It is a self-evident truth that the invasion of Ethiopian territory has attained the highest level in international news. To an outside observer it may not be immediately clear, to understand what happened in the past two years, why Eritrea invaded the sovereign territories of Ethiopia. Time and space do not allow us to go in details into the intrigues and lies of Isaya's regime. Serious concerns emerged for the first time in political arena about the geo-political integrity of Ethiopia. Thus concerned manifested themselves in an entirely different way after the Eritrean invasion sovereign Ethiopia territories and many refused to recognize the legitimacy of Eritrea having access 600 mills seacoast. Access to the sea posed the strongest challenge to the EPRDF; paradoxically the concept of self-determination in the EPRDF political lexicon at the time did not imply that possibility. Nevertheless, Ethiopia's national cohesion was now open to question the EPRDF self-determination to Eritrea and it has been extremely pain full contentious issue ever since.

Boundary maintenance has been uniquely important to the integrity of Ethiopia's survival because of her vulnerability to international politics. Now Ethiopia is confronted by the dilemma of steadily increasing military power and deteriorating national security that will worsen the situation. Assab has recently became the focus of domestic tension with the inflicting self-determination claims voiced against the background of interstate territorial disputes and the unsettled legacy of the EPRDF political stance. In 1993, the EPRDF leaders were not overly concerned with the constitutional procedure of Ethiopia's border change. This political implication of the 1993 act became painfully clear in the late 1990s. The image of the Red Sea as an historical territory is deeply rooted in Ethiopia's national consciousness. It is fair to say most Ethiopian people who anguish over the question of Assab are trying to find ways to avoid relinquishing any of the privileges that Ethiopia enjoyed for centuries having an outlet the sea. At least insofar as it involved the loss of Assab, surrender to Eritrea would be too high a price for Ethiopia to pay.

Since it was from Eritrea that Italy has launched its main invasion in 1935, consideration of national security must be dominant in Ethiopia's quest for the return of Assab. But this argument may be insufficient by them to convince the EPRDF. The problem with Eritrea can not be solved in a round table, without addressing the question of security concerns more than anything else. Ethiopia as the victor should set the conditions and dictate her own terms on Eritrea (as the defeated nation), as has been the case in all wars that has been won. Eritrea must not be the exception. In the long run Ethiopia may lose more than what could possibly hope to gain by feigning to ignore the security concern of her survival as an outlet to the sea.

Nevertheless Assab remains a potential source of territorial controversy in the context of lasting geo-political interest to concerned Ethiopians. Not taking Assab into consideration in its security strategy constitutes a serious threat to peace and stability. So far EPRDF has proved unresponsive to the legitimate rights of the Afar population that has remained strongly opposed to Eritrea's rule, and who continue to view the Ethiopian people and government as the guarantor of their political and cultural rights.

By international law, Afar's status can be supported by the principle of self-determination. That will attract international support, since most observers concur those economic considerations and civil or human right violations under Eritrean rule basically motivate contemporary secessionist claims. At worst the optimal solution to the Red Sea case may lie in consolidating the Afar's autonomous status within Ethiopia without challenging the breakaway province of Eritrea. They are many legitimate grounds to retain Assab, however it is downplayed by the EPRDF for reasons that are unknown (at least for now).

The United States and the international community are expecting the two governments to return to the negotiating table and hammer out the technical details. However, any agreement should embody the consent of Ethiopian people, which had been expressed on question of Assab. I hope the EPRDF will not repeat its soft approach in their attempt to influence Eritrea through political dialogue. Such an attempt to influence is doomed to failure and we cannot afford to enter another period of uncertainty. That will produce a severe backlash. So incontrovertible to the fact of Assab are the words of Issayas quoted in New Africa in the June/July 1990 edition titled "A Man Who Worked to Rule" in which the author spoke exclusively to Judith Perera on question of Assab as follows:

Question: Do you anticipate any further obstacles to Eritrea's self-determination? Is Ethiopia accessing to the sea problem?
Answer: "There are still groups in Ethiopia, which want to retain Eritrea by force although others are ready to allow us self-determination. Access to the sea was never a problem. Ethiopia can use Eritrea…The EPLF does not want to strangle Ethiopia. In contest of lasting political solution there will be negotiations and arrangement to guarantee that Ethiopia will not be landlocked."

The power of Issayas words is evidence the right of Ethiopia's outlet to sea. Thus it should be subjected to the standards of contemporary international law on the question of Assab. The Afar people existed as a sovereign people of Ethiopia until Eritrea exercised self-determination. The Afar's right to self-determination fell short of the legal requirements to determine their destiny. And it is necessary to consider the legal grounds on which the Afar can reassert itself on international justice. Self-determination is the only expression of the right norm, which can destroy or build.

In the Second World War, the initial positions of the super powers (France, Britain and U.S.A) were that Ethiopia be granted an outlet to the sea through the port of Assab. Knowing this fact full well, the international community continues to linger in a haze of apathy. No country would hope to see as much carnage, distraction and instability as Somalia. Ironically, this chaos was not their expectation.

In contrast, with the current position of the EPRDF, justification remains unsatisfactory on the issue of Assab. The legal issues echoed by many Ethiopians are particularly impressive, but the party line of the EPRDF is hard to make a case or claim. At least for now Eritrea has shown what she can not achieve on the battleground she is trying to achieve at the negotiating table.