1 No. 134
In the Matter of The United
Federation of Teachers, Local 2,
AFT, AFL-CIO,
Appellant, v. The Board of Education of the
City School District of the
City of New York,
Respondent.
2003 NY Int. 130
November 20, 2003
This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before
publication in the New York Reports.
Charles G. Moerdler, for appellant. Scott Shorr, for respondent.
READ, J.:
In this appeal we are asked whether an arbitrator acted
properly when she determined that respondent Board of Education
of the City of New York (the Board) arbitrarily selected teachers
for an after-school reading program, and ordered the Board to
provide a position to a qualified applicant whom the principal
had passed over. We conclude that the award did not violate
public policy and the arbitrator did not exceed her authority
under the collective bargaining agreement.
I.
In September 1998 New York City School District 26
posted an announcement for anticipated vacancies in the position
of "Per Session Teacher - Project Read After-School Program" in
its elementary schools. The announcement set forth selection
criteria, including a preference for teachers holding "Early
Childhood/Reading License[s]."
Linda Feil applied for this position. While she did
not hold either of the preferred licenses, she did have a "common
branch" license and 26 years of primary school teaching
experience, most recently as a third-grade teacher at PS 173. In
addition, she had taught as a substitute teacher in Project Read
and another reading program at PS 173. The principal of PS 173 filled six openings in Project
Read from the pool of applicants who responded to the posting.
He did not select Feil, instead offering her work as a "primary
substitute." He also advised her that other district schools had
inquired "if any of our excellent teachers would be available to
teach Project Read in those schools." He asked her to let him
know right away if she was interested in this possibility. Of
the six teachers whom the principal selected for a position in
Project Read, two had the preferred licenses and less seniority
than Feil. The remaining four did not have the preferred
licenses; two had more seniority than Feil, two had less. The
parties do not dispute that the six selected teachers are
qualified; the parties do not dispute that Feil is qualified. Feil's union, appellant United Federation of Teachers
(UFT), filed a grievance in Feil's behalf under articles 15 and
20 of the collective bargaining agreement (CBA). Article 22 of
the CBA prescribes a four-stage grievance process, culminating in
arbitration if the grievance is not otherwise resolved. During a Step II grievance conference, UFT argued that
Feil had been improperly denied a position in Project Read
because she was qualified and more senior than two of the
successful applicants. The principal replied that while he
believed that Feil was a satisfactory teacher, the teachers he
selected had, in his judgment and based on their applications, a
greater level of specific teaching experience, which he detailed.
He acknowledged that he took into consideration his personal
observations of the various applicants in the classroom during
his fifteen years as principal. The deputy superintendent denied
the grievance. He found that while satisfactory teaching and
seniority were compelling selection criteria, they were not
required by the posting and did not control the selection process
for Project Read, a specialized program. After a Step III hearing, the Chancellor's
representative found that the applicants were not equally
qualified for the positions, and denied the grievance.
UFT filed a demand for arbitration. The Board did not move to
stay the arbitration, and so the grievance was submitted to an
arbitrator jointly selected by UFT and the Board pursuant to the
CBA. The arbitrator accepted UFT's formulation of the issue:
"Did the Board violate Articles Fifteen and
Twenty of the 1995-2000 collective bargaining
agreement when it denied Grievant Linda Feil,
a teacher at P.S. 173, the per session
position of After-School Project Teacher at
P.S. 173? If so, what shall be the remedy?"
The arbitrator rejected UFT's argument that the Project Read
selection process was governed by the seniority provisions in
article 15 of the CBA entitled "Rates of Pay and Working
Conditions of Per Session Teachers." Instead, she found that the
matter involved the application of article 20 of the CBA,
entitled "Other Matters."[1]The arbitrator also found that while the CBA contained
no selection criteria for Project Read, "[t]he selection of
teachers for positions in programs which are not covered by the
Agreement are governed by managerial discretion." The arbitrator
determined that her power to decide whether the Board's exercise
of this discretion was arbitrary or capricious derived from
article 22(c) of the CBA.[2]The arbitrator emphasized that Feil was well qualified
for the position, and had more seniority than two of the teachers
who were selected for the program. She recited testimony from
another teacher who had been rejected for a position in Project
Read the previous year because she was the most junior applicant.
She discredited the principal's testimony that the preferred
license was a governing factor because four of the successful
applicants did not hold this license. She found that there was
no documentary evidence supporting the principal's position that
the successful applicants were better qualified for the positions
than Feil, and concluded that the "selection process was
arbitrary in nature."
The award, issued on August 9, 1999, found that the
Board violated article 20 of the CBA by acting in an arbitrary
manner when selecting teachers for positions in Project Read.
The arbitrator directed the Board to place Feil in Project Read
at PS 173 for the 1999-2000 school year, and to award her back
pay. The Board appointed Feil to the position, but resisted
the back-pay award. Pursuant to CPLR article 75, UFT moved in
Supreme Court to confirm the award. The Board cross-moved to
vacate under CPLR 7511(b) (iii), arguing that the arbitrator
exceeded her authority. Supreme Court confirmed the award and
denied the Board's cross-motion. The Appellate Division
unanimously reversed, vacating the award and holding that "this
award violates public policy by impermissibly infringing on the
nondelegable responsibility of the public school system to
maintain educational standards" (298 2 60, 61-62 [1st Dept
2002]). As an alternative basis for reversal, the Appellate
Division found that the award "exceeded the arbitrator's power"
under the CBA ( id.).
II.We begin our analysis by determining which of the
parties' arguments are subject to our review. We conclude, as
the Appellate Division did, that by failing to move to stay and
participating in the arbitration, the Board waived its right to
seek vacatur of the award on the basis that the parties did not
agree to arbitrate disputes arising out of Project Read. We
further conclude that the Board's actions did not forfeit its
right to seek vacatur of the award on public policy grounds. The role of public policy in restricting an
arbitrator's power to resolve disputes arises at two distinct
points on the arbitration continuum. It first appears as a
ground for obtaining a stay of arbitration when a party
challenges the arbitrability of a dispute. It reappears as a
ground for vacating the award as being made in excess of the
arbitrator's powers. In Matter of City of Johnstown (Johnstown Police
Benevolent Assn.) (99 2 273 [2002]), we stated a two-part test
for determining the arbitrability of a dispute: the "did-they-
agree-to-arbitrate" prong, which requires that we examine the
agreement to determine what issues the parties agreed to submit
to arbitration; and the "may-they-arbitrate" prong, which asks
"whether there is any statutory, constitutional or public policy
prohibition against arbitration of the grievance" (99 2 at 278
[citations omitted]). Because arbitrability is a threshold question going to
the arbitrator's power to resolve the dispute, a party can seek
judicial intervention to determine whether the dispute is
arbitrable before consenting to arbitration. Moreover, the CPLR
requires that in order to raise the "did-they-agree-to-arbitrate"
prong of arbitrability in a motion to vacate, a party must move
to stay before participating in arbitration ( compareCPLR 7511 [b][1] withCPLR 7511 [b][2]). Of course, a party may choose
not to move to stay arbitration for a variety of legitimate
economic or tactical reasons. But with forbearance comes risk:
a party that participates in the arbitration may not later seek
to vacate the award by claiming it never agreed to arbitrate the
dispute in the first place ( see Rochester City School Dist. v
Rochester Teachers Assn., , 41 NY2d 578, 583 [1977]). By contrast, a party is not required to raise the "may-
they-arbitrate" prong on a motion to stay, and may later seek to
vacate an award as violative of public policy. Indeed, while
public policy may be raised on a motion to stay, it can also be
raised for the first time on a motion to vacate ( see Hirsch v
Hirsch, , 37 NY2d 312, 315 [1975] ["[A] challenge to the
arbitrability of an issue on public policy grounds may be made
either on an application for a stay of arbitration * * * [or] on
a motion to vacate the award"] [citations omitted]; see also Matter of Professional, Clerical, Tech. Empls. Assn. [Buffalo Bd.
of Educ.], , 90 NY2d 364, 373 [1997]). We next consider whether the award violates public
policy and whether the arbitrator exceeded her powers under the
CBA.
III.
An arbitration award may be vacated on three narrow
grounds: "it violates a strong public policy, is irrational, or
clearly exceeds a specifically enumerated limitation on the
arbitrator's power" ( Matter of Board of Educ. of Arlington Cent.
School Dist. v Arlington Teachers Assn., , 78 NY2d 33, 37 1991]
[citations omitted]). Only the public policy and enumerated
powers grounds are disputed here.
As we recently stated, the scope of the public policy
exception to an arbitrator's power to resolve disputes is
extremely narrow ( see Matter of New York City Tr. Auth. v
Transport Workers Union of Am. Local 100, AFL-CIO, , 99 NY2d 1
[2002] ["[J]udicial intervention on public policy grounds
constitutes a narrow exception to the otherwise broad power of
parties to agree to arbitrate all of the disputes arising out of
their juridical relationships, and the correlative, expansive
power of arbitrators to fashion fair determinations of the
parties' rights and remedies"]).[3]
Moreover, "[j]udicial
restraint under the public policy exception is particularly
appropriate in arbitrations pursuant to public employment
collective bargaining agreements" ( id. at 6-7). In Transport Workers, we established a two-prong test
for determining whether an arbitration award violates public
policy. First, where a court can conclude "without engaging in
any extended factfinding or legal analysis" that a law
"prohibits, in an absolute sense, the particular matters to be
decided . . . by arbitration" (99 2 at 9 [citations omitted]),
an arbitrator cannot act. Second, an arbitrator cannot issue an
award where "the award itself violates a well-defined
constitutional, statutory or common law of this State" ( id. at 11
[citations omitted]).
Transport Workers spoke to whether two awards should be
vacated on public policy grounds because they improperly
infringed on the employer's statutory duty "to exercise all
requisite and necessary authority to manage, control and direct
the maintenance and operation of transit facilities * * * for the
convenience and safety of the public" (99 2 at 8, citingPublic Authorities Law § 1204[15]). We upheld the awards,
finding that Public Authorities Law § 1204(15) contained only a
general responsibility that did not prohibit delegation of the
duty "in an absolute sense" (99 2 at 8-9), and that no other
well-defined law or policy barred the awards. Citing Cohoes City School Dist. v Cohoes Teachers Assn.
(40 2 774 [1976]), Matter of Candor Cent. School Dist. (Candor
Teachers Assn. (42 2 266 [1977]) and Honeoye Falls-Lima Cent.
School Dist. v Honeoye Falls-Lima Educ. Assn. (49 2 732
[1980]), the Board argues that this award should be vacated
because public policy prohibits it from bargaining away its
vested responsibility to determine if a candidate is qualified
for a teaching position. We have never held, however, that an
award violates public policy if it affects teacher qualifications
( see Matter of Enlarged City School Dist. of Troy [Troy Teachers
Assn.], , 69 NY2d 905, 907 [1987] [" Even assuming that the School
District must remain the ultimate judge of an applicant's
qualifications . . . "][emphasis added]). Moreover, even if we
had, this "policy" is not triggered by the facts here, as the
award did not force the Board to hire or select a non-qualified
candidate for a teaching position. Rather, the award overruled
the Board's decision not to select a particular qualified
candidate where the arbitrator found the selection process
arbitrary and capricious ( see Matter of Middle Country Teachers
Assn. v Middle Country Cent. School Dist., 231 AD2d 570 [2d Dept
1996], lv denied , 89 NY2d 806 [1997] [declining to vacate award in
favor of grievant as against public policy where grievant, the
"weakest qualified applicant," was nonetheless qualified]). The Board further relies on Honeoye for the principle
that public policy prohibits a school board from "surrender[ing]
through collective bargaining a responsibility vested in the
board in the interest of maintaining adequate standards in the
classrooms" (49 2 at 734 [emphasis added]). We have never
held, however, that the interest of "maintaining adequate
standards" is, standing alone, sufficient to vacate an award as
violative of public policy ( see Cohoes City School Dist, 40 NY2d
at 775-778 [public policy bars delegation of tenure decisions];
Candor Cent School Dist, 42 NY2d at 271 [public policy bars
delegation of right to terminate a probationary appointment at
the close of the probationary period]; Honeoye, 49 NY2d at 733
[public policy bars delegation of responsibility for implementing
layoffs]). This maintenance-of-adequate standards principle is
akin to the statute we reviewed in Transport Workers. It is a
general responsibility and does not "prohibit, in an absolute
sense," an arbitrator from reviewing a school's selection from
among qualified candidates for an after-school position. It is
only when the interest in maintaining adequate standards is
attached to a well-defined law that public policy is implicated.
The Board points to no such law applicable to the decision made
here, and so cannot meet the second prong of the Transport
Workers test. Next, Matter of Three Vil. Teachers' Assn. v Three Vil.
Cent. School Dist. (128 2 626 [2d Dept 1987], lv denied , 70 NY2d 608 [1987]), relied on by the Appellate Division below, does
not control the outcome here. In Three Village, the court found
that the "school district's ultimate responsibility to determine
the qualifications required and preferred for a particular
teaching position, * * * and to determine whether a prospective
applicant is possessed of those qualifications is a
responsibility of the type that may not be bargained away, as it
is central to the maintenance of adequate standards in the
classroom" (128 2 at 627 [citation omitted]). Importantly, the Three Village Court found that the
award violated Education Law § 2573(9), which provides that no
teacher "shall be appointed to the teaching force of a city who
does not possess qualifications required under this chapter and
under the regulations prescribed by the commissioner of
education." Here, the award does not impinge on the school's
responsibility to appoint qualified teachers to positions in the
public schools, nor is Education Law § 2573(9) even applicable.
Three Village also involved a "past practice" that "permitted the
school district a degree of discretion" in determining teacher
qualifications (128 2 at 627).[4]Given the narrow scope of the public policy exception
to an arbitrator's powers, we decline to find that public policy
has an interest in choosing from among qualified candidates for
after-school teaching positions. The Board has provided no
reason why public policy requires such a result. The question
left open in Enlarged City School Dist. is not implicated on
these facts, and so we leave its resolution for another day. Finally, we also disagree with the Appellate Division's
alternative conclusion that the arbitrator exceeded the scope of
her authority under the CBA. "[I]t is not for the courts to
interpret the substantive conditions of the contract or to
determine the merits of the dispute" ( Board of Educ., Lakeland
Cent. School Dist. of Shrub Oak v Barni, , 51 NY2d 894, 895
[1980]). This is true "even where the apparent, or even the
plain, meaning of the words of the contract has been disregarded"
( Maross Constr. v Central N. Y. Regional Transp. Auth., , 66 NY2d 341, 346 [1985] [citations omitted]). In Matter of New York
State Correctional Officers & Police Benevolent Assn. v State (, 94 NY2d 321 [1999]), we refused to disturb an award, cognizant of
the fact that "[a] court cannot examine the merits of an
arbitration award and substitute its judgment for that of the
arbitrator simply because it believes its interpretation would be
the better one. Indeed, even in circumstances where an
arbitrator makes errors of law or fact, courts will not assume
the role of overseers to conform the award to their sense of
justice" ( id. at 326 [citations omitted] [emphasis added]). The arbitrator determined that the dispute fell within
the scope of article 20 of the CBA. She found that the
principal's decisionmaking process was arbitrary and capricious.
These interpretations and factual findings appear highly
debatable on this record; however, whether we agree with the
arbitrator is beside the point. Further, the Board may not
revive what is, in actuality, a challenge to arbitrability in
another guise. By submitting to arbitration, the Board ran the
risk that the arbitrator would find Project Read covered under
some provision of the CBA, as she did, notwithstanding the
Board's position that Project Read positions were outside the
agreement's scope. Having determined that the selection process for
Project Read was encompassed within article 20, the arbitrator
had the authority under article 22 to find that the Board's
exercise of its discretion under this provision was arbitrary and
capricious, and to fashion an appropriate remedy. In finding
that the arbitrator had "couched her analysis of the case in
procedural terms" but that her decision was really "directed at
the substantive grounds on which the selection was made" (298
2 at 66), the Appellate Division went beyond the face of the
award and substituted its judgment for the arbitrator's. This
was error. Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should
be reversed, with costs, and the order and judgment of Supreme
Court reinstated.
Footnotes
1 Article 20 provides that "[w]ith respect to matters not covered by
this Agreement which are proper subjects for collective bargaining, the Board
agrees that it will make no changes without appropriate prior consultation and
negotiation with the Union. . . . All existing determinations, authorizations,
by-laws, regulations, rules, rulings, resolutions, certifications, orders,
directives, and other actions, made, issued or entered into by the Board of
Education governing or affecting salary and working conditions of the
employees in the bargaining unit shall continue in force during the term of
this Agreement, except insofar as change is commanded by law."
2 Article 22 provides that "[g]rievances involving the exercise of Board
discretion under any term of this Agreement may be submitted to arbitration to
determine whether the provision was disregarded or applied in a discriminatory
or arbitrary or capricious manner so as to constitute an abuse of discretion.
. . . The arbitrator shall limit his decision strictly to the application and
interpretation of the provisions of this Agreement and he shall be without
power or authority to make any decision: . . . (2) Involving Board discretion
under the provisions of this Agreement, . . . except that the arbitrator may
decide in a particular case whether the provision was disregarded or applied
in a discriminatory or arbitrary or capricious manner so as to constitute an
abuse of discretion, namely whether the challenged judgment was based upon
facts which justifiably could lead to the conclusion as opposed to merely
capricious or whimsical preferences or the absence of supporting factual
reasons."
3 We note that our decision in Transport Workers postdates the Appellate
Division's decision here.
4 The other cases relied on by the Appellate Division are also
distinguishable. Matter of Riverhead Cent. School Dist. of Towns of
Riverhead, Southhampton & Brookhaven v Riverhead Cent. Faculty Assn. (140 2
526 [2d Dept 1988], lv denied , 72 NY2d 810) involved an appointment to a
coaching position, and relied on Enlarged City School Dist., without noting
that this case left open the question of qualifications. Matter of Board of
Educ. of Port Jefferson Union Free School Dist. v Port Jefferson Teachers'
Assn. (243 2 468 [2d Dept 1997], lv denied , 91 NY2d 814), also involving a
coaching position, found that the grievance was not arbitrable, and cited to
Riverhead as an alternative basis for staying arbitration. In Matter of
Meehan v Nassau Community Coll. (152 2 313 [2d Dept 1989] lv dismissed , 75 NY2d 1005), leave to appeal was dismissed for nonfinality. Finally, Matter of
South Country Cent. School Dist. (103 2 780 [2d Dept 1984]) relied on
Matter of Sweet Home Cent. School Dist. v Sweet Home Educ. Assn. (58 2 912,
914 [1983]), a case superseded by statute.