April 16, 2000

Today, as both Ethiopia and Eritrea face a major food crisis due to drought, the Eritrean elites are spreading unsubstantiated rumors that the extent of the crisis is being exaggerated, and that aid donors should view Ethiopia’s requests with scepticism.

Never mind that the releif aid requests come from very detailed post-harvests assessments conducted by the FAO and WFP. (see the report: FAO/WFP Crop And Food Supply Assessment Mission to Ethiopia, Jan 26, 2000). Never mind that the director of the WFP, after visiting Ethiopia has decided that the number of beneficiaries should be revised upward. The Eritrean elites are only interested in the short-term propaganda value.

Instead of spending time lobbying for relief for their own drought-affected people (so far pledges to Eritrea are well short of what is needed), they spread discredited rumors about Ethiopia's food needs trying to reduce the amount of aid that reaches drought affected Ethiopians.

This is shameless behavior but not unexpected. We have experienced the Eritrean pattern of behavior all too often before.

But what makes this disgusting though is the Eritrean theft of food aid from Assab in 1998/99 - food that could have made the critical difference in the current emergency.

The behavior of the Eritrean elites is also particularly outrageous given the degree to which Ethiopia helped Eritrea overcome its food-deficits from 1993 to 1997,

The following articles provide evidence of how Eritrea benefited from Ethiopia. Although Eritrea has consistently imported food from Ethiopia since colonial times, these imports were ramped up dramatically in 1996 when Ethiopia produced an overall food surplus, while Kenya and Eritrea were suffering from drought. Eritrea was able to purchase a large portion of Ethiopia’s surplus in local currency. Eritrea had plenty of local Ethiopian currency due in part to the one-billion Birr loan that Ethiopia gave Eritrea in 1996/97.

Thus, food that could have been exported to Kenya in exchange for hard currency, or that could have gone into the Emergency Food Security Reserve, was instead sent to feed hungry Eritreans. Two years later, Eritrea repaid Ethiopia with a large-scale military invasion.

"Indeed, in 1995 and 1996, Eritrea avoided major food supply difficulties by turning to Ethiopia. Significant imports were made through the public and private sectors and through cross-border transactions. These imports were purchased through the Ethiopian Birr -- which remains the official currency -- and so excess pressure on foreign exchange reserves were avoided. Ethiopian and Sudanese grains could help feed needy neighbours FAO Special Report, January 1997

"The importance of food supplies from Ethiopia was clearly evident in areas visited by the mission, where a number of urban and rural markets were observed to be well stocked by imported grains from across the border. Together with market access and purchasing capacity, especially of vulnerable groups, this source of grains will continue to be an extremely important factor in determining future food security in the country. Had access to such supplies been more restricted, or depended more on limited hard currency, the consequences of shortfalls in food production in Eritrea would have been far more manifest and dramatic, especially as the volume of food aid in 1996 fell sharply, in response to donor concerns regarding the newly introduced policy of monetization of food aid." SPECIAL REPORT: FAO Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission to Eritrea 18 December 1996