Excerpt of the SC Decision on the KB case

The following is the text of the resolution promulgated by the Supreme Court En Banc, remanding the controversial Kuratong Baleleng rubout case to the Quezon City Regional Trial Court, and setting guidelines for the RTC to refer to when it deliberates on whether to reopen the case.

G.R. No. 149453
People of the Philippines et al. vs Panfilo M. Lacson

(24) On the same day, respondent Lacson filed before the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari against Judge Pasamba, the Secretary of Justice, the PNP chief, State Prosecutors Ong and Zacarias, 2nd Assistant City Prosecutor Jamolin, and the People of the Philippines. The said petition was amended to implead as additional party-respondents State Prosecutor Claro Arellano and the RTC, Quezon City, Branch 81 in which the Informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112 were filed.

(25) The Second Amended Petition dated June 14, 2001 and admitted by the Court of Appeals on June 26, 2001, alleged:

“The reliefs of certiorari, prohibition and injunction against the questioned Order (Annex A) and the new Informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112 pending before respondent Yadao (Annex B) are founded upon the grave abuse of discretion by respondent Judge Pasamba of her discretion in its issuance, the illegality of the proceedings of the respondent State Prosecutors as they cannot revive complaints which had been dismissed over two years from the date the dismissal order was issued, and the invalidity of the new Informations for Murder filed against petitioners and others, all in defiance of law and jurisprudence as shown by the following:

(a) Respondent judge ruled that the merits of the main prohibition action a quo rendering the same moot and academic by concluding that the dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679-Q-99-81689 by the QC RTC was not final and executory, hence [i] complaints therein can be reinvestigated, and [ii] petitioner’s arraignment while the case had not yet been remanded to the QC-RTC and while the Sandiganbayan had valid jurisdiction thereover [Criminal Cases No. 23047-2048] was void, notwithstanding that the only issue in the TRO application was the existence or lack of a valid complaint as defined in Sl and S3, Rule 110.

(b) Respondent Judge ruled that respondent State Prosecutors could proceed to re-investigate and thereafter file new Informations on June 6, 2001 covering those offenses subject of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679-Q-99-81689 on the basis of affidavits filed after said cases were dismissed on March 29, 1999, despite the fact that under Section 8, Rule 117, cases similar to those filed against the petitioner and others (where the penalty imposable is imprisonment of six years or more) cannot be revived after two years from the date the dismissal order was issued.

(c) Respondent Judge held that the petitioner had not shown a right to be preserved despite evidence showing the short cuts taken by respondent State prosecutors in re-investigating a dismissed case, in not complying with Rules in respect of its re-opening, and in insisting that a valid complaint was filed in clear violation of the Rules and case law thereon, and despite the fact that petitioner had shown that an inextendible deadline of June 5, 2001 was given him to file his counter-affidavit without which his indictment for a non-bailable offense is assured because of DOJ Secretary Hernando Perez’s political schemes.”

(26) In the meantime, on June 8, 2001, respondent Lacson also filed with the RTC-QC Branch 81 (presided by Judge Ma. Theresa Yadao), a Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable Cause and in the absence thereof, to dismiss the cases outright. Respondent Lacson, however, filed a Manifestation and Motion dated June 13, 2001 seeking the suspension of the proceedings before the trial court.

(27) The Court of Appeals issued a temporary restraining order enjoining Judge Yadao from issuing a warrant of arrest or conducting any proceeding or hearing in Criminal Cases Nos 01-101102 to 01-101112.

(28) On Aug. 24, 2001, the Court of Appeals (Special Third Division), rendered the now assailed Decision. It characterized the termination of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 as “provisional dismissal,” and considered Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112 as mere revivals of the same. Applying Section 8, Rule 117 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, it dismissed the criminal cases against the respondent, viz:

“In sum, this Court is of the considered view that the subject dismissal of [the] criminal cases was provisional in nature and that the cases presently sought to be prosecuted by the respondents are mere revival or re-opening of the dismissed cases. The present controversy, being one involving “provisional dismissal” and revival of criminal cases, falls within the purview of the prescriptive period provided under Section 8, Rule 117 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. The second paragraph of the said provision is couched in clear, simple and categorical words. It mandates that for offenses punishable by imprisonment of more than six years, as the subject criminal cases, their provisional dismissal shall become permanent two years after the issuance of the order without the case having been revived. It should be noted that the revival of the subject criminal cases, even if reckoned from the DOJ’s issuance of subpoenas to petitioner, was commenced only on April 19, 2001, that is, more than two years after the issuance, on March 29, 1999, of RTC-Quezon City’s Resolution, provisionally dismissing the criminal cases now sought to be revived. Applying the clear and categorical mandate of Section 8, Rule 117, supra, such efforts to revive the criminal cases are now definitely barred by the two-year prescriptive period provided therein.

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WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. As prayed for, the Temporary Restraining Order earlier issued against the conduct of further proceedings in Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112, including the issuance of warrants of arrest against the petitioner, PANFILO M. LACSON, is hereby made PERMANENT. Accordingly, with respect to said accused, the proceedings conducted by respondent State Prosecutors in respect of the said is criminal cases are declared NULL AND VOID and the corresponding Informations, docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 01­-101102 to 01-101112, entitled ‘People of the Philippines vs. PanfiloM. Lacson, et al.” and filed before respondent Judge Maria Theresa L. Yadao of Branch 81 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, are hereby ordered DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.”

The issue is whether Section 8, Rule 117 bars the filing of the 11 informations against the respondent Lacson involving the killing of some members of the Kuratong Baleleng gang. (emphasis ours—Ed.) This rule which took effect on Dec. 1, 2000 provides:

“SEC. 8. Provisional dismissal. — A case shall not be provisionally dismissed except with the express consent of the accused and with notice to the offended party.

The provisional dismissal of offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding six years or a fine of any amount, or both, shall become permanent one year after issuance of the order without the case having been revived. With respect to offenses punishable by imprisonment of more than six years, their provisional dismissal shall become permanent two years after issuance of the order without the case having been revived.”

Like any other favorable procedural rule, this new rule can be given retroactive effect. However, this Court cannot rule on this jugular issue due to the lack of sufficient factual bases. Thus, there is need of proof of the following facts, viz: (1) whether provisional dismissal of the cases had the express consent of the accused; (2) whether it was ordered by the court after notice to the offended party, (3) whether the two-year period to revive has already lapsed, and (4) whether there is any justification for the filing of the cases beyond the two-year period. (Emphasis ours)

There is no uncertainty with respect to the fact that the provisional dismissal of the cases against respondent Lacson bears his express consent. It was respondent Lacson himself who moved to dismiss the subject cases for lack of probable cause before then Judge Agnir, hence, it is beyond argument that their dismissal bears his express consent.

The records of the case, however, do not reveal with equal clarity and conclusiveness whether notices to the offended parties were given before the cases against the respondent Lacson were dismissed by then Judge Agnir. It appears from the resolution of then Judge Agnir that the relatives of the victims who desisted did not appear during the hearing to affirm their affidavits. Their affidavits of desistance were only presented by Atty. Godwin Valdez who testified that he assisted the private complainants in preparing their affidavits and he signed them as a witness. It also appears that only seven persons submitted their affidavits of desistance, namely:

1. Myrna Abalora, mother of the victims Sherwin Abalora and Rey Abalora
2. Carmelita Elcamel, wife of Wilbur Elcamel;
3. Leonora Amora, mother of victim Joel Amora;
4. Nenita Alap-ap, wife of victim Carlito Alap-ap;
5. Imelda Montero, wife of victim Manuel Montero;
6. Margarita Redillas, mother of victim Hilario Jevy Redillas; and
7. Rolando Siplon.

From the records of the case before us, it cannot be determined whether there were affidavits of desistance executed by the relatives of the three other victims, namely: Meleubren Soronda, Pacifico Montero Jr., and Alex Neri. The same records do not show whether they were notified of the hearing or had knowledge thereof. To be sure, it is not fair to expect the element of notice to be litigated before then Judge Agnir for Section 8, Rule 117 was yet inexistent at that time.

The fact of notice to the offended parties was not raised either in the petition for prohibition with application for temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction filed by respondent Lacson in the RTC of Manila, presided by Judge Pasamba, to enjoin the prosecutors from reinvestigating the said cases against him. The only question raised in said petition is whether the reinvestigation will violate the right of respondent Lacson against double jeopardy. Thus, the issue of whether or not the reinvestigation is barred by Section 8, Rule 117 was not tackled by the litigants. (Emphasis ours)

Nor was the fact of notice to the offended parties the subject of proof after the 11 informations for murder against respondent Lacson and company were revived in the RTC of Quezon City presided by Judge Yadao. There was hardly any proceeding conducted in the case, for respondent Lacson immediately filed a petition for certiorari in the appellate court challenging, among others, the authority of Judge Yadao to entertain the revived informations for multiple murder against him.

This is not to be wondered at. The applicability of Section 8, Rule 117 was never considered in the trial court. It was in the Court of Appeals where respondent Lacson raised for the first time the argument that Section 8, Rule 117 bars the revival of the multiple murder cases against him. But even then, the appellate court did not require the parties to elucidate the crucial issue of whether notices were given to the offended parties before Judge Agnir ordered the dismissal of the cases against respondent Lacson and company. To be sure, there is a statement in the Decision of the appellate court to the effect that “records show that the prosecution and the private offended parties were notified of the hearing x x x.” It is doubtful whether this finding is supported by the records of the case. It appears to be contrary to Judge Agnir’s finding that only seven of the complainants submitted affidavits of desistance.

Indeed, the records of this case are inconclusive on the factual issue of whether the multiple murder cases against respondent Lacson are being revived within or beyond the two-year bar. (Emphasis ours) The reckoning date of the two-year bar has to be first determined — whether it is from the date of the Order of then Judge Agnir dismissing the cases or from the dates the Order were received by the various offended parties or from the date of the effectivity of the new rule.

If the cases were revived only after the two-year bar, the State must be given the opportunity to justify its failure to comply with said timeline. The new rule fixes a timeline to penalize the State for its inexcusable delay in prosecuting cases already filed in courts. It can therefore present compelling reasons to justify the revival of cases beyond the two-year bar.

In light of the lack of or the conflicting evidence on the various requirements to determine the applicability of Section 8, Rule 117, this Court is not in a position to rule whether or not the re-filing of the cases for multiple murder against respondent Lacson should be enjoined. Fundamental fairness requires that both the prosecution and the respondent Lacson should be afforded the opportunity to be heard and to adduce evidence on the presence or absence of the predicate facts upon which the application of the new rule depends. They involve disputed facts and arguable questions of law. The reception of evidence on these various issues cannot be done in this Court but before the trial court. (Emphasis ours)

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the case at bar is remanded to the RTC-Quezon City, Branch 81 so that the State prosecutors and the respondent Lacson can adduce evidence and be heard on whether the requirements of Section 8, Rule 117 have been complied with on the basis of the evidence of which the trial court should make a ruling on whether the Informations in Criminal to 01-101102 to 01-101112 should be dismissed or not. Pending the restrained from issuing any warrant of arrest against respondent Lacson. Melo and Carpio, JJ., take no part.

SO ORDERED

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