Gulf War Syndrome - The Burlington Free Press, 06/15/2002:

Sanders to address British Parliament

Gulf War Syndrome - The report to Congress 11/07/97

[contents]:

Union Calendar No. 228

Back To:

Primal Scream: Beyond the Box

Essays: Gulf War Syndrome and The News

Links:

GulfWeb.org

GulfLink.mil




Pages 22 - 27 of the printed ver-sion are shown at right. A complete copy of this re-port is available from your Con-gressional Rep-resentative, or from:

U.S. Printing Office

A pdf version is available from the Federal Government at:

Library of
Congress

C. TOXIC EXPOSURES IN GULF WAR THEATER

U.S. troops who served in the Gulf War were exposed to multiple toxins, any one of which -- alone or a combination of toxins producing a synergistic interaction -- may well be responsible for the illnesses reported by thousands of veterans.
According to a GAO report, "U.S. troops might have been exposed to a variety of potentially hazardous substances. These substances include compounds used to decontaminate equipment and protect it against chemical agents, fuel used as a sand suppressant in and around encampments, fuel oil used to burn human waste, fuel in shower water, leaded vehicle exhaust used to dry sleeping bags, depleted uranium, parasites, pesticides, drugs to protect against chemical warfare agents (such as pyridostigmine bromide), and smoke from oil-well fires. DOD acknowledged in June 1996 that some veterans may have been exposed to the nerve agent Sarin following post-war demolition of Iraqi ammunition facilities."73

Chemical Weapons
After 5 years of denial that United States troops were exposed to any chemical weapons, DOD disclosed on June 21, 1996** that some 400 soldiers were "presumed exposed" to Iraqi nerve agents. This event occurred when the 37th Army Combat Engineers detonated enemy munitions bunkers at Khamisiyah,** Iraq in March 1991, sending plumes of nerve gas wafting into the atmosphere and dispersing over unprotected soldiers.74
The number of exposed troops began to rise in following months as the DOD and CIA reconsidered modeling results pertaining to wind direction and other factors. In September 1996, DOD raised the number to 5,000 exposed; in October, to nearly 21,000 exposed.75
On July 24, 1997, results of a new computer modeling study were revealed by the DOD and CIA suggesting that 98,900 United States troops must be "presumed exposed" to chemical weapons from the Khamisiyah bunker detonations. Original CIA computer modeling estimates released in June 1996 stated the plumes carried northerly for perhaps 25 miles. New modeling estimates stated the plumes carried southerly for perhaps 300 miles from the blast site, producing fallout over some 100,000 troops positioned in southern Iraq, Kuwait, and northern Saudi Arabia.76
In April 1997, the CIA released 41 declassified documents, 1 of which stated the CIA had warnings starting in 1984 that thousands of chemical weapons were stored in Khamisiyah bunkers.77 According to news accounts, the CIA claims they notified the Pentagon before the war of the presence of these weapons at Khamisiyah. The DOD had denied it until February 25, 1997, when the Pentagon disclosed that the CIA had in fact warned the Army but it never reached commanders of the 37th Army Engineers Battalion that detonated the Khamisiyah depot.78
The United Nations Special commission on Iraq [UNSCOM] testified on July 29, 1997 at the Presidential Advisory Committee [PAC] meeting in Buffalo, NY that the aerial bombardment during the war of the Ukhaydir,** Iraq chemical weapons storage depot, and possibly the Mymona** depot, sent toxins into the air that may have produced fallout over United States troops stationed in Saudi Arabia.79 The CIA, also in testimony at the PAC meeting, stated: "CIA and DOD now assess that there may have been a release of chemical agent from the Ukhaydir Ammunition Depot as a result of aerial bombing . . ." The CIA is continuing exposure modeling of this event.80
In August 1997, it was reported that a 1990 study by the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory informed the U.S. Air Force -- 3 months before the Gulf War began -- that bombing of Iraqi chemical weapons manufacturing facilities would release deadly nerve agents over U.S. troops who were massing several hundred miles to the south. This report predicted** a dispersion of chemical warfare agents over an area 10 times greater than subsequent DOD and CIA studies show.81
According to testimony before the Human Resources Subcommittee by Gulf War expert James Tuite, director of the Gulf War Research Foundation, the Livermore Laboratory study proved to be prophetic. He stated: "Up to now, the missing element . . . has been the mystery of how the [chemical] agents were transported from the research, production and storage sites in Iraq to [Coalition] troops." This has been an especially difficult issue given that it has been the long-held assertion of DOD, DIA, and the CIA that the winds were blowing in the wrong direction [northerly] during the detection events.
"The report I submit today [I believe] solves the mystery of the [chemical] detections that occurred after the initial wave of Coalition bombings of these chemical warfare agent storage facilities during the first 2 days of the air war. Using available visible and infrared meteorological satellite imagery from NOAA [National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration], which was available to military planners [but not used] during the war -- a war before which they expressed deep concern over the fallout effects from these bombings -- I have been able to determine that a thermal plume rose into the atmosphere over the largest Iraqi chemical warfare agent research, production, and storage facility at Muthanna** after Coalition aircraft and missile bombardment."
"Seventeen metric tons of Sarin were reportedly destroyed during these attacks, which began on January 17, 1991. These thermal and visual plumes extended [southerly] directly toward the areas where those same chemical warfare agents were detected and confirmed by Czechoslovak chemical specialists. Hundreds of thousands of U.S. servicemen and women were in the area where these detections occurred, assembling for the upcoming ground invasion of Iraq and the liberation of Kuwait."82

Biological Weapons
According to Dr. Jonathan Tucker's 1996 report to the subcommittee, Iraq had initially denied possession of biological weapons following the war. Over the next 5 years, however, persistent detective work by UNSCOM personnel gradually forced Iraqi authorities to admit the existence of an offensive biological warfare program, an extensive and sophisticated effort led by Ph.D. scientists trained in the west.
Dr. Tucker stated: "As the centerpiece of this effort, Iraq mass-produced and weaponized three [biological] agents on a large scale: the bacterial agent that causes the disease anthrax, which is nearly always fatal within 4 days; botulinum toxin, an exceedingly potent bacterial toxin; and aflatoxin, a fungal toxin that is a liver carcinogen but can also serve as an incapacitation agent. In addition . . . Iraq experimented with a range of other lethal and incapacitating agents."83
Dr. Tucker reported that Iraq conducted field trials of biological agents in bombs, rockets and aerosol generators from 1988 until Iraq invaded Kuwait in August 1990. At this point, their research and development [R&D] program shifted to a "crash" effort on large-scale production and weaponization.
Even if Iraq was deterred from a large-scale or overt use of chemical and biological weapons [as a result of United States warnings of massive retaliation], it may still have engaged in covert or insidious (i.e., low-level) operations. Certainly, Iraq would have nothing to gain by admitting that it had employed chemical or biological weapons during the Gulf war, and much to lose politically and economically, since such as [sic] admission would make it even less likely that the UN sanctions would be lifted. Thus, Iraq's denials [of chemical and biological weapons use] should not be taken at face-value, especially in view of the evidence for Iraqi chemical weapons use."
Dr. Tucker cites Iraqi military manuals ** on the use of chemical and biological weapons. An Iraqi Air Force Academy manual ** on nerve agents notes that these poisons "have a cumulative effect; if small doses are used repeatedly on a target, the damage can be very severe."84 An Iraqi Chemical Corps manual ** states: "It is possible to select anti-personnel biological agents in order to cause lethal or incapacitating casualties in the battle area or in the enemy's rear areas . . . [and] incapacitating agents are used to inflict casualties which require a large amount of medical supplies and treating facilities, and many people to treat them. Thus it is possible to hinder the opposing military operations."85
A report by the U.S. Navy's Biological Defense Research Program, which performed BW detection and analysis for U.S. forces during the Gulf War, concluded: "No agents (including anthrax and botulinum toxin) detected during Desert Shield/Storm despite fielding of state-of-the-art detection methods."86
A recent GAO report stated: "DOD has consistently denied that Gulf War veterans were intentionally or unintentionally exposed to biological warfare agents, and prior to June 1996, it denied any exposure to chemical warfare agents. If servicemembers were exposed, exposure would have occurred in one of three ways: 1) through intentional Iraqi use of chemical or biological warfare agents; 2) through theaterwide contamination resulting from air war bombings of Iraq, or 3) through site-specific events. DOD has taken the position that chemical and biological agent exposures can be confirmed only through evidence of mass [and immediate] incidents of morbidity and mortality. Since there were no such instances, DOD asserted that Gulf War veterans were not exposed.87
The GAO report observed: "According to the CIA . . . the Iraqis had weaponsized several biological agents at the time of the Gulf War, including anthrax, botulism, and aflatoxin (a potent liver carcinogen). . . . [Aflatoxin's'] effects may not be observed until decades after low-level exposure . . ."88

Infectious Diseases
According to the PAC December 1996 report, "Infectious diseases endemic to the Gulf region include shigellosis, malaria, sandfly fever, and cutaneous leishmaniasis. Along with these infectious diseases, DOD medical personnel also monitored troops for dengue, Sindbis, West Nile fever, Rift Valley fever, and Congo-Crimean hemorrhagic fever. The documented low rates of infection among U.S. troops suggest exposures were minimal and/or preventive measures were ineffective."89
Microbiologist and immunologist Dr. Howard Urnovitz, chairman of the Calptye Biomedical Corp., testified before the Human Resources Subcommittee on the Gulf War Syndrome. He stated: "One of my research efforts is focused on how chemical and infectious agents interact to initiate and maintain a chronic disorder. The symptoms [of Gulf War Syndrome] are similar to those of over a dozen unexplained epidemics over the last 60 years . . . including headache, muscle pain, slight paralysis, damage to the brain, spinal cord or peripheral nerves, mental disorders . . ."
"Recent studies have found that prolonged and aggressive antibiotic therapy appears to abate many of the symptoms associated with Gulf War Syndrome. Usually the therapy takes longer than ordinary treatments (i.e., 6 to 9 weeks instead of less than 3 weeks) and in many cases the symptoms return when the therapy is discontinued. It is not clear whether this response is directly due to the control of some antibiotic-sensitive microorganisms or a direct action on an inflammatory or neurologic process or some placebo effect."
"It is known that the Gulf War was one of the most toxic battlefields in the history of modern warfare. Syndromes associated with organophosphate-induced delayed neuropathy [OPIDN] could explain many of the observed and unexplained illnesses. However, it may not be mutually exclusive to have tissue damage resulting from toxic exposures, which leads to inflammatory responses in critical tissues with ensuing opportunistic bacteriological, viral, and fungal infections. The continued presence of these pathogens may greatly impair a possible healing process. All of these risk factors need to be considered in trying to understand the underlying pathology of Gulf War Syndrome."90
Dr. Garth Nicolson, chief scientific officer and research professor at the Institute for Molecular Medicine, states that some illnesses can be explained by exposure of veterans to various biological agents, called chronic pathogenic infections, in combination with chemicals and then transported home to family members. Dr. Nicolson, who has studied 650 Gulf veterans and their immediate family members, discounts stress as a major factor in causing Gulf veterans' illnesses.
In testimony before the Human Resources Subcommittee, Dr. Nicolson stated: "Gulf War illness [GWI] is not caused by stress, it is caused by multiple exposures to chemical, environmental, radiological and/or biological agents that cause chronic multisystem signs and symptoms that for the most part can be diagnosed as existing diseases. we have been particularly interested in veterans with GWI whose family members are now also sick with similar signs and symptoms, suggesting that many GWI patients suffer from biological, not chemical or radiological, origins for their illnesses. Illnesses caused by chemical or radiological exposures should not be transmitted to family members. GWI in immediate family members is officially denied by DOD and VA."91
"After examining GWI patients" blood for the presence of chronic biological agents, the most common infection found was an unusual microorganism, Mycoplasma fermentans (incognitus strain), a slow-growing mycoplasma located deep inside blood leukocytes (white blood cells) of slightly under one-half of GWI patients studied. When they are in the blood, similar to other bacteria, they can cause a dangerous system-wide or systemic infection. In addition, cell-penetrating mycoplasmas, such as Mycoplasma fermentans, may produce unusual autoimmune-like signs and symptoms . . ."92
"In GWI patients that tested positive for mycoplasmal infections in their blood, we have found that this type of infection can be successfully treated with multiple courses of specific antibiotics, such as doxycycline. Multiple treatment cycles are required, and patients relapse often after the first few cycles, but subsequent relapses are milder and patients eventually recover."93
"Chemical exposures can cause toxicological effects and produce many but not all of the signs and symptoms of GWI. In addition, chemical exposures can result in immunosuppression and leave an individual susceptible to infections."94
Leishmaniasis is also an infectious disease and is caused by a microscopic parasite that invades certain types of white blood cells. The disease is transmitted by sandflies, and a number of different leishmania species are known to infect humans. Disease that involve low levels of parasite infection can be particularly difficult to diagnose. It is rarely seen in the United States; however, more than 30 cases have been diagnosed among Gulf veterans. accurate diagnosis of leishmaniasis, which can have a long latency period, is important because effective treatment involves the use of potentially toxic drugs in clinical trials but not yet approved by the Food and Drug Administration [FDA].95

Depleted Uranium



[NOTES]

73. See supra note 48, pp. 1-2.
74. U.S. Department of Defense, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), News Briefing, June 21, 1996, p. 4.
75. U.S. Department of Defense, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), News DOD News Briefing, September 19, 1996, p. 1, and October 22, 1996, p. 2.
76. See supra note 45.
77. Document released by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency to accompany the report, "Khamisiyah: A Historical Perspective on Related Intelligence," April 9, 1997, p. 3.
78. Dana Priest, "CIA Warned of Chemical Arms in '91," Washington Post, February 26, 1997, p. A1.
79. Report of the United Nations Special Commission [hereinafter "UNSCOM"], "Investigation of Deployment of Chemical Weapons," July 1997.
80. Statement of Robert Walpole, Special Assistant for Gulf Illnesses, U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, to the Presidential Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans' Illnesses, "Probable Release of Mustard Agent From the Ukhaydir Ammunition Storage Depot," July 29, 1997.
81. "Chemical Risk to Gulf Troops was Forecast," USA Today, August 14, 1997, p. 1.
82. Statement of James Tuite, Human Resources and Intergovernmental Relations Subcommittee hearings, Nos. 1-4, p. 439.
83. See supra note 2, Tucker Report, p. 1.
84. U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Intelligence Agency, (translation of) Iraqi field manual, "A Course in Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Protection," August 23, 1991, p. 5.
85. U.S. Department of Defense, Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center, (translation of) Iraqi manual, "Chemical, Biological and Nuclear Operations," January 12, 1992, p. 6.
86. Report of the Naval Medical Research Institute, U.S. Navy, "BW Detection Capabilities" Biological Defense Research Program, Naval Medical Research Institute, Bethesda, MD, September 3, 1997, Summary page (in subcommittee files).
87. See supra note 48, p. 62.
88. Ibid.
89. Final Report of the Presidential Advisory Committee on Gulf War Related Illnesses, (U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 1996)[hereinafter "PAC Report"], pp. 98-99.
90. Statement of Howard Urnovitz, Human Resources and Intergovernmental Relations Subcommittee hearings, Nos. 1-4, pp. 194-196.
91. Prepared statement of Garth Nicolson, Human Resources Subcommittee hearing of June 26, 1997, p. 1 (in subcommittee files).
92. Ibid., p. 3.
93. Ibid., pp. 4-5.
94. Ibid., p. 7.
95. See supra 1note 48, p. 60.