The Eritrean dictator appears to have capitulated and finally accepted the OAU peace plan. However, there is a great deal of insincerity in Eritrea’s pompous statements, and the Ethiopian government should not formally accept this plan until it is clarified in detail. It is unfortunate that this extra step must be taken, but Eritrea’s duplicitous and insincere behavior leaves Ethiopia no choice.

For example, the plan talks about the re-establishment of the civilian administration. Any sensible reader will conclude this means the re-establishment of the pre-existing Ethiopian administration in the areas invaded by Eritrea (Zalanbessa, Alitiena, etc), and the pre-exisiting Eritrean administration in the areas gained by Ethiopia during Operation Sunset that were not administered by Ethiopia prior to May 6 1998.

But the Eritreans could brazenly claim that all the disputed areas used to be administered by Eritrea at one time, and therefore the OAU clause means the re-establishment of an Eritrean administration in Badime, Zalanbessa and Alitiena. Ethiopia must make it absolutely clear that the pre-existing Ethiopian administration will be re-established immediately subsequent to the Eritrean withdrawal.

The formal ceasefire agreement must include very specific detail. Otherwise the Eritreans will once again attempt to exploit any ambiguities to its advantage even if it directly contravenes the spirit of the agreement.

The OAU implementation modalities incorporate the two points that Ethiopia has rightfully insisted upon from the very beginning:

(1) Withdrawal of Eritrean forces from ALL occupied areas.
(2) Re-establishment of the pre-existing civilian administration

It is not clear why the Eritrean dictator has finally caved-in - at least in his public pronouncements. Maybe he finally realized that he has no hope of winning the war and that if it continues it will end in defeat for Eritrean on all fronts. Maybe he finally saw that he was taking Eritrea on a dead-end journey to destruction.

Some more detailed reasons could be:

(1) Failure of the repeated Eritrean attempts to recapture Badime
(2) Poor response to their appeals for military aid financing from Libya
(3) Heavy casualties that decimated the frontline Eritrean units
(4) A ruined economy tottering near collapse
(5) Lack of hope for any other exit

But why did so many people have to die before the Eritrean leadership and its dedicated elite followers finally accepted the peace proposal that was on the table from day one?

What has Eritrea gained in the last year during the period that it was rejecting the very principles it claims to accept today? Did it gain more land? Did it gain more population? Did its economy benefit?

At least we know what the Ethiopian soldiers died for. It is their sacrifice that has forced the Eritrean troops out of the occupied areas. In the case of Badime they ejected the Eritreans from the vaunted Mereb-Setit line within four days. It is because of their victories that the Eritrean army seems ready to pack up and return to where it came from. Without their sacrifice the Eritreans would still be boasting about not leaving “even if the sun didn’t rise.”

But what did the Eritrean conscripts die for? So that the Eritrean dictator could engage in endless boasting for one year? Can some Eritrean please explain why the peace plan of July 1998 was rejected by Eritrea? Can some Eritrean please explain what was the point of waiting over one year to accept the same peace plan that was on the table from the very beginning?

After months of bull-headed stubborness, Eritrea has now gained entry to the Slobodan club of futile behavior. In the manner of Milosevich, Eritrea preferred death and destruction to compromise. It got death and destruction in abundance, but nothing else. Now it has ended up accepting the very points it initially rejected. Like Saddam Hussein “withdrawing” his troops from Kuwait, Eritrea waited until thousands of its young citizens were dead before accepting a complete withdrawal from all occupied areas.

An amusing side-note will be the forthcoming articles and position papers of the Eritrean intellectuals. Once again they will contort themselves to keep in line with the latest statements emanating from Asmara. Once again, they will spin their articles and gyrate to the new tune composed by their dictator Isayas Afeworki. Their old positions and declarations will be tossed out like a song that has gone out of fashion. A good example is the vociferous, braying, Eritrean denunciations of the OAU Framework Agreement. That stance was casually discarded in late February 1999.

Although I have contempt for these unprincipled and spineless intellectuals, I can understand the pressure they are under. And despite all, I have derived some enjoyment from watching their gyrations during the course of this conflict.

But the scale of the suffering wrought by Eritrea’s invasion far outweighs any temporary diversion. Ethiopia and Eritrea will be counting the real cost of this conflict for many years to come. It is too painful to even imagine the suffering of those families who lost their loved ones in this conflict, both civilians as well as soldiers.

And the lessons of this conflict? It seems that Issayas Afeworki has seen the writing on the wall and may have accepted the OAU peace plan in order to save himself. But the example of other militarisitc dictators such as Saddam Hussein offers little hope that Eritrea will reform and turn away from the path of militaristic nationalism.

In fact this conflict is likely to continue indirectly for a long time to come. The demonstration of jingoist hysteria by the Eritrean elites, and the near-total lack of opposition to the war among the Eritrean intellectuals, will give great comfort to the Eritrean dictator and embolden him to continue embroiling Eritrea in pointless, counterproductive conflicts