Commentary:

The Misleading Metaphor of Assab

By Afera Gebru; July 22, 2000

Some states live in peace, others sow conflict and perpetuate war. How can one account for the difference? Confrontations occur repeatedly in international politics. When that happens each country's actions in any single round of the war has consequences.

War ends when the two countries arrive at a common picture of their relative power and a common assessment of appropriate settlement claims. A stable settlement means that the agreement, however unfavorable, must be accepted as realities. There is negotiating on many questions within each nation. War only ends when mutual rejection of claims is not worth the cost of continued fighting to either side. In modern war, struggle engages the whole society and victory and defeat are not so clearly marked. The victor is the side that wins the last battle.

Mr. Prime Minister for us the war is not over without guaranteeing Ethiopia accesses to the sea. I do not quite agree with your political rhetoric or economic analysis. Your sincerity in many cases is doubtful. The more insincere it is, (and this often obvious enough) the more it serves to perpetuate Eritrea's unfair privilege.

It would be better for us to face it directly than to go pretending that Assab does not matter for our survival. There is a basic conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea on the question of national interest and economic need for Assab. Following the conflict of Ethio-Eritrea war, the way is now open for face to face talk and real negotiations at the US brokered peace talks in Algeria and in Washington DC on ending Africa's two years old bloodiest war.

The problem of Eritrea once again became the main issue like a rash that never goes away. Eritrea has been a security treat to Ethiopia's survival ever since its inception. The initiative to give autonomy to Eritrea was basically the main issue for lasting peace in the region according to EPRDF's political doctrine. But the unfair political stance for not securing Ethiopia's interest has persistently frustrated many concerned Ethiopians. The war is producing growing discomfort due to the lack of securing Ethiopia's vital interest in an outlet to the sea. So many lives are lost during the war; dissent is being voiced far more openly than it was eight years ago. The main obstacle to restore is still some EPRDF official for not wanting to hammer the illusive past agreement on the interest of Ethiopia's geographical disadvantage that our country can face if it is land locked.

Ethiopia gets access to sea for Eritrean freedom (SAUDI GAZETTE Thursday July, 4 1991) Addis Ababa, (AFP). A deal has been struck to give Ethiopia access to the sea in return for what amounts to independence for the Northern province of Eritrea. Ethiopian officials said…The Assab agreement said: The provisional government of Eritrea recognizes the vital importance of the port of Assab to Ethiopia's economic welfare and development and considers it not to be a source of conflict between the people of Ethiopia and Eritrea. Consequently it has deemed to make Assab a free port to Ethiopia…"

This was the reality in the early 90s. Now Ethiopian's are fed up with the EPRDF's policies on the question of Ethiopia's access to the sea via Assab. Military posturing and fighting may continue for feasible future. Ethiopia access to the sea is a main pressure for peace. Ethiopia as a landlocked country must always negotiate with Eritrea to gain access to the sea.

Empirical evidence confirms that landlocked countries experience slower economic growth. From an economic point of view trade competitiveness is reduced when transportation costs of import and export is burdened by charges over which Ethiopia does not have direct control, such as port charges, freight forwarding fees, or custom duties, bilateral trucking and shipping agreements etc. Lack of physical access to the sea, isolation and remoteness from world market, prohibitive transit costs and high risk entail socio-economic consequences for landlocked developing countries. Therefore, no wonder the most of them have an average less than 400 dollars per capital GNP. Handicapped by their geographical location, the landlocked developing countries are in particular disadvantage position with respect to the ongoing globalization process. (Journal of the group of 77 March/April 1997)

Over the period 1960-92, landlocked countries grew an average of 1.5 per cent per year slower than countries that were not landlocked. (Transition Economic Series No.14)

On the basis of the above, there is compelling evidence that lack of a port can damage economic and political security that ensures continued survival. Ethiopia's loss of her sea outlet has imposed a great burden on the economy. Our country's resources are already wasted in the hands of Eritrean regime. To name a few; one hundred thirty-five thousand tons of dry cargo, 47,000 cubic meter of wet cargo and 50,000 tons of asphalt was plundered and used by the Eritrean regime. (Zemen, Hamle 4, 1990 E.C)

EPRDF leaders are creating a hostile environment to a point where the strategic interests of the country is in question against unfair, morally objectionable policies towards Eritrea. Ethiopia's access to the sea was widely seen as a prerequisite for negotiations to secure Ethiopia's national interest and territorial integrity. In view of the above, considerations of national interest and security must be of paramount concern to the EPRDF and it should undertake bold initiatives in dealing with a belligerent Eritrea. At this stage nothing short of having access to the sea will satisfy the Ethiopians.



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