by Abebe Gemetchu, May 25, 2000

The journey from the Badme plains to Barentu with fierce fighting taking place intermittently, took six days for the Ethiopian Armed Forces to complete. The Ethiopian contingent attacking on the left flank was only less than ten kilometers from Barentu on the fourth day but it had to wait for the right flank to link up after decimating the Eritrean forces which were stationed at the strategic mountain pass at Dasse.

The capture of Barentu is now history. Military historians will be in a better position to write about this incredible journey, because they will by provided with all relevant facts on which to base their analyses. I would only like to share my observations of the fighting from a military perspective, for it is an unbelievable military success that has dumbfounded the Eritrean commanders as well as the so called military experts who had predicted otherwise.

The "Sky-line" Trenches:

The invading Eritrean forces spent the last two years digging incessantly and digging trenches throughout the 1000-km border with Ethiopia, to defend the territories they had occupied in surprise attacks in May-June,1998.

Last year after the debacle of Badme, whereby the Ethiopian forces crushed and over-run the "impenetrable wall" within four days, Issayas said, "We have learned our lessons." I don't think he has learned his lessons, neither then nor until this very day.

The trenches that extend from the banks of the River Mereb up to River Tekezze in the west, covering more than 100 kms, were built within the last two years and were called the "sky-line trenches" by Alex Last, the BBC /Reuters correspondent stationed in Asmara.

I have seen some footage of them on TV, filmed from a helicopter. The scene is so majestic and awsome that it more or less reminds me of the Great Wall of China in reverse. All the trenches had been surrounded by the anti-personnel and anti-tank land mines. All these defensive preparations were rendered useless and irrelevant by pincer attack of the brilliant strategists and very well trained army, like the Maginot-line built by the French to keep away the Germans during World War II.

Different Styles of Warfare:

The EPLF had fought in trenches for more than 20 years as a guerrilla organization and its commanders still believe that they are "the authors of trench warfare." True, their style is trench warfare and they applied the tactic of "war of attrition" to defend themselves from the Derg for more than twenty years in the Sahel Mountains, Northern Eritrea. It relies on defensive position with no room for maneuvering.

The EPRDF style is mobile warfare, which is diametrically opposed to the EPLF's and is by all account more superior. And with a good command and control system, it gives more room for flexibility and creativity. Having clarified the different styles of warfare of both armies, I will proceed to narrate what happened in the six days between May 12-May 17, that led to the capture of Barentu.

The Surprise Element:

In any battle, the surprise element is very crucial; it is the first step to victory provided that the momentum of assault is kept. The surprise element could manifest itself in the choice of place, direction of attack, timing of the operation and the way the action is conducted.

The EPLF leadership, like its advisors and many so called military experts, had ventured some predictions on how, when and where the Ethiopian offensive would be launched. All of them invariably had concluded that the offensive would take place in the Central Front (Zelambessa-Egela). This was the obvious! Accordingly, Issayas deployed most of his divisions in the Central Front, expecting a frontal push. But the Ethiopian commanders chose to give their thunderbolt blow at the Western Front.

Time and again for the last nine months, to be precise since September 1999, the EPLF and its sympathizers had been talking of an impending Ethiopian offensive. They new the offensive would be coming in May. They even told the UN Security Council team that visited the Region two days before the war escalated that they were ready to give a "warm welcome" to the Ethiopian army, in their customary language of saying that they are ready for the encounter. But, their miscalculation was that they expected the offensive to take place after the general elections on 14 May 2000. At times, I believe, they were not dead sure whether the offensive would take place at all. They have told visitors to Asmara that the Ethiopians were bluffing, because they would not take such action while the courtly was grappling with an acute drought-induced crisis.

Moreover, oblivious of the surprise element in the tactics of war, the EPLF expected a frontal attack by the infantry, supported by tanks, heavy artillery and Ariforce in the way that the war was conducted in February 1999. Alas! For the EPLF, the least expected happened this time round. The tactic applied was penetration of the trenches from the left and right sides of the Eritrean positions by infantry units alone, which were supported by tanks and artillery after they secured their positions behind enemy lines. This was a superb military surprise of modern times.

The Eritreans blamed human waves for the lightening speed with which their trenches were breached and their forces were dislodged. They said it on the first day of the latest escalation when an Agence France Press reporter, Carol Pinou, picked it up and has been repeating it nonstop in a way similar to the sound of a broken musical record. Any credible military specialist will tell her that the elements applied in breaching the Eritrea trenches did not require human waves to achieve the objectives.

Eritrean Troops and Armaments in the Western Front

All men and women in these trenches were armed with weapons such as Ak47, PKM, RPG, etc., that is from light individual guns to machine-guns and rocket propelled grenades (RPG).

Among the sophisticated weapons, they had four batteries (16) of 130mm artillery, numerous 122mn, 85 mn, 76mm artillery pieces. And the number of different mortars was more than 59 batteries. In addition to these, they had 69 tanks, 4 Bm 21 (Stalin's Organ) and 26 anti-aircraft guns including anti-air and anti-tank missiles.

Two thirds of the eight divisions, as a matter of positioning, were deployed in the trenches and one third was kept as a reserve. Because of their sophisticated trenches and armaments, the EPLF leaders were over-confident to the extent of having the courage to reject appeals to discuss the substance of an implementation plan to resolve the conflict peacefully. Plans to hold proximity talks in Algiers between April 29-May 5, 2000 were aborted by Eritrea's new pre-conditions.

" Secret Weapon"

It is true that the Ethiopian forces penetrated the trenches on foot without any mechanized support and traveled tens of kilometers under darkness to reach positions behind enemy lines at dawn. Imagine, more than 20,000 soldiers dropping behind enemy lines from right and left flanks like dropping from the sky by parachutes, with little resistance.

As far as I am concerned, it is not the donkeys that are the 'secret weapon' of the Ethiopian defense forces, but their habit of meticulously planning, coupled with intensive training of its soldiers. The Army stood at 46 thousand when the conflict started in may 1998, but grew to about 350 thousand in May 2000, which means the size of the Ethiopian army increased sevenfold in two years.

To build a trained and committed army seven times the original size within two years alone is an enormous and daunting task. The credit goes to the political and military leadership of the country.

The Battles of the Three Days

The 16th division was also isolated and surrounded and its heavy armaments including tanks were dangerously exposed to the striking Ethiopian forces. The different divisions in the trenches, out-maneuvered and out-gunned by the Ethiopian forces, started to run in all directions, with minimum resistance to the advancing Ethiopian forces.

The Ethiopian air force controlled the Eritrean air space. As the Washington post on 22 May 2000 put it, "Although Eritrean jets sometimes venture into the battle zone, Ethiopia has all but owned the skies since the latest round of fighting began nine days ago." One Mig-29 ventured to the battle zone near Barentu, and was shot down by the Ethiopian ground defense forces.

The Western Mereb-Setite Front with its famous "sky-line trenches," was condemned to sustain the Badme syndrome. Most of the Eritrean contingents were defeated in the early morning of the first day and almost all the units on that front were paralyzed on the second day. Those who had scattered were mopped -up on the third day.

"Operation Sun Set," which took place in Feb.1999, repeated itself despite Issayas's arrogance and stubbornness. It reminds me of what Major General Samora Yunus of the Ethiopian Armed Forces said in late 1998: "The EPLF army knows how to fight only in the trenches and we know from our experiences how to pluck the enemy soldiers out of their trenches and bury them where they dug the trenches".

The astounding success of the Ethiopian army in the latest fighting is the result of the superior tactics and strategies employed by the Ethiopian forces, as opposed to the archaic, first-world-war type trench warfare employed by the Eritrean commanders.

The Battle for Barentu

The Ethiopian forces that had penetrated the trenches moved all their artillery and tanks across the Mereb River using a temporary pontoon bridge, the same day they secured the strategic positions.

The Eritrean army couldn't be able to stage any meaningful resistance. The commanders were desperate and unable to give orders, though they tried to force the soldiers to fight back at gun point. The troops refused and run to save their skin.

The Eritrean army was unable to regroup at Shelalo, Tokombia and its surroundings, and its troops were forced to retreat to Barentu and Dasse. Some brigades of the famous commando unit, the 525th division, came to Mai-dema to reinforce the dispersed units but could not make a headway in a two day battle.

The retreating forces joined some contingents which were stationed around Barentu and Dasse and were reinforced by the three divisions from the Omhajer, Tsorona and Bure fronts. Trainees from Sawa were also rushed to save Barentu.

Four divisions of the Ethiopian forces, moved on the left side in hot pursuit, took positions a few kilometers from Barentu on the fourth day. Two divisions attacked Dasse, and two more divisions were available nearby. On the fourth day, the EPLF again withdrew three more divisions from other fronts to beef up the defense of Barentu area, hoping to change the situation in their favour.

On the fifth day there was stalemate. Thus there was hope in the leadership camp and Yemane, the spokesperson of the Eritrean regime started to say, "The situation is fluid ", and ,"we have encircled an Ethiopian contingent." This was hope against hope for the poor guys who live in illusions. On the sixth day, Ethiopian forces at Dasse, reinforced by two more divisions, bombarded the mountain pass beyond recognition and dislodged the Eritrean forces completely. That was the end of the Eritran forces, who had tried to defend Barentu: eight divisions were put out of action on the Mereb - Setit trenches, and seven more divisions were disabled by 50% at the Barentu and Dasse encounters. A futile attempt of desperation could not save the fall of Barentu.

Issayas was caught by surprise at the swift and speedy military victories on the Western Front. But, I am sure, he will never admit defeat. Dictators never admit defeat until their last demise , like Hitler who never accepted defeat until the Allied Forces reached Berlin in 1945, though the decline had already begun by 1943.

Infatuation with Exaggerated Numbers:

The same exaggerated number is given about the displaced people, Issayas saying that one million displaced are on the move. The whole population of Barka and Gash-Setite does not add up to half a million, let alone the people on the Barentu-Agordat corridor where the battles have taken place. If the displaced people in Keren are registered, they will not be more than fifty thousand and would be similar and as exaggerated figure given in the Sudan. The claim in Khartoum was that one hundred thousand were on the move but the UNHCR has registered short of twenty thousand people and some of them have already started to return to Tessenay and other small towns at the border with Sudan,

To sum this up, let me quote from a 21 May 2000 dispatch by a Reuters reporter, Kieran Murray:

"… Ethiopia's latest offensive, now 10 days old, has opened up the war, capturing Eritrean positions on the Western Front, and dramatically tipping the balance along the disputed 1000 km border".

He continues,

"Eritrea's army, which prided itself on the apparent invulnerability of its heavily fortified trenches, was forced to retreat… as trench war gave way to running battles, as the Ethiopians chased enemy troops deep into Eritrean territory… burned out tanks and rotting corpses lie on the plains and mountain roads around Barentu. The speedy assault has left Ethiopia in command of a large chunk of Eritrean territory for the first time since the border war began … and a clear upper hand."