December 1876
REPLY TO GENERAL HOWARD
"The war's over, but the fighting's just begun."
__________
General Meade, on page 348 of the report of the Committee on the Conduct of the War, continues:
About 1 o'clock on the 1st of July I received the sad intelligence of the fall of General Reynolds, and the actual engagement of my troops at Gettysburg. Previous to receiving this intelligence I had had a long consultation with General Hancock, and explained to him fully my views as to my determination to fight in front, if practicable; if not, then to the rear or to the right or the left, as circumstances might require. Without any further reflection than the fact that General Reynolds was the officer upon whom I had relied under my instructions, and anxious to have someone in front who understood and who could carry out my views, I directed General Hancock to proceed to Gettysburg and take command of the troops there, and particularly to advise me of the condition of affairs there, and the practicability of fighting a battle there.
On page 349 he says:
I will call the attention of the committee to another despatch received by me from General Buford, marked "I," and dated 20 minutes past 3 o'clock, and which must have been received by me after General Hancock had gone to the front. I read it to show that my sending General Hancock there was in a measure justified by the opinion of that distinguished officer, General Buford, now deceased.
The despatch from General Buford, then at Gettysburg, mentioned by General Meade, reads thus:
HEADQUARTERS FIRST CAVALRY DIVISION
July 1, 1863 -- 20 minutes past 3
General Pleasonton.
I am satisfied that Longstreet and Hill have made a junction. A tremendous battle has been raging since 9 1-2 A.M., with varying success. At the present moment the battle is raging on the road to Cashtown, and in short cannon range of this town; the enemy's line is a semicircle on the height from north to west. General Reynolds was killed early this morning. In my opinion there seems to be no directing person.
JOHN BUFORD
Brigadier General of Volunteers.
We need help now.
BUFORD
I have also in my possession a letter informing me that General Buford earlier in the day, directly after General Reynolds's death, wrote a despatch to General Meade in the note book of his signal officer, Lieutenant A. B. Jerome, which throws a still stronger light upon his views of how matters were going upon the field at that time, and the neccessity for a "directing person" there. The letter is as follows:
NEW YORK, October 18, 1863
Major General Hancock.
GENERAL: A few moments after the death of Major General Reynolds, the late General Buford wrote a short despatch in my note book to Major General Meade. If that message could be found, it would add still greater lustre to your well won reputation. The purport of that despatch was this: "For God's Sake, send up Hancock. Everything is going at odds, and we need a controlling spirit." Yet, General, in all the parade that has taken place since, of names and incidents, memories oratorical and poetical, from Edward Everett to General Howard, have you not noticed that your friend, the heroic Buford, has been nearly disregarded ? I was a young lieutenant and staff officer, and I loved the General, and I am sure you will pardon me if I call your attention to this injustice.
A squadron of the "First Cavalry division" entered Gettysburg, driving the few pickets of the enemy before them. The General and staff took quarters in a hotel near the seminary. As signal officer, I was sent to look out for a prominent position and watch the movements of the enemy. As early as 7 A.M. I reported their advance, and took my station in the steeple of the "Theological Seminary." General Buford came up and looked at them through my glass, and then formed his small cavalry force. The enemy pressed us in overwhelming numbers, and we would have been obliged to retreat, but looking in the direction of Emmettsburg [sic], I called the attention of the General to an army corps advancing, some two miles distant, and shortly distinguished it as the "First," on account of their "corps flag." The General held on with as stubborn a front as ever faced an enemy for half and hour unaided, against a whole corps of the rebels, when General Reynolds and a few of his staff rode up on a gallop and hailed the General, who was with me in the steeple, our lines being but shortly advanced. In a familiar manner General Reynolds asked Buford "how things were going," and received the characteristic answer, "Let's go and see." In less than thirty minutes Reynolds was dead, his corps engaged against fearful odds, and Howard only in sight from my station, while the enemy were advancing on the right flank in numbers as large as our whole front. It was then the despatch before alluded to was written. I carried a verbal message to General H., asking him to "double quick" for life or death. When evening came the enemy had possession of the town, but many of the First division rode round rather than retreat through it.
Excuse me, General, but it will be difficult to find a parallel in history to the resistance made by a small force of cavalry against such odds of infantry men.
This letter has been suggested by a paragraph in the New York papers, stating that you had just returned from Gettysburg, and giving an account of your remarks, etc. Will you not, General, endeavor to bring General Buford's name more prominently forward ?
Every one knows that he "in his day" was "first and foremost." I have the honor to enclose an extract from his report, which will show, I presume, that I speak from actual experience.
I have the honor to be, General,
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
A. B. Jerome.
As commander of our forces at Gettysburg, just after my arrival on the field, I sent Geary's division of the Twelfth corps, which had just arrived, to occupy the ground to the left, near Round Top, commanding the Gettysburg and Emmettsburg [sic] road, as well as the Gettysburg and Taneytown road to our rear. This was a part of General Slocum's corps; and although I had not been directed by General Meade to assume command of other than the First, Third, and Eleventh corps, I felt that in the urgency of the case (not having heard of General Slocum's arrival in person), and seeing that division approaching the field, my duty as commander required me to place it at the point where it would best protect our left and rear. In December, 1865, more than two years after the battle, I received from General Geary the subjoined letter, relating to my disposition of his division on the occasion above described:
NEW CUMBERLAND, CUMBERLAND CO., PA.,
December 5, 1865.
Major General Hancock.
DEAR GENERAL: While in Washington I failed to obtain access to my report on the battle of Gettysburg.
Upon my return here I examined my retained copy, and I find that portion of it relating to the occupancy of the extreme left of the line under your orders is tolerably satisfactory. It is as follows:
"Not finding General Howard (to whom I was ordered to report), I reported to Major General Hancock, commanding Second corps, who informed me the right could maintain itself, and the immediate need of a division on the left was imperative. By his direction, upon this threatening emergency, I took a position on the extreme left of the line of battle, as the enemy were reported to be attempting to flank it, and cavalry were already skirmishing in front of that position.
"At 5 P.M. this movement was consummated, and my line extended at that time from about half a mile west of the Baltimore turnpike, the left of the First A. C., to a range of hills south and west of the town, which I occupied with two regiments of the First brigade. These hills I regarded as of the utmost importance, since their possession by the enemy would give him an opportunity of enfilading our entire left wing and centre with a fire which could not fail to dislodge us from our position.
"This line was held by the First and Third brigades. The Second brigade, with two pieces of Battery K, Fifth U. S. Artillery, pursuant to orders fro Major General Slocum, were detached during the march to take position in reserve on the immediate left of the turnpike, about two miles from Gettysburg.
"No serious attack was made upon me at either point, the speedly formation of the line on the left frustrating the enemy's designs, which would, if successful, have proved so disastrous to the entire position. The command rested on their arms during the night."
Most respectfully subnitted for your information.
Your devoted friend,
JNO. W. GEARY,
Brevet Major General.
Major General G. K. Warren, Chief Engineer of the Army of the Potomac, testified before the Committee on the Conduct of the War:
On the morning of the 1st of July we got information from General Buford that the enemy were moving down upon him at Gettysburg, from the direction of Fairfield. I do not know how orders were issued; but I know that about that time General Reynolds moved forward to the supposrt of General Buford, passing through the town of Gettysburg, and engaged the enemy there. This news came in very early in the morning. General Meade ordered me to go to Gettysburg to obtain information about it, and examine the ground. In consequence of mistaking my road, I went to Emmettsburg, a little out of the way. Almost ast the same time that I left, news came down that General Reynolds had been killed. General Meade then sent up General Hancock, with discretionary orders, I think, either to hold that place, if he thought it a good one, or, if not, then to fall back to the line of Pipe Creek, keeping General Meade informed. General Hancock got there a little before I did. At that time General Reynolds's corps, the First corps, had fallen back pretty badly damaged, and what there was of the Eleventh corps (Howard's), that had gone out to help him, was coming back in great confusion. General Howard was then on Cemetary ridge with one division. General Buford's calvalry was all in line of battle between our position there and the enemy. Our cavalry presented a very handsome front, and I think probably checked the advance of the enemy. General Hancock made a great deal of personal effort to get our troops into position; and I think his personal appearance there did a great deal toward restoring order.
I went over the ground with General Hancock, and we came to the conclusion that if that position could be held until night, it would be the best place for the army to fight on if the army was attacked. General Hancock himself reported that to General Meade, who ordered all the army up to that position.
I have now given more than sufficient evidence, of a nature not to be questioned, to prove that I was sent to Gettysburg, when General Reynolds's death or fatal wounds became known to General Meade, to assume command of our forces there; that I did assume such command at once upon my arrival, and held the same, with all its great responsibilities, until nearly dark that evening, when I transferred it to General Slocum about 7 P.M.; and that General Howard was well aware of all the facts connected therewith; and I think also that I have fully shown the incorrectness and speciousness of his statement that it did not strike him "that Hancock, without troops, was doing more than directing matters as a temporary chief of staff for Meade."
The inaccuracies in the "Atlantic" article are glaring, and it is important in the interests of truthful history that they should be pointed out; but they are no so certain to convey unreliable information concerning the battle of Gettysburg as similar errors embraced in his official report, which will be a public record for all time, and which I have seen since my attention was attracted to that article. In his official report of his operations at Gettysburg to the Adjutant General of the Army of the Potomac, dated August 31, 1863, which was made when he had all the facts fresh in his mind, and presumably the order to which he refers before his eyes, General Howard says:
General Hancock came to me about this time (4:30 PM), and said General Meade had sent him on learning the state of affairs; that he had given him his instructions while under the impression that he was my senior.
This proves that General Howard contradicts himself. In this report he admits that when I arrived upon the field he knew General Meade had sent me to supersede him, and in his article he says it did not strike him then "that Hancock, without troops, was doing more than directing matters as a temporary chief of staff for Meade." If he stands by his report, he falls by his article; if he stands by his article, he falls by his report. But the fact is that he falls by both, for both statements, as he makes them, are incorrect as well as contradictory. I have shown that his statement in his article that I implied that General Meade had sent me to represent him "as Butterfield, the chief of staff, would have donw, on the field of battle," has no foundation in fact. I now most emphatically assert that I made no such statement to General Howard as that contained in the foregoing extract from his report. General Meade was well aware that General Howard was my senior, as Major General of Volunteers, before I left Taneytown for the front, because, as I said in the beginning, I called his attention to the fact before I separated from him, and his answer to me was that the Secretary of War had authorized him to make such changes as he saw fit in his commanders, and that any such changes made by him would be sustained by the Secretary and the President.
Nor was this the only instance during the Gettysburg campaign in which General Meade superseded commanders by their juniors in rank. On that very occasion when I was about seting out from Taneytown for Gettysburg, as I have already stated, he placed General Gibbon in command of the Second corps, although General Caldwell, commanding the First division, was senior to Gibbon, who commanded the Second division of that corps. He also superseded General Doubleday, in command of the First corps, on the battlefield, by General Newton, his junior, as is well known, and as General Doubleday states in his testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War; and both Gibbon and Newton held the commands thus assigned them until the close of the battle.
General Howard is careful to forget that I assumed command of the left wing of our army at all on the first day. As bearing on the subject, I attach an extract giving a striking description of these occurrences at the time I took command of the left wing at Gettysburg, written by the late Brigadier General C. H. Morgan, United States Army, then my chief of staff, who accompanied me to the battlefield from Taneytown:
About 3:30 he (General Hancock) reached Cemetary Hill. Near the cemetary gate he met General Howard, and announced that he had been ordered to assume command. General Howard did not ask to see the order, but remarked that he was pleased that General Hancock had come. No time was spent in conversation, the pressing duty of the moment, it was evident, being to establish order in the confused mass on Cemetary Hill.
Buford's cavalry was holding the front in the most gallant manner; the horse holders in some instances voluntarily giving up their horses to retreating infantrymen and going themselves to the skirmish line. General Buford himself was on Cemetary Hill with General Warren, where General Hancock met them for a moment. Generals Howard, Buford, and Warren all assisted in forming the troops. By threats and persuasion the tide flowing along the Baltimore turnpike was diverted, and lines of battle formed behind the stone walls on either side of the road. To show the disorder into which General Howard's troops had been thrown by the unequal conflict they had waged during the day, it is only necessary to mention that 1,500 fugitives were collected by the provost guard of the Twelfth corps some miles in rear of the field.
Wadsworth's division and Hall's Fifth Maine battery were at once sent to the western slope of Culp's Hill, which important position they held during the entire battle. The brave Wadsworth was by no means daunted or weakened by the day's work, but was still full of fight.
The lines having been so established as to deter the enemy from further advance, General Hancock despatched his senior aide, Major Mitchell, with a verbal message to General Meade, "that General Hancock could hold Cemetary Hill until nightfall, and that he considered Gettysburg the place to fight the coming battle." Major Mitchell left Gettysburg about 4 o'clock, and arrived at Taneytown before 6 o'clock. Having delivered his message to General Meade, the latter replied. "I will send up the troops."
The following is the disposition of the troops as made by General Hancock: The First corps -- except Wadsworth's division, which was placed as above -- was on the right and left of the Taneytown road. The Eleventh corps was on its right, on both sides of the Baltimore turnpike.
Apparently to make his claim for honors at Gettysburg still stronger, General Howard (page 59) says: "I know that afterward General Hancock said in substance to Vice-President Hamlin concerning this battle: 'The country will never know how much it owes to your Maine General, Howard.'"
In regard to this I have only to say that I have rarely lost an opportune occasion to speak in exalted terms of the Maine troops who served under me during the war; and in conversation with General Howard's friends, I have never felt called upon to dissent from their claims for faithful services rendered by him during the period of his connection with the Army of the Potomac, in which he held hight command, and in whose battles he lost an arm, and often risked his life.
I recollect an accidental conversation with the distinguished citizen of Maine referred to, whom I met at St. Paul, Minnesota, and it is probable that the character and services of the Maine troops were mentioned then, and those of General Howard as well. I do not now recall the conversation in detail, but I am well satisfied that if the gentleman informed General Howard that I made the remarks concerning him which he quotes in his article in the "Atlantic Monthly," he either misunderstood my meaning and applied what I said of the Maine men to General Howard personally, or that he had forgotten the exact purport of what I did say.
In concluding this subject General Howard (pages 60 - 61) says: "Of course it will make very little difference to posterity whether I served under Hancock unwittingly for two hours and a half or not, but it is of importance to me and mine to explain the facts of the case." Whatever posterity may think of the matter, if it think anything at all, it might just as well have "the facts of the case" as they transpired. That General Howard "served under Hancock unwittingly for two hours and a half" on that occasion is certainly not a fact. On the contrary, that I assumed absolute command of our forces at Gettbysburg immediately on my arrival, exercising the same for several hours, until I transferred it to General Slocum, and did so with the full knowledge of General Howard, are "facts of the case" which cannot be refuted.
Had Gettysburg gone against us instead of crowning our arms with a great success, few would come forward to claim the responsibilities and possible censures of those anxious hours. Now, however, a claimant for undue honors steps forward, and I have found it necessary to show in part what his claim is worth. I have heretofore avoided making any publication concerning the operations of my command during our civil war, and any writings other than my official reports save when called upon to correct mistakes or verify facts for others. For myself I have been quite content to leave the historian of the future to say what was the value of the services I was enabled to render my country during the period of her great extremity. As the terrible contest at Gettysburg contributed in its results probably more than any other battle of the war to the maintenance of the Union in its integrity, so, far above private interests or individual reputations rises the great renown won on that field by the grand old Army of the Potomac.
Cemetary Hill has since become consecrated ground. The place where General Howard was superseded in command on the first day of the fight is now covered with the graves of thousands of gallant soldiers whose bones lie buried at the base of the beautiful monumental column which commemorates their fame. Two of the marble statues ornamenting the pedestal personify War and History. War, symbolized by a soldier resting from the conflict, narrates to History the story of the struggle, and the deeds of the martyr-heroes who fell in that famous battle. In remembrance of those noble comrades who laid down their lives for the general weal, it were simply sacrilege for any survivor to pour into the ears of History an incorrect account of the contest, still more to assume to himself honors belonging perhaps less to the living than to the dead.
The historians of the future who essays to tell the tale of Gettysburg undertakes an onerous task, a high responsibility, a sacred trust. Above all things, justice and truth should dwell in his mind and heart. Then, dipping his pen as it were in the crimson tide, the sunshine of heaven lighting his page, giving "honor to whome honor is due," doing even justice to the splendid valor alike of friend and foe, he may tell the world how the rain descended in streams of fire, and the floods came in billows of rebellion, and the winds blew in blasts of fraternal execration, and bet upon the fabric of the Federal Union, and that it fell now, for, resting on the rights and liberties of the people, it was founded upon a rock.
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