Analysis:

Reliving Ethiopian history: Welwel (1934) Vs. Badme (1998)

By G. Michael
Feb 25, 1999

The calendar year shows it is 1999. All the talk about the Y2K (year 2000) problem also confirm it is 1999. Therefore, I believe it is 1999. However, the conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea, the response of the international community for the last nine months, the tactics employed by the aggressor Eritrean government both in delay tactics and its propaganda and handling the international community, the Ethiopian acceptance of all sorts of peace proposals from the international body, all suggest Ethiopians may as well be revisiting the early 1930's.

The parallels of the current conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia and that of the 1934 conflict between Italy and Ethiopia are remarkable. All these coincidences could not have happened by chance alone.

How the conflicts started

Back then, Mussolini's Italy was considered "the most disinherited nation in Europe". Mussolini was thus looking for a fertile land to improve his country's poor economy with high unemployment. If he succeeds in colonizing Ethiopia, not only was he "securing a place in the sun" for his country but he would also avenge the loss Italy suffered at the battle of Adwa of 1896. There is no proof as to when Mussolini initiated his plans for invading Ethiopia but according to Angelo D. Boca (1965), it may have started in 1925. Regardless of when the planning started, however, it became obvious in November 1934. That is when an Anglo-Ethiopian Commission investigating pasture-lands in the Ethiopian province of Ogaden (southeastern Ethiopia) was prevented by Italian military force from continuing its work upon its arrival at Welwel, situated about 100 kilometers within Ethiopia. According to the book by T.M. Coffey (1974), Fitaurari (=Vanguard Commander) Balchi Shiferra, who was the Governor of that province had arrived a day early to make preparations for the commission. Naturally he headed to the only suitable site to set up his camp, where there were water wells. Unfortunately, this area has been occupied by Italy. Although Fitaurari Balchi did not ask for the Italians to leave the area since it was an Ethiopian territory, his request for the Italian troops to move so that he and his men could camp near the water wells was refused. He was told that the area was an Italian territory. The next day, the two English and three Ethiopian commissioners headed by a British lieutenant colonel named E.H.M. Clifford arrived at the site to find the Ethiopian and Italian soldiers facing each other. Colonel Clifford asked the rifle-pointing Italian troops to move back far enough so that his men could pitch camp close to the wells. His request was also refused.

Then the five commissioners composed a letter of protest to the Italian officers. A ranking Italian officer, Captain Roberto Cimmaruta then came to the camp of the Ethiopians to discuss the issue. Although they informed him that Welwel was an Ethiopian territory and all they wanted was to camp near water wells, the Italian officer refused to withdraw. However, he offered a compromise in that the Ethiopians can draw water under the supervision of the Italians from the wells behind the Italian line. The Ethiopians rejected this offer because it would imply recognition that the water wells were under Italian territory. As the negotiations were failing to achieve any deals, two Italian military airplanes flew low over the British and Ethiopian camps where Colonel Clifford was able to see a machine gun pointed at them from one of the planes. This angered Colonel Clifford but to avoid complicating the situation for the Ethiopian government, he withdrew his British mission to another town.

So started a conflict with few hundred soldiers from both sides camped near each other in a desert area for 10 days. On December 5, 1934, the Italian captain wrote a letter to Fitaurari Balchi telling him that he has reliable sources that there was a strong concentration of men on the Ethiopian side and that they had aggressive intentions. It was a letter of warning. This letter was however written in Italian and since neither Fitaurari Balchi nor anyone of his men could read Italian, they sent the letter to the town where the British officers were staying. As the truck was leaving with the letter for translation, the Italian troops started shooting killing many Ethiopians who were standing in the open. At the same time, three Italian planes appeared and two armored cars moved in the midst of the Ethiopians spraying machine-gun fire in all directions. In this surprise attack, 107 Ethiopians died, 45 were wounded. The Italian causality was 30 dead and 100 wounded, all native (Somali) troops.

The Eritrean-Ethiopian conflict of 1998

Except for the short period Eritrea was under Italian colony, its has been part of Ethiopia under different names and boundaries with many of its residents who can trace their ancestors from several districts of Tigray. Even after 1941, when the Italians were defeated during the second world war, Eritrea continued to be part of Ethiopia either as a federated state or as one of the 14 provinces of Ethiopia. It was not until the 1960's when some Eritreans started a guerrilla war whose objectives varied from self administration to a total independence and after a 30-year-long war that Eritrea became de facto independent in May 1991 after the collapse of the Ethiopian dictator Mengistu Hailemariam's government. The first action of the newly independent country was to expel all Ethiopians and all Eritreans who have been married to or have children from Ethiopians.

Reporting for the New York Times from Mekelle, Ethiopia, Jane Perlez wrote on July 15, 1991 that "tens of thousands of Ethiopian civilians who have been expelled by the new authorities in Eritrea have started to arrive in camps at the Eritrean border. About 30,000 wives and children of the Ethiopian soldiers stationed in Eritrea have been bused by the Eritrean People's Liberation Front [EPLF] across the border in the last two weeks and are crowded into camps here and in Adigrat, Aduwa and Aksum. The Eritrean Front has told relief officials to expect 150,000 more Ethiopian civilians soon, apparently people who are being dismissed from their jobs in Eritrea, some of them longtime residents in Eritrea. Some military wives have made their way to Addis Ababa, where they remain stranded in camps, uncertain whether their husbands are dead or alive, and in many cases with no home to go to. The report included the following statement from one of the deportees; a 20-year-old Eritrean woman seven months pregnant and married to a lieutenant in the Ethiopian Army who said: "I have no idea where my husband is"

Under normal circumstances, this would have ended any kind of normal relations between the Ethiopian and Eritrean governments. However, the Ethiopian government not only ignored this abuse of its innocent citizens, but it allowed Eritrea to continue to receive all sorts of benefits including use of the Ethiopian currency without much control from Ethiopia. When Eritrea declared her independence from Ethiopia officially in 1993, the President of the Transitional Government of Ethiopia at the time who is the current Prime Minister, Mr. Meles Zenawi was among the people who celebrated Eritrean independence. This is proof that the Ethiopian government was expecting a friendly neighbor.

With the experience of many civil wars and other problems in Africa, it was understandable for the international community to expect a lot more from Ethiopia and Eritrea in their effort for peace and development. This is so, because Ethiopia (including Eritrea as a province) had spent more than a decade in a civil war and the focus would be on economic development. The newly declared independent Eritrea also boasted that it will be the tiger of Africa in its economic development.

Despite the good intentions and support from Ethiopia, Eritrea was spending some of its resources in military build-up and forced many of its youth for a mandatory national military service. No one seemed to have asked the simple question as to why Eritrea would need a militaristic society when its southern neighbor was doing all for her. The border dispute between Eritrea and Ethiopia was considered as a family dispute by both leaders and the Eritrean President, Mr. Issayas Afewerki had even stated sometime in a 1997 interview that border demarcations between Eritrea and Ethiopia would be unnecessary, because, he declared, the people will naturally come together as brothers and sisters.

Despite the declaration of independence and waving a new flag, however, many Eritreans felt they were still Ethiopians. Besides the family relations and the similarities in culture and language, they were still trading with the same currency, the Ethiopian Birr. The Eritrean government had been talking about introducing its own currency immediately after independence but it was not until late 1997 that the idea became a reality. When the Eritrean government introduced its new currency, the Nakfa, in November 1997, it had expected the Ethiopian government to treat the Nakfa as equal to the Ethiopian Birr. To their surprise, not only did Ethiopia refuse to trade them at one to one rate but introduced new notes with better protection from counterfeiting. When Ethiopia declared that trade between the two countries be conducted in hard currency, the two friendly countries were now at odds with each other. To assure the public, President Issayas stated some time in February 1998 that Ethiopia was not to blame for economic problems in Eritrea. He added that Eritrea could not claim to have meaningful sovereignty without formulating its own trade and economic policy.

Then all of a sudden, the minor issue of border dispute became more important than the family relations we were being told about. It all started in a small area at Badme in the northwestern part of Tigray, the northern region of Ethiopia. Their invasion which started at Badme soon expanded to the eastern Tigray towns of Zalambessa and Alitena and their surroundings and farther to the eastern town of Bure in the Afar region (home of the archeological find of Lucy).

The preparations

Although the Italo-Ethiopian conflict at Welwel started in 1934, Italy had been engaged in subversive activities under the cover of good relations. As General De Bono was later to admit, "… from the very outset of the campaign, there were signs of the results of this disintegrating political action, and that it deprived our enemy [Ethiopia] of at least 200,000 men who either did not take arms or who, although enrolled and armed, remained inert." It was also his opinion that, taking advantage of a rebellion which Italy helped, they could have attacked and overrun Ethiopia in 1930 except they were not ready. (A.D. Boca pp. 13-14).

Even in the present conflict with Eritrea, Ethiopia was totally unprepared for an invasion from Eritrea. It was in fact Eritrea's calculation when it invaded Badme followed by Zalambessa and Alitena in Tigray and then moved another force to the Afar region; that it was to achieve its objective without much resistance because it knew very well Ethiopia had reduced the size of its army and its budget on defense. As the Ethiopian government later found out, Eritrea also had a well organized spy network at several places in the country.

The propaganda

After the start of the conflict on December 5, 1934, the Italians gave a news release to a government controlled media, Stefani News Agency which generously provided it to the Associated Press (AP) bureau in Rome to be wired to America.

The news release (AP Dec. 7) stated that Italy was a victim of aggression and that the attackers had machine guns and artillery. The Next day, the AP reported the Ethiopian response which charged that it was the Italians who attacked and who have now advanced 75 miles inside Ethiopian territory. But, the Italians responded within the same page of the article from Ethiopia claiming Italy was the victim and that the Italians were defending their territories declaring the Ethiopian official communiqué as false. The success of the media campaign by Italy could be seen from this initial reports that they were able to refute the Ethiopian claim within the same day and on the same page of the report (we were not even in the information age back then).

A frustrated British ambassador in Rome, Sir Eric Drummond, is reported to have sent a telegram message (on February 1935) to his Foreign Secretary, Sir Simon stating that: "The military preparations are questions of fact and speak for themselves. What has disquieted me particularly has been the disparity between official explanation that military measures taken are purely defensive and indications I and members of my staff have received unofficially regarding possible ultimate aims of Italian policy on Abyssinia. ... My growing suspicion that explanations of Italian Ministry for Foreign Affairs cannot be taken entirely at their face value and that ultimate Italian intentions are more far-reaching were today confirmed by long confidential conversation I had with a particularly well-placed and reliable source. ... " (Coffey 1974 page 44).

In the current conflict with Eritrea, when Ethiopia reported its territory was occupied by Eritrean troops and ordered for their withdraw, the Eritreans claimed they never occupied Ethiopia's territory and that they were the victims of aggression from the Ethiopian side. See for example, the following report from Asmara:

May 14 (Reuters) - Eritrea on Thursday denied its forces had invaded Ethiopia and said instead Ethiopian troops were responsible for a border skirmish which has soured relations. ``Ethiopian army contingents that had already penetrated Eritrean territory... opened fire and caused grave damage,'' Eritrean Foreign Minister Haile Woldensae said in a statement ahead of a news conference.

Even when a Voice of America reporter filed a report about an invasion that took place around Alitena before the Ethiopian government could even admit that it was being invaded in that area, the Eritreans declared they were being attacked by Ethiopia. The claims and counter-claims continue to this day. In fact, Eritrea seems to forecast when the next attack would come from and when, which suggests it is in charge of the initial fighting but prefer to report it as a victim, a strategy that was attempted by Mussolini.

Back then, when the Ethiopian government refused to provoke the Italians who were ready for an attack on the Eritrean border, they accused the Ethiopian Emperor for asking his people to pray as the following message from General De Bono in Eritrea indicates: The February 13, 1935, telegram states that: "At present the Negus Neghesti [Haile Selassie] is ordering too many prayers and fasts to give us reason to think that he wishes to attack us; however, it would be criminal not to be on our guard…"

Ethiopia's appeal to the world

Despite the invasion and provocation that had taken place which was witnessed by British Officers, the British minister in Ethiopia, Sir Sidney Barton advised Emperor Haileselssie to discuss the matter with the Italians instead of reporting it to the League of Nations when the Emperor told him he was going to approach the League of Nations at the same time he was approaching the Italians.

However, Ethiopia finally decided to bring her case to the League of Nations in a note written on January 3, 1935. When the League of Nations Council met on January 11, the Welwel incident was supposed to be the major issue. However, the Italians with the support of the British government tried to avoid the case from being discussed at the Council meeting. Instead, they worked hard to convince the Ethiopian delegate Mr. Tekle Hawariate who indicated that his country was very eager to settle the dispute peacefully.

The British Foreign Secretary, Sir John Simon then worked out a proposal on his own and sent it to his men in Addis Ababa and Rome. His message to Sir Sidney Barton in Ethiopia was that if the Emperor wanted to reach a settlement, he, rather than Mussolini, should make the concessions including admitting Ethiopia's guilt.

Sir Simon wrote:
"If the Emperor could take the initiative, by a note to the Italian government in which he would first express in general terms his regret that lives should have been lost in an encounter ....... and secondly undertake to pay into a bank in neutral territory (not in Geneva) 200,000 Ethiopian dollars on the understanding that it would be the first task of an Italian-Ethiopian boundary commission, proposed to be set up in the note, to distribute the sum for the relief of sufferers from the encounter of 5th December …… assuming such note also contained a definite assurance pending delimitation of the frontier that every endeavor would be made by Ethiopian forces to avoid contact with the Italian then I think it might be possible to persuade the Italian Government to take favorable note of such communication…" (Coffey, p.37).

Even this was revised to appease Mussolini so that Ethiopia was to pay the indemnity to an Eritrean bank rather than to a neutral country because of Mussolini's protest at the original proposal drafted by the British Foreign Secretary who was accused by Mussolini for favoring Ethiopia. Italy's objectives were to delay any action by the League of Nations at any cost until it had her army ready by October 1935. If the League of Nations was to take action against Italy after that, Italy was ready to withdraw membership from the League.

Back then, Ethiopian delegate Tekle Hawariate once accused Italy of stalling all the League of Nations' and Ethiopia's attempts at peaceful resolution accusing it of avoiding "precise reply in the affirmative" (Coffey page 65). This tactic has been used by Eritrea during the current conflict which seems to have worked even in the eyes of the United States. Eritrea has managed to delay accepting any of the peace initiatives by either calling them dead on arrival or we have questions that need to be clarified. The US President, Mr. Clinton recently stated that Ethiopia had accepted the peace proposal but Eritrea is awaiting clarification from OAU.

There was nothing to be clarified on the issue. The US government could have made it clear that Eritrea did not accept the peace proposal. As in 1934-35, even now 1998-99, Ethiopia has been eager to solve her dispute peacefully. In the current conflict with Eritrea it has been accepting all peace initiatives whether they came from the US-Rwanda team, the OAU, or the UN Security Council.

Again, the Eritrean government in the current crisis accused the US in its US-Rwanda proposal in favoring Ethiopia only because it asked the Eritreans to withdraw first before any demarcation could be made. Eritrea also accused one of the OAU members, Djibouti's President for being on the Ethiopian side in its attempt to discredit the peace initiative. That is similar to Mussolini's accusation of France and Britain who were doing what the Italians had wanted them to do. In fact, although Mussolini had made it clear that his intentions were not limited to a small territorial dispute but a conquest of Ethiopia, the Europeans leaders, that of France and Britain were working hard to give whatever Italy wanted peacefully.

Back then, the only country without any interest in the horn of Africa, the USA, who was not a member of the League of Nations discouraged its diplomats from involvement. Secretary of State Cordell Hull had instructed the American Charge d'affaires in Addis Ababa, W. Perry George, "to refrain scrupulously from encouraging any request by the Emperor for the mediation by the United states." This is one minor exception in the whole analysis in that at present, the US is not only a member of the UN Security Council but the only supper-power in the world. However, the differences end there. Now, as in the past, the US has attempted to stay as an outsider although its denunciations against Ethiopia suggest otherwise.

All the inaction and delaying tactics by Italy against any action by the League of Nations had allowed Italy to continue sending its troops to Ethiopia. The current delay also allowed Eritrea to dig trenches along the territories it occupied and to procure more weapons.

Back then, when Mussolini's son (22 years old Vittorio Mussolini), on his first combat mission, was unable to locate his target, he decided to drop his bombs where they would do the most damage- into the midst of the town of Adwa. But he was quite dissatisfied with his work. He later recalled, "I was always miserable when I failed to hit my target, but when I was dead on, I was equally upset because the effects were so disappointing. I suppose I was thinking about American movies and was expecting one of those terrific explosions when everything goes sky-high. Bombing these thatched mud huts of the Ethiopians does not give one the slightest satisfaction." (A.D. Boca 1965 pp. 59-60).

It was perhaps with similar intentions of creating the most damage that the Eritrean airforce bombed a school full of children at Mekelle in northern Ethiopia on June 5, 1998. The bombing of the school happened twice within a few minutes apart. Perhaps the first one did not cause as much damage to please the bomber. It may also be the case that the feeling of the bombers was to see explosions like Hollywood movies that they bombed a grain store in Adigrat a week later on June 11, 1998. Adigrat has become a refuge for those displaced from their homes from the Zalambessa and Alitena areas. It is perhaps for such excitement that the Eritrean artillery and air attack has targeted civilians far away from the border such as the town of Adigrat which has been shelled several times in November 1998 and February 1999. They must have been reading V. Mussolini's book "Voli Sulle ambe" [Flight over the Ambas] when they carried the bombings of innocent children and displaced people.

In October 1935, many Ethiopians had began calling the Italians "baby-killers" in reference to their bombing of civilians at Adwa and Adigrat. It is not surprising then that the first Eritrean Air Force attack on June 5, 1998 was targeted at school children, not to be denied the title of "baby-killers".

In September 1935, a league of Nations appointed Committee of five (Britain, France, Poland, Spain and Turkey) had suggested an international protectorate over Ethiopia which was to be sponsored by the League and dominated by Italy. The plan would also have given Italy the Afar (Danakil) and Ogaden regions. Although this would have been rejected by Ethiopia, Mussolini nevertheless rejected the plan because it meant "all the 200,000 Italian troops in east Africa should be brought home and told they have been sent out there for an excursion trip." (Coffey p.146) His problem was that where can he find jobs for his troops and return them to civilian life. On September 28, 1935, the fourth meeting of the 89th session of the League Council adjourned without any decision. The League of Nations Commission of Conciliation and Arbitration that was investigating the Welwel incident had submitted its report with a conclusion that neither side could be held responsible for the incident. Italy had already decided early in 1935 that it will start its invasion from Eritrea in the north and from the east on October 3, 1935. The timing was perfect for Italy.

Unlike the conclusion reached by the League of Nations' Commission in 1935, however, the OAU fact finding mission of 1998 had concluded, Eritrea had invaded Ethiopian territory. This was adopted by the UN Security Council. This is one exception from all the similarities. Even here, despite their findings, the OAU and the UN Security Council failed to order the withdrawal of the invading army . Similar to Italy's problems, the rejection of withdrawal by Eritrea regardless of the peace proposal may be that the more than 200,000 soldiers would have no jobs in civilian life.

Emperor Haileselassie may have put too much faith on the League of Nations contrary to the advice of his chiefs who told him that they would have to defend their country themselves. He did not listen to his own chiefs and gave time for the Italians. It was not until two weeks had passed after the war began that Ethiopia started the mobilization. On October 17, 1935, the War Minister Ras Mulugeta declared his readiness to go to the war front and declared loyalty to his country and the Emperor but also gave the King the following advice: "Do not interest yourself over much in politics. Your weakness is that you trust the foreigner too much. Kick him out. What are all these foolish newspapermen doing here? … Send all foreigners packing. I swear to perfect loyalty." (Coffey p. 190).

Even now in 1999, about 10 months into the invasion, Ethiopia has not declared war and still believes on a peaceful resolution of the conflict. The public opinion has however changed and the consensus seems to say: we have given too much time for a peaceful resolution and expected more from the international community, neither of which materialized. The mistrust of the newspapermen by Ras Mulugeta nearly 65 years ago seems to be still true. Ethiopia is not getting a fair treatment by the international media for whatever reason and may be it will have to do without the journalists.

And then there is the issue of embargo which went into effect on November 18, 1935. That is after Italy had started the invasion in October 1935 and had moved all its army and ammunition to Eritrea. Even under the embargo, however, many companies continued to deliver all Italy needed because of their economic interest. The embargo did not include the most important one, oil, if it was to hurt Italy. Had the League of Nations threatened an embargo on oil and Great Britain closed the Suez Canal to Italian shipping, it would have had an effect but for political and financial calculations, these actions were not taken.

On October 5, 1935, President Roosevelt stated US neutrality and put an embargo of armaments, and warned Americans that their dealings with belligerents would be at their own risk. Meaning, he was more worried about their financial risk. In December, 1998, the US government suggested an arms embargo on Ethiopia and Eritrea. On February 10, 1999, the UN Security Council adopts a resolution on arms embargo to both countries, without regard as to punishing the aggressor and knowing too well, that Eritrea would get arms from countries like Libya. On February 15, 1999 Britain becomes the first country to implement the arms embargo on Ethiopia and Eritrea, revisiting its role in 1934-35 with Italy's Mussolini.

I can not figure out what the calculations of the United Nations Security Council were when they decided to impose an arms embargo on both the victim and the aggressor when they had also agreed that Eritrea was the aggressor.

Then as now, it did not matter what the source of the conflict was and who the aggressor was, because the motives of both aggressions were different from the official statements. In fact, the Eritrean government has stated on many occasions that the issue was not Badme (where it all seem to have started). Similarly, Italy back then had said, Welwel was not the issue. Despite the similarities, we all know that Eritrea is no Italy.


Books used for reference of the Italo-Ethiopian war:

A.D. Boca, 1965. The Ethiopian War 1935-41. English translation by P.D. Cummins (1969).

T.M. Coffey. 1974. Lion By The Tail.



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