One day, and hopefully soon, Ethiopia and Eritrea are going to have to live in peace. The two peoples, who have been torn apart by this conflict, are going to have to reconcile. But genuine peace and reconciliation require not only time - a time for healing - but a proper assessment of 'where we are, how we got here, and where we are headed.'

People in Ethiopia acquaint the very word Eritrea with war. I have heard people say that it was war when Eritrea was a part of Ethiopia and war when it left and became another country. That is unfortunately true. But it ignores the years between 1991 and 1998 when, despite difficulties, relations with Eritrea were close.

Undoubtedly there are many critics who argue that Eritrea 'lived on Ethiopia's back' all during those years, and that, with Ethiopia so generous, Eritrea needed no other donor. That may well be true. Let the future show just how both countries will fare without being hitched together in the way they were in the past. The multi-layered and tangled relations between Ethiopia and Eritrea, and between Ethiopians and Eritreans would require more than a casual attempt like this one to receive a proper hearing. I am sure the subject will be tackled by many in attempts to find out what went wrong, and how to design a formula to live together. I hope that the future debate will be one that will go beyond knee-jerk defense arguments, although it would not be fair to expect people to avoid expressing their convictions either way.

Let us first start by accepting that the divorce between Ethiopia and Eritrea has now been traumatically concluded. Although Eritrea was a de-facto independent entity since 1991 and an independent state since 1993, it could be said, that for all practical purposes, the two countries shared one economy in that period. Furthermore, the peoples of the two countries lived quite freely in each other's country. The major exception was the forced expulsion of some categories of Ethiopians and anyone related to them from Eritrea in 1991. In Ethiopia, the issue of citizenship was swept under the rug. What emerged was a set up resembling a confederation without the superstructures (common administration, legislature, judiciary and so on).

The impression was formed in Ethiopia that, despite the divorce, Eritrea had not really gone away, and that although Eritrea did make off with goods destined to and from Ethiopia in Assab as war booty in 1991, the ports of Assab and Mitsiwa did, by and large, provide the services needed by Ethiopia. Ethiopia did not feel hemmed in, or landlocked. Neither did Eritrea feel particularly independent, as it was using the Ethiopian Birr. But as long as the going was halfway comfortable, it could be livable.

True, in Ethiopia, there were segments of the society that felt that Eritrea was sponging off the Ethiopian economy and that the Ethiopian government was allowing the perpetuation of an unfair situation for the benefit of Eritrea and at the expense of Ethiopians. The Government in Addis Ababa had, therefore, to carry a heavy political burden during those years, but it did so. The other side of the coin was that life in the Ethio-Eritrean condominium anaesthesized people from the reality of Eritrea's separation, until it really hit home in 1997 and 1998 with the currency divorce, and finally, military conflict.

Since then, both sides have felt the full force of the separation and what it means, particularly the issue of identity and nationality. Today, the confederation is no more. The Ethiopian cushion is no longer available to Eritrea, and Ethiopia feels the real impact of being landlocked. Moreover much blood has been spilt, people have been displaced and the scars of the last twenty-four months could well require as many years (a generation) to heal.

Optimists, however, argue that beneath the surface of the current hostility there is enough goodwill born out of the years of common and shared existence that will tide the two peoples over this period, ushering in a new beginning along new, do-able and probably more enduring lines.

A new beginning will require the reexamination and possible debunking of a number of stereotypes that some in both countries have with regards to one another. At the risk of appearing frivolous, I will take pasta as an example. Much has been made about the Eritrean attachment to pasta (read Italy). Pasta may have entered Ethiopia after Eritrea, but it certainly has more consumers in Ethiopia today. In a similar vein, following the currency divorce Eritrean media made much of teff (read Ethiopia) as stomach - churning food. But Eritrean urbanites love teff. It may come from Ethiopia but teff has become as Eritrean as pasta is Ethiopian.

This awkward example may not do justice to the point that is begging to be made. Those who would have us believe that Eritrea is a unique phenomenon utterly devoid of Ethiopian links have their head in some very deep sand. Others who demonize everything Eritrean also must recognize that they are denying the very glaring fact that Eritreans and Ethiopians, though citizens of two very different states, share a joint heritage. To outsiders, they are so much alike that they confound the rest of the world when they fight each other with such vehemence.

I do not wish readers to get the mistaken impression that I am arguing for a re-unification of Eritrea with Ethiopia. Like many, I wish separation had never come. But after all that has passed, I do not believe re-unification to be possible in the lifetime of this generation, and maybe never. It is therefore not really worth laboring for.

Integration may inadvertently come to pass as a by-product of something much larger. On the contrary, I am arguing for acceptance and recognition of each other's identity, as peoples and as states. I think the dilemna that a number of Ethiopians have faced is that caused by the hesitation to finally purge Eritrea from one's heart and mind as being a part of Ethiopia.

Now I am pretty sure that the war of the last two years has helped the purging exercise, except as it applies to Assab (which I will come to later). I am also quite certain that the war may have helped many Eritreans also come to proper terms with real independence. But this consciousness could well have come about without war. The currency divorce could have brought it about naturally enough. Unfortunately we're not that lucky, and tens of thousands had to die to redefine the relationship between the two countries and peoples.

In addition it is time to admit that although there may be Ethiopians that continue to hanker after Eritrea, they are a dwindling breed and, more often than not, people here are resigned to a separate future, but one that takes into account the fundamental interests of Ethiopia.

What does the fundamental interest of Ethiopia mean? A friendly neighbor? A port of our own? Both?A mix of the two? It is obvious that Ethiopians do not wish to see a hostile neighbor barring their way to the sea, and paving the way for the destabilization of the country and the entire sub-region that would serve the interests of, say Egypt. So, a friendly Eritrea is desirable. For Eritrea to be genuinely friendly would probably require a type of governance in Asmara that recognizes the benefits of a win/win political/economic/social relationship.

But at the end of the day, that is a matter for Eritreans to decide. Ethiopians cannot decide the character of their government for Eritrea. So aspirations may have to settle on ensuring access to the sea for Ethiopia. That itself is no small matter considering the fact that the formerly separately administered port of Assab has emerged as part of sovereign Eritrean territory since de-facto independence in 1991. Ethiopians should by no means feel constrained to talk about and demand access to the sea. I have learnt that the Ethiopian Government is in no hurry to use Assab and thereby provide much-needed revenue to the current authorities in Eritrea. Neither is there the desire to let Eritrea use the 'Assab card' in its dealings with Ethiopia.

So unless and until Eritrea puts port issues on the agenda, the Ethiopian Government is likely to demonstrate a lack of interest. The wisdom of that argument notwithstanding, it is difficult to resist the temptation to wrench a fundamental concession from Eritrea as regards port use. After all, the key players in the international community, and world public opinion for that matter, do fully understand Ethiopia's need for direct access to the sea. Whether that means they would swallow direct annexation by Ethiopia is, of course, another matter altogether. For many people in Ethiopia, access to the sea means the re-incorporation of Assab into Ethiopia, and they cite strong historical arguments to support their position.

Others, however, interpret access to the sea to mean the right of Ethiopia for unfettered access to the port of Assab which would be formally under the Eritrean flag. The arguments have started mainly in the private media. It is high time that the whole national media got on board and brought to public discussion the hitherto private mutterings about access to the sea. Serious debate about the issue could help in the forging of a measure of national consensus that would guide thinking in the difficult and delicate period ahead.

For Eritrea, such talk initially would demonstrate that Ethiopia is working for its dismemberment, probably with the support of Red Sea Afars. Ceding Assab would, in the minds of Eritrea's strategists, deny Eritrea any leverage over Ethiopia. But knowledgeable observers know that 'Dankalia' (as the Assab region is known in Eritrea) is far away from the center of gravity in Eritrean political life. In political terms, the port of Assab in particular is only valuable as a reminder to Ethiopia of its being a landlocked state. This is a recipe for permanent tension and instability.

Unless Assab is incorporated into Ethiopian territory, or unless it fulfills that function, short of sovereignty, it would not be difficult to predict that the future of Ethiopian-Eritrean relations would be unstable at best, and conflictual at worst. Eritrea will have to decide between a tenuous future fraught with menace, and a more placid relationship with Ethiopia. The future will show us the choice Eritrea makes.

For Ethiopia, the challenge will come when the 'price' for Assab is presented. With armies facing each other across borders and in the wake of the human and material losses incurred in the conflict, talking about a future relationship and the status of ports appears at best premature. It would make more sense at this time to discuss what needs to be done to create a conducive environment for the signing of a comprehensive peace agreement that would conclusively end this war. It certainly would help to tone down the language of war and conflict. In Addis Ababa, the Prime Minister told the diplomatic community that this would come naturally as the peace process took effect. Although one cannot switch anger on and off at will, it would help for those 'in the writing and talking business' to turn a new leaf and to exercise their minds regarding the best way to move forward.

The going ahead will not be easy. In the first place the issue of compensation will have to be settled. There is also the issue of responsibility for the conflict, and an assessment of its socio-economic consequences. One can predict a multiplicity of claims. Among other things Ethiopia will ask why Zalanbessa was dismantled wall by wall, door by door, roof by roof and window by window while under Eritrean rule. No doubt, Eritrea will make its own claims. Rough roads definitely lie ahead.

As far as Eritrea is concerned, people need to come to terms with a few hard truths about how such a disaster has come to pass. Painting a defeat, and a bad one at that, in victorious colors only postpones the inevitable reckoning. As for who won and who lost, the cessation of hostilities agreement says it all. Eritrea has signed a document that forbids it to shoot at Ethiopian troops on its territory.

But in the interest of making progress, rather than speculate whether Ethiopia could have taken Assab or Asmara, it would be more forward-looking to address the fundamental question, 'what is it going to take to have peace - real peace - with Ethiopia?' Neither does it make much sense to make life hell for Ethiopian citizens in Eritrea, particularly at a time when both sides are engaged in finding a way to move from a cessation of hostilities to a comprehensive peace agreement. This issue of the proper handling of each other's nationals, of course, applies to both sides.

As far as Ethiopians are concerned the best way to deal with the conflict is, to the extent possible, to put it behind them. While one can expect difficulties in the coming weeks and months that will be a reminder of unfinished business with Eritrea, the most practical thing to do is to shift gears and get down to dealing with the myriad problems that are faced at home. One cannot wish one's neighbor away and Ethiopians and Eritreans will continue to live side by side 'on the same block'. They can either make life easier or more difficult for themselves. Understanding the limits would make life a lot easier.

One thing is sure, Eritrea is for Eritreans and Ethiopia for Ethiopians. Ethiopia will need full access to the sea. Eritrea will need to have its security. It is time to do away with the seeds of future conflict once and for all. It's time to think together about a new beginning.