Africa News Online - Ethiopia denies occupying Baidoa

29. The Gedo region had been relatively peaceful until 14 March 1998, when the Al-Itihad slamic Organization engaged the Somali National Front led by General Omar Haji Mohamed "Masale" in a successful bid to control El-Wak District. About 23 combatants were reportedly killed while many were
injured. By 5 August 1998, however, the Marehan clan appeared to have settled the rift between Al-Itihad and General Omar Haji Mohamed "Masale".

30. On 8 April 1999, at Belet-Hawa in Gedo region, the self-proclaimed Chairman of the Somali National Front, the Bardere District Commissioner, and two others were assassinated in what appeared to be a power struggle
within the Somali National Front. Then on 21 April 1999, the militia of another member of the clan, who claimed to have succeeded the assassinated Somali National Front Chairman, attacked the militia of General Omar Haji who had signed the Addis Ababa agreement of 1993 as Chairman of the Somali
National Front at Burdhubo town. Ten people were reportedly killed and 16 wounded before the Burale militia retreated to their bases at Belet-Hawa. There have been persistent allegations of Ethiopian troop movements within the region. The United Nations Political Office for Somalia has not been in a position to establish the veracity of these reports.

Merka

31. Merka, until recently a place enjoying relative peace, had begun to attract a number of aid agencies, which established themselves in the town after relocating from Mogadishu. However, the situation has deteriorated since April 1999.

C. Role of women and minority groups

32. Women and minority groups in Somalia have continued to express concern over the lack of law and order in the country. On 1 June 1999, the Chairperson of a Somali NGO, Save Somali Women and Children, submitted a petition on behalf of 120 women to my Representative for transmission to
the Security Council. The petition noted that Somali women have
traditionally been excluded from politics and carry the main burden of the suffering in Somalia. In particular, because of the situation within IGAD, they felt that the United Nations may be best placed to help all Somalis to restore their government, paying particular attention to the role women should play. At a meeting held in Nairobi from 21 to 25 June 1999, a
delegation of representatives of five women's groups from different regions of Somalia established a campaign for Somali women's political participation. Other Somali women have been holding monthly vigils at Nairobi in support of peace.

33. My Representative has also been meeting with several spokespersons for minority groups in Somalia, including the Chairmen of the Somali African Muki Organization, and the Somali National Union as well as the Sultan of
the Jiddo, who emphasized the exclusion of minorities from the political process and the serious discrimination suffered by minorities in different parts of Somalia.

34. On 14 July 1999, Abdulkadir Mohamed Aden "Zoppe", the leader of the Digil and Mirifle people, issued a statement in which he called for the establishment of an international war crimes tribunal for Somalia, interalia, to investigate and punish Hussein Aidid and his militia, who, he claimed, had carried out ethnic cleansing on the territory of the Digil and
Mirifle people.

D. Allegations of arms flows into Somalia

35. In his letter of 31 March 1998, Mr. Egal said that the neighbouring countries should be told in unmistakable terms to stop giving arms and ammunition to the warring factions in Somalia. In his second letter of 8 August 1998, he deplored the fact that, at a time when the reservoir of
ammunition left over from the cold war period was drying up and the warlords were no longer able to terrorize the population, new supplies appeared to be arriving in Somalia. He called for the arms embargo against Somalia to be enforced.

36. There have been claims by Somalis that Eritrea has bee

shipping arms and fighters of the Oromo Liberation Front into Somalia. In January 1999, at least two flights arrived at Balidogle from Assab, Eritrea, and it was alleged that the flights carried arms. There were also reports of further arms deliveries by sea at Merka in mid-February and early May 1999, and at Faax in mid-June 1999. It was also widely reported that together with the arms, Oromo Liberation Front fighters disembarked at Merka and Faax. On 31 March 1999, Ali Mahdi accused Ethiopia of providing arms to his opponents, notably to Hussein Haji Bod. Colonel Abdullahi Yusuf wrote to me on 6 May
1999 condemning the troops and arms that were allegedly arriving in Somalia from Eritrea. In mid-July 1999, officials of the Somali Consultative Council issued statements in which they condemned the presence of Oromo Liberation Front fighters in Somalia. They drew attention to what they considered to be a danger of a degeneration of security in Somalia, warning
that the entire region was likely to be destabilized. On 8 April 1999,

Hussein Aidid, Ali Mahdi and General Omar Haji wrote to me claiming that Ethiopia had not only exported arms into Gedo region but also continued to occupy Somali territory. They asked the Security Council to request Ethiopia to remove its troops from Somalia. UNPOS has neither the mandate nor the capacity to verify these reports. Both Ethiopia and Eritrea have denied any involvement in arms shipments into Somalia.

III. WORK OF THE UNITED NATIONS

37. Since my last report to the Security Council, the
Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, Kieran Prendergast, has convened on four occasions ambassadorial meetings of external actors on Somalia, on 7 October 1997, 16 June 1998, 15 December 1998 and 13 April 1999. They were attended by members of the Council, countries that have
undertaken peacemaking initiatives, and relevant regional and subregional organizations. The meetings offered an opportunity for an informal exchange of views and coordination of initiatives on Somalia. It was suggested that such meetings take place more frequently than in the past, and the Under-Secretary-General has undertaken to convene them three times a year, or more frequently if need be.

38. I visited the Horn of Africa region between 29 April and 10 May 1998, and consulted on Somalia with the leaders of Ethiopia, Djibouti, Kenya and Eritrea. The then President of Djibouti, Hassan Guled Aptidon, expressed the views of most of the leaders when he called for a halt to what he described as "political tourism" of Somali leaders, in which they go to
various capitals to sign documents which are not honoured. He said he would like all future reconciliation efforts to take place inside Somalia. At Nairobi, I had a meeting with external actors involved with Somalia, including the ambassadors of Member States and representatives of international organizations and non-governmental organizations. At my request, Mohamed Sahnoun, my Special Envoy in Africa, met a wide range of
Somali leaders at Nairobi.

39. I asked Under-Secretary-General Prendergast to visit Nairobi in November 1998 to assess the prospects for peace in Sudan and Somalia. On Somalia, he exchanged views with President Daniel Arap Moi and Foreign Minister Bonaya Godana at Nairobi and met the Italian Special Envoy for
Somalia, a delegation of the European Commission and a wide range of Somali faction leaders or their representatives, as well as leaders of Somali civil society, including women. In addition, he exchanged views with other external actors on Somalia, including heads of United Nations agencies and programmes, and representatives of non-governmental organizations.
Under-Secretary-General Prendergast reported that the Kenyan authorities were supportive of the IGAD "building-block" approach as the way forward in Somalia, and that they were optimistic that the Standing Committee could assist the international community in speaking with one voice on the Somali
peace process.

40. A common strand in Under-Secretary-General Prendergast's discussions with his Somali interlocutors was a strong feeling that the days of the "warlords" were over. Most of them called for a renewed United Nations effort to disarm militia members in the country. However, there was less disagreement on the way forward in the peace process. While many supported
the "building-block" approach, some expressed the fear that it could lead to unsustainable "emirates" and/or to many "presidents" in an absurd fragmentation of the country, ultimately reaching as far down as the district if not the village level. Under-Secretary-General Prendergast
emphasized my continued interest and that of the Security Council in finding a solution to the Somali problem, and assured the Somali leaders of continuing commitment of the United Nations to a political solution. At the same time, he stressed to them that the onus for peace rested with Somalis themselves, and that members of the international community could only
assist them in those efforts.

41. As the Council is aware, following submission of my report dated 16 September 1997 (S/1997/715), I appointed David Stephen as my Representative for Somalia as well as head of UNPOS. With the approval of the Security Council, a professional staff member has been added to UNPOS, which
continues to be based at Nairobi. This has enabled UNPOS to enhance its briefing and reporting role, and in particular to improve its contacts with Somali leaders in Somalia. UNPOS staff have, during the period covered by the present report, made visits to all parts of the country, ensuring regular contacts and dialogue with all sectors of opinion inside Somalia. My Representative has also paid several consultation visits both to the capitals of Governments and to the headquarters of regional organizations that are involved in the peace process in Somalia. These efforts have helped to improve the flow of information among external actors, and have also enhanced understanding of the need for a uniformity of approach in fostering peace in Somalia, in an environment previously characterized by a
multiplicity of approaches and initiatives