Thoughts on the present impasse in the negotiation process

Note: The thoughts outlined below are based on discussions (in Addis Ababa between 8 August and 19 September, 1999) with a variety of Ethiopian government (PMO, Parliament, MOD) and EPRDF party figures, as well as members of the foreign diplomatic community and NGO observers of Ethiopian political dynamics.

1. “Intransigence” is neither an accurate or useful characterization of the Ethiopian position with regard to the present stall in achieving a negotiated settlement to the Ethiopian-Eritrean conflict.

2. The Ethiopian approach to the settlement (or conflict) is NOT driven primarily by internal cleavages within the leadership between “hard-liners” and “moderates” (as some observers suggest); nor is it driven by a perceived inability to “sell” a negotiated settlement to a domestic audience. A focus on internal “factions” diverts attention to more fundamental issues. There are differing opinions within the collective leadership, but they largely relate to tactical approach.

3. The leadership appear unified in their belief that the present “Technical Arrangements” are inconsistent in significant respects with the Framework Agreement and its Modalities, and that unless the Technical Arrangements are modified (as opposed to simply being “clarified”) to improve their precision and correct inconsistencies, they will not provide the basis for a durable resolution of the conflict.

4. The leadership also appear unified in:

i) a profound distrust of the Eritrean leadership, which although it has been very successful at manipulating international opinion to believe it is committed to a peaceful resolution of the conflict, only accepted the Framework Agreement to preserve its tactical position (i.e. it still holds ZalaAnbessa and other indisputably Ethiopian areas) in the face of major setbacks on the Badme front; in questioning the sincerity of the Eritrean commitment, Ethiopian officials cite subsequent Eritrean assertions that ZalaAnbessa and other occupied areas were not covered by the agreement; they also cite recent probing by Eritrean forces on the ZalaAnbessa front;

ii) a profound scepticism regarding the international community’s commitment and capacity to act as a guarantor of an eventual agreement, especially one which is sufficiently imprecise as to allow an opponent acting in bad faith to stall at the implementation stage;

iii) a general belief that Ethiopia’s security interests should not be compromised, even if this means adopting a stance regarding the present negotiations that will lead to major reductions in foreign development assistance flows (this should NOT be taken to imply that senior leadership are unconcerned either about the impact of the conflict on assistance, or the overall impact of the conflict on the development agenda).

5. Distrust of the international community (and especially the U.S.), is not entirely irrational, and stems from a number of observations of its conduct during the past 18 months: i) the unwillingness to publicly condemn what is viewed by the Ethiopians (and privately admitted by many if not all diplomatic observers) as clear Eritrean aggression; ii) statements by the U.S., U.N. Security Council and others which place Ethiopia and Eritrea in a position of parity with regard to the genesis and resolution of the conflict; iii) what is perceived as an evident desire on part of U.S. and others to maintain close relations with Eritrea (and at a minimum to preserve EPLF authority), perhaps as an element of a wider regional strategy of containing Sudanese-sponsored Islamist movements, etc. (perhaps also as a nation of potential strategic utility to Israel on the Red Sea).

6. Given these general areas of agreement, there appear to be tactical differences regarding how to proceed. The Eritrean leadership is viewed as militarily weakened, but not so decisively as to preclude further adventurism; the domestic political factors which led to Eritrean forays against Yemen, Sudan and eventually Ethiopia continue to be operative, and may have been intensified by the domestic economic consequences of the military campaign.

Some appear to believe that only when Isayas has been dealt a decisive defeat and evicted from the areas of Ethiopia that are presently occupied by Eritrean forces, will the political conditions for a durable settlement be in place.

Others appear inclined to believe that if, and only if, a modification of the Technical Arrangements is achieved which i) clearly specifies the areas from which Eritrea is to withdraw; ii) removes inconsistencies between the Technical Arrangements and the Framework Agreement and its Modalities (particularly those relating to the distinction between peacekeeping forces and observers), it would be worth the risk of accepting the deal.

Clearly at this level the economic and developmental costs of continued conflict are factored into the analysis of acceptable risk.

7. From the Ethiopian perspective, “negative” decisions by international donors to suspend assistance pending a resolution of the conflict are unlikely to have much direct influence on the decision calculus (they can, however, can be expected to have negative indirect effects - e.g. further undermining confidence in international partners, etc...).

8. In contrast, “positive” decisions to i) modify the Technical Arrangements, and ii) publicly acknowledge what is privately admitted to be Eritrean aggression, might increase the likelihood of a negotiated settlement.

9. In perverse respects, the present international stance which places the onus of accepting or rejecting a negotiated settlement on Ethiopia (with little apparent attention to the viability of the present package), may increase the incentives for Eritrean forces to provoke an Ethiopian response. Recent probing on the ZalaAnbessa front should probably be viewed from this perspective.

Stevens P. Tucker