Of all the armies of the English Civil War, Montrose's Scots Royalists are by far the most Romantic. The great victories of the annus mirabilis (1644-5) were not sufficient to secure Scotland for the king, but they have certainly given birth to an abiding Romanticism. Vastly outnumbered, Montrose's band of highlanders nevertheless routed government troops time and time again. How was this possible? One answer has traditionally been to ascribe superior tactics to Montrose, namely the famed highland charge. Many wargames rules give a benefit to charging highlanders, and certainly no more romantic notion has ever graced a wargames table than the image in the mind's eye, of rank on rank of highland ferocity bearing down on the enemy in terrifying, and unstoppable manner, armed to the teeth with terrifying and rather improbable weapons of war. This article seeks to sum up some of the arguments presented over this issue.

The highland charge is described by James M Hill in his book Celtic Warfare 1595 - 1763 thus:

"Their manner of fighting, is adapted for brave but undisciplined men. They advance rapidly, discharge their pieces when within musket length of the enemy, and then, throwing them down, draw their sword, and... dart with fury on the enemy through the smoke of their fire... Their attack is so terrible, that the best troops in Europe would with difficulty sustain the first shock of it; and if the hordes of the Highlanders once come in contact with them, their defeat is inevitable."

For Hill, such a style of waging war suited a people who could not sustain formal armies, but who depended upon the prowess of individual fighting men. Leaders led by example, heading knots of followers who would try to force their way through the enemy line. Hill identifies this tactic as the traditional Celtic manner of waging war. He emphasises the manner in which the celtic fighting man rewarded bravery in battle by sparing the life of those who had fought bravely. The slaughter of lowlanders is ascribed to their perceived cowardice.

Dr Stevenson, author of an excellent biography of Alasdair M^cColla, leader of the Irish brigade, however, has argued that the advent of the basket-hilted sword by the 17^th century, replacing the two-handed sword, brought about the highland charge as a new tactic, employed first by Alasdair and his Irish troops, and then exported to Scotland. Alasdair fought in the Ulster uprisings of 1641/2. In May 1642 MacColla was victorious at Ballymoney (Blaney), often cited as the first recorded use of the "Highland Charge" in which the forces of Sir Robert Stewart where routed. Both, however, argue that the highland charge was a uniquely Celtic tactic. Hill, recognises that by the mid 17^th century Scottish armies were emulating traditional tactics, many Scots having served as mercenaries in the wars of Gustavus Adolphus.

Stuart Reid takes up this point most cogently. In his view, and based on an analysis of weapons from a muster in Perthsire, the general lack of musketry makes any account based on a volley followed by a throwing aside of valuable weapons most unlikely. Instead Reid argues that the highland charge can easily be explained by the adoption of conventional tactics alone. Reid reminds us that conventional tactics involved some sort of fire-fight, usually by introduction, followed by a push of pike to resolve the issue. The lack of musketry among highland troops would have ensured that any fire-fight must needs have been brief, their only hope lying in a speedy contact to lessen the effects of their lack of fire-power.

Reid is convincing, I think in his timely application of Occam's razor, but does it make a difference? Perhaps we could view the highland charge not as an innovative tactic, but a virtue born of necessity. The question of how effective it was remains. In wargaming terms we can restate this question as, should highlanders get a charge bonus? The answer, I would argue, is no.

Hill, argues that the advent of greater figher power saw an end to the effectiveness of the highland charge, especially when fixed bayonets allowed regular armies in particular to keep firing longer, enabling them to withstand any mad charge. In any case, flat terrain made the tactic less effective, and the effectiveness of the highland charge rested with the difficulties for regualr formations represented by uneven terrain.

I find it hard to argue that a highland rabble was anything more than that. Their successes in Montrose's campaign were seldom replicated, and can be explained largely with reference to the poor quality of the government troops opposing them, the difficulty of the terrain, and perhaps naked fear given the reputation of the Irish brigade in particular, hardened by the brutality of the Irish uprising. Reid's analysis of highland weapons shows that beyond the chieftains, few highlanders were adequately armed, and most would have carried little more than a knife! I find it hard to reconcile this with the picture of the heavily-armed highland superman often presented.