Reports of Maj. Gen. Winfield S. Hancock, U.S. Army, commanding Second Army Corps
At 4.30 p.m. Carroll's brigade, of Gibbon's division, advanced to the support of Getty's right on the right of the plank road, and a few minutes later Owen's brigade, of Gibbon's division, was also ordered into action in support of General Getty on the right and left of the Orange plank road. The battle raged with great severity and obstinacy until about 8 p.m. without decided advantage to either party.
During this contest the Irish Brigade, commanded by Colonel Smyth, of the Second [First] Delaware Volunteers, and Colonel Brooke's (Fourth) brigade, both of Barlow's division, Second Corps, attacked the enemy vigorously on his right and drove his line for some distance. The Irish Brigade was heavily engaged, and although four-fifths of its numbers were recruits, it behaved with great steadiness and gallantry, losing largely in killed and wounded. The section of Ricketts' battery, which moved down the plank road when Birney and Getty attacked, suffered severely in men and horses. It was captured at one time during the fight, but was retaken under the direction of Captain Butterfield, of Colonel Carroll's staff, by detachments from the Fourteenth Indiana and Eighth Ohio Volunteers, of Carroll's brigade. It was then withdrawn and replaced by a section of Dow's (Sixth Maine) battery.
During the night of the 5th. I received orders to move upon the enemy again at 5 a.m. on the 6th. I was cautioned to keep a sharp lookout on my left, and was informed that my right would be relieved by an attack by General Wadsworth's division, of the Fifth Corps, and two divisions of the Ninth Corps under General Burnside. General Getty's troops, under command of General Wheaton (General Getty having been wounded on the 5th [6th]), remained under my orders.
Before the hour at which the attack was directed to commence had arrived I was informed that Longstreet's corps was passing up the Catharpin road to attack my left flank. Preparations were at once made to receive the enemy at that point. Barlow's division was placed in position for that purpose, and my artillery was formed to cover the road leading from the Catharpin to the Brock road, along which it was supposed the enemy would advance. A strong skirmish line was also thrown out covering the Brock road. These preparations were made under the immediate supervision of General Gibbon, who was placed in command of his own and Barlow's division and the left of my line, General Birney being in command of the right.
At 5 a.m., according to instructions before mentioned, the command of General Birney, consisting of his own and Mott's division, advanced along the Orange plank road, simultaneously with General Getty's troops (now under command of General Wheaton), and attacked the enemy with great vigor. These troops were supported by Carroll's and Owen's brigades, of Gibbon's division.
After a desperate contest, in which our troops conducted themselves in the most intrepid manner, the enemy's line was broken at all points, and he was driven in confusion through the forest for about 1½ miles, suffering severe losses in killed, wounded, and prisoners. Our line, which had become somewhat disordered by the long distance which it had pressed after the enemy through the wood, was now halted, to adjust its formation before advancing farther.
About this hour Webb's brigade, of Gibbon's division, was ordered to the right in support of Birney. General Birney directed General Webb to relieve the troops of General Getty's division with his brigade. These troops, having lost heavily during the fight earlier in the morning, were withdrawn after having been relieved by General Webb, and were formed on the original line of battle along the Brock road.
At 7 a.m. I sent a staff officer to General Gibbon, commanding the left of my line, informing him of our success on my right, and directing him to attack the enemy's right with Barlow's division, and to press to the right toward the Orange plank road. This order was only partially carried out. Frank's brigade, of Barlow's division, was sent to feel the enemy' right, and after an obstinate contest succeeded in forming a connection with the left of Mott's division. I do not know why my order to attack with Barlow's division was not more fully carried out, but it was probably owing to the apprehended approach of Longstreet's corps on my left about that time; but, had my left advanced as directed by me in several orders, I believe the overthrow of the enemy would have been assured. At all events, an attack on the enemy's right by the troops of Barlow's division would have prevented the turning of the left of Mott's division, which occurred later in the day.
At 8 a.m. Stevenson's division, of Burnside's corps, reported to me at the intersection of the Orange plank road and the Brock road. About the same hour General Wadsworth, of the Fifth Corps, with about 5,000 troops, was placed under my orders. General Wadsworth's command went into action on the right of the Orange plank road, connecting with General Birney's line of battle. I was also informed about this time, by a dispatch from General Meade, that two of General Burnside's divisions had pushed forward nearly to Parker's Store and would attack across my front to relieve me.
The enemy was now making some demonstrations on my extreme left, which led me to apprehend an attack in that direction and gave me some uneasiness, but I was notified at 8.15 a.m., by a dispatch from General Humphreys, that General Sheridan, with one division of cavalry, had been directed to attack the enemy on the Brock road. It was supposed that Longstreet's corps was marching on that road toward my left.
At 8.50 a.m. Birney's, Stevenson's, Mott's, and Wadsworth's divisions again advanced along the Orange plank road with Webb's, Carroll's, and Owen's brigades, of Gibbon's division, and became very furiously engaged with the enemy. The firing had hardly commenced at this point when my left flank was seriously threatened. The enemy opened with artillery and pressed forward their skirmish line. Rapid firing was also heard in the direction of Todd's Tavern. This was supposed to be Sheridan's attack on Longstreet, which had been ordered by the major-general commanding, as narrated above.
The impression that Longstreet was executing the flank movement, concerning which I had been cautioned during the night, was strengthened by a report that infantry was moving on the Brock road from the direction of Todd's Tavern about 2 miles from my left. Knowing that we had no infantry in that direction I supposed it must be the advance of the enemy, and Brooke's brigade, of Barlow's division, was immediately sent out on the Brock road to my extreme left, where a strong breast-work was constructed across the road. Leasure's brigade, Ninth Corps, and Eustis' brigade, Sixth Corps, were held in readiness to support Barlow.
The infantry reported as moving on the Brock road proved afterward to be a body of several hundred convalescents who had marched from Chancellorsville and were now following the route of the Second Corps around by Todd's Tavern. Sheridan, instead of meeting Longstreet, encountered Stuart's cavalry, while Longstreet abandoned his flank movement and came in on the Orange plank road to the support of Hill, who had been effectually disposed of by my own attack. The arrangements made on my extreme left to receive Longstreet prevented me from pushing my success at the time when General Birney was driving Hill on the plank road.
At 9.15 a dispatch reached me from General Humphreys, stating that Lieutenant-Colonel Comstock, of General Grant's staff, had been sent to point out to General Burnside where to attack the enemy near the plank road. The same dispatch directed me to attack simultaneously with General Burnside. When I received it my line was closely engaged with the enemy on the right and left of the Orange plank road.
Half an hour later another dispatch arrived from General Humphreys, inclosing one from Colonel Platt, judge-advocate of the Army of the Potomac, which stated that Cutler's brigade, Fifth Corps, on my right, had fallen back out of the woods considerably disorganized, General Cutler reporting heavy losses, and that the enemy's skirmishers were within one-half mile of General Warren's headquarters. I was directed to take immediate measures to check this movement of the enemy through General Warren's left and was informed that General Meade had no troops to spare for that purpose.
I at once ordered General Birney to send to the right as many troops as he could spare to drive the enemy back and restore the line where it had been broken on General Warren's left. General Birney sent two brigades to effect that object, and reported to me a short time afterward by one of his staff that the force he had dispatched to the right had connected with Warren's left and had re-established the line which had been lost by Cutler's brigade falling back.
About 10 a.m. General Gibbon informed me that the enemy did not hold the Brock road, but that General Miles' skirmishers were engaged on my extreme left, in front of the Brock road, with the enemy's dismounted cavalry, while in the direction of Todd's Tavern our cavalry was engaged, it was supposed, with Longstreet's corps.
The enemy now advanced upon Frank's brigade, of Barlow's division, which joined the left of Mott's division. That brigade, having been heavily engaged in the earlier part of the day, had nearly exhausted its ammunition, and was compelled to retire before the enemy, whose attack was made with great vehemence. This was Longstreet's attack. Passing over Frank's brigade, they struck the left of Mott's division, which in turn was forced back.
Some confusion ensuing among the troops of that division, I endeavored to restore order and to reform my line of battle along the Orange plank road, from its extreme advance to its junction with the Brock road, by throwing back my left, in order to hold my advanced position along that road and on its right, but was unable to effect this, owing to the partial disorganization of the troops, which was to be attributed to their having been engaged for many hours in a dense forest, under a heavy and murderous musketry fire, when their formation was partly lost.
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