From the battles of South Mountain and Antietam which followed, date a succession of unfriendly attacks by General McClellan upon General Burnside's conduct in those engagements, and which were repeated with exaggerations after his succession to the command of the Army of the Potomac, and especially after the repulse at Fredericksburg, to his great prejudice; and which have continued to be recounted since his death, serving as a basis of other detractions which scandalize his memory and belittle his personality, all of which are primarily traceable to the resentful aspersions of General McClellan.

      "Whatever may have been his faults and deficiencies as a general, a lack of resolution or a distaste for fighting could never be reckoned among them".

Senator Benjamin Harrison, afterwards President, in a eulogy pronounced in the United States Senate after his death, said of him:
"If unfriendly criticism shall deny him some of the qualities of the perfect leader, only base souls will fail to do reverence to the nobility of his character."

Wade Hampton, of South Carolina, the dashing cavalry leader of the Confederate Army, thus bore tribute to his soldierly qualities:
"In the dark days of the Civil War, when we stood in opposing ranks, I learned to respect him as a true, brave and gallant soldier. . . . It seems . . . not inappropriate that I, who, during the war, stood under the starry Cross, should pay a tribute, however feeble, to that gallant soldier, who, amid all trials and vicissitudes, in disaster as in success, bravely upheld the flag of the Union."

The first manifestation of unfriendly feeling by General McClellan towards Burnside was on the occasion of the sending of a dispatch to Washington on the evening after the battle of South Mountain, notifying President Lincoln of the result of the engagement, but in which he made no mention of Burnside, although the battle was fought by the troops under his command.   The animus of this omission is apparent, taken in the light of McClellan's probable personal pique, resulting from undoubted knowledge of the confidence reposed in Burnside by the authorities at Washington and the popular favor in which he was held by the people, as well, also, in the light of his subsequent animadversions regarding his conduct both at South Mountain and Antietam.

McClellan, at page 583 of 'his "Own Story," in a statement made long after the engagement, declares in insinuating terms, referring to South Mountain:
"Burnside never came near the battle, as my position, yet it was his command in action."

General Cox, in command of the Kanawha Division, says in his story of the battle (see Volume 2, page 588, of Century Company's "War Book"):
"McClellan, Burnside and Reno had come soon after Wilcox's Division (which was about 2 to 2.30 p. M.), to the knoll in the valley, and from that point, a central one in the midst of the curving hills, had issued their orders."

General McClellan, at page 577 of his "Own Story" further says:
"Generals Burnside and Reno arrived at the base of the mountain and Burnside directed the latter to move up the divisions of Generals Sturgis and Rodman to the crest held by Cox and Wilcox and to move upon the enemy's position with his whole force as soon as he was informed that General Hooker (who had just been directed to attack on the right) was well advanced up the mountain.   General Reno then went to the front and assumed the direction of affairs.   Shortly before this time I arrived at the point occupied by General Burnside and my headquarters were located there until the conclusion of the action."

General McClellan "arrived at the front at Middleton at about noon.".   Burnside had been present at the front from six o'clock in the morning, directing the movements of his troops, and continued to do so, as McClellan states, until after his arrival at the knoll, overlooking the operations on the mountain.   McClellan made no criticism at the time of Burnside's dispositions that they were not properly made and were not judicious and effective.   The statements of both McClellan and Cox regarding Burnside's participation in the conduct of the battle would seem to dispose of the charges made long afterwards by McClellan, that Burnside was an inactive figure in the battle, or that he did not go as near to the battle as McClellan's position.

These facts also throw light upon the motive of McClellan's omission to mention Burnside's name in his dispatch to the President informing him of the result of the engagement.

In a private letter, under date of September 29, 1862, and published in his "Own Story," he writes:
"I ought to treat Burnside very severely, and I probably will. . . . He is very slow, is not fit to command more than a regiment."   The very extravagance of this statement would seem to imply a covert animosity.

His "Own Story," together with his private letters, disclose but one complaint of slowness at South Mountain.   In his statement therein made long afterwards he says in substance, that Burnside upon his own request received orders early in the morning after the battle of South Mountain, to move his column over the turnpike towards Sharpsburg, that he, "McClellan", rode up to the battlefield about noon and found his troops had not stirred from their bivouac.

General Cox, in his story of South Mountain published in Volume 2, at page 590, of the Century "War Book," says, in substance, regarding the delay in moving on the morning of the 15th:
"The delay was inevitable.   The morning hours were consumed in burying the dead and caring for the wounded of both the Union and Confederate armies, and also in conveying the wounded from the field hospitals to the General Hospital at Middleton."
During the forenoon the troops were ordered to advance.   The troops then started, General Cox's Division leading.   On reaching that part of the field where the most severe fighting by Wilcox's Division took place, "it was halted for two or three hours," says the general, "to await the passing of a corps having the right of way."   It was during this halt that McClellan rode onto that part of the field and saw, as he says, that "the troops had not stirred from their bivouac."

This is the sole act of slowness that McClellan points out on the part of Burnside at South Mountain.   He points out another act of slowness during the battle of Antietam, charging that Burnside failed to make the attack at the bridge over Antietam Creek at the time ordered, and that but "for his delay the result of the battle would have been more decisive."   As a matter of fact, the only delay was the halt for two hours under the crest, made after a three hours' fierce and bloody struggle to gain a foothold in order that necessary preparations might be made for the further advance.   Nine months subsequent to the battle, it was alleged by McClellan that he ordered Burnside to cross the bridge at eight o'clock in the morning, and that he did not move until ten o'clock, and then only after repeated urgent commands.

Burnside, in his official report, under date of September 30, 1862, two weeks after the battle, states the time he received the order to be ten o'clock.   McClellan, in his preliminary report, under date of October 13, 1862, nearly a month after the battle, states the time also as ten o'clock, but in his official report, published in August, 1863, nearly a year after the battle, when recollections of situations in the field had become indistinct, and for some reason not explained by him, he changed the hour from ten o'clock to eight as the time when he sent the order to Burnside to advance across the bridge.

General Cox having in his report given his judgment nine o'clock as the time when the order wag given to Burnside, points out that it was "merely an impression of passing events, he having hastened at once to his duties without looking at his watch, while the cumulative evidence seems to prove conclusively that the time ten o'clock stated by Burnside and by McClellan himself in his original report, is correct."   See Century " War book," Volume 2, note, page 649, Id., note, page 648.

Colonel D. B. Sackett, who brought the order, gives the time when he got the order from McClellan "about nine o'clock,"! which fails to support his statement of eight o'clock as the time.   General Cox further points out that facts in his recollection strongly sustain the view that ten o'clock was the hour when the order to attack was received.

It appears that after the preliminary orders of the day had been issued, General Cox went to the position occupied by Burnside, overlooking a large portion of the field, where he remained until the order of attack came.   As the morning wore away lines of the Union troops were seen advancing from the right, upon the other side of the Antietam, and engaging the enemy.   The right center becoming threatened, Franklin's Corps, as it went on the field, was detained to support it, and to further assist the heavy guns of Benjamin's battery, which had opened an effective fire.

Cox says, "It seems to me very clear that about ten o'clock in the morning was the great crisis in the battle.   Id., page 646.

It would seem that McClellan then determined to further help the right by a demonstration on the left.   At this time, therefore (ten A. M.), McClellan gave his order to Burnside to try and cross the stream, thus making a diversion to aid the hard-pressed right.   In the meanwhile, our lines having halted, Burnside and Cox were tortured with anxiety, watching to see whether our lines would advance or retreat, also noting the results of the long-range guns.   Cox points out that,
"While this contest was going on one of McClellan's staff rode up with an order to Burnside.   Burnside turned to me saying, 'We were ordered to make our attack.'   I left ... at once to give personal supervision to the movement and did not return. . . . The manner in which we had waited, the free discussion of what was occurring under our eyes, the public receipt of the order by Burnside in the usual business form, forbid the supposition, that it was a reiteration of a former order.   It was immediately transmitted to me without delay or discussion further than to inform us that things were not going altogether well upon the right and it was hoped our attack would be of assistance."   Id., pages 647, 648, 649.

McClellan manifests another lapse of memory, if not a purpose to mislead, in a statement contained in his official report of August, 1863, in which he speaks of the task of carrying the bridge as little different from a parade or march across, which might have been done in half an hour, while in his original report he truly said it was "a difficult undertaking."

McClellan, insinuating cowardice on the part of Burnside, says in his "Own Story," that "he did not cross the bridge during the engagement."

General Cox is the authority for the fact that he did cross, and in his story of the battle published in the Century "War Book," regarding the changes and preparations for the further advance, after gaining a foothold under the crest, says:
"It was three o'clock before these changes and preparations could be made.   Burnside had personally striven to hasten them, and had come across the bridge to the west bank to consult and hurry matters, and took his share of personal peril, for he came at a time when the ammunition wagons were delivering cartridges, and the road where they were, at the end of the bridge, was in the range of the enemy's constant and accurate fire."

This would seem in all reason to put to rest the sinister charge that Burnside did not cross the bridge.

General Burnside testified before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, regarding events during the evening of the 17th, that,
"Late in the evening after the battle I went to General McClellan's tent, and in course of conversation I expressed the opinion that the attack might be renewed the next morning at five o'clock, and told him that if I could have five thousand fresh troops to pass in advance of my line, I would be willing to commence the attack on the next morning."

McClellan denies the truth of Burnside's testimony regarding an offer to lead an advance, and points out in his "Own Story," in contradiction of it, that early on the morning of the 18th Burnside "sent to me for a fresh division to enable him to hold his own," that he told him "he would lend him Morell’s Division for a few hours and that the division was sent."   McClellan then adds, "I cannot, from my long acquaintance with Burnside, believe that he would deliberately lie, but I think his weak mind was turned; that he was confused in action; and that subsequently he really did not know what had happened, and was talked by his staff into any belief they chose."

This statement is both so extravagant, in the light of Burnside's true character, and so passionate in its tone and spirit, as to convey to an impartial mind an absolute conviction of its falsity.   If further proof is needed to disprove these charges, a copy of an affidavit of Brevet-Colonel of Volunteers James T. P. Bucklin, of Rhode Island, a Companion of the Massachusetts Commandery of the Loyal Legion, serving as captain in the Fourth Rhode Island Volunteers, Ninth Army Corps, in the battle of Antietam, is printed herewith as an appendix.   He states therein that he called, on the evening after the battle, on General Rodman, his former colonel, and Lieutenant Robert Ives, an aide on his staff, at the field hospital where both lay mortally wounded, to inquire after their condition; that during his call General Burnside, who was making the rounds of the field hospitals looking after the wounded, dropped in to see these wounded officers; that being well acquainted with Burnside, he stood by during his interview with General Rodman; that his, Burnside's, manner was calm and self-possessed, and his utterances were coherent and without any appearance of excitement or confusion of thought.   He spoke a few comforting and encouraging words to the wounded officers; that General Rodman inquired, "How has the battle gone, General ?"   General Burnside, in his optimistic, confident way of speaking, replied in substance as follows:   "It has gone well today, General; tomorrow we will have it out with them again."   Colonel Bucklin says, "I then returned to my command, in the confident expectation that the battle would be renewed the next morning."

      These things ought to satisfy all reasonably minded persons that Burnside was not in the condition of mind as represented by McClellan, and that he was then expecting a renewal of the battle.   In support of the statements regarding Burnside's alleged sending for a division on the next morning, the 18th, MeClellan invoked letters from D. B. Sackett, Inspector-General, United States Army, bearing date respectively February and March 9, 1876, fourteen years after the battle.   These letters are published in his "Own Story," in support of this statement of McClellan, but they fail to corroborate him in a number of essentially substantial facts.   General Sackett says he was present at headquarters when Burnside called on McClellan at his tent, and fixes the time as late in.   The evening after the 'battle, and admits a conversation between Burnside and McClellan about five thousand men, but states with vagueness and uncertainty that he thinks that the troops were wanted for the purpose indicated by McClellan, namely, to enable Burnside to hold his own near the bridge, while McClellan alleges that Burnside sent for a division early on the morning of the next day, the 18th.   These admissions of General Sackett of a personal interview between McClellan and Burnside on the evening of the 17th and a request for five thousand men, and the failure of a definite recollection by General Sackett for what purpose they were to be used, although not entirely controlling, yet strongly tend to support Burnside's testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, if any proof is necessary.

      McClellan's statement that Morell's Division was sent to Burnside, and at his request, is true; but these facts do not support his allegation as to the time, namely, on the morning of the 18th, when he would have it understood it was sent at Burnside's urgent request made early in the morning, nor, further, that it was sent under the circumstances or for the specific purpose as related by McClellan in criticism of Burnside.

General I. B. Cox, who was in charge of affairs on the field, says (see Volume 2, pages 658-660, Century "War Book") :

"The Ninth Corps occupied its position on the heights west of Antietam without further molestation, except an irritating picket firing, till the Confederate Army retreated (night of 18th).   But the position was one from which no shelter from the weather could be had; nor could any cooking be done; and they were short of rations.   Late in the afternoon of Thursday (18th) Morell's Division of Porter's Corps was ordered to report to Burnside to relieve the picket line and some of the regiments in the most exposed positions.   One brigade was sent over the Antietam for this purpose, and a few of the Ninth Corps regiments were enabled to withdraw far enough to cook some rations, of which they had been in need for twenty-four hours."   It appears also in General Cox's account that Harland's Brigade of Rodman's Division, which had been badly used up, was taken to the east side of the stream for reorganization, being the only troops of the command moved over to that side.   All the others remained on the west side until the retreat.   It is submitted that it fairly appears from all the facts and circumstances:

First, that Burnside called for troops and guns when, in the late afternoon of the 17th, he was being driven back by the reinforced enemy towards the bridge; receiving only a battery.

Second, that he called at McClellan's headquarters late in the evening after the battle and suggested an advance the next morning, offering to lead with five thousand fresh troops placed in advance of his own, which suggestion was not approved.

Third, that late in the afternoon of the 18th the division of Morell was loaned him temporarily, which is substantially as McOlellan puts it, aud likewise for a temporary purpose as declared by General Cox.   And also that the time, late in the afternoon, when Morell's Division was sent, would seem to reasonably imply a request for it made later than an early hour in the morning, namely, when, in addition to the fatigue induced by the strenuous experiences of the previous day, there appeared the exhausting effects of twenty-four hours of sleepless vigil and enforced fasting on the exposed heights across the bridge.   An impartial analysis of the conflicting statements of General McClellan regarding times, conversations and occurrences touching Burnside's acts and statements, taken in connection with McClellan's manifest irritation and illy suppressed anger, indicate, to say the least, that he was not disposed to be reasonable or just in his attitude towards Burnside, whom he makes quite the sole target, in his "Own Story," of embittered criticism.

      The criticisms directed against both General Burnside's character and his military career, to which attention has been called, were obviously inspired by jealousy, which, it seems reasonably certain, has been the source, very largely, of all the extravagant imputations of military incapacity, slanders, sneers and belittlements with which many writers, posing as historians, and idly gossiping tongues, have in the past, and are still continuing to regale the public to the scandal of as stainless a character, as unselfish a patriot, and as gallant, brave and resolute a soldier as ever drew sword in battle.

      Passing now to the consideration of the repulse at Fredericksburg: No attempt will be made to discuss the details of the campaign, but simply to present a brief outline of General Burnside's plan of battle and the disposition and movements of the grand divisions composing the Army of the Potomac previous to and during the engagement, and stating the reasons why the actual responsibility for the disaster rested, in the light of all the facts, not with General Burnside, but with those of his subordinate commanders entrusted with the execution of his plan of battle who failed to respond in harmony of spirit or with martial zeal and enterprise in giving it their loyal support."    Neither will there be any attempt to evade the fact that General Burnside was not blameless, having failed as military commander invested with supreme authority to enforce obedience from reluctant or distrustful subordinates to his absolute and compelling will.   As the storm of protest and censure swept over the country after the battle of Fredericksburg, assailing the Government for its failure to seasonably provide pontoons for crossing the Rappahannock and for undue haste in urging an advance against the enemy, Burnside saw as in a vision the perilous straits into which the country's cause was speeding, and with a moral courage that attested the sincerity of his patriotism and the greatness of his soul, stepped manfully into the breach, declaring, "For the failure of the attack I am responsible"; thus not only stemming the threatening tide of adverse public clamor and unrest that was menacing the cause of the Union, but also performing an act of self-sacrifice rarely, if ever, witnessed, save in one possessing a thoroughly unselfish nature.   The Government was thus relieved in an exceedingly critical situation of affairs, which threatened the most calamitous crisis of the war. Public confidence had been for some time undergoing a severe strain by reason of military failures and the nation's credit having become impaired to such an extent that the Government was fast approaching the limit of its ability to provide resources for the prosecution of the war.   The people were profoundly touched by General Burnside's straightforward frankness and his splendid magnanimity, according him the fullest measure of their confidence, and he, in turn, confidently trusting that when all the conditions and circumstances involved in the disaster should be fully known he would receive vindication at the hands of his countrymen.   The full force and extent of the disaffection that existed among some of his leading generals, which unquestionably led to the disaster at Fredericksburg, did not disclose itself at once to the unsuspicious and generous nature of General Burnside, causing him to be slow in passing judgment upon the offending ones.