From the Gov't Spokesperson website. Follow link for more interviews with Eritrean POWs.

Probably it was in the hope of seizing the water wells that the Eritreans attacked at Burie on June 11, 1999. A successful attack would also have opened up possibilities for cutting the main Djibouti- Addis Abeba highway.

As it turned out the Eritreans were badly beaten, as indicated in this Washington Post report from June 12.

"Ethiopia claimed a major victory in the fighting on the southeastern border between the two countries, near the Red Sea, saying it killed, wounded or captured 2,000 soldiers after an Eritrean sneak attack went awry. Eritrea denied the claim, saying it had been attacked, but a diplomat here in the Ethiopian capital said: "This time the Eritreans may have really gotten mauled. The early indications are that they may have really stepped on their poncho this time." [Washington Post, June 12]

The following POW interview provides more details on this poncho-stepping operation by the Eritrean army

Name: Mohammed Abdela Mohammed Age: 28 Place of birth: Habero Senhit, near Keren Family: Married, no children (father and three sisters) Education: 5th Grade Unit: Command Division 525, Brigade 2, Battalion 2, Company 2, Platoon 1, Team 3 (no Corps) Position: Deputy team leader

He joined the EPLF in 1989 and was with the army all the time except when he was sent to school in 1990 at Nakfa. He studied with Red Flowers. He did not participate in battles during the time of the Derg. His first battle was at Bure and his second battle was at Tsorona.

Question: Until when did you stay at Bure?

"I stayed there with my unit until you took Badme back. Then after your forces occupied Badme we took the boat to Massawa. Then we used trucks and came to Tsorona."

Question: Did you understand why you came to Tsorona? Had you been informed about your Badme debacle?

"Yes, we were informed about Badme first through the radio. But our leaders told us that we withdrew to take up better places--that we were not at all pushed out."

Question: Did you believe them?

"This time I did not believe it because we had already been informed about how great and strong our bunkers and trenches at Badme were. We were also being told to get ready to move. Well this made it clearer. We were aware that thousands died at Badme. A lot of people had brothers and sisters and friends at Badme. It was just terrible. National service perished at Badme because most of our soldiers are national service children. Only about six old soldiers (EPLF) are in the platoon. At night we arrived at Mai Ainee where we were given an orientation, which was:

1.We left Badme to rearrange our front line altogether.
2.You are in Tsorona now to reinforce the Tsorona front.
3.The Ethiopians are going to go on the offensive soon.

Question: How was this battle?

"At 8 am you started with heavy weapons, planes, everything. You were about to break the lines of our defense when our commander was ordered to rescue our soldiers who were under great distress."

Question: How were you captured?

"I had RPG (my weapon). I saw a tank in front and I was trying to hit it. I did not realize that your men were behind me. These people came from behind all the time. They come from all directions. All things added, we lost the day. I was captured."

Question: What things added?

"For example, we never even for one moment thought that our bunkers could be taken or our defense lines broken."

Question: Why?

"Because we thought that we were prepared very well. We prepared for seven years. We felt we were the best soldiers. We were told the Ethiopian army was backward and primitive; that they were newly trained and poorly equipped. And we, including myself, believed it. But..."

Question: But what?

"I realized that the Ethiopian army was preparing even better than us. You had better weapons, better technicians, and more arms and men who want to fight."

Question: What is the relationship between the command and the regulars?

"The commanders are kind of isolated. We only meet them when there is a meeting. We only obey orders. There is no way we can give opinions. Even if we do it is rejected. The commanders keep to themselves and we keep to ourselves. We don't mix. Even team leaders keep to themselves. Whatever the team leader says is true. Even if you argue and you are telling the truth and the team leader is not, he is right. He is always right.

We made many mistakes. We underestimated your army, especially the Ethiopian army. I think it is wrong to look down on any people. Because of this problem we did not understand the nature of the challenge that was facing us. Our basic mistake was underestimation of the enemy."

Question: Did you pay a great price for this mistake, in your opinion?

"We paid a terrible price: the lives of thousands of our friends and comrades. I used to like my government, but now I feel betrayed. This war is a source of worry for all Eritreans. Now I realize the occupation of Badme was wrong. We know it was under Ethiopian administration. We could have asked to get Badme peacefully if it was supposed to be ours. We came by force and we left by force."

Question: Could you describe the battle of Bure and tell me about your experience?

"We took the initiative at Bure on June 11, 1998. We took the offensive at 10 pm. We were given an orientation at 9 pm about the plan to attack Bure. We were told that we were going to take back land taken by Woyane way beyond Bure. We then got ready. I for one believed that our land was taken by Woyane because our leaders said so. I always believed what our leaders said. I was in a unit of one brigade and one battalion. All five were command battalions (525). Three battalions went into Woyane territory to curb the enemy forces and two remained behind to follow later. The three battalions were to control the main road. Then there were units from 491 corps that were to engage the enemy. The battle started at 4 am. Your artillery was doing very well, as was ours. We fought and fought but your lines were impossible to break. Our units started to fall back to retreat, but three of our battalions were left behind. I was with the 2nd battalion left behind which went in at 7 am along with tanks, etc. But the battle was terrible for us because we made many mistakes. We knew that our assessment of the Bure front was inaccurate."

Question: Why was it inaccurate?

"What we were told is that our assessment evaluation and intelligence was correct but that the very night we started the offensive, 9,000 Ethiopian troops joined the Bure front."

Question: Did you believe what you were told this time?

"Yes, we did and I did. The two battalions tried to help the three battalions that were trapped but we could not. The heat was impossible too. So we were defeated. We lost many, many people. We could not even retrieve our wounded. We tried many times but to no avail. It was just impossible."

Question: Did you have a meeting after the battle of Bure?

We had a meeting three days after we were defeated at Bure. Since we were scattered all over the place (e.g., Assab), some were lost forever. I still don't know where they are. In that meeting we evaluated the battle. We asked why we were not successful. There was no official statement but the Division Commander (Wodi Memher) said:

1.We did not fail because the Ethiopians were coming to take Assab and we stopped them. But this battle was not as good as we planned it to be.
2.Our success could have been better because we could not only have stopped them from taking Assab but we could have also pushed them to snatch back our land on which they are standing now.
3.The sun was too hot.

We did not believe the bit about taking Assab because it was not part of the orientation given to us the evening before the battle of Bure. However, some thought that 'Yes, Ethiopia may be trying to get its stuff which we nationalized at Assab' (i.e., a lot of it in May). We always believed what we were told, i.e.:

1.Ethiopia took Badme in 1997
2.Ethiopia took Adi Murug in 1997
3.Ethiopia will take Eritrea if it can

I knew at that time that the bit about Assab was only a cover for the defeat we suffered at Bure. We were totally defeated at Bure."

Question: How did the Eritrean army feel about the defeat at Bure?

"We were defeated and we tried to see our shortcomings which were:

1.No proper intelligence about enemy capacity and strength (arms, men, etc).
2.No proper preparation (e.g., water tankers that were assigned to come did not arrive).
3.Underestimating the enemy.
4.I believe there were problems among the leaders of 491 (i.e., the commanders). The issue was the participation of national service. I don't quite know the issue but we realized later they had disagreements. This issue was hushed."

Question: Were some people punished as a result of the Bure defeat?

"Yes, though I don't know their names. I heard from people I know that there were people who were in jail as a result. A battalion commander was jailed. I think his name is Gidey."