Reports of Maj. Gen. Winfield S. Hancock, U.S. Army, commanding Second Army Corps
The enemy pushed forward until he was within a few hundred paces of our breast-works, but did not attempt to assault them at that time. I had dispatched a staff officer to inform General Meade that, owing to a heavy attack by Longstreet on my left, my troops had been forced to retire to the Brock road, where the line of battle had been re-established I also informed him that I was about to attack the enemy's left with Leasure's brigade, of the Ninth Corps, then under my orders. This brigade was in position toward the left of my line, and under the command of General Gibbon. I instructed him to advance it upon the left flank of the enemy, directing that Colonel Leasure should sweep along the front of my line to the right in the direction of the Orange plank road, keeping his right about 100 paces from our breast-works; that he should attack the enemy's left and endeavor to drive him back.
These instructions were executed by Colonel Leasure with great spirit and success. Deploying his brigade at right angles to our line of battle, he traversed the entire front of Mott's and Birney's divisions, crossing the Orange plank road in his march, encountering as he proceeded what he supposed to be a brigade of the enemy, which fell back in disorder without engaging him. After carrying out my instructions very fully and intelligently, Colonel Leasure's command resumed its former position in the line of battle.
At 2.10 p.m. one brigade of Robinson's division, of the Ninth [Fifth?] Corps, and two regiments of heavy artillery, commanded by Colonel Morrison, reported to me by order of Major-General Meade.
These troops I directed to be massed near the plank road in reserve.
No further demonstrations were made in my front until 4.15 p.m., when the enemy advanced against my line in force, pressing forward until they came to the edge of the abatis, less than 100 paces from my first line, where they halted, and continued an uninterrupted fire of musketry. Though the firing was very heavy, little execution was done among our troops, but after half an hour had passed, some of the troops began to waver, and finally a portion of Mott's division and Ward's brigade, of Birney's division, in the first line, gave way, retiring in disorder toward Chancellorsville. My staff and other officers made great exertions to rally these men, and many of them were returned to the line of battle, but a portion of them could not be collected until the action was over.
As soon as the break in our line occurred, the enemy pushed forward and some of them reached the breast-works and planted their flags thereon. A few of them were killed inside of our breast-works.
At the moment when the enemy reached our line, General Birney ordered Carroll's brigade, of Gibbon's division, to advance upon them and drive them back. Carroll moved by the left flank and then forward at the double-quick, retaking the breast-works at once and forcing the enemy to fall back and abandon the attack in great disorder, with heavy loss in killed and wounded.
Brooke's brigade, of Barlow's division, was sent up from the left by General Gibbon to reenforce Mott about the same time, but was just anticipated by Carroll's brigade, which reached the breast-works first and drove the enemy back. This attack was principally on the left of the plank road.
Dow's battery (Sixth Maine) rendered valuable and effective service, one section being on the plank road, the others in the second line near Mott's left. It delivered a destructive fire as the enemy approached our line, and was served with great steadiness and gallantry.
The confusion and disorganization among a portion of the troops of Mott's and Birney's divisions on this occasion was greatly increased, if not originated, by the front line of breast-works having taken fire a short time before the enemy made his attack, the flames having been communicated to it from the forest in front (the battleground of the morning), which had been burning for some hours.
The breast-works on this portion of my line were constructed entirely of logs, and at the critical moment of the enemy's advance were a mass of flames which it was impossible at that time to subdue, the fire extending for many hundred paces to the right and left. The intense heat and the smoke, which was driven by the wind directly into the faces of the men, prevented them on portions of the line from firing over the parapet, and at some points compelled them to abandon the line. About the time the enemy had been repulsed, I received a dispatch from the major-general commanding countermanding the order for the attack which had been previously directed to take place at 6 p.m.
While on my way to army headquarters between 7 and 8 p.m., in obedience to a summons from the major-general commanding, I was called upon for troops to assist Major-General Sedgwick, whose line had been broken by the enemy. I directed General Getty's division, Sixth Corps (then under command of General Wheaton), to report to General Sedgwick at once.
The night of the 6th and the following day passed without material incident save that early in the morning of the 7th a reconnaissance was made under General Birney's command, when it was found that the enemy did not hold the Orange plank road in force for some distance in my front. During this reconnaissance Captain Briscoe, of General Birney's staff, distinguished himself in a marked manner.
At 9 a.m. a dispatch reached me, from General Humphreys, stating that the movements of the enemy indicated that either General Warren or myself would be attacked, but nothing more than light skirmishing occurred in my front.
About dark I sent to their proper commands, by order of the major-general commanding, all the troops under my orders not belonging to my own corps. Birney's division was detached just before dark and ordered to Hawkins' Church to cover the Reserve Artillery, but the order for this movement was countermanded after the division had moved out a short distance. It then returned to its former position.
At daylight on the morning of the 8th, in obedience to orders, I withdrew my corps from its position on the Brock road and covered the rear of the army during the movements toward Sposylvania Court-House.
I am aware that I have given but a meager sketch of the part taken by the troops under my command in the battle of the Wilderness. The nature of the country in which that battle was fought is well known. It was covered by a dense forest, almost impenetrable by troops in line of battle, where maneuvering was an operation of extreme difficulty and uncertainty. The undergrowth was so heavy that it was scarcely possible to see more than 100 paces in any direction.
No movements of the enemy could be observed until the lines were almost in collision; only the roar of the musketry disclosed the position of the combatants, to those who were at any distance, and my knowledge of what was transpiring on the field, except in my immediate presence, was limited and was necessarily derived from reports of subordinate commanders.
The casualties of service then and subsequently have rendered it impossible for me to obtain the official reports of many of the gallant officers who took a prominent and distinguished part in that great battle. Major-General Birney, Brigadier-Generals Wadsworth, Stevenson, and Hays, are dead; General Barlow is in Europe, and Generals Ward and Owen are out of service. I have applied to General Getty for his report, but have not yet received it.
Looking at the action after so long a time has elapsed, it seems that the expected movement of Longstreet on the left flank, on the morning of the 6th, had a very material effect upon the result of the battle. I was not only cautioned officially that the movement was being made, but many incidents narrated in the body of this report, such as the skirmishing and artillery firing on General Barlow's flank, the heavy firing in the direction of Todd's Tavern, where Sheridan was to attack Longstreet, and the report of the infantry moving on the Brock road from the direction of Todd's Tavern, confirmed me in the belief that I would receive a formidable attack on my left.
This paralyzed a large number of my best troops, who would otherwise have gone into action at a decisive point on the morning of the 6th. Had Frank's brigade been supported that morning by the remainder of Barlow's division the result must have been very disastrous to the enemy in his then shattered condition. From accounts from Confederate sources it is now known that our fierce attack along the Orange plank road on the 6th had broken Hill's corps to pieces, and that Longstreet was recalled from the Catharpin road to retrieve the disaster which had over-taken Hill, while Stuart with his cavalry was directed to attack our left.
I am not aware what movements were made by General Burnside near Parker's Store on the morning of the 6th, but I experienced no relief from the attack I was informed he would make across my front, a movement long and anxiously waited for.
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