upon by sovereign states, whereas a Constitution would represent the peoples of Europe. Thus, the Constitution implies a federal Europe, where politics are no longer a tool for furthering national interests, but a means of representing the collective will of the citizens of Europe. In Rousseau's view, the Constitution would finally turn Europe into a representative democracy, accountable to its citizens. For this to happen, the Constitution must be submitted to the collective approval of the citizens of Europe by a collective vote (Rousseau, 2002). Thus, a Constitution involves far more than cosmetic changes to the existing treaties, it involves a total rethink of the inner workings of the EU. However, this idea is already threatened by the Convention on the Future of Europe, which is suggesting the far less ambitious and judicially contradictory (Rousseau, 2002) term of "Constitutional Treaty". Regardless, many have already proposed their own version of what a Constitution should contain. Some, like Robert Badinter (8) (2002), French Socialist Senator, are true to the Constitutionalist spirit and propose a reinforcement of the European Parliament, which is divided along political rather than national lines. Others, such as Jack Straw (9) (2002) and The Economist, wish to use the future document to sabotage any further social developments, preserving Europe as merely a large free-trade area, and reinforcing the power of national parliaments. At first, this may seem a democratic move, but under close scrutiny, it is a move to weaken the EU as a political entity. Devolution and the principle of subsidiarity are important in order to preserve cultural diversity and to cater for regional needs. However, there is no reason why this devolution should benefit national parliaments rather than the regions. Moreover, on key issues of foreign policy, Straw's proposals would paralyse the EU. Indeed, a vote in the European Parliament will be swift and decisive, whereas waiting for 25 or more Parliaments to respond rapidly and to come to a consensus is unrealistic. A paralysed political system will leave the market forces unchallenged. Moreover, granting more powers to national parliaments only encourages EU citizens to think along nationalistic or even xenophobic lines. The nation states of Europe are an artificial construct of the 19th century, and have been the cause of several crippling wars. The entire founding principle of the European Coal and Steel Community was to encourage the peoples of Europe to come together as one, and to put an end to nationalism and war. Granting more powers to the European Parliament will encourage people to think beyond their narrowly defined boundaries, and to realise that they share ideas with people all over the continent. The Schengen area, which allows freedom of movement from state to state, was a start, a common government is the next logical step. The 105 member Convention includes representatives of national governments and parliaments, the European Parliament and Commission, and is engaged in consulting the public and civil society, through various means, which include the online posting of suggestions. However, there is no obligation on the part of Giscard's team to take the suggestions into account, and there are no plans to submit the final draft to a Europe-wide referendum. The Nice treaty mentions civil society essentially as being allowed to participate in bodies such as the Economic and Social Committee, which is purely advisory. The citizens of Europe must be more actively involved in designing the future of our continent. In this context, Europe-wide referenda should be organised concerning any major new treaties. But the occasional "yes" or "no" referendum is far from enough. Regional democracy, based on the Danish model of "consensus conferences", or on the Swiss model of "citizen's petitions", is essential. At the federal level, democracy can be enhanced only by reinforcing the role of Parliament, at the expense of the Commission and Council of Ministers. If there is to be a European head of State, then she or he would be more democratically credible if chosen by the Parliament (Badinter, 2002), or even directly by the people of Europe. Whatever it contains, the Constitution should be written in simple terms, free of the usual jargon, and understandable by the majority of the population. It should clearly state the boundaries of supranational and national authorities, as well as allowing for the secession of member states, which are entirely dissatisfied with the Union (this idea has already been mentioned as a possibility by the Convention). Conversely, the Constitution should allow for certain member states to go ahead with reinforced cooperation and integration, even if others do not wish to be involved. There must also be a clear hierarchy in the implementation of different clauses, with a priority on social and environmental aspects. The social aspects can be integrated in the constitution as part of a "social contract" as suggested by Elisabeth Guigou (10) (2002). This would grant protection to public services, the alignment of social norms to the highest common denominator, and the guarantee of a minimum wage based on the wealth of each member state. Finally, the Constitution must imperatively incorporate the European Charter of Fundamental (Human) Rights, which was signed in Nice in 2000. With their integration into the Constitution, "…the rights enshrined in the Charter, beyond their moral value, will have legal power" (Badinter, 2002). Reform must also lead to a better world outside our borders, not only because this is morally desirable, but also because it will help Europe avoid the blowback that the USA is currently experiencing for decades of misguided foreign entanglements. Europe must have a solid commitment to international law (e.g. no deals that could undermine the ICC), and a renouncement to the dangerous concept of "preventative warfare". A large entity such as the EU, if it were committed to the principles of the United Nations, could save the latter from becoming irrelevant in the face of recent challenges by the Bush administration. In the same way that European determination saved the Kyoto Environmental Protocol after the American pullout, the collective allegiance of 25 European nations can help consolidate the United Nations. Beyond international legislation, the EU commitment should be to fair trade rather than free trade. We could start by reducing weapons sales to developing countries. Britain recently tried to sell a £28 million military air traffic control system to Tanzania, a country ravaged by AIDS and malnutrition. Worse, the World Bank recently published a report saying the system should have cost one ninth of that price (Hencke, 2002). The reformed EU must be able to block such deals. If allowed to trade fairly, many developing nations would not require so much foreign aid. In the words of a recent Guardian editorial: "What stinks is that the west has been peddling free trade as a route out of poverty while protecting the sort of industries that should be open to competition from developing countries" (Anonymous, 2002a). In fact, the Third World needs to be allowed a certain amount of protectionism before its industry can reach a level where it can compete on more equal terms with our own. The much-derided Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) is in severe need of alteration. The CAP subsidies result in a gargantuan overproduction, which then drives down world food prices to a level where third world farmers earn almost nothing for their exports (Anonymous, 2002c). It is not surprising that as a result, many farmers turn to the production of poppies to ensure their survival. The 40 billion a year of subsidies should be reserved to save the farmers of applicant countries from economic ruin when they join the EU, not "…to pay for producing food nobody wants, keeping third-world farmers poor and wrecking Europe's rural environment…" (Anonymous, 2002c). Blair, Aznar and Berlusconi's abominable proposals for a "Fortress Europe" strategy towards immigration must also be resisted. Jack Straw (2002) proposes a common European asylum policy, in order "…to deal with illegal immigration and the criminality which underlies it". The criminals who are paid enormous sums and treat their desperate human cargo like cattle should of course be prosecuted. However, the notion "illegal immigrant" criminalizes the victims of this human trade, which is repugnant. In any case, how can a person be "illegal"? We criminalize these people by making the rules for immigration unbelievably severe. The fascist-leaning trend to try and distinguish between "those genuinely fleeing tyranny and oppression" (Straw, 2002) and the "economic" (i.e. illegal) migrants is based on false logic. Should it make a difference if your family is dying of malnutrition or of "tyranny and oppression"? Isn't the economic imperialism of the west a form of oppression? Is it unreasonable for people to leave a country where they cannot offer a future to their children, a country where their life expectancy is reduced to below 50 years by economic meltdown? Even if we are morally insensitive enough to ignore these issues, the ageing population of Europe is in severe need of new blood, and therefore of immigration. Thus, the new Europe should forsake its phobia of "illegal immigration" and deal instead with the reasons why people emigrate in the first place, as well as guaranteeing the basic human rights of those who end up on our shores. Aznar would do well to remember that just 20 years ago, his country's economy was sorely dependent on income from Spanish emigrants working in the richer parts of Europe. What would have become of Spain if it had been locked out of "Fortress Europe"? The European Union has clearly moved on from Schumann's Coal and Steel Community. The Cold war is over, and the single market has essentially been achieved. European unification has successfully averted the risk of further wars in Western Europe, and has significantly reduced the poverty of countries such as Greece, Ireland, Spain and Portugal. But these achievements are meaningless if our enrichment is at the expense of the third-world, if it contributes to greater inequality, or of we are unable to stop United Nations from suffering the same fate as pre-war League of Nations. We must move away from a Europe where politics have been dethroned by the rules of free market and competition, stripping the most vulnerable of vital social protection. Despite all its shortcomings, the EU is essential not only as a shield against the worst aspects of globalisation, but also as an economic safety net for Eastern Europe(11) . However, only radical social reforms can consolidate these achievements and ensure that its citizens, and international law, are not left behind. Notes1- 1883-1979. France's Planning Commissionner in 1950. Often seen, along with Schuman, as the founding father of the European Community. 2- 1886-1963. Schuman was the French foreign minister in the 1950s. 3- Of 9th May 1950, establishing the European Coal and Steel Community. 4- Or maybe the EU never was designed with social justice in mind. 5- International speculator, most famous for bringing the British Pound crashing out of the European Exchange Rate Mechanism 5- See the essay "A European Court for the Environment" ,on this site, for a similar conflict between single-market imperatives and environmental legislation. 6- Professor of Constitutional Law at the Montpellier University, France ReferencesAnonymous.
2002a. An unequal world. The Guardian, 13/04/02 |
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