Author of several books on the Horn of Africa, Gilkes last Monday appeared at the Convention Center to deliver a lecture on "Regionalizaton of Conflict," as part of the lecture series organized by the African Institute for Democratic Deliberation and Action (AIDDA). Following are excerpts from his lecture.

The [Ethiopia-Eritrea] conflict has been going on for nearly a year, and most attention inevitably has turned into what's happening in the disputed border areas - the specific points of the conflict. And it's in these areas that the war will be decided if indeed any military solution is to be reached. Alternatively, it's on the basis of whatever battles have been taking place in these areas that any negotiated settlement would ultimately be reached.

I am not trying to minimize the significance of territorial claims on either side, along the border, but there is a very much wider dimension to the conflict. And I think it needs a certain framework of the various tensions and pressures that you have in the region of the Horn of Africa and also in the Red Sea area. And I also want to articulate the efforts being made by both Eritrea and Ethiopia, directly and indirectly, to try and destabilize each other, and by extension affect the stability of the whole region.

There are hegemony interests in the region. There is, of course, the question of the rivalry between Eritrea and Ethiopia, which was almost inevitable since these are one-level, two successive states to Mengistu's military dictatorship - even without the constraints in the relationship between the EPLF and the EPRDF.

But there are other hegemony interests. For example, Egypt sees itself as a regional superpower with interests ranging as far as Somalia, something I will come back to later. So it's in Egypt's interest to have close relationships and some influence in Sudan and have a weak Ethiopia. This does not mean that it does not want to see a strong Eritrea either.

Egypt also has strategic interests right down the Red Sea, as do Saudi Arabia and Israel. And to an extent, all three can be seen as rivals over the northern half of the Red Sea. Israel in particular wants the Red Sea to be an international and preferably - from and Israeli point of view - non-Arabic waterway. So, in that sense, it prefers to see a significant strip of the coastline under a non-Arab power. Whether it is under Ethiopia (before 1991) or Eritrea (since 1991) is irrelevant to Israel - provided that Eritrea suddenly does not turn itself into an Arab state, something it's been showing signs of doing recently.

In the southern areas of the Red Sea, there is the rivalry between Eritrea and Yemen, which led to conflict in 1995/96 over the Hanish Islands which are very strategically situated. Israel simply sympathized with Eritrea to take over the Hanish Islands. Israel also seemed to be almost sympathetic when Eritrea had its problems with Djibouti. The significance of that move by Eritrea was that the disputed areas, if placed under Eritrea, would allow Eritrea with the exit point of the Red Sea.

Now, these potential and actual hegemony rivalries are further complicated by a whole series of other points with reference to the Red Sea and the region. The issue of Sudan and its Islamist policies which have specific relations with physical roots them seem to have whether in Ethiopia, Eritrea or Somalia. In Ethiopia, there is the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Oromia, the still-active Ogaden National Liberation Front; in Somalia, there is Al-Itihad Al-Islamia; and then there are the two factions in Eritrea of the Islamic Jihad, both of which changed their names recently. There are a number of parties in the region with Islamist credentials, and this is something that the Islamic government in Sudan clearly takes an interest in.

There is also the issue of the mineral deposits in the Red Sea which affects everybody's interests. I'm not just talking about oil, which has not yet really been found, so much as the other minerals in the seabed. There are very substantial quantities yet to be exploited.

The issue of where the regional hub port might be placed for the future contain attractive passing for this part of the world. The port in Djibouti or the port in Yemen may be the possibilities but there are certain rivalries that need to be sorted out in this connection. Recent developments, I think, have increased Djibouti's prospects to be the hub-port.

You also have to consider, in a general sense, the situation in Somalia as a state, which has offered various opportunities to neighbouring parts to interfere. Kenya, Ethiopia, Egypt have all shown their interests, and Eritrea has recently shown some signs.

Overall, I think this amounts to a highly volatile situation in this region, even without the additional stress imposed by Eritrea's efforts to assert its status as a regional power in the last few years. It is, of curse, a very strategic country now, and I think it was quick to open its doors to the United States and Israel for various facilities. It took a very essential role in the US-organized effort to conquer Islamism in Sudan. Equally, I think it is facing strong pressure from the Unites States in the current conflict because one of the responses it has made was to try to turn to the Arab world and indicate its interest of joining the Arab League. It has also been pursuing much closer relations with Libya, and receiving financial and military support. And that in itself is going to provide another element of regional instability.

And this is a very highly volatile situation, even without the conflict that has been taking place over the last year, and even without the efforts of both Ethiopia and Eritrea to withstand the conflict.

If I begin with Eritrea, I would have some reason to believe that Eritrea had begun to reverse its demobilization very rapidly in 1997. It was calling former EPLF fighters into the army, and was already in discussion with dissident groups in Ethiopia before the conflict started. According to some evidence, it was talking to elements in the Oromo Liberation Front earlier last year, before the OLF held a congress in April in Mogadishu and its new leadership was elected. That congress was held under the pretension of one of the major Somali warlords - Hussein Aideed. In retrospect, those contacts had a considerable significance in the formation of a majority of the Oromo leadership executive committee that was elected last April from the military wing of the OLF and from its Muslim membership.

The relationships they had with Hussein Aideed allowed a number of the Oromos to take part in Hussein Aideed's operations against his enemies last year, for instance against the Rahweyn Resistance Army in Baidoa. There had been a number of clashes in which OLF fighters had taken part.

The price Hussein Aideed paid for this was to support OLF activities elsewhere, possibly including the provision of some weaponry, and to back the OLF activity along the border with Kenya. Late last year, there were a number of indications of activities in that area, and there were some reports in the Kenyan press that some sizable groups of OLF fighters have been moving in and out of the Kenyan border into western Somalia.

At that stage, I don't think it's very clear how much direct Eritrean involvement might have been in what was going on there. Hussein Aideed visited Addis Ababa in September last year, and there is no doubt that, at that time, it was thought here to be a successful visit. All the indications were that the Ethiopian government had ironed out some of the past problems with Aideed - particularly in organizing another Somali reconciliation conference. The Somali conference in Sodore was not attended by Aideed but by other faction leaders, while the conference in Cairo was attended by Aideed but not by the others. So there was some considerable divergence between the reconciliation attempts by Egypt and by Ethiopia. And it was thought that the Ethiopian government had ironed these out and also prevent the possibility of cross-border activities by Somali= dissidents.

In fact, it's very clear now that Hussein Aideed's visit to Ethiopia did not satisfy Hussein Aideed at any rate. I understand he wasn't offered very much, and certainly, it wasn't long before he was in Asmara at the beginning of this year. He later returned to Mogadishu, in one of five plane loads of weaponry provided by the Eritrean government.

A few weeks later, a shipload of weapons arrived at the port of Mercca, also controlled by Hussein Aideed. These were weapons supplied by Eritrea, financed by Libya, and transported by Yemen.

Now, these arms were intended partly for Hussein Aideed and his own Somali national alliance. Equally, some were intended for the Oromo Liberation Front, some for the Ogaden National Liberation Front, and some for the Al-Itihad Al-Islamia.

The effect, I think, has already been seen. There is an upsurge of activities in the Somali region of Ethiopia, including a number of kidnappings and other incidents. So these arms are already being used.

I think it seems less likely that Al-Itihad would use any of the weapons it may have obtained directly against Ethiopia. That's because, in 1996, Ethiopian troops made extensive cross border incursions into Somalia, attacking Al-Itihad positions and seizing towns like Dolo. Of course, Al-Itihad suffered great losses, and in fact it took a specific position last year to confine its activities to Somalia, instead of extending to Ethiopia - although it may use the weapons it acquired to cooperate with Hussein Aideed in the battle against his opponents.

In this sense, the role of Ethiopia in Somalia is a very active one. Even prior to Eritrea's support to Hussein Aideed, Ethiopia has been quite extensively supporting Hussein Aideed's opponents - and over a longer time frame. These, of course, are not directly related to the Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict, but in terms of what has been going on in Somalia, both sides are clearly arming their own friends.

At one level, Ethiopia has been trying to organize a national reconciliation in Somalia, though these have been unsuccessful. One aspect of Ethiopia's involvement in Somalia has also been active military policy designed to crush Al-Itihad and control Islamism. And at another level, it has been supporting in arms, and possibly finance groups that are opposed to Al-Itihad or its allies, including Hussein Aideed.

In this sense, I think it's very clear that Ethiopia and Eritrea are thinking of a proxy war in Somalia. And this has the possibility of spreading both inside Somalia and in the Somali region of Ethiopia. This sort of proxy approach is certainly not confined to Somalia; Eritrea, for instance, has been involved with the opposition in Djibouti that was engaged in armed struggle against President Hassan Gulleid, overrunning most of the areas in Djibouti, until it was stopped by priests rapidly recruiting the Djibouti army. Actually it was a largely Afar organization but not exclusively.

[The opposition] finally rallied behind the Djibouti government, but one element, headed by the former prime minister, stayed outside the agreement and they continued with their opposition to the government in Djibouti. They were expelled a couple of years ago from Ethiopia, following improvements in the relations between Djibouti and Eritrea.

Following this, the opposition in Djibouti no doubt looked for assistance from Eritrea, and there is reason to believe that it took Eritrea backing last year. Certainly, the attack was launched by the Djibouti opposition elements on the Ethiopian convoy on the road near the Djibouti border. It's something that fitted into Eritrea's interests in trying to stop the traffic along the road from Djibouti to Addis Ababa.

There were subsequent attacks there, but the Djibouti opposition fighters are currently massed on the northern border of Djibouti, at the point where Ethiopia, Eritrea and Djibouti meet.

One result of this is that Ethiopia has sent troops into Djibouti. There is quite an extensive number of troops near the northern part of Djibouti, helping Djibouti forces to preserve the integrity of the Djibouti-Eritrean border, and security along the links to Ethiopia. Ethiopia of course has every interest in trying to prevent any destruction of these links.

The final context is the Sudan. Eritrea has since 1994 been backing Sudanese oppositions with arms, training and, in some occasions with troops. At one level, Eritrea had been largely involved with the elements of the anti-Sudan front in Ethiopia, Uganda, etc., in what I see as a US-orchestrated front aimed against the government in Khartoum. That particular policy is certainly now in ruins. Additionally Eritrea has also concentrated to some degree on backing specific opposition parties, as well as the National Democratic Alliance as a whole.

In turn, Sudan has supported military activities against Eritrea, particularly the two factions of the Eritrean Islamic Jihad, and ELF led by Abdalla Idris. Two years ago, one of the Islamic Jihad factions, the ELF, and the ELF National Council came together in one front - encouraged by Sudan. That has now been extended, over the last few months - and actively supported by Ethiopia - to form an alliance of ten Eritrean opposition organizations.

In conclusion, I would like to emphasize very much that there are very serious strains and stresses that operate in the Horn of Africa and in the Red Sea area, independent of the present [Ethiopia-Eritrea] conflict. Whatever the causes of the conflict, and whatever the results of the conflict, I think these stresses are going to be exacerbated by what is going on, i.e., by Eritrea's activities with the Oromos, Somalis and the Djibouti opposition, and Ethiopia's similar activities in Somalia, Djibouti, among Afars, and now Eritrea.