RESPONSE TO: Why Ethiopia Should Sign The Peace Plan’

Implications And Possible Pitfalls Of The Third Document (The Technical Arrangements)
by L.G. September 4, 1999

I would like to indicate that your points are well taken. It is true that the Ethiopia Government’s handling of the peace negotiation was not meticulous, strategically dynamic or complete. As you mentioned about the punitive action against Isayas’ regime missing in the peace plan, it is quite puzzling why Ethiopia has barely touched upon the issue of accountability in its request for clarification and still didn’t put it as a major point of negotiation:

"Article 14 of the Technical Arrangements envisage arbitration on
humanitarian issues and issues concerning the socio-economic
consequences of the dispute if the Parties fail to settle it
through bilateral negotiations or mediation. Will individuals have
direct access to the arbitration mechanism or will their cases be
espoused by their respective government? Will the mechanism have
the mandate to handle and decide cases concerning:
- Ethiopian property taken by the Eritrean Government at the ports of Assab and Massawa,
- destruction of public infrastructures like schools, clinics, public
administration buildings, religious and cultural objects and
private property of all kinds in the areas occupied by Eritrea
since 6 May 1998,
- disappearances and killings of civilians in the occupied territories
of Ethiopia etc."

The negotiation capability of the government suffers from the same drawbacks of the propaganda work. It is truly frustrating. There are too many of us who keep worrying what costly mistakes could be made again that would push our country into endless crisis than the few loyalists who mindlessly try to assure us ‘oh, don’t worry, the government is quiet these days; it is going to make miracles’. At least, the Anseba regime in Asmara could manage to use Eritrean intellectuals for its own end. Nontheless, it is not my belief that the Ethiopian government in any way lacks the sincerity in its efforts this time. It is the approach, the culture of indoor-politics it couldn’t abandon. It has to have the openness, confidence and the intellect of risk taking, and needs to do self-assessment.

Coming back to your commentary, however, your conclusion emanates from hopelessness and your proper criticisms do not stand up to the challenges this peace deal could bring about. I don’t think it is the kind of a peace agreement that both parties sign and turn away their faces from the border.

I believe it still is not late to provide a strategically dynamic and complete demand on Eritrea that puts Ethiopia on the right track if peace negotiation stands a chance; or if Isayas and his gang has to be held responsible, it is still possible and better done solely by Ethiopian punitive action. After all, the Afar issue in Eritrea needs to be addressed by referendum as part of this crisis. They are the people involuntarily taken away by Eritrean independence from Ethiopia.

In regard to the consternation of Ethiopia being isolated from the world if it did not sign the peace deal, why didn’t Eritrea suffer from the same consequence of isolation or condemnation when the world witnessed with wide eyes its invasion of another country’s territory? When I think of our western donors, they always come around for profit and for continuos geopolitical manipulation.

This peace deal is not adequate to the principles Ethiopia stands for and even strategically dangerous to its future security. The following is the basis of my discussion.

IMPLICATIONS AND POSSIBLE PITFALLS

OF THE THIRD DOCUMENT (THE TECHNICAL ARRANGEMENTS)

The Eritrean regime, exhausted from military workout, is right on target pulling together a peace deal, incessantly pushed by the UN and USA. This peace process did not come as a surprise. It was a well timed, calculated and coordinated three-part document with the involvement of foreign interest. In fact, Eritrean quarters claim that the transfer of OAU chairmanship to Algeria also helped revers its tarnished relationship with the organization in its favour.

When Isayas said he took a two-hours nap after reading the document, he only meant he is relieved to have in his hands treasured piece of papers that could save his life in power. Back in May, Presidential advisor, Yemane Gebremeskel seemed to reaffirm with certainty his regime’s ambition to affix Ethiopia into the international spotlight with a border crisis that never was a border issue. In his words, "Whether there is full-scale war or not, at the end of the day we will have to negotiate peace." (May 16, 1999. CNN). Eritrea’s primary objective was to attract foreign physical involvement in the dispute, such as UN peace keepers. That objective to materialize is to be seen if and when Ethiopia sings the Technical Arrangements document.

The document proves to be a multipronged weapon for Eritrea. If we assume that Isayas acts rationally and turns away from his aggressive behaviour during this peace process, then, First, Isayas is trying to throw out a hot iron into the hands of the Ethiopian government and people. According to the Technical Arrangements, the transformation of responsibility by the UN in the peace mediation shows the crisis to be absorbed solely by Ethiopia, and Eritrea going free for its heinous crime. Second, with the peace keepers in place, Isayas is trying to guard his rear end from Ethiopian attack if his troops pull out of their trenches and withdraw from Ethiopian territory. The deal, if ratified, is also going to save his power into the foreseeable future. The belief held by many that his political power in the wake of this conflict is going to be diminished by internal unrest, is unreasonable; mainly because Eritrean nationalism and nationhood are based on anti-Ethiopianism and he is a dictator. Third, once Isayas disentangles himself from the deadly job of making war, he is up on his knees to negotiate Ethiopian territory. If by any miracles possible, he will be a renown figure who played an outdated colonial game and turned an outrageous act of aggression into territorial boon.

Eritrea is doing every thing, including exposing what is supposedly a secret document, to make its dream a reality.

Implications of the Technical Arrangements

1) The equal treatment of the aggressor, Eritrea, as a lawful party in this document legitimizes the war of aggression and war crimes committed by Eritrea.

2) The document transforms the delirious Eritrean regime into an ennobled personality in international diplomacy.

3) The document enshrines the Eritrean regime with a renewed power and survival mechanism to the rank of a formidable power in the sub-region tackling Ethiopia. Needless to say the prolonged war and dwelling of the Ethiopian government on ‘peaceful resolution’ gave the impression that Eritrea is indeed overpowering.

4) Since the disputed border remains within Ethiopian territory, the ratification of this three-piece document is tantamount to violating the sovereignty of Ethiopia by foreign forces such as the peace keepers. The peace keepers are going to be stationed more likely on the so called ‘disputed’ Ethiopian land. As may be defined in the documents, no party will have sovereign right to the disputed territories before demarcation. Ethiopian territory will automatically turn into no-man’s-land over years of lingering peace-mediation.

5) The content of the third document eliminates the legitimacy by Ethiopia of holding Isayas Afewerki personally and his regime accountable for the crimes committed. On the contrary, the dictatorial regime in Asmara is given all the military, political and diplomatic prominence to put forward a demand on Ethiopia. His preposterous demand includes compensation for Eritrean deportees.

6) The Ethiopian government accepting the Technical Arrangements, diametrically shifting from its long standing position, would imply qualifying Eritrean claim on Ethiopian territory; consequently giving away its land under Eritrean occupation for negotiation.

If Prime minister Meles Zienawi’s statement is quoted correctly, in the document leaked by the Eritrean regime, there is an indication of his government abandoning the stronger stance of ‘no cease-fire without prior withdrawal of Eritrean troops’: "In my discussions with your Special Envoy I had indicated that verification of lines of redeployment can take place before cessation of hostilities….Why was the option I put forth not preferred?" The original stand doesn't even seem to have been a point of discussion in the peace process since he is trying to get his message across through an envoy.

7) The third document, if practiced will relieve the Isayas regime from censure at home and possible political crisis. Instead, he will be a living legend in Eritrean history. If it needs to be said again, Eritrean nationalism is founded on anti-Ethiopianism; and as a reminiscent of this, its regime's grand policy (foreign and internal) is based on Ethiopian-exclusion.

8) The bottom line of all this is Ethiopia is incapable of managing its affairs including that of a runaway province of Eritrea. As a consequence, the crisis has been an issue of foreign physical interference.

THE MAJOR FLAWS OF THE THIRD DOCUMENT

The Technical Arrangements document is badly but seemingly purposely and neglectfully flawed against Ethiopia. Without going into the details, a document that does not allow any amendment by the two parties involved is nothing but indicative of predilection. Haile Weldetnsae, Minister of Foreign affairs, in his statement to the diplomatic community wants to tighten the lead on this issue as follows: The OAU has clearly stated that the three documents must be taken as a package and the document containing the Technical Arrangements is not open to any amendment or interpretation. (ASMARA, 26/08/99). Why is it now necessary to exclude an amendment or interpretation and not before when Eritrea kept derailing the peace process? The document is not open to any amendment or interpretation because it is prepared by qualified experts, according to Eritrean propaganda.

The document is not also founded on the unique history of Ethiopian independence during the colonial era. Article A.1.2 of the clarification to the Ethiopian government states, "The principle set forth is that of the respect for the boundaries existing at independence, as stated in Resolution AHG/Res 16(I) adopted by the OAU Summit in Cairo in 1964". A reference to this resolution in border demarcation would obviously ignore Ethiopian status of independence and the fact that Eritrea was its own province after colonial era. Eritrea still retains and has to settle Ethiopian territory that it took away on independence in 1991.

POSSIBLE PITFALLS TO ETHIOPIA

1) The deployment of foreign troops on Ethiopian territory could lead to clashes with Ethiopian forces. The size of the peace keepers required to cover a large portion of 1000-mile border line makes it more dangerous to Ethiopian security in the event of any conflict with the UN peace keepers. We should not ignore the possibility that the UN and its mentor (the USA) are out for the first or a second experiment of New World Order in a politically vulnerable region and least resistant part of the world.

2) There should not be much hope that the conflict will be resolved fast and easy border demarcation with the help of a third party. The unrepeatable UN is a third party pulled by too many strings of too few manipulators. It is possible that the mediation could take years, more than what is now estimated at six months; thus leaving Ethiopia as hostage of the UN.

3) The role of the peace keepers is unknown in the event of a resumption of conflict between the warring parties, which is more likely to happen in the process of implementation. Recapturing favourable militarily strategic locations by Ethiopia can be difficult in the presence of the peace keepers in the middle of demilitarized zone. The peace keepers in any event can serve to the Eritrean regime as shields against Ethiopian surveillance and military advancement while Eritrean troops aggressively push into the demilitarized zone.

4) The desperado Hamasien regime is not subject to the rule of law. It is uncharacteristic of Isayas to yield to fact-based border demarcation or to mediation. After all, the border issue is only a pretext for unprovoked aggression.

5) The continuation of the Isayas regime bolstered by western post-war-recovery program will be even a devastating security risk to Ethiopia. The perpetuation of conflict and war should end with Isayas.

6) Most of all, the involvement of a third party and up on the inability of Ethiopia resolving the conflict in its own terms will push it into uncertain future. The uncertainty of a secure access to the outside world will always remain vital to its survival.

L.G.


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