"For we must never abdicate before misdirected popular enthusiasm"
Pieter Geyl

In the last several weeks concerns over the national security of Ethiopia came to focus on the question of Aseb, partly no doubt because of the recent Ethio-Eritrean war and also because of the apparent decision on the part of the Ethiopian government not to take the port by force. Most of the views on the question of Aseb, it must be added, are somewhat simplistic, perhaps reflecting the lack of depth of knowledge in what is involved and also reflecting the political biases of the writers.

The question of Aseb is often difficult and complex and that the inferences drawn are often influenced by one's political position. Most times there are no ways of avoiding political judgments about the issue, which might be linked to one's evaluation of the relative merits (and demerits) of the Ethiopian government. But conclusions that are simply functions of political opinions will not command respect for long and it has the tendency to retard the establishment of positive propositions that represent the most appropriate to the framing of Ethiopia's policy.

Before I attempt to explain my position on this thorny question, I state here a fact that all readers should now be well aware. Every alternative course of action towards Aseb by the Ethiopian government involves certain sets of cost. That is, whether or not these costs are explicitly stated or even understood by those incurring it, the question of Aseb is a question of trade-offs. Hence, given all the list of alternatives Ethiopians have in mind, the most effective solution would be a policy that increases the country's long-term prosperity.

Belai Abbai and Zeru Kehishen (See Dagmawi's web site of July 15, 2000 issue) have devoted much of their time in articulating the alleged shambles of the current Ethiopian government on handling the question of Aseb. The writers do a fine job of documenting the popular proposition on the issue from a wide range of reasons, such as, national security, economic and historical accounts. The underlying assumption of their argument lay not in the notion of extending Ethiopia's legitimate right to the usage of Aseb but rather in the absolute and unconditional character of ownership right of Aseb, " ...including the Red Sea Afar area, constituted the Autonomous Afar region within Ethiopia, just as Eritrea (without the Red sea Afar region) was an autonomous region within Ethiopia, until 1991, when it seceded and became de facto independent."

I should like to clear up a possible misunderstanding, or rather to forestall a possible objection. The distinction between "ownership" and "usage" of the port of Aseb is crucial to understanding the incentives that govern the action of the Ethiopian government. The lack of making such distinction is the source of endless confusion, which many Ethiopians are unable to dispel even among themselves. Since Belai and Zeru never make such distinction explicitly except in fragmented terms (such as, " ...must have its own port" and "the use of an asset that is rightfully theirs") and assume what has to be demonstrated if their terminology is to have analytical value, their argument simply leaves me mystified. But however confusing their position may be, the conclusion emerges intact: "...Ethiopia's right to Assab and her access to international waters are not negotiable."

Belai and Zeru's arguments mask a generally unspoken political concern that allows the use of force and a continuous cycle of violence would have undesirable and counter productive effects on the entire fabric of economic, social, national, regional and international relations. I do not believe that their mode of argument has much prospect of success in securing peace in the region, at least as applied to resolve the issue of Aseb without confronting the fact that Eritrea is a well recognized state by the international community.

Their underlying argument is the kind of reasoning within which hard-liner Ethiopians has been confined during the last three painful decades of conflict with Eritrea and which is still predominant in some quarters, particularly Ethiopians in Diaspora. It is a circle of reasoning that seems to leave Ethiopia little choice than the use of force. Yet if the truth must be told, there is no economic and moral sense for such constricting beliefs. Ethiopians have only themselves to blame if their no-nonsense patriots and hard-liners have mesmerized them over the months into this unrelenting frame of mind.

Historical Account:

If my understanding of Belai and Zeru's complete argument is correct, it is apparent that the entitlement of the port of Aseb for Ethiopia is mainly based on historical accounts. According to them and in the opinion of many vocal Ethiopians, the port of Aseb belongs to Ethiopia by historical prescription. While it is certainly true that the port of Aseb has been an Ethiopian route for a long time, it seems equally true that the strongest argument for the Ethiopian case is Aseb's development and utilization by Ethiopia. But the question is how much do these historical accounts matter is solving such a complex issue? Even if (big if) we believe that historical accounts matter most, it is very difficult to assign a greater weight to the current history (Eritrea as an independent state) or recent past (as a part of Ethiopia) or colonial history of Eritrea or ancient history.

The solution to the question of Aseb requires something more than invoking historical accounts of ownership. It requires some careful dispassionate analyses based on a wider range of issues. Even if historical facts have been successfully established and its applicability to the current Ethiopian conditions is agreed, it is not by itself sufficient basis for claiming the port. This is not intended to suggest that the economic explanations (as some would like to argue) even when unambiguously established, can serve as a sufficient guide to policy. Thus, although the conclusions of historical facts and economics are necessary for a rational framing of policy, in my humble opinion, they are not sufficient for the purpose. In this context, it is therefore unlikely that any formula for determining a justifiable course of action towards Aseb will be satisfactory for all Ethiopians.

Professor Haggai Erlich's, one of the prominent historians of Ethiopian history, remark (on the Ethio-Eritrean conflict back in 1983) comes to mind at this point. "Thus by any historical criterion, the Eritrean highlands are an integral part of Ethiopia. The Christian-populated districts of Hamasen, Sarai, and Akalla-Guzai have historically been more a part of Ethiopia's political framework and culture than have the provinces of southern Ethiopia (Kaffa, Wallaga, Arusi, and others) occupied by Ethiopia in the late nineteenth century, which are today undisputed parts of Ethiopia. In any case, historical facts, even if they can provide an academically satisfactory answer to a question, are seldom relevant to a living conflict. This is especially the case in the dispute between Ethiopia and Eritrea. In such a situation, then, the outsider is left with the following moral criterion: the right side is the one that is aware of the rights and necessities of its rival and acts accordingly." (The Struggle over Eritrea, 1962-1978. pages 12-13)

Security Concerns:

The whole focus on the port of Aseb in determining the fate of Ethiopia's survival may have been created misplaced and counter productive effects of popular sentiments. The belief that only by owning Aseb will enable Ethiopia to be stable and economically secure hardly stands up to analysis. Neither does the view that the country's ability to survive a conspiracy of foreign adversaries depends on its ownership of the port of Aseb carry conviction. The real issue of the country's long-term prosperity, of reducing the grinding poverty and national security (however it is defined), doesn't depend on Aseb. It depends primarily on the country's productivity growth and its ability to maintain a stable political, economic and social environment in the region.

Almost immediately after the fall of the Derge regime and the introduction of peace and stability in the country, there is evidence of a quickening in the pace of Ethiopian economic growth and political stability that are essential to the prosperity of the country without the port of Aseb as being part of the Ethiopian proper. This faster average growth rate, to some extent, shows that other aspects of the Ethiopian economy may well have been more important determinants of success. Therefore, the country's access to the sea via Aseb, however significant, cannot be isolated from the question of peace and stability in the region and even across regional boundaries.

Many Ethiopians are arguing to have the Aseb area preserved as Ethiopia's natural outlet to the sea. But preserving the port of Aseb by force involves tremendous costs that Ethiopia cannot afford. Broadly speaking, equating security with military issue and the use of force has the tendency of prolonging the conflict and making it worse. The main costs include the permanent state of war with Eritrea, lack of stability in the region and the possibility of economic sanctions against Ethiopia by major powers and trade partners. This could only enlarge the scope of isolation of Ethiopia by the members of the broader international community including the OAU. This will not only threaten the economic structure of the country directly but also generate powerful effects within the region thereby undermining the national interest of the country.

It also would be futile, of course, to suggest that we should be thinking about the possibilities of activating the Afar people. Because, first, there are few plausible candidates for "good organization" status deserving of unconditional military support, much less serving Ethiopian interest. Second, it will spillover to Djibouti and that will plunge the region into greater darkness.

To put the issue in a broader framework, how Ethiopia relates to other counties in terms of their threats and vulnerabilities will obviously shape the country's security concerns. The logic of regional security implies security interdependence among neighboring countries. Even at the risk of laboring the obvious, I must remind readers that Ethiopia's national security problems cannot reasonably resolved apart from Eritrea's problems. The failure to account for such web of security interdependence will lead to the breakdown of peace and stability in the region. By now, Ethiopians should know that they can run, but they cannot hide, when it comes to dealing with Eritrea's security concerns.

Having set forth what I conceive to be the best alternative to the question of Aseb, and what I believe to be the proper and fair road map, I shall remind readers to rationally evaluate the imperative security of Ethiopia that might lead to the conscious acceptance of calculated risks. Since the parameters and indefinite ranges of security measures made the historical account alone unworkable, it is my contention that Ethiopia's problem of accessing the high sea and usage of Aseb should be settled appealing to the international law. Moreover, Ethiopia must actively engage in search of alternative seaports for sake of minimizing its risks in the future. Despite the drawbacks and failures, of international law dealing with poor countries like Ethiopia, in my humble opinion, is worth undertaking. My claim is that Ethiopia's use of its meager resources to wage a war against Eritrea for accessing the sea, instead of negotiating at round tables, is morally repugnant. However unpopular my perspective might be, I fall back then on the current Ethiopian government stand and explicit belief that getting some kind of concessions at the negotiating tables is a wise thing in itself and it is consistent with national interest of the country. I hope that Ethiopians of the "use of force" persuasion will significantly revise their doctrines of force into accord with the existing international law.