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"No, I don't think so. If they do, they'll find they've bitten
off more than they can chew" Prime Minister Winston Churchill when asked about the chances of Japan entering the war. |
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"Entering Singapore produced a comforting feeling of security.
Uniforms of all kinds were to be seen everywhere. Aeroplanes droned
incessantly overhead, and at night the sky was streaked with the
pale beams of searchlights. There was the great Naval Base...
By day and night one heard firing practice from the 15 inch guns
which defended the island."
"The main thing I try to do is to convey an impression of confidence,"
"My attack on Singapore was a bluff - a bluff that worked. I had 30,000 men and was outnumbered more than three to one. I knew that if I had to fight long for Singapore, I would be beaten. That is why the surrender had to be at once. I was very frightened all the time that the British would discover our numerical weakness and lack of supply and force me into disastrous street fighting." "The Tiger of Malaya", Lt Gen Tomoyuki Yamashita
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Before the tumultuous clouds of war came to Malaya and Singapore in 1942, a posting in the Far East for a professional soldier was an awful prospect. And should the likelihood of war occur, it would still be a despairingly dull war. In truth, unlike the Germans, facing an enemy like the Japanese was a disappointment, for their fighting reputation against the even more 'inferior' Chinese in China was unimpressive as were their pathetic weapons of war. 'Asiatics' the term given to Asians at that time, were a walkover. The resources-lacking Japanese however might be deterred from going to war. The British Empire, with a defence policy implemented in the 1920s and now decidely out of touch with reality; its massive and lavishly equipped naval base in Singapore, ready to succour a major task force; the numerous airbases with the untested Buffaloes and their mostly untested but photogenic pilots - the favourites of the newreels and newspapers; and the tough Australians, albeit unblooded, was not built in a day. With guts, gumption, fortifications and stiff upper lips, the Empire believed in its inherent destiny to rule its dominions. And should one start believing in one's own propaganda, well, there were really much worse things than high morale to worry about.
"The worst disaster and largest capitulation in British history."
Prime Minister Winston Churchill describing the fall of Singapore
"It will be a lasting disgrace if we are defeated by an army of clever gangsters many times inferior in numbers... "
Lt.Gen. A.E.Percival
"My attack on Singapore was a bluff - a bluff that worked."
Lt .Gen. Tomoyuki Yamashita
Lt General A.E. Percival, who had fought with distinction in WWI returned to Britain after the Japanese surrender, carrying with him the major blame for the fall of Singapore. Ironically, in a study prepared for the UK War Office in 1937. Percival had predicted with uncanny foresight the landing points and lines of advances of the Japanese army in its invasion of Malaya/Singapore. Unknowingly, he was to fight in World War 2 with strategies from World War 1.
"The Tiger of Malaya", Lt Gen Tomoyuki Yamashita was the son of
a village doctor, Yamashita was 56 years old when he was summoned
from a military assignment in Manchuria to command the attack
on Malaya/Singapore. After his victory, he was posted back to
Manchuria in July 1942. He remained there till he was recalled
to Southeast Asia in October 1944 to resist the American invation
of the Philippines. When the Japanese surrendered in September
1945. Yamashita was the first Japanese general to be tried by
the Americans for war crimes. He was hanged in February 1946.
Prior to the Japanese invasion of Singapore through Malaya, possible attack routes were published by the Illustrated London News. The Kota Bahru beach-head accurately predicted the chosen route of the Japanese army.
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December 8th, 1941: A few hours after its attack on Pearl harbour, Japan unleashes
its invasion force on the beaches of Thailand and north-eastern
Malaysia. Lt. Gen. Tomoyuki Yamashita's strategy was to conquer
Singapore in the shortest time possible in order to overcome his
numerical disadvantage. He intended to drive hard against the
enemy with a Kirimoni Sakusen. The Blitzkreig-like stategy was well-described by orders given by one of his battalion
commanders: "Do not stop but charge forward no matter what happens and do
not respond to fire from behind." Yamashita believed the war to be a "great sacred war" that the whole world was watching. He was determined to fight
it openly and squarely, in such a way that colonised people would
look upon the Japanese as "soldiers of justice." Only then, he believed, would the war have achieved its objective. January 15th, 1942: Winston Churchill cables Lord Wavell, to ask what sort of defenses and obstructions the island has and would Wavell be able to dominate with the fortress cannons when besieged. Wavell's prompt reply: "... little or nothing was done to construct defences on north side of island to prevent crossing of Johore strait." Wavell also informs the prime minister that the huge guns can swivel around to fire at the Japanese but because they were meant to fire at ships, their flat trajectories was a problem. January 19th, 1942: Lord Wavell cables Churchill: "I must warn you, however, that I doubt whether Island can be held for long once Johore lost... many troops remaining are of doubtful value. I am sorry to give you a depressing picture but I do not want you to have false picture of Island Fortress." Churchill complains to his Chiefs of Staff: "It never occurred to me for a moment... that the gorge of the fortress of Singapore with its splendid moat half a mile to a mile wide was not entirely fortified against an attack from the northward... I saw before me the hideous spectacle of the almost naked island and of the wearied, if not exhausted, troops retreating upon it." January 20th, 1942: Churchill instructs Wavell that he was to fight for every inch of ground in Malaya, and that 'no question of surrender was to be entertained until after protracted fighting among the ruins of Singapore City."
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In a well-laid ambush in northern Johore on 14 January, Australian troops killed some 700 Japanese of the Mukaide Detachment. It was the biggest loss suffered by the Japanese in any single action. Many in Singapore thought the action was the long awaited turning point and that the rout of the Japanese invasion force was not long in coming.
Ambush at the bridge over the Sungei Gemencheh River, beyond Gemas, 14 January 1942. Murray Griffin, 1946.
AWM ART 24500
The Japanese invasion force crosses the Straits of Johore just after midnight. The Australians had searchlights but for some reason, they were never turned on. The imposing building in the background is the Sultan of Johore's palace with the breached causeway on the right. Just behind the causeway, the fuel tanks near the naval base can be seen burning in the distance. Illustration: Great Commanders and their Battles
The Battle of Singapore: The Point of No Retreat
Extracted from the book The Singapore Chinese Massacre by Ralph Modder,
There was no panic; no ‘stunned silence’ at the news on the evening
of 31 January 1942 that British, Australian and Indian troops
had been withdrawn from Johore Bahru, capital of Malaya’s southern-most
state (across the Causeway from Singapore) and that the ‘Battle
for Singapore’ had begun.
Following almost two months of ‘running battles’ also known as
‘strategic withdrawals’ in war communiqués from Malaya Command
headquarters, the people of Singapore and Malaya had become used
to hearing unpleasant news ‘toned down’ by pleasant-sounding synonyms
such as ‘withdrawal’ instead of ‘retreat’ and ‘evacuated’ instead
of ‘abandoned’.
“Would someone tell us what’s really going on?” had probably been the most-asked question in the various languages
spoken in cosmopolitan Singapore and Kuala Lumpur since the Japanese
invasion at Kota Bahru in Kelantan on 8 December 1941.
At times one had to assume where battles were being fought or
to which area a ‘strategic withdrawal to prepared positions’ by
the defenders was made. But, one thing seemed quite certain: the
Japanese were coming closer to Singapore, faster than they themselves
had probably imagined.
They ruled the sea - with the sinking of the battleship Prince
of Wales and battle-cruiser Repulse two days after their invasion
began.
They ruled the land - towns and airbases in the north were ‘successfully
evacuated’ before the arrival of the Japanese whose rapid advance
was halted at Kampar and the Slim River in Perak where they suffered
heavy losses before continuing to ‘breeze’ through pockets of
disorganised British resistance.
Half of Malaya was in Japanese hands.
Other Japanese army units had moved down the east coast of Malaya
from Kota Bahru in Kelantan (where the invasion began) and had,
almost unopposed, come as far as Endau in Johore.
The Japanese ruled the air, too. Whatever obsolete British aircraft
that had escaped destruction on the ground in Japanese bombing
raids had been ‘successfully transferred’ to Java, leaving the
ground forces exposed to aerial machine-gunning, dive-bombing
and attempting to repulse infantry attacks supported by tanks
and artillery fire.
This was the grim scenario from the start of the Japanese invasion.
Nobody could, with any justification, have blamed the tired and
sleep-starved British, Australian and Indian defenders who had
arrived in Johore Bahru and were ‘withdrawn’ to Singapore on 31
January for having lost their will to put up a ‘gallant last-stand’
to save Britain from its worst military defeat in history - a
fact that British Prime Minister Winston Churchill was well aware
of.
In the early days of the war, the Japanese air force had raided
Singapore with squadrons made up of a modest 27 bombers. but,
after occupying abandoned (‘evacuate’) airbases in north and central
Malaya, they began raiding Singapore with up to 156 bombers whenever
they felt like it, the pilots flying well above the range of anti-aircraft
guns. Dive-bombers and fighter-bombers operating from bases in
Malacca and northern Johore joined in the round-the-clock attacks
on Singapore.
What about damage caused by the bombings and the loss of civilian
life - questions that everyone was asking. A typical communiqué
from Command Headquarters in Singapore usually issued 24 hours
after a bombing raid would read as follows: ‘Enemy bombers visited
the north and south-western areas off Singapore Island yesterday,
causing damage and casualties.’ There might also have been a vague
communiqué about ‘enemy action in Malaya’ and about ‘our troops
occupying prepared positions after inflicting heavy casualties
on the enemy.’ Newspaper reports about the war were consequently
vague and ‘padded’ with trivia and unimportant ‘background’ material
since no journalists and photographers other than those permitted
by Malaya Command headquarters were allowed anywhere near battle
areas.
Would someone tell us what’s really going on? The question was
now being asked in outbursts of rage following the first bit of
stimulating news that broke the monotony of the terse official
announcements.
It was about a well-laid ambush in northern Johore on 14 January
(in which Australian troops had killed some 700 Japanese of the
Mukaide Detachment only 17 days before Gen. Percival withdrew
his forces from Johore Bahru to Singapore.) It was the biggest
loss suffered by the Japanese in any single action and it was
felt that the long-awaited turning point in a one-sided war had
finally arrived.
There was wild speculation that with the sensational (and confirmed)
Australian victory, ‘the Japs would from now on be on the run
with the Aussies hot on their heels!’
Then came the news of the withdrawal of British forces to Singapore.
‘What the hell’s going on! We kill seven hundred Japs! then, when
it looks as though we’re winning for the first time, we withdraw!’
said an irate, grey-headed English tuan while sheltering under a dining table at the ‘Europeans only’
Singapore Swimming Club during a heavy Japanese air raid. ‘Somebody
should tell those buffoons at Command Headquarters that the idea
is to keep the Japs away from Singapore and not invite the bastards
in!’
The Australian ambush
Maj.-Gen. Gordon Bennett, Commander of the Australian Imperial
Forces (AIF) was in command of ‘Westforce,’ a new line of defence
from east to west in northern Johore. On 10 January he had inspected
the Gemencheh River and the wooden bridge that spanned it, located
just above the railway junction town of Gemas. Bennett had chosen
the spot for a major ambush against advancing Japanese troops
on their way south towards Singapore. Ambush positions were taken
up by men belonging to the 2/30th Battalion of the Australian
27th Brigade.
At about 4 pm on 14 January, an advance force of some 300 Japanese
troops on bicycles crossed the bridge and entered the ‘killing
zone’ further down the road that the Australians had prepared.
They were joined by 500 others, also on bicycles. It was then
that the Australians blew up the bridge. In a fast and furious
battle 700 Japanese lay dead and several of their tanks destroyed.
Australian losses were 8 dead and 80 wounded. The Australians
continued with a follow-up operation, mopping up the remnants
of the Japanese force.
A week later on 21 January, to the west of the Gemencheh River,
Australian and Indian troops successfully halted the advance of
a strong Japanese force supported by artillery, tanks and fighter
planes. In bitter hand-to-hand fighting for possession of a strategic
bridge at Parit Sulong losses on both sides were heavy, the Japanese
also losing several tanks. The heroic action by the Australians
and Indians allowed time for the major strength of ‘Westforce’
to regroup and strengthen their defences. Lt.Col. Charles G.W.
Anderson of the Australian 2/19th Battalion who was in command,
was awarded the Victoria Cross for his bravery and leadership.
These actions had proved that the Japanese advance could be effectively
stopped and heavy losses inflicted on them under proper direction.
But, as much as Gen. Percival might have wished for a counter-offensive
led by Gen. Bennett, he would have realised he had the heavy responsibility
of reserving whatever troops he could for the fast approaching
‘Battle for Singapore’ in an attempt to save British ‘face’ and
an ‘impregnable fortress’ from humiliating surrender.
The realisation that Japanese troops were about to take up positions
on Singapore’s ‘doorstep’ in Johore Bahru had prompted British
Prime Minister Winston Churchill to send an urgent message on
29 January to Gen. Sir Archibald Wavell, Supreme Commander, Allied
Command, Far East, saying: “I want to make it absolutely clear
that I expect every inch of ground to be defended, every scrap
of material for defences to be blown to pieces to prevent capture
by the enemy, and no question of surrender to be entertained until
protracted fighting among the ruins of Singapore City.”
Fighting words from 10,000 miles away in London! But what Churchill
didn’t know was that Wavell had discovered very little had been
done to strenghten Singapore’s northern defences and it was too
late now to do anything about it. To add to the confusion, newly
recruited British troops were arriving in Singapore - and nobody
seemed to know what to do with them. A few crates containing Hurricane
fighter aircraft had also arrived - too late to be of any use
since there was nobody to assemble them - or pilots to fly them!
The morale of troops was low and the whole defensive pattern as
Wavell saw it, was in pretty poor shape.
The beginning of the end
31 January - 8 February 1942
The scene: the waterfront at Johore Bahru.
British troops had departed after blowing a hole in the Causeway
in the hope of delaying Japanese tanks and army vehicles from
crossing over to Singapore. Japanese army engineers quickly repaired
the damage.
As night fell, Japanese troops looked across the straits of Johore
for a first glimpse of the Singapore coast and at the huge, black
‘oil cloud’ from burning diesel storage tanks at the giant Seletar
Naval Base that had been set alight by the British before abandoning
it some weeks before. The reason for this was to deprive the Japanese
of precious oil supplies.
Japanese troops were in jubilant mood. Soon they would be celebrating
a memorable victory in ‘fortress’ Singapore. From the tower of
the Sultan of Johore’s grand palace overlooking the Straits of
Johore, Gen. Yamashita focused his binoculars on the shores at
kranji in northern Singapore. But he was in no hurry to begin
his invasion - for good reason. he realised his supplied of food
and artillery ammunition were very low and his invasion force
of some 30,000 troops would soon be facing 130,000 British troops
whom he expected to put up tenacious resistance to save their
‘impregnable fortress.’
Yamashita had to take a chance for a quick victory. A prolonged
battle would be a disaster - and an irrecoverable ‘loss of face’
for him. He spent the next few days in conference with his divisional
commanders.
On 6 February, he issued final orders for the invasion. It would
begin with a cunning ‘dummy’ attack by a unit of the Imperial
Guards division directed at Pulau Ubin, an island off the eastern
tip of Singapore. It would be carried out in order to make British
defenders pay less attention to the beaches along the northern
coast where the actual invasion would begin.
Yamashita would wait until early the following day (8 February)
to direct his main attacking forces (the 5th and 18th divisions)
across the Straits of Johore towards the Kranji areas in northern
and north-western Singapore. Once the invasion was in full swing,
the main force of the Imperial Guards Division would cross the
Straits and begin landings in the Woodlands area west of the Causeway.
Yamashita reckoned that the Japanese flag would be flying over
Singapore within four days. As planned, he launched his invasion
on 8 February.
Australian machine-gunners defending the north-western and western
sectors of Singapore where the Japanese 5th and 18th Divisions
concentrated their attack, mowed down wave after wave of the invaders,
who despite suffering heavy losses, were finally able to come
ashore.
Later, Yamashita set up his headquarters in a rubber plantation
near Tengah airbase where he was surprised to discover several
undamaged aircraft, uneaten food on dining room tables and clothes
scattered in the barracks, indicating that a hurried evacuation
had taken place.
Japanese troops made some advances while a fierce artillery battle
was raging. Japanese gunners kept up an incessant barrage although
they were running dangerously short of ammunition. But, it was
part of Yamashita’s bluff to make Gen. Percival believe that his
artillery units had a plentiful supply of shells.
10 February: Yamashita was expecting to come up against stiff resistance at
Bukit Timah hill but to his surprise the British defenders seemed
disorganised and were retreating in confusion.
11 February; Japanese 5th division troops continued their advance eastwards
along Jurong road and southwards. They took control of Bukit Timah
Village. There were bitter hand-to-hand fighting and bayonet charges
in which men of the Australian 22nd Brigade suffered heavy casualties.
Japanese Imperial Guards who had earlier broken through the Australian
27th Brigade defending Woodlands, pushed aside what was left of
the Kranji-Jurong line of defenders and were headed towards the
Peirce and MacRitchie reservoirs. On the Chua Chu Kang road, Japanese
5th division troops advanced towards Bukit Panjang Village.
12 February: Japanese 5th Division troops supported by tanks advanced down
the Bukit Timah Road while British and Indian troops clashed with
the advancing Imperial Guards Division who had already captured
MacRitchie and Peirce reservoirs.
In western Singapore in the Pasir Panjang area, men of the 1st
Battalion Malay Regiment and the 44th Indian Brigade stopped advancing
troops of the Japanese 18th Division in their attempts to capture
the huge British supply depot at Alexandra Barracks. The Japanese
suffered heavy casualties as they come up against Malay Regiment
machine-gunners. Heavy fighting continued and the Japanese were
reinforced with tanks.
13 February: Percival told Wavell that he would not be able to hold out for
more than two more days since Japanese bombers had damaged the
reservoirs and the water supply system - and there was no hope
of restoring the supply. He implied that continued fighting would
only produce needless suffering. Wavell replied: “You must continue
to inflict maximum losses on the enemy for as long as possible
by house-to-house fighting if necessary.”
Fighting was still going on during the morning of 15 February.
Yamashita was with Gen. Renya Mutaguchi, commander of the 18th
Division and as they stood on high ground on Upper Bukit Timah
Road, Yamashita noticed through his binoculars, that several British
artillery positions had been silenced by fierce dive-bombing attacks
the previous day. Mutaguchi’s troops had meanwhile advanced along
the west coast of Singapore and were moving in towards the city.
Yamashita gave orders that his artillery units would keep on firing
until the very last round and his troops would continue their
advance at whatever cost.
This could have been Yamashita’s ‘last stand’ before he completely
exhausted his ammunition and food supplies. He was unaware that
his bluff had worked and that Percival was ready to surrender.
Ralph Modder, The Singapore Chinese Massacre, Horizon Books, Singapore 2004
References:
Colin Smith; Singapore Burning; Viking; 2005
Geoffrey Brooke; Singapore's Dunkirk; Leo Cooper; 1989
Fortress Singapore - The Battlefield Guide, Times Books International,
1995
Lee Geok Boi; Syonan, Singapore under the Japanese 1942-1945;
Singapore Heritage Society, 1992
James McEwan; The Remorseless Road - Singapore to Nagasaki; Airlife
Publishing Ltd; 1997
Alan Warren; Singapore 1942 - Britain's Greatest Defeat; Hambledon
and London; 2002
F. Spencer Chapman; The Jungle is Neutral; Corgi Books; 1973
Ralph Modder, The Singapore Chinese Massacre, Horizon Books Pte Ltd, Singapore, 2004
Henry Frei, Guns of February: Ordinary Japanese Soldiers’ Views of the Malayan Campaign and the Fall of Singapore 1941 - 42, Singapore University Press, 2004
Brian Farrel & Sandy Hunter, Sixty Years On - The Fall of Singapore
Revisited, Eastern Universities Press, 2004
Martin J. Brayley & Richard Ingram; Khaki Drill & Jungle Green;
Growood Press; 2000
www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/publications/pointer/journals/2004/v30n4/book_review.html
www.malaysia-today.net/books/2006/03/20a-japanese-invasion-ibrahim-yaakubs.htm
www.fepow-community.org.uk