The Eritrea-Ethiopia conflict is winding down, and Ethiopia has indicated it is prepared to enter into direct talks with Eritrea. This is a bad sign.

Direct talks, without the presence of outside observers, would reduce the talks to the level of a private TPLF-EPLF reconciliation conference. The outcome of these talks would be a secret treaty based on the interests of the two parties. It should be clear that the interests of the TPLF and the EPLF are not synonymous with the national interests of Ethiopia and Eritrea.

Many people still deeply distrust the TPLF and are unsure of its long-term intentions. This is natural because the TPLF is harboring many secrets about the agreements it signed with Eritrea in the past. In addition, its political program in Ethiopia raises questions about its long-term commitment to a united Ethiopia.

What will happen when the TPLF eventually loses power in Addis Abeba? One has to wonder if the TPLF would ever consent to be governed by a multi-ethnic, Ethiopian nationalist party that threatens its power base in Tigrai. What would the TPLF do if it were faced with the choice between submitting to rule by a popular, nationalist Ethiopian political party or leading Tigrai to independence with Eritrea standing at its side as a strong ally?

Of course most people imagine the TPLF-EPLF alliance to be dead due to the recent war. But there are three reasons why this would be premature.

(1) The track record of the TPLF. In 1985, political disagreement led the EPLF to close off the established supply route from Sudan to TPLF-controlled areas in Tigrai. This was the time of the great famine and relief food was being given to both the TPLF and EPLF to feed people in areas they controlled. The EPLFs action caused great hardship to the people living in TPLF-held areas - they were basically condemned to starve to death. Six years later however, the TPLF had completely forgiven the EPLF. In fact Meles began showering Eritrea with gifts from Ethiopia - helicopters, ships, loans, grain, passports - nothing was held back from the Eritreans. Thus it is clear that the TPLF has an immense capacity to forgive the EPLF.

(2) The continued lock on power by the same leaders in Ethiopia and Eritrea. They know each other, they were friends. They are related to each other. They have a long history together. The recent war is only a two-year dispute in what has been a 25-year marriage. If Meles and Isayas were replaced, then the prospects for renewal of the TPLF-EPLF alliance would be lessened. But they are both still there. Meles in particular is completely unrepentant for his previous Eritrea policy and nobody in the TPLF is holding him accountable for what he did.

(3) The continued absence of political reconciliation despite the war. The TPLF-EPLF alliance has allowed both organizations to concentrate on smashing their opponents rather than trying to build internal political harmony. This was especially true in the early years of the alliance, but the same pattern has continued to 1998. Both the TPLF and EPLF can now help each other by suppressing the opposition forces. This will likely be an important clause in a future EPLF-TPLF reconciliation treaty. The TPLF will additionally benefit because with the Eritrea threat removed, the TPLF will be under far less pressure to liberalize the political climate. The EPLF will similarly benefit from the reduced opposition pressure.

Despite the bitterness and humiliation of his defeat, Isayas is likely to welcome with open arms the re-establishment of the TPLF-EPLF alliance. It was great for Eritrea while it lasted, and Isayas has only himself to blame for alienating the TPLF. He would be ecstatic if he could go back to the 1998 'status-quo.'

The TPLF and EPLF are natural allies. They may have bitter disagreements occasionally, but they are both dedicated to the success of Tigrean nationalism. In Ethiopia this takes the form of the Tigray national state and the total domination of Ethiopia by the TPLF. In Eritrea, the EPLFs policies of Tigreanization of Eritrea leaves no doubt that it is a Tigrean nationalist organization although using the name 'Eritrea'. No matter what happens, the TPLF will always be closer to the Tigrean-dominated EPLF than to any Ethiopian opposition party. Similarly, the EPLF will always be closer to the TPLF than to the Eritrean opposition.

So what can we expect from Meles? The danger signs are starting to appear. We should be prepared for the possibility of yet another sell out, and the resurrection of the TPLF-EPLF unholy alliance.