Commentary:

A Response to the article: "The Price of Peace: Can it be More War?"

Reading the passionate plea of a Mr Sotal in the Monitor (29 July 99) prompts me to make a critical response to it .

First let me hasten to say that I agree with much of the author’s characterisation of the Eritrean government dominated and impersonated by its leader, President Issayas Afewerki. My layman understanding of the latter’s personality is based on a perception of him as a man of hot temper and changing moods, excessive pride and prejudices, obsessive secrecy and remoteness. This perception is also admittedly influenced by his legendary dislike for conventional propriety and etiquette. He appears to me to be a man who believes in might and militaristic discipline as the most essential tools for building a prosperous nation (perhaps because he regards the enterprise of building a prosperous nation as no different than that of waging a war of independence).

Last but not least, I see him as a man who jealously guard his absolute power, and who compulsively play games in geo-political manoeuvring, games in which he constantly seeks to prove that he is head and shoulder above his peers in the wretched neighbourhood of the Horn of Africa.

The president’s erratic behaviour in forming and breaking alliances, in seeking and rejecting foreign assistance, in behaving hot and cold towards the OAU and other mediators, etc. seem to be manifestations of such temperament, attitudes and views. Given these characteristic traits and the records of his past conducts, it would be very difficult to trust the man and his government whose members simply implement his wish with clever and plausible public statements and justifications.

Be that as it may, I beg to differ with the author’s plea for continuing the Ethiopia-Eritrea war until a trustworthy alternative Eritrean leadership emerge to ensure the advent of a lasting peace. Though a comprehensive victory over the forces of Mr Afeworki may guarantee a lasting peace, this should not lead to the conclusion that it should be pursued whatever the price. I strongly believe Ethiopia has already paid a stupendously big price for a restitution of tarnished honour. To keep on paying more will be madness.

If the OAU framework agreement and the modalities are accepted now, the regime of Mr Afewerki will be allowed to survive. So long as the latter survives, there may be no guarantee for lasting peace. Therefore the argument goes, if Ethiopia accepts it how can her government justify the tens of thousands of lives that were sacrificed, the enormous amount of material resources that were spent, not to mention the sufferings of hundreds of thousands who had been displaced, impoverished, wounded, etc.?

My objection to this proposition is informed by a number of considerations. First of all the single most important objective of the war, at least as professed by the Ethiopian government, is the restoration of forcibly occupied territories. There have also been statements of teaching the Asmara government a lesson or two in acceptable behaviour concerning international relations, the consequences of its belligerency, and the futility of its prejudices and attitude problems. The framework agreement and the modalities, if implemented, will restore all the territories Ethiopia administered hitherto. What is more it allows the international boundary to be demarcated by a neutral party, thus removing at one stroke the possibility of using ill defined boundary as a pretext for invasion that is meant to further hidden agendas of one sort or another. Hence the primary objective of Ethiopia will be achieved.

Since the professed objectives of the government of Ethiopia omit the overthrow of that of Afeworki, there is also a strong case for being obliging to give chance to the mediators’ initiative.

As for the enormous human and material cost of the war, there was no need for it in the first place. The government caught unprepared for war by an aggressive regime, should have known better than to fall into the trap of fighting on terms and conditions set by its erstwhile friend-turned-foe. Knowing very well that it had made no preparations for war, that it had serious vulnerabilities vis-à-vis its enemy, it should have opted to pursue a peace process. It should have realised that with or without war, the boundary problem can only be resolved by international arbitration, by a boundary demarcated using the good office of a recognised third party. Having done so, it should have relentlessly pursued diplomatic offensive coupled with defensive military action, lest the Eritrean government undertakes possible further encroachment on its territories.

True in so doing the government may be seen outwitted and humbled, Ethiopia’s honour may be tarnished, and Mr Afeworki may continue to pose as the smart, daring and mighty member of the so called ‘new breed of imaginative African leaders’, now a by-word for American misjudgement of character. Yet what are these ‘loses’ compared to the cost of tens of thousands of lives, and much more? One must also ask whether the chosen course of action of the Ethiopian government spared it and the country from such humiliation?

Concentrating on diplomatic offensive, beside avoiding pitfalls, had had other advantages. To name only few: (a) the Eritrea friendly world media would not have misconstrued Ethiopia’s military effort to regain her territories as a possible cover to a sneaking intentions to repossess Assab; (b) the country’s development effort and investment opportunities would not have been compromised; (c) our leaders would have shown true statesmanship vis-à-vis their bloody-minded counterparts in Eritrea.

Ensuring a lasting peace is a continuous and subtle effort. Winning a comprehensive war (even if it was possible in this specific case), or removing a belligerent government by forcible intervention (even if it was legally and morally acceptable), do not necessarily lead to amicable co-existence. The very act of using force to achieve them generates resentment and bitterness in the heart of the subjects of the defeated party. With such deep seated negative feeling no peace can be said to be genuine or lasting.

A far sighted government could have seen the benefit of exposing its adversaries by formulating and implementing policies that show the consequences of their belligerency to their citizenry. Whilst trying to solve the border problems by diplomatic means, it should also have addressed constitutional and/or legal tasks that it had ignored hitherto. One such task is passing laws that clarify ambiguities on nationality and citizenship. Concomitant to this may be taking measures that take away special privileges of citizenship from those who no longer are Ethiopian subjects. The cutting off all economic, social and cultural ties with Eritrea is another. In fact such total disengagement should be maintained even after a successful conclusion of the border conflict, and until such time that the offending government is replaced by a responsible one by its people, or until the existing one publicly apologised and make amends for invading Ethiopia.

As for lesson, apart from what I have outlined above, could there be any other better and less costly way of teaching a lesson to an aggressor and its blindly faithful subjects? Can a government claim the moral high ground by reducing itself to the level of a warlike, vindictive, desperate and arrogant government it is dealing with? Is there a better way of showing a nation gripped by a fervent and hateful nationalism that in the end only reason not force, good neighbourliness not hostility, equal partnership not claiming seniority, working for mutual benefit not demanding a lion’s share work to their advantage and future prosperity.

Ethiopia should not also attempt to play a leading role in the Horn region. An attempt to assume leadership in the volatile region will end in grief. She just suffered at the hands of a government with hegemonic ambitions that inexorably led it to commit great historical blunder in the first decade of its existence. To pose for a leading role in Eritrean shoes will be a great folly. Ethiopia should not appear to be a threat to her neighbours. Instead she should play the part of a good neighbour, a neutral state disinterested in the domestic affairs of other countries, an economic hinterland that compliments her geographical position, a country only wanting to do proper and legitimate business with honourable coastal counterparts.

The disasters of the last fifteen months is now water under the bridge. Regrettably there is no going back to remedy the course of action taken. But this is a good moment at least to stop and make a cool and dispassionate reflection on the border war as a whole. It is high time to opt for the non-military course of action. By complete disengagement with Eritrea, it may be possible to turn attention to even more immediate and serious domestic problems of famine, Aids epidemic, the crisis in education and health services, and the widespread corruption and malpractice that hinder development efforts and that threaten to paralyse the machinery of state.

Complete disengagement must also be welcome by the Eritrean government and its faithful subjects. It allows them to prove to the rest of the world what they have always claimed: that backward Ethiopia hindered their development; that her progress depends on their port, industrial goods, and on their educated and skilled manpower; that she will fall apart without their military support and political advice. We can only wish them good luck in their endeavours to be the Singapore of Africa without us as their subservient market. Because if they go more prosperous, they become less reckless not to lose what they gained, and thus less inclined to bother us.

Sharew Tesemma