December 1876
REPLY TO GENERAL HOWARD
"The war's over, but the fighting's just begun."
__________
When General Reynolds fell, the command of our forces at the front devolved on General Howard as the senior officer. The Confederate army was advancing toward the town of Gettysburg. Our troops were sorely pressed, and at best were only adequate to the duty, important in itself, of retarding the enemy's hitherto triumphant progress, until our army could be concentrated, on an advantageous line, for a general engagement. After Reynolds's death, when General Buford said, "There seems to be no directing person," and, "We need a controlling spirit," the Commanding General of the Army sent me forward to the scene of action with an order superseding General Howard. It is only natural that a soldier should feel chagrined at being thus relieved, by a junior, on the field. Acting under that feeling, General Howard wrote General Meade a letter in which he said: "General Hancock's order to assume command ... has mortified and will disgrace me." With these few words of explanation it will be easier to account for the special plea in the "Atlantic" article, to shield its author from the lack of confidence apparently implied in the order superseding him in command.
To give a clear understanding of the operations which General Howard has misstated, it is necessary that I should begin with the movements of my own command on the first day of the battle.
On the morning of July 1, in accordance with orders from General Meade, the Second Corps marched from Uniontown to Taneytown, where it arrived about 11 A.M. The troops were immediately massed, and I reported in person at headquarters of the Army of the Potomac, which were then at that point. While there, General Meade informed me of his plan for the coming battle. He stated, in general terms, that his intention was to fight on Pipe Creek; that he had not examined the ground, but, judging from his maps, it was the strongest position he could find; that the Engineers were examining and mapping it, and that he had made an order for the movement to occupy that line. General Reynolds was in the advance in command of the left wing of the army, consisting of the First, Third, and Eleventh corps, with General Buford's cavalry. I returned to my corps headquarters, and shortly afterward General Meade received information that Reynolds, with the First and Eleventh corps (Howard's) and Buford's cavalry, was engaged with the enemy at Gettysburg. Subsequently, at about 1 P.M., he heard that Reynolds was either killed or mortallywounded. General Meade came immediately to my headquarters and told me to transfer the command of the Second Corps to General Gibbon, and proceed at once to the front, and in the event of the truth of the report of General Reynolds's death or disability, to assume command of the corps on that field -- the First and Eleventh, and the Third which was at Emmettsburg [sic]. I reminded him that General Caldwell, commanding the First division of the Second Corps, was senior to General Gibbon, and that General Howard was senior to myself as Major General of Volunteers. (The commissions of Generals Howard and Sickles as Major Generals of Volunteers, bore the same date as my own, but their commissions as Brigadiers antedated mine, and that determined our relative rank as Major Generals of Volunteers.) He replied that he had a communication from the Secretary of War authorizing him to make such changes as he saw fit in his commanders, and that any changes made by him would be sustained by the Secretary and the President. Accordingly, written orders directing me to proceed to the front and assume command of our forces on the field were furnished me on the spot, and read as follows:
HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF POTOMAC
July 1, 1863 -- 1:10 P.M.
Commanding Officer, Second Corps.
The Major General commanding has just been informed that General Reynolds has been killed, or badly wounded. He directs that you turn over the command of your corps to General Gibbon, that you proceed to the front, and by virtue of this order, in case of the truth of General Reynolds's death, you assume command of the corps there assembled, vis.: the Eleventh, First, and Third at Emmettsburg [sic]. If you think the ground and position there a better one to fight a battle under existing circumstances, you will so advise the General, and he will order all the troops up. You know the General's views, and General Warren, who is fully aware of them, has gone out to see General Reynolds.
LATER -- 1:15 P.M.
Reynolds has possession of Gettysburg, and the enemy are reported as falling back from the front of Gettysburg. Hold your column ready to move.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
D. BUTTERFIELD,
Major General and Chief of Staff.
It will be observed that, having been informed of General Meade's intentions to form his forces for the coming conflict on the line of Pipe Creek, these orders required me not only to assume command of the troops at the front, but also to examine the ground at Gettysburg, and if I thought the position there a better one to fight a battle under existing circumstances, I was so to advise him and he would order his whole army up.
The moment these instructions were given me I turned over the command of the Second Corps to General Gibbon, and then started with my personal staff at a very rapid pace for the battlefield, which was distant about thirteen miles. On the way we met an ambulance containing the dead body of the heroic Reynolds. Owing to the peculiar formation of the country, or the direction of the wind at the time, it was not until we were within a few miles of the field that we heard the roar of the conflict then going on. I hurried to the front, and saw our troops retreating in disorder and confusion from the town, closely followed by the enemy. General Howard was on the crest of Cemetary Hill, apparently endeavoring to stop the retreat of his troops, many of whom were passing over the hill and down the Baltimore Pike. A portion of Steinwehr's division of Howard's corps, which had been stationed on Cemetary Hill by order of General Reynolds, was still in position there, and had thus far taken no part in the battle. (Bates's "Gettysburg," p. 69.)
As soon as I arrived on the field, at about 3:30 P.M., I rode directly to the crest of the hill where General Howard stood, and said to him that I had been sent by General Meade to take command of all the forces present; that I had written orders to that effect with me, and asked him if he wished to read them. He replied that he did not, but acquiesced in my assumption of command. As it was neccessary at once to establish order in the confused mass of his troops on Cemetary Hill and the Baltimore Pike, I lost no time in conversation, but at once rode away and bent myself to the pressing task of making such dispositions as would prevent the enemy from seizing that vital point; and from that moment until evening, when I transferred the command to General Slocum, I exercised positive and vigorous command over all the troops present, and General Howard, so far as my knowledge goes, gave no orders save to the troops of his own corps, the Eleventh.
This brings me to the first of the incorrect statements which I wish to notice in General Howard's article. On page 58 he writes as follows:
At this moment, 4:30 P.M., according to the time I had gone by all day, General Hancock appeared. (He reports to the Committee on the Conduct of the War that he was at Cemetary Hill by 3:30 P.M.) General Doubleday states that his troops did not commence to give way till a quarter before four; and surely it was half an hour later than this that he was leading his corps into position on Cemetary Ridge, where he and I first met Hancock. General Hancock greeted me in his usual frank and cordial manner, and used these words: "General Meade has sent me to represent him on the field." I replied, "All right, Hancock. This is no time for talking. You take the left of the pike and I will arrange these troops to the right." He said no more, and moved off in his peculiar gallant style to gather scattered brigades and put them into position. I noticed that he sent Wadsworth's division, without consulting me, to the right of the Eleventh Corps, to Culp's Hill; but as it was just the thing to do I made no objection -- probably would not have made any in any event -- but worked away, assisted by my officers, organizing and arranging batteries and infantry along the stone wall and fences toward Gettysburg, and along the northern crest of the ridge. It did not strike me then that Hancock, without troops, was doing more than directing matters as a temporary chief of staff for Meade.
In the next paragraph of his article (page 59) General Howard states that the order superseding him came "just before night," and on the same page appears his letter of complaint, intercession, and excuse to General Meade, dated July 1, which reads as follows:
HEADQUARTERS ELEVENTH CORPS, July 1, 1863
Major General Meade, commanding Army of the Potomac
GENERAL: General Hancock's order to assume command reached here in writing at seven (P.M.). At that time, General Slocum being present, having just arrived at this point, I turned over the command to him. This evening I have read an order stating that if General Slocum was present, he would assume command.
I believe I have handled those two corps to-day froma a little past eleven until four o'clock -- when General Hancock assisted me in carrying out orders which I had already issued -- as well as any of your corps commanders could have done. Had we received reinforcements a little sooner, the first position assumed by General Reynolds and held by General Doubleday till my corps came up might have been maintained; but the position was not a good one because both flanks were exposed, and a heavy force approaching from the north roads rendered it untenable, being already turned, so that I was forced to retire the command to the position now occupied, which I regard as a very strong one.
The above has mortified and will disgrace me. Please inform me frankly if you disapprove my conduct to-day, that I may know what to do. I am, General,
Very respectfully your obedient servant,
O.O. HOWARD
Major General Commanding.
The points at issue in the foregoing extract and letter are: the time of my arrival on the field, the time that General Howard relinquished command, and the meaning of the orders I bore from General Meade.
With reference to the first -- the hour of my arrival -- I do not know what time General Howard "had gone by all day," but the time of my arrival on the field was noted by my chief of staff and other staff officers, and I am well assured that I fixed it quite accurately in my testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War. As I have already stated, I left Taneytown shortly after receiving my instructions (1:15 P.M.) and rode toward Gettysburg at a very rapid gait. I arrived at Cemetary Hill by 3:30 P.M., having had over two hours in which to travel the thirteen miles -- a distance very easily covered in that time. And, deeply impressed as I was with the importance of the duty entrusted to me, with Reynolds killed and the enemy pressing on, it is easy to understand that I wasted no time upon the road. My official report of the battle fixes the time of my arrival on the field at even an earlier hour -- three o'clock -- and I am certain that I met General Howard not later than 3:30 P.M. In his letter to General Meade, quoted above, General Howard himself admits that I was there making dispositions of troops at 4 P.M. There is abundance of direct and circumstantial evidence to show that I was on the field as early as half-past three. The exact moment of my arrival on the field, however, I do not consider of great importance -- the essential matter is the condition of affairs at the time of my arrival and assuming command, and what subsequently transpired.
With reference to the hour at which General Howard yielded his command, he says in that letter to General Meade, "General Hancock's order to assume command reached here in writing at seven (P.M.)" The apparent intention of that sentence is to convey the impression that he had no knowledge of the existence of that order until that time. But while it may be that 7 P.M. of that day was the time he received from the Adjutant General of the army his copy of the written order, it was not the first time that day he had the opportunity to see that order, because, as I have stated, I offered to show him the original in writing when I first met him on the field and assumed command at about 3:30 P.M. He then said he did not desire to see it, and immediately yielded the command to me. And further, if he pretended to transfer the command to General Slocum at 7 P.M. when, he says, "General Hancock's order to assume command" reached him in writing, he was doing that which he had no authority to do. He knew that he was not vested with the command at that time; he knew that he had yielded it to me, without protest, when I arrived on the field and informed him that I had an order from General Meade to assume command of our forces; he knew that, by virtue of that order and his own relinquishment, I was formally vested with the command, and had actively exercised it from the moment of my arrival until the close of the day, "when," as I stated in my testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, "General Slocum arrived, he being my senior and not included in this order to me, I turned the command over to him." In fact General Meade instructed me verbally, through General Butterfield, chief of staff, before I left for the front, that I was to do so.
With reference to the meaning of the written order I received from General Meade to assume command of our forces on the field, I must say that in view of the fact that I stated its substance, and offered to hand the order itself to General Howard when I met him on Cemetary Hill, his acquiescence therein, and the fact that, to his personal knowledge, I assumed immediate command of those forces and exercised the same for some hours, it is incomprehensible to me how he can state, as he does in the extract already quoted, that it did not strike him then "that Hancock, without troops, was doing more than directing matters as a temporary chief of staff for Meade." Certainly that statement does not accord with the facts as they existed, and as I have related them. Recurring to this point, General Howard, on page 60, says:
As I understood the matter at the time, General Meade really intended, and Hancock so implied in his conversation with me, that he (Hancock) was to represent Meade as Butterfield, the chief of staff, would have done, on the field of battle.
In the first place General Meade could not have so intended, for, in his conversation with me at Taneytown, and in his written order directing me to assume command of the forces on the field, it is clear as sunlight that he "really intended," and so directed, that General Howard should be superseded; and in the second place, knowing that General Meade had assigned me to that duty, having his written order in my pocket, it is impossible that I could have conveyed to General Howard the implication above quoted. My action and orders on the field show that I had no such idea of my duties as now occurs to General Howard. When I moved off, as he says, "to gather scattered brigades and put them into position," and when I send Wadsworth's division to Culp's Hill, without consulting him, he knew I was exercising authority which no staff officer would have dared to personally exercise under any circumstances. At 6 P.M. General Meade telegraphed to General Halleck: "General Reynolds was killed this morning, early in the action. I immediately sent up General Hancock to assume command." But to be more explicit: I assert positively that I never implied in any conversation with General Howard that when I arrived at Gettysburg on that occasion I "was to represent Meade as Butterfield, the chief of staff, would have done, on the field of battle."
General Howard claims (page 58) that there was an understanding between us whereby I was to take charge of the troops on the left of the turnpike while he arranged those on the right. He does not disclose the fact that I exercised independent powers, but in his letter to General Meade, already quoted, says, "General Hancock assisted me in carrying out orders which I had already issued." Now, I had no such understanding with General Howard, and I did not so assist him in carrying out orders which he had already issued. The only pretext for his statement of such an understanding is, that as I was about riding away to the left I understood him to indicate to me that he would prefer the right, where his troops were then posted, for his own position, and he said that he would be found there personally; but there was no division of command between General Howard and myself. Indeed, one of the first orders I gave on assuming the command was for the troops of the Eleventh corps (Howard's) to be pushed forward to the stone walls in the next field to give room for development, and to deter the enemy's advance. And about the same time I addressed a few words to his own troops on the left of the pike with a view to encourage them to hold the position while our lines were forming. I then rode on to place the First corps further to the left, in order that we should cover the whole of Cemetary Hill, only a small portion of which was occupied when I arrived upon the field. General Doubleday, commanding the First corps, after the fall of Reynolds, can give positive evidence that I assumed immediate command and directed the dispositions of his troops, as soon as he fell back to Cemetary Hill. General Buford was also directed by me to hold his command in the flat to the left and front of Cemetary Hill as long as possible in order to give me time to form our line of battle on the hill itself. I took charge of all our forces on the field, as my orders directed me to do and, seeing the importance of the point, immediately send Wadsworth's division and a battery to occupy Culp's Hill. I had no idea of consulting General Howard as to the propriety of that movement, which he states he noticed, but to which he "made no objection." I ordered the movement because, as commander of the troops, and being responsible for what was done on the field, I considered it proper that it should be promptly made.
In regard to the service done by that division and the battery on the occasion referred to, I give the following extract from one of General Lee's despatches, as quoted in an article on Gettysburg, by the late Brigadier General C.H. Morgan:
With reference to Ewell's advance upon Culp's Hill, Lee's report says:
"General Ewell was therefore instructed to carry the hill occupied by the enemy if he found it practicable, but to avoid a general engagement until the arrival of the other divisions which were ordered to hasten forward. In the mean time the enemy occupied the point which General Ewell designed to seize (Culp's Hill)."
Before proceeding futher, I shall quote a despatch to Major General Halleck, General-in-Chief, from General Meade, a portion of the latter's testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, a part of the testimony of General Warren, chief engineer of the Army of the Potomac, before the same committee, with my own verbal despatch to General Meade, just after my arrival on the field, sent by my aide, all of which are given to show that his intentions and instructions to me, and my understanding of the same, were in perfect accord in regard to the fact that I was sent to Gettysburg to relieve General Howard of the command of all our forces there, and to determine and inform General Meade whether or not, in my opinion, Gettysburg was the place to fight the battle.
General Meade's despatch to General Halleck is as follows:
HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
VIA FREDERICK, July1, 1863 -- 6 P.M.
General Halleck.
The First and Eleventh corps have been engaged all day in front of Gettysburg. The Twelfth, Third, and Fifth have been moving up, and all, I hope, by this time on the field. This leaves only the Sixth, which will move up tonight. General Reynolds was killed this morning early in the action. I immediately sent up General Hancock to assume command. A.P. Hill and Ewell are certainly concentrating. Longstreet's whereabouts I do not know. If he is not up tomorrow, I hope, with the force I have concentrated, to defeat Hill and Ewell; at any rate I see no other course than to hazard a general battle. Circumstances during the night may alter this decision, of which I will try to advise you.
I have telegraphed Couch that if he can threaten Ewell's rear from Harrisburg, without endangering himself, to do so.
GEORGE MEADE, Major General.
At the time the above telegram was written the Second Corps (whose position General Meade does not give) was on the march to and within a few miles of the battlefield.
General Meade, in his testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, page 330, says:
On the 1st day of July, my headquarters being at Taneytown, and having directed the advance of two corps the previous day to Gettysburg, with the intention of occupying that place, about one or two o'clock in the day, I should think, I received information that the advance of my army, under Major General Reynolds of the First corps, on their reaching Gettysburg had encountered the enemy in force, and that the First and Eleventh corps were at that time engaged in a contest with such portions of the enemy as were there.
The moment I received this information I directed Major General Hancock, who was with me at the time, to proceed without delay to the scene of the contest, and having in view this preliminary order which I had issued to him as well as to other corps commanders (the order referred to here was the one for the proposed occupation of the general line of Pipe Clay Creek), I directed him to make an examination of the ground in the neighborhood of Gettysburg, and to report to me, without loss of time, the facilities and advantages or disadvantages of that ground for receiving battle. I furthermore instructed him that in case, upon his arrival at Gettysburg -- a place which I had never seen in my life, and had no more knowledge of than you have now -- he should find the position unsuitable, and the advantages on the side of the enemy, he should examine the ground critically as he went out there and report to me the nearest position in the immediate neighborhood of Gettysburg where a concentration of the army would be more advantageous than at Gettysburg.
Early in the evening of July 1, I should suppose about 6 or 7 o'clock, I received a report from General Hancock, I think in person, giving me such an account of a position in the neighborhood of Gettysburg which could be occupied by my army, as caused me at once to determine to fight a battle at that point; having reason to believe, from the account given to me of the operations of July 1, that the enemy were concentrating there. Therefore, without any reference to, but entirely ignoring the preliminary order (the order for the general line of Pipe Clay Creek), which was a mere contingent one, and intended only to be executed under certain circumstances which had not occurred, and therefore the order fell to the ground, the army was ordered immediately to concentrate, and that night did concentrate on the field of Gettysburg, where the battle was eventually fought.
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