Commentary:

A Military Head to Head: Or Why Eritreans Should Keep Their Dollar

by: an Ethiopian; May 23, 2000

Following a recent BBC report written by Alex Last, Eritreans have taken to badmouthing the Ethiopian military as being primitive etc.. for using "thousands of donkeys and mules.." in the critical offensive that broke the Eritrean defences a mere eight days ago. While their comments can rightly be indicative of the "...clutching at straws..." mentality that has engulfed Eritreans these days, they reveal also the attitudes and ignorances central to the humiliating defeat the Eritrean military has been facing over the past ten days.

These past ten days have revealed that the Eritrean military organization is completely outclassed in all the relevant metrics that a military can be judged by.

1. Air Power

Not only has the Ethiopian air force had complete dominance of the air in this war, but the Eritrean air defenses have been virtually non-existent. This is not only indicative of the courage and skill of the Ethiopian Air Force, but also of the maturity and effectiveness of the Ethiopian Air Force as an institution. This is evident in the acumen the Ethiopian side has displayed in the selection of Aircraft and associated weaponry to be purchased and deployed for this war. One guesses that Eritrea purchased its Mig-29s not for any particular military reason, but perhaps because it had had more publicity in some surplus military boutique. Additionally, the Ethiopian side was able to train and deploy its pilots and technicians quicker and to much more devastating effect than Eritrea ever could. The Eritrean Air Force has displayed poor judgment in purchasing its weapons (including aircraft), unacceptably long time in turning out quali! fied pilots and technical staff, and completely moribund air defense.

2. Intelligence

The Eritrean military was completely blind to tens of thousands of enemy troops moving right under its nose. Not only was it blind, it was stupid enough to be easily misled into moving its artillery and other forces away from what eventually turned out to be the location of surprise attack. The Ethiopian side had achieved surprise and misdirection before a single shot had been fired. In addition, from the results it is obvious that the Ethiopian side had excellent intelligence on Eritrean forces, not only on the border and the immediate front area, but also deep inside Eritrea itself.

3. Strategy

The Ethiopian side has made one brilliant strategic decision, and that is to make the WHOLE of Eritrea the battle ground, instead of the border area that Eritreans were expecting and perhaps had an umpteen number of contingency military plans for. The scale and vision is so audacious that in one stroke, Eritrean plans on containing and defeating Ethiopian attacks on Eritrean trenches were out the window and Eritrea was faced with the unhappy prospect of defending its territory, saving its army and dealing with a civilian refugee crisis of almost unimaginable proportions, all at the same time. The Eritrean military's version of strategy has so far been to fight, lose and retreat. Some want to compare the Ethiopian advance to Napoleon's 1812 march into and retreat from Russia, easily forgetting that Eritrea has neither the strategic depth nor the Russian winter to come to her rescue.

4. Tactics and the Ability to Learn

After the experiences at Tsorona in March of 1999, the Ethiopian military has completely changed its tactics. This ability to learn from past experiences is a sign of a mature leadership. The Eritrean side expected that the same old wine was going to be served, and so its focus was on doing more of the same, i.e. more trenches and mines to oppose what they thought was going to be another frontal attack. At its heart, the Eritrean inability to rethink tactics is an indication of the conviction most Eritreans have about their superiority to Ethiopians and Ethiopia.

5. Logistics

The dramatic success of the Ethiopian side is in no small measure due to the logistical support it had. In all of the eight or so days of the current round of fighting, the Ethiopian side has always been on the offensive, with the necessary supplies reaching the required locations. Weapons, fuel, food and water followed what some observers estimate was a force of around 100,000 without a major hiccup. This by itself is an incredible achievement, let alone the victories that have rolled Ethiopia's way. It is a sign of a thoroughly professional army.

6. Fighting Troops and Morale

After the plans are drawn, the air cover is provided and the material reaches the battlefield, it is ultimately up to the fighting skill, courage and spirit of the soldier on the ground. The recent results speak volumes about the superb quality of the Ethiopian soldier. One needs to keep in mind that the number of soldiers involved in the fighting so far have been equivalent, i.e. around 100,000 each for the western Eritrea front, and that the Eritrean side had the benefit of fighting on terrain they live on and that they had fortified over the past two years. On all the engagements that count, the Eritreans have either been destroyed as a fighting force or fled.

Oh, yes. The Donkeys! If I was an Eritrean I would be embarrassed to make the idiotic argument that they were defeated by a "primitive army" For the thousands of Eritreans who have put themselves into personal bankruptcy to fund a "modern army", defeat at the hand of nothing more sophisticated than determined infantrymen with donkeys and mules must now make the future years of digging out of debt even more galling. Perhaps they can now honor the lowly jackass and try to recoup their investments by using them as their fleet of choice in the transportation business.

Ultimately, Eritreans need to realize that the battles fought so far have demonstated that the Eritrean military is led by thouroughly incompetent people who have neither the military skills, nor the geopolitical acumen, nor the diplomatic werewithal, nor at least the humility to be ready to learn from their mistakes. Perhaps thay are in the process of learning even as we speak, but then the currency is not Dollars and Deutschemarks anymore, but the precious lives of the flower of Eritrea's youth. Is that what Eritreans all over the world want to be responsible for? To go in debt for the sole purpose of having their own brothers and sisters, sons and daughters decimated?


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