Commentary:
Eritrea’s food aid dependency

Although the failure of the Belg rains and the subsequent food emergency in parts of Ethiopia has been well publicised, the much larger food aid operation in Eritrea (in precentage terms) has gone barely noticed.

As a matter of fact, Eritrea has appealed for food aid for nearly twice the percentage of its population as has Ethiopia. (FAO, April 1999)

The reason this receives little attention is because the main news sources in Eritrea (Alex Last for Reuters/BBC, and Julie Stewart for the AP) don’t want to antagonize their Eritrean hosts and friends by focusing attention on this issue. It is an issue that completely undermines the currently fashionable Eritrean propaganda that is fed to gullible Western journalists.

But the hard facts demonstrate that Eritrea is a famine-prone country where military spending during the last six years has consistently exceeded over 25 percent of its current budget (IMF Statistical Appendix for Eritrea, September 1998). In some years, the percentage has gone over 50 percent. These figures are roughly two to three times the level of Ethiopia’s defense spending over the same period. (Click on the link to see the comparison of Eritrean and Ethiopian Military (Defense) Expenditures: 1993 - 1997.

Meanwhile, during the last Eritrean drought in 1994, fully 85 percent of the population was fed using foreign food aid. Two months ago (April 1999), the FAO stated that Eritrea had issued an appeal for food aid to feed over 450,000 people, (about 15 percent of its population). This despite the absence of drought, and the claimed record harvest in 1998 that supposedly represented a 480% increase in agricultural production.

Eritrea claims that large numbers of its people have been displaced by the war (which it started). But using its own figures (about 150,000 displaced and deported), that still leaves over 300,000 Eritreans (about 10 percent of the population) who would have required food aid regardless of the war – a percentage that exceeds Ethiopia’s total food aid needs.

That Eritrea has been ignoring the needs of its own people is not widely reported. All the funds raised by Eritreans go to maintain Eritrean troops in Ethiopian territory occupied since May 1998. As for the rural Eritrean population, Eritrea has “dumped its social and economic responsibilies” on the international community.

For example, Mr. Wayne Kessler, a former Peace Corps volunteer in Eritrea who visited southern Eritrea (Dedda) on April 22, 1999 writes about the plight of the children he saw:

“All are malnourished and about 1/3 of the children show signs of Kwashiorkor, severe protein deficiency. The people complain that weekly visits are not enough. Two have died in the last month. “

Now why are these children malnourished while Eritrea spends more than half its budget on weapons to continue a war that it could easily end tomorrow. Why aren’t Eritreans in the Diaspora raising funds to support their starving compatriots instead of raising funds to replace their burnt Mig-29’s?

Of course the same questions can and should be asked of the Ethiopian government. In fact, in my opinion, the Ethiopian Prime Minister should take full responsibility for the preventable hunger crisis in Wello. We don’t need excuses or explanations. We need accountability. This is an issue over which it would be appropriate for the PM to resign. It is not a political issue. It is simply a question of a critical job not getting done.

However, in comparison to Eritrea, the Ethiopian defense budget is far less excessive and far more open to review. Because Ethiopia is currently in the middle of an ongoing IMF Structural Adjustment program, its budget is required to be open to scrutiny. On May 16, 1999, a yearly public expenditure review was conducted by the Ethiopian government and a donor team that included World Bank, IMF, and African Development Bank representatives.

The review concluded that Ethiopia's increased defense spending was funded in a “transparent manner." The increased defense spending brought upon by Eritrea’s invasion was funded from federal budget contingencies and extra-budgetary funds. These included several non-tax revenue sources, such as the public enterprises privatization fund and the fuel stabilization fund. In this way, government borrowing was minimized and private sector credit was not put under pressure.

In addition, the mission commended the government's effort to increase expenditures on health, education, and roads, and noted the higher real per capita spending on these sectors over the last four years. However, the mission noted that the current expenditures were unsustainable if Ethiopia was to maintain its economic stability and meet its development targets.

By contrast Eritrea is currently in a recession (despite official pronouncements to the contrary) and is financing its war by sharply increasing taxes, slashing social spending, putting development projects on hold, and borrowing funds from whatever sources it can find.

The alternative and far less costly strategy for Eritrea - pulling its troops out of Ethiopia, does not seem to receive any consideration either from the Eritrean government or from its supporters in the Diaspora.

This is why Eritrean children are malnourished and exhibiting signs of Kwashiorkor. This is why the international community will be feeding nearly 15 percent of Eritrea’s population this year.