B. CHEMICAL DETECTIONS AND EXPOSURES

According to Gulf veterans who testified before the Human Resources Subcommittee, thousands of chemical alarms sounded and numerous chemical detections by trained U.S. specialists with state-of-the-art equipment were made only to be ignored by American commanders. Czech chemical warfare experts recorded numerous detections, including detections along the Saudi border where hundreds of thousands of United States troops were massed for invasion.
DOD has admitted that "the Czech detections were valid."⁴¹
In May 1994, DOD Secretary William Perry and Joint Chiefs Chairman John Shalikashvili signed a memorandum to Gulf veterans declaring: "There have been reports in the press of the possibility that some of you were exposed to chemical or biological weapons agents. There is no information, classified or unclassified, that indicates that chemical or biological weapons were used in the Persian Gulf."⁴²
In October 1994, however, the Senate Banking Committee released a staff report which compiled official documents and eyewitness testimony suggesting that U.S. troops had been exposed to chemical warfare agents during the Gulf War.⁴³
In March 1995, another event cast some doubt on DOD's insistence that there were no chemical or biological warfare agent exposures. In a television interview, John Deutch, then Deputy Secretary of DOD repeatedly qualified his statements regarding chemical weapons exposures in the Gulf War:

Mr. DEUTCH. Our most thorough and careful efforts to determine whether chemical agents were used in the Gulf lead us to conclude that there was no widespread use of chemicals against U.S. troops.
BRADLEY. Was there any use? Forget widespread.
Mr. DEUTCH. I -- I do not believe . . .
BRADLEY. . . . was there any use?
Mr. DEUTCH. I do not believe there was any offensive use of chemical agents by Iraqi military troops. There was not . . .
BRADLEY. Was there any -- any accidental use. Were our troops exposed in any way to chemical . . .
Mr. DEUTCH. I do not believe that our troops were exposed in any widespread way to chemical . . .
BRADLEY. In any narrow way? In any way?
Mr. DEUTCH. The Defense Science Board did an independent study of this matter and found, in their judgment, that there was not confirmation of chemical weapon widespread use in the Gulf.⁴⁴ (emphasis added)

The Pentagon, after 5 years of denial that United States troops were exposed to chemical weapons, finally admitted in June 1996 that 300 to 400 soldiers were "presumed exposed" to chemical warfare agents from fallout following detonation of Iraqi munitions bunkers at Khamisiyah. The number of "presumed exposed" continued to rise rapidly and by July 1997 the Pentagon had raised the number of exposed to 98,900.⁴⁵
In a January 1996 report to the Human Resources Subcommittee, Dr. Jonathan Tucker stated, "Considerable data [exists] suggestive of such exposures during the Gulf War. During 1993-94, the staff of the U.S. Senate Banking Committee issued three reports compiling extensive circumstantial evidence for both direct and indirect exposures to U.S. troops to CBW [Chemical/Biological Warfare] agents during the war. In addition, a workshop sponsored by the National Institutes of Health [NIH] in April 1994 found that despite the lack of hard evidence, the possibility of CBW exposures should not be ruled out prematurely. The NIH report concluded, 'Until it can be unequivocally established that chemical and/or biological weapons were not used and that troops were not exposed to plumes of destroyed stockpiles, the possibility remains that some symptoms are chronic manifestations of such exposure.' "⁴⁶
Dr. Tucker pointed out that in the last few years considerable information in the public domain -- including press accounts, interviews, declassified Government documents under the Freedom of Information Act or posted on GulfLink⁴⁷ -- presents a variety of evidence indicating Coalition troops were exposed to low levels of chemical warfare agents. He stated that while these exposures had no influence on the war's outcome, "they appear to have resulted in delayed health problems in many of the exposed troops." In additions to "affected United States troops, Gulf War illness has been reported among Australian, British, Canadian, Czech, Hungarian, Kuwaiti, New Zealander, and Norwegian veterans."
Chemical detections during the war were also reported by French and Czech forces, Dr. Tucker stated. Among detections by the French were nerve and mustard vapors near King Khalid Military City during the air bombing campaign. Among the Czech detections were some along the Saudi border where hundreds of thousands of United States ground troops were massed for the invasion of Iraq.
According to a General Accounting Office [GAO] report, "It is important to note that detections of the nerve agent Sarin occurred on January 19, 1991, and of mustard gas on January 24, 1991, by Coalition partners from Czechoslovakia in areas near Hafir al Batin. DOD has verified the reliability of the Czech equipment but never identified the source [emphasis added] of these detections, although both DOD and CIA have deemed the detections credible. One cannot rule out the possibility that these detections were the result of fallout from Coalition bombing."⁴⁸
A recent NY Times report, following an interview in Prague with Defense officials and Gulf War veterans, stated: "Czech detection teams patrolling the northern Saudi Arabian desert in January 1991 were convinced that nerve gas detected in the early days of the war had been released from Iraqi chemical plants bombed by the United States."
"Yet despite the reputation of Czech soldiers and their chemical equipment for reliability, combat logs compiled by officers working for Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf show that American commanders ignored Czech warnings that low levels of nerve and mustard gas had been detected in the vicinity of American troops," The Times reported. "Czech soldiers recalled that even as they hurriedly pulled on their gas masks and rubberized chemical warfare suits after detecting chemical agents in the northern Saudi desert, the Americans who were stationed only several hundred feet away remained unprotected.⁴⁹
According to the Tucker Report, "Although DOD officials insist that all chemical agent detections by United States forces in the Gulf were false, they have reluctantly admitted that detections by Czech chemical defense detachments operation under contract to the Saudi government appear to have been authentic."⁵⁰
"In addition to chemical alarms not associated with any obvious military activity, which were presumably triggered by chemical fallout from the bombing campaign," Dr. Tucker stated, "many sick Gulf War veterans describe incidents in which they believe they were directly exposed to a chemical attack. Although most of these accounts are based exclusively on eyewitness testimony, in some cases the veterans' accounts have been corroborated by the available documentary record. A number of direct chemical exposures reported by veterans were associated with attacks by Iraqi SCUD or Frog ballistic missiles."⁵¹
One such exposure cited by Dr. Tucker included the statement: "Testifying in March 1994 before a subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee, Sgt. George Vaughn . . . described a SCUD attack . . . in which he claimed he was exposed to some toxic chemical. During an alert, Vaughn experienced a problem with sealing his gas mask and the lens fogged up . . . but in the heat of the moment . . . [he] took the mask off his head. He immediately experienced a bitter almond taste and began choking. Within a day or two, Vaughn and three other members of his unit began to experience nausea, diarrhea, and severe fatigue. The gastrointestinal symptoms persisted after the four men returned from the Gulf. All four also developed fatty skin tumors called angiolipomas, which were surgically removed by have grown back repeatedly. Vaughn testified that the tumors have caused numbness in his arms and limited his motor skills.⁵²
Among numerous detection devices and equipment used in the war by U.S. forces were M8A1 detector/alarms and the FOX detection vehicles. The Tucker report states that each of the nearly 14,000 M8A1 alarms deployed in the war went off an average of two or three times a day.⁵³
"The alarms went off so frequently, day and night, that some commanders ordered their troops to disregard or even disable them because no obvious symptoms of nerve-agent poisoning had been observed. DOD officials contend that every one of the tens of thousands of chemical agent alerts during the Gulf War was a false alarm,"⁵⁴ Dr. Tucker reported.
The most sophisticated CW agent detection system deployed in the Gulf was the German-made FOX Nuclear/Biological/Chemical [NBC] Reconnaissance Vehicle, and air-tight detector vehicle designed to detect chemical contamination on the ground so that advancing troops can avoid those areas. It carries a crew of four.
Two detection experts in the Gulf War, Army Major Michael Johnson and Marine Gy/Sgt. George Grass, appeared before the Human Resources and Intergovernmental Relations Subcommittee on December 10, 1996. Though still on active duty, they agreed to testify despite concerns about their military careers.
Major Johnson was a commander of a FOX troop of detection vehicles. In testimony before the Human Resources subcommittee, he stated: "On 7 August 1991, the 54th Chemical Troop received the task of confirming the presence of a suspect liquid chemical agent a the Sabahiya High School for Girls [Kuwait]. I led the mission . . . [with] two FOX vehicles. The mass spectrometer showed the presence of H-Agent (Mustard, a highly volatile blister agent) in the soil. Simultaneously, a dismounted collection team, in full chemical over garments, moved to the container (estimated to be 800-1,000 liter capacity) with chemical agent monitors [CAM] and chemical detection equipment. The dismounted collection team employed detection paper and the CAM . . . the detection paper [registered] H-Agent detection; the CAM registered H-Agent."⁵⁵
Major Johnson indicated that additional tests by both FOX vehicles registered the same results -- H-Mustard agent. He also reported that while withdrawing liquid from the container, a British soldier and member of team, had liquid drops make contact with his wrist. He was in extreme pain immediately and going into shock. He was decontaminated and taken to the hospital. The tapes and samples were turned over to personnel wearing camouflage with no rank or patches. It is unknown what happened to the tapes and samples [or the British soldier], according to Major Johnson.⁵⁶
"I would like to emphasize that these are the facts and not speculation of what actions we took," stated Major Johnson. "I know that my unit . . . did in fact detect and confirm the presence of toxic chemical warfare agents in Kuwait."⁵⁷
Gy/Sgt. Grass, a FOX vehicle commander, also reported confirmed detections to the Human Resources Subcommittee. One detection reported was near an ammunition storage area outside Kuwait City. He testified: "The alarm sounded on the mass spectrometer with a full and distinct spectrum across the monitor and a lethal vapor concentration of S-Mustard. We drove the FOX closer to the dug-in ammo bunkers and fully visible were the skull and crossbones on yellow tape with red lettering, and scull [sic] and crossbones on boxes [of ammo] and on signs. As we continued driving through the same ammo storage area the alarm sounded again . . . HT-Mustard in lethal dose came across the monitor . . . again with skull and cross bones. Another alarm sounded showing positive readings of Benzine Bromide."⁵⁸
Gy/Sgt. Grass stated: "I gave my superior officers all the mass spectrometer tickets from the Al Jaber Airfield [detections in the oil fields] and the ammo storage area . . . I never saw the tickets I had given them again. When the EOD [ordnance disposal team] arrived, I escorted them to where the chemical weapons were detected [in the ammo storage area] . . . they donned full protective equipment . . . [and later] . . . verbally acknowledged the presence of chemicals weapons in the storage area."⁵⁹
"Since returning from the Gulf War, I have spoken to almost every FOX vehicle commander from both the 1st and 2d Marine Divisions," Gy/Sgt. Grass concluded, "and every one of them has verbally acknowledged the positive identification of chemical agents in their area of operations."⁶⁰
A DOD report on the Gy/Sgt. Grass' detection stated: "Based on the information available thus far in this investigation, the presence of a chemical warfare agent in this area . . . is judged to be 'Unlikely.' Although two members of the FOX crew believe that their mass spectrometer detected something, the MM-q did not sound an alarm. Senior NBC officers said that there was no report of chemical warfare agents at this time. Finally, there is no physical evidence -- no spectrum, no sample, et cetera."⁶¹
When a subcommittee Member asked Major Johnson and Gy/Sgt. Grass if they were suffering any physical effects from their Gulf War service, both men answered yes. Major Johnson said he began to have problems after he returned home . . . "changes in my blood pressure, headaches, burning eyes, joint pain, a mysterious growth in my left knee, chest pains, and gastrointestinal bleeding."⁶²
Gy/Sgt. Grass said, "I have rashes on my ankle and other parts of my body. My wife has been diagnosed with multiple sclerosis, and there are just numerous cases of illnesses that people have from something that went on over there, whether that was the exposure of chemical weapons or the biological weapons or both."⁶³
Dr. Tucker, in testimony before the Human resources Subcommittee, stated: "Low level exposures to chemical weapons appear to have resulted from three sources: Chemical fallout from the aerial bombardment of Iraqi field munitions depots containing chemical weapons; explosive demolition of munitions bunkers by United States combat engineers; and sporadic and uncoordinated Iraqi use of chemical weapons in the ground campaign. The Pentagon would have us believe that the Khamisiyah incident is the whole story, I will argue that it is just the tip of the iceberg."⁶⁴
Dr. Tucker, in his statement, identified over 55 specific chemical weapons detection or exposure incidents, and their locations, from January 13 to March 26, 1991.⁶⁵ In addition, he cites a U.S. Marine Corps survey of 1,600 chemical-defense specialists from Marine units who served in the Gulf War. A declassified Marine report stated that 221 respondents (about 13 percent) reported some contact with or detection of Iraqi chemical weapons during the ground war.⁶⁶
In addition, the possibility is raised by Dr. Tucker that the Iraqi saboteurs who ignited the Kuwaiti oil well fires may have deliberately contaminated some of them with chemical warfare agents. He cites a captured top-secret Iraqi military record which gives detailed instructions for sabotaging 31 oil wells with explosives. The record includes an attached letter from the commander of the 29th Infantry Battalion which states in part: "Please send an assigned person from your personnel to the Chemical Rank Command of Battalion 14 to receive the chemical preparations (Tucker emphasis) distributed to your units according to the directions of the use of individual chemical protective gear and decontamination stations for equipment and vehicles.⁶⁷
"This document raises the possibility that Iraqi troops deliberately contaminated the oil well fires with chemical warfare agents, generating clouds of poison-laced smoke with the intent of debilitating Coalition forces downwind,"⁶⁸ Dr. Tucker stated.
In that connection, FOX vehicle operator Gy/Sgt. Grass also testified about detections at Kuwait's Al Jaber airfield during the oil well fires: "As the mass spectrometer was monitoring for chemical agent vapor contamination with the usual readings from the oil fires, the alarm went off and the monitor showed a lethal vapor concentration of the chemical agent S-Mustard." Gy/Sgt. Grass noted that when he reported the detection to the Division NBC officer, he was told the reading was false and had been produced by oil well vapors. "We explained to him [NBC officer] that we already know what the oil fire vapors looked like on the monitor and the readings were clearly distinct with the words S-Mustard printed across the screen and on the tape printed out as evidence of the contamination the Marines were exposed to. Division still insisted we had false readings and abruptly signed off the radio."⁶⁹
Dr. Tucker's hypothesis about Iraqi disbursement of toxic agents in the updraft and high downwinds of the oil well fires is supported by the experience of ex-CIA agent Dr. David Morehouse. While in the Gulf theater, Dr. Morehouse and other CIA agents found multiple empty canisters or metal cylinders about 20 inches long and 4 inches in diameter placed upright in the sand [and] "leaned like the Tower of Pisa," downwind of numerous well-head fires. In his book "Psychic Warrior," he writes: "It's obvious that the Iraqis placed canisters next to the fires to mask the plume from the canisters. So I think they released a slow-acting toxin to poison the Coalition forces, and they covered it up with oil well fires. Every soldier downwind of those fires must've inhaled the bug of whatever it was. The heroes had been poisoned."⁷⁰
Dr. Tucker's subcommittee statement concluded: "Evidence in the public domain from a variety of sources indicates a far larger number of credible chemical weapons detection and exposure incidents than DOD or CIA have thus acknowledged. Eyewitness accounts, declassified intelligence records, and operational logs all suggest that Iraq deployed chemical weapons into the Kuwait Theater of Operations [KTO] prior to the Gulf war and may have employed them in a sporadic and uncoordinated manner against the Coalition forces during the ground war. U.S. troops also appear to have been exposed to low level chemical warfare agents from the air bombardment and ground detonations of chemical facilities."⁷¹
Dr. Tucker, a former senior policy analyst to the Presidential Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans' Illnesses [hereinafter "PAC"], was dismissed summarily from the PAC in December 1995, allegedly for his research on chemical exposures to U.S. troops and gathering the views of people inside and outside the Government who also believed that Gulf veterans were suffering from toxic exposures. His dismissal with only 1 hour's notice was in spite of high performance review ratings.⁷²

C. TOXIC EXPOSURES IN GULF WAR THEATER

[Notes]

41. U.S. Department of Defense, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), News Briefing, Czechoslovakian Chemical Report, November 10, 1993, p. 2.
42. U.S. Department of Defense, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), News Release No. 323-94, Department of Defense Letter of Gulf War Veterans, May 26, 1997.
43. Staff Report No. 3, Senate Committee on Banking, "Chemical Warfare Agent Identification, Chemical Injuries, and Other Findings," October 7, 1994, pp. 1-24 and appendix materials (in subcommittee files).
44. Statement made to CBS News, 60 Minutes, March 12, 1995; also see supra note 2, Tucker Report, p. 5.
45. Shenon, Philip, "Study Sharply Raises Estimate of Troops Exposed," New York Times, July 24, 1997, p. A18. See also, statement to the Presidential Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans' Illnesses by Bernard Rostker, Special Assistant for Gulf War Veterans's Illnesses, U.S. Department of Defense, July 29 and July 30, 1997.
46. See supra note 2, pp. 4-5, citing National Institutes of Health, Office of the Director, Persian Gulf Experience and Health: Technology Assessment Workshop Statement, April 27-29, 1994 (Bethesda, MD, National Institutes of Health), p. 12.
47. GulfLINK is the Internet website maintained by the Department of Defense containing information on Gulf War issues. It can be found at URL http://www.dtic.dla.mil.gulflink/.
48. U.S. General Accounting Office, "Gulf War Illnesses," GAO/NSIAD-97-163, June 1997, p. 63.
49. Shenon, Philip, "Czechs Say They Warned U.S. of Chemical Weapons in Gulf," New York Times, October 19, 1996, p. A1.
50. See supra note 2, Tucker Report, p. 18.
51. Ibid., p. 23.
52. Ibid., p. 23-24.
53. Ibid., p. 16.
54. Ibid.
55. Statement of Michael Johnson, Human Resources and Intergovernmental Relations Subcommittee hearings, Nos. 5-6, pp. 79-81.
56. Ibid., pp. 82-83.
57. Ibid., p. 84.
58. Statement of George Grass, Human Resources and Intergovernmental Relations Subcommittee hearing, Nos. 5-6, p. 103.
59. Ibid., p. 104.
60. Ibid.
61. Report by the U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, "Case Narrative: U.S. Marine Corps Minefield Breaching," CMAT Control #7/29/97, 1997191-0003-330, July 29, 1997, p. 13 (in subcommittee files).
62. Testimony of Michael Johnson, Human Resources and Intergovernmental Relations Subcommittee hearings, Nos. 5-6, p. 90.
63. Testimony of George Grass, Human Resources and Intergovernmental Relations Subcommittee hearings, Nos. 5-6, p. 97.
64. Statement of Jonathan Tucker, Human Resources Subcommittee hearings, No. 2, p. 269.
65. Ibid., pp. 280, 286.
66. Ibid., p. 270 citing Captain T.F. Manley, "Marine Corps NBC Defense in Southwest Asia," Research Paper No. 92-0009, Marine Corps Research Center, Quantico, VA, July 1991, p. 11.
67. Ibid., pp. 271-272 citing "Captured Iraqi Military Record," December 2, 1990, at GulfLink file #20tr2_6.j17.
68. Ibid., p. 272.
69. Statement of George Grass, Human Resources and Intergovernmental Relations Subcommittee hearing, Nos. 5-6, p. 102.
70. David Morehouse, Psychic Warrior (St. Martin's Press, 1996), pp. 168-171.
71. Statement of Jonathan Tucker, Human Resources Subcommittee hearings, No. 2, pp. 275-276.
72. Ibid., p. 275.