Our understanding of Egyptian control over its western neighbour is only in an early stage, and it is difficult to say whether Libya was ever part of the Egyptian Empire in the way that Nubia or the Levant was. However, some similarities in the way the regions were treated are apparent.
Nubia of the Middle Kingdom and the Levant of the New Kingdom saw the control of resources and trade routes emphasised, with restrictions on external relations imposed (Smith 1991a:77, 83-4). However, there was no attempt at acculturation or colonisation, there being only a relatively small Egyptian presence of a military, administrative and commercial nature, designed to ensure regional stability (Smith ibid., 1997:66, 68).
This is very much like the situation that has been proposed for the Mediterranean coastal zone, where the aim of occupation was to ensure national security via a mix of military and socio-economic controls. An Egyptian military presence, based at the garrisons, created a secure buffer zone between Egypt and hostile groups further west, but also served to control regional trade and contact. There was no apparent attempt at acculturation or large-scale settlement, although this may have been a long-term goal though one that was never fulfilled.
To what extent the local Tjemehu Libyans were incorporated into the regional administrative network in not entirely clear. Although they were subjected to various controls, whether they were ever so completely integrated as has been proposed for the Shasu bedouin of the Sinai, for example, is not known. This integration may have been so complete, that the Shasu were recruited to man the fortresses of the "Ways of Horus" (Oren 1987:94-95) .
There is a stela, known as Tanis II, that contains a vague reference to Ramesses II capturing "the country of the west" and putting its inhabitants to military service (Kitchen 1996:119; 1999:174). This might indicate that Tjemehu were "press-ganged" into Egyptian military service. Perhaps "press-ganged" is too strong a term and control was not as harsh as suggested by this stela, designed as it was to stress the power of the king and to celebrate his victories. Mention is also made of destroying the Shasu-Land, and it may be that both references are somewhat rhetoric, reflecting an Egyptian desire for control over others that was actually a relationship based more upon mutual consent than they wished to admit on a monument such as this. If such a scenario is correct, might the supposed Libyan structures at Zawiyet Umm el-Rakham not represent a post-abandonment settlement phase, but in fact be evidence of Libyans manning the fort? Only further work may tell...
Exactly when the Egyptians abandoned the coastal fortresses is not known. At Zawiyet Umm el-Rakham, there is no stratigraphic evidence to indicate a long occupation, and nothing archaeological dating before or after the reign of Ramesses II. This suggests that the fort was abandoned by it's Egyptian population during or soon after his reign. There is no evidence of destruction to indicate that hostility ended the occupation here.
So little work has been done on other sites that it is impossible to comment on their occupation or abandonment, although none of proposed coastal fort sites have produced anything other than remains dating to the time of Ramesses II, suggesting that they were maintained only during his reign or for a very short time afterwards.
One possible scenario might see the forts' population monitoring the approach of the massed Rebu and "Sea People" invasion force in year 5 of Merenptah, realising they were overwhelmed and making a hasty retreat to raise the alarm.
The records of the invasions in the time of Merenptah and Ramesses III indicate that at least some of the fortresses were still operational at this point and played a role in the defeat of the invaders. It might be that these were only those nearest to the Delta's western edge which were less isolated and vulnerable. This might be supported by the evidence that we have for continued occupation at Kom el-Abqa'in beyond the New Kingdom.
With control over the North African coastal zone perhaps ending with the invasion in year 5 of Merenptah, the western frontier was breached and the threat of Rebu-Meshwesh hostility reached Egypt proper. Although Merenptah succeeded in repulsing the invasion, there is nothing to suggest control was re-established to the degree seen under Ramesses II. Domestic problems between the reigns of Merenptah and Ramesses III may have resulted in this failure that ultimately allowed the continual raiding on the Delta that preceded the invasions under Ramesses III (Leahy 1985:53).
It is possible that Ramesses III, stronger than the rulers of the recent past, may have attempted to reaffirm control over the Libyans in the same manner that he tried to restore the Egyptian empire in Palestine (Weinstein 1981:22). He imposed an Egyptian vassal over the Libyans, but this just led to large-scale uprisings (O'Connor 1983:275; Peden 1994:13); there is nothing to suggest widespread control was ever re-established.
Continued infiltration and political disintegration within Egypt would lead eventually to the country falling under the rule of the Libyans during the 22nd, 23rd and 24th Dynasties.