"Democracy and human freedom are not an optional extra added to decorate the revolution when it seems strong enough to bear such embellishment. These are not incidental, marginal factors that can perhaps be postponed to be added later on, but rather they are guiding principles... Doubtless, revolution can occur in a society that is not yet able to stand, or, to make use of more than a small dose of democracy and freedom. But to that extent, the revolution is not a revolution. It is like a mentally ill person who enjoys only a few lucid moments per day. It remains rudimentary, embryonic, sickly. Such a revolution very soon becomes the opposite of what its originators intended. - Jean-Francois Revel, The Totalitarian Temptation
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MAR 22 2009: WHAT THE CANCELLED ECONOMIST BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE CONFERENCE REVEALS ABOUT MELES ZENAWI, PRIME MINISTER OF ETHIOPIA
Ethiopian News and Views, March 22, 2009

MAR 21 2009: Interview with Ken Ohashi, World Bank Representative in Ethiopia Eventually, it is healthy for Ethiopia to institute a system to determine the exchange rate purely by the market - Reporter, Mar 21, 2009.

    One fundamental thing all countries can do is the exchange rate adjustment. In Ethiopia, most of the fruit juice in the market is imported either from South Africa or the Gulf. Juice can't be too difficult to produce. Ethiopia can produce lots of good fruit. And yet, Ethiopian business people are finding it easier to import than produce it because the exchange rate makes it cheaper to import it.

    But if exchange rates are adjusted and imports become much more expensive, some people will begin to say, "Why don't we produce it here?" That's how you stimulate domestic production. And at the moment, when I see simple things like fruit juice being imported, I feel quite sure that the exchange rate is not right.

COMMENT - This is a good, informative interview. Mr. Ohashi praises the gov't in several areas (like getting its borrowing and spending under control, and importing wheat to break inflation), but theses are things the gov't should have done earlier. This is only rectifying mistakes.

Mr. Ohashi does mention one significant area where Meles could do something besides begging, and that is fix the exhange rate. China for example has kept its currency undervalued in order to stimulate exports and discourage imports. WHy isn't Ethiopia doing the same? Actually Ethiopia's currency is overvalued as Mr. Ohashi has explained. But to devalue the Birr would disrupt the large import and distribution business and would increase inflation. This could be sensitive for the TPLF - an unpopular government that lacks legitimacy. Thus the TPLF prefers short-term stability but long-term begging, rather than short-term painful adjustment (think Argentina 2001) followed by long-term rapid, sustainable, industrialization.

MAR 21 2009: Economist Magazine Cancels Business Roundtable Conference after Meles told the Ethiopian Government not to participate The Economist cancels conference with gov�t - Reporter, Mar 21, 2009.
COMMENT: It seems that Meles tried to censor an article that the Economist was going to include in the conference materials. The Economist, a well known international magazine that has been in existence for over 100 years, was not intimidated. Meles in his typical childish fashion, had a temper tantrum and pulled the government participation, rendering the conference meaningless. The Economist has been organizing these business roundtable conferences with governments all over the world - look at their busy conference schedule. Who is hurt by this? The Economist - which has dozens such conferences? Or Ethiopia - which desperately needs foreign investment and more visibility in international business?

MAR 21 2009: British Dev. Agency Chief Economist Says Excessive Gov't Borrowing Led to High Inflation Economic crisis beginning to bite, DFID chief economist says - Reporter, Mar 21, 2009. "Ethiopia had got itself into a bit of macroeconomic muddle with very high borrowing resulting in very high inflation," he said.
COMMENT: When the Ethiopian auditor general did his job and warned about this three years ago, Meles insulted and fired him. Ethiopians were told that high inflation was due to worldwide increases in commodity prices. Strangely, this inflation was only found within Ethiopia's borders. The rest of the world (except Zimbabwe)was experiencing an overall low inflation rate. Weird. By late 2008 however, Meles was telling the IMF that he would implement severe controls on lending and gov't spending in order to rein in inflation. But he never apologized to the auditor general or explained to the Ethiopian people about the inflationary economy of 2005-2009. Typical Meles - childish, irresponsible, and never admitting mistakes.

When the Meles dictatorship is toppled, we should remember the auditor general and recognize him for speaking the truth. That is the type of person we want in government offices, and the type of person that Ethiopia needs to develop.

MAR 21 2009: WARS, GUNS, AND VOTES: Democracy in Dangerous Places, By Paul Collier Book Review in NY Times.

    These days no self-respecting government wants to present itself on the world stage without the legitimacy of a democratic mantle. Elections are now de rigueur, even if many a despot rejects the idea of actually abiding by voter preferences . The result is an embrace of "democracy" by such authoritarian leaders as Vladimir Putin of Russia, Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe, Meles Zenawi of Ethiopia, Islam Karimov of Uzbekistan, Umaru Yar�Adua of Nigeria and Mwai Kibaki of Kenya. They all have used some combination of violence, fraud and repression to ensure that elections do not threaten their grasp on power.

    They get away with this charade in part because the Western democracies that might be expected to demand the real thing have economic and strategic incentives to settle for farce. Rather than insist on the elements of democracy that make it meaningful � a free press, a vigorous civil society, the rule of law, a fair and transparent process for counting ballots � they close their eyes to electoral travesty.

    It has long been an article of faith that these pseudodemocracies are inherently unstable. When citizens have no real opportunity to select their leaders, grievances fester, and violence may be close behind. But it is one thing to know of this phenomenon, quite another to prove it. In "Wars, Guns, and Votes," Paul Collier has set out to bring empirical rigor to our intuitions.

MAR 20 2009: BEGGING-LED INDUSTRIALIZATION: CAN IT WORK FOR ETHIOPIA? In his recent remarks to the Financial Times, Meles Zenawi pleaded for more aid as a solution for Africa's crises. Call for IMF gold sale to aid Africa - Financial Times, Mar 18, 2009.

This shows how obsolete Meles is as a thinker. Far from being a progessive African leader, he is the captain of the remnant beggars. When the leaders of Rwanda and Ghana are making statements about ending aid, and while Zambian economist Dambisa Moyo has written a provacative book, Dead Aid, that is generating wide interest across the world, the only idea Meles can think of is to beg louder and more insistently for more handouts.

Here are a few ALTERNATIVE ways Ethiopia can take action to DEVELOP ITSELF without begging:

  • 1. Drop the TPLF restrictions on telecoms that have kept Ethiopia as the most backward country in the world. "[Peter Allgeier, the U.S. representative to the WTO] at one point waved his non-functioning handheld wireless device to illustrate a point about Ethiopia�s telecom service. Ethiopian Telecommunications�s monopoly enables it to charge $35 for a mobile-phone SIM card, which is required to obtain a phone number. In neighboring Somalia and Kenya, which have private mobile services, cards cost less than $5." - Ethiopia Should Ease Bank, Telecom Rules to Join WTO, U.S. Says Bloomberg, Mar 19, 2009.

    This is an area where there is consumer demand but the TPLF is blocking development. Telecoms are also key to spurring productivty in agriculture, industry and services, so the TPLF telecom policy is damaging in many ways.

  • 2. Drop the TPLF restrictions on banking that have kept the Ethiopian financial sectors as one of the most backward in the world. "Ethiopian Trade Minister Girma Birru said in a Feb. 17 interview the country was unlikely to liberalize its banking sector." (see above Bloomberg article)

    Thanks to this TPLF policy, foreign tourists and business travelers in Ethiopia cannot use credit cards and cannot easily access their home bank accounts electronically while in Ethiopia. Consequently Ethiopia has lost millions of dollars in potential revenue.

    More importantly, the banking sector plays a key role in development by making it easier to turn savings into productive investments. Thanks to the TPLF, this key development tool remains at a primitive stage, so it is much harder to mobilize domestic and international savings for productive investment in Ethiopia than basically anywhere else in the world.

  • 3. Drop the TPLF restrictions on owning and buying farmland. Another key to development is increasing agricultural productivity and using the increased earnings or savings to fund industrialization. A key to increasing agricultural productivity is increasing the farm size or at least having great flexibility in the land market. Innovative successful farmers buy or rent their neighbors property and increased scale allows them to introduce more efficient techniques and reduce unit costs. Most other countries in the world have gone through this process - usually in a matter of a few decades, a majority of the population leave rural areas and moves to cites. The TPLF is blocking this process in Ethiopia.

Why give money to a beggar who won't take simple steps to feed himself? Is the Ethiopian population afflicted by widespread physical handicaps? Are Ethiopians mentally retarded so that they cant organize their own development? Is Ethiopian society and culture uniquely backaward and deviant such that it cannot follow the same routes to success as other countries?

Actually we know what the answer is. The problem is that the aid (begging) is allowing Meles to continue making policy choices that help keep the TPLF in control, but keep Ethiopia from developing. STOP THE BEGGING! We can and should develop ourselves. Meles has been begging for nearly 20 years with hardly anything to show for it.

Imagine if there were no rich countries to beg from? What then? Meles Bereket, Girma Birru, Addisu Legesse, and all the other TPLF/EPRDF geniuses put their heads together and all they could think of was more begging? This is the quality of Ethiopian governance today. Thousands of top quality, experienced, hard-working Ethiopian professionals are available today to help set and guide development policy. Dozens of studies, and tons of research papers have been written and published. But no one can tell the TPLF/EPRDF anything.

Begging-led industrialization is the development policy of Ethiopia. Officially it is Agricultural development-led industrialization (ADLI) but after nearly 20 years the industrial sector still comprises little more than 10 percent of GDP and agricultural productivity is stagnant. The only change is a large increase in aid and more insistent begging by Meles. This policy is failing and long-term beggar countries have never industrialized elsewhere in the world.

MAR 3 2009: Ethiopia says recession hits Dutch flower sales - Reuters, Mar 2, 2009.
COMMENT: There is something strange �bout the way Meles makes wild boasts. "Not a single hut has been burnt" he said referring to the brutal Ogaden campaign that he ordered in 2007. It was a flat lie as shown by photographs taken by Doctors without Borders and by satellite photographs analyszed by the American Associatio�n of Scientists. But there is a pattern here with Meles and the system he has created - a tendency to disengage from reality - as Vaclav Havel noted regarding the similar political system he confronted in the Czech Republic.

The latest 'stupid' boasts by Meles are regarding economic growth. What is the need to predict 11% growth? There is a severe world recession. Ethiopia itself is worse off because of the inflationary economy of 2005-09 and the need to reduce the growth in the money supply. Remittances are highly unlikely to increase 11%. Agriculture is stuck in a low productivity trap caused largely by the Meles p�licies. Where is this 11% growth going to come from?

The answer is that it doesnt matter. This is propaganda. It is the party line. This is a "developmental state" hence high growth must be reported in the mass media regardless of the actual facts. In a normal country, a politician would suffer if he lied repeatedly and made exaggerated predictions and boasts that turned out to be hollow. No one holds Meles accountable in Ethiopia. We have proof that Meles lied when he said "not a single hut has been burnt" in the Ogaden. But not a single prominent TPLF/EPRDF has publicly condemned Meles for his brutal, unconstitutional actions in the Ogaden. Even if a TPLF/EPRDF supporter wanted to condemn Meles it would be impossible. You dont condemn a vanguard party. You kiss up to it. Thats what Meles wants and expects. Flattery, not accountability.

The Ethiopian economy is crashing. Thats why it needs 750 million extra dollars this year, plus roughly 500 million dollars for emergency and so-called 'regular' food aid. And it could get much much worse if the rains are poor this summer. But as with the Derg in 1984-85, no one can stop the TPLF/EPRDF from boasting and partying as if they have actually accomplished something significant.

FEB 23 2009: National Bank of Ethiopia Annual Report 2006/07 - Natinoal Bank of Ethiopia - latest available annual economic report on website.
This report provides some useful background on Ethiopia's economic growth "miracle":

  • About three percentage points should be subtracted from the growth figures each year to account for population growth. See Table 1.1; Real GDP per capita

  • Real per capita GDP was -1% and -5% in 2001/02 and 2002/03 respectively. These years are left out when calculating averge GDP.

  • Almost half the economy (46%) is agriculture, which grew to a large extent thanks to good rainfall and increased area under cultivation. This is clearly unsustainable and leads to environmental degradation. Also the next drought will likely cause economic growth to be negative again.

  • The second largest contributor to growth is services which account for 41% of economic activity. According to the NBE "The share of the service sector has been growing up steadily in recent years reaching 40.8 percent in the review year from its level of 36 percent in 1996/97. This was mainly the result of the fast growth of education; real estate, renting and business activities; whole sale and retail trade; and hotels and restaurants sub-sectors, which in the last five years registered annual average growth rates of 11.6, 10.2, 11.3 and 13.7 percent, respectively"

  • The huge size of the service sector (relative to industry) in a developing economy should be a concern. Industry only accounts for 13.3% of the economy. The agricultural sector is largely at subsistence level with only marginal increases in productivity. What is sustaining growth in these services then? The answer is certainly (a) remittances, and (b) the 'hot money' speculative activity - especially in real estate - that was driven by easy money from banks (for those who had access). As the IMF pointed out recently, lending rates in the high-inflation economy of 2005-2009 were actually negative! Savers were punished with low interest rates, while 'investors' who had access to land, loans, permits, were able to make huge amounts of money simply through various short-term trading and speculation schemes, taking advantage of the huge year-over-year price increases.

  • CONCLUSION - OVER 25% OF ETHIOPIA'S ECONOMIC GROWTH COMES FROM POPULATION GROWTH - IT IS AN INCREASE IN POPULATION NOT AN INCREASE IN WEALTH. RAINFALL IS WHAT DETERMINES AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION. THE TPLF/EPRDF AGRICULTURAL POLICIES ARE ETHNICIZED AND POLITICIZED VERSIONS OF THE FAILED DERG POLICIES AND HAVE NOT SUBSTANTIALLY INCREASED AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTIVITY. INDUSTRY REMAINED A MINOR PART OF THE ECONOMY WHILE SERVICES EXPANDED. THIS IS NOT A ROUTE TO SUCCESS.

FEB 19 2009: Egyptian Political Dissident, Imprisoned for Years, Is Suddenly Released - NY Times, Feb 19, 2009

  • "While his release was welcomed, it was also seen as evidence that Egypt�s justice system was ruled by decree, not law."

  • "Mr. Nour�s imprisonment ended Egypt�s brief experiment with allowing opposition politics to flourish."

  • "I am happy he is out, but I am sad that the executive power and the president can interfere directly in judicial outcomes," said Alaa Aswani, a writer and sharp social critic of Egyptian society. "The president can put someone in jail and can pardon him and then look for a legal pretext. This is the sad part."

FEB 17 2009: Does Meles Zenawi represent these people? (they were not mentioned in his Feb 13 press conf.):

    "In 2009, an estimated 12 million people, 20 percent of the rural population will continue to require humanitarian assistance. This is derived from the Humanitarian Requirements Document issued on 30 January 2008 which indicates that a total of 4.9 million people will require emergency food assistance in addition to the 7 million chronically food insecure people that continue to be assisted through Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP). The document requests a net total of USD 454.3 million to address food needs for the year and non-food needs for the first six months of 2009". - UN OCHA, Feb 17, 2009 HUMANITARIAN SITUATION UPDATE

incidentally, in some areas of Tigray, farmers are using the word "Shiftenet" to refer to "Safety Net" due to the politically motivated favoritism shown by the TPLF in operating this program - {source withheld}

The above 12 million people did not participate in the inflation-driven 'hot money' economy of 2005-2008. Although the harvest is said to be good, the humanitarian situation is about where it was during 1984-85; the worst drought of the Derg era. This despite the huge increase in aid and the end of the civil war.

FEB 16 2009: Meles Zenawi stated the following at a press conference on Feb 13, 2009, "This is a nearly white capitalist country", and "What we are building here is a nearly white capitalist system and we have no illusion about building any other system here". ( Excerpts from Meles interview at Fortune newspaper)

To find out what "white capitalism" means, the independent observer may want to read the report: Policies to Promote Cereal Intensification in Ethiopia: A Review of Evidence and Experience by the International Food Policy Research Institute (2007). (Note - this is only one example - many others will be provided later in an article.)

On pages 20-23 of this report, the reader will see that the Derg had prohibited the private sector from supplying agricultural inputs like fertilizer.

    Under the military regime of the Derg (1974-1991), the private sector was excluded from participation in this sector, while fertilizer was subsidized by the state, and special credit programs were put in place to encourage fertilizer use. The Agricultural Inputs Supply Corporation (AISCO), established in 1984, was the sole importer and distributor of fertilizers to cooperatives and state farms. Although fertilizer consumption rose to 100,000 tons by 1990, the fertilizer market during this period was characterized by widespread operational inefficiencies.

After the TPLF/EPRDF takeover in 1991, the private sector was allowed to work in this area, and the Derg's AISCO (renamed AISE) had only a minority share of the market. But things began to change after 1995, and by the year 2000, the private sector was once again gone from the fertilizer supply market (see figure).


    However, since 1999 the private sector that had initially responded to the reforms has largely exited the fertilizer market. In the case of imports, the share of private firms operating in the market went from 33 percent in 1995 to zero in 1999. Since then, the AISE has taken the majority share, followed by 'private' companies closely affiliated with or owned by the governing party and, more recently, cooperative unions (Figure 8).

    The decline of the private sector reflects several factors, including difficulties in the import process itself. Importing fertilizer requires that the importer obtain a license that is allocated by the GoE through a tendering process, in lots of 25,000 tons. The importer almost always requires financing as well, given that a single shipment of fertilizer alone requires about $US 5 million over several months. However, while a private sector buyer is currently required to deposit 100 percent of the value of the fertilizer to be imported at the time a line of credit is opened, the AISE and party-affiliated companies have privileged collateral requirements.

The current system has regressed back to what the Derg had created. The main change is that the business has been ethnicized and politicised. Is this what Meles means with "white capitalism?" According to the aforementioned report, this neo-Derg "white capitalism" system is inefficient and; "reduces the quality of input services to smallholders, incurs many hidden costs to the government, and generates significant risks to both smallholders and the government."

FEB 16 2009: In contrast to Meles Zenawi's Feb 13 press conference, the IMF believes that Ethiopia is in a "difficult situation" and faces significant risks to the downside. The IMF says that gov't borrowing and spending MUST be cut. (When the respected, longtime auditer general noted this two years ago, Meles insulted and fired him). The only way to keep the Ethiopian economy from crashing is through a huge increase in foreign aid. Even the projected 6.5% GDP growth is at risk if private transfers (e.g. remittances) - which doubled from $1.2 Billion in 2005/06 to $2.4 Billion in 2007/08 - go down. The gov't is projecting these private transfers at $2.2 Billion for 2008/09 - which seems unlikely given the international financial crisis.


Ethiopia: Request for Disbursement Under the Rapid-Access Component of the Exogenous Shocks Facility - Staff Report. IMF, Feb 2 2009

"MACROECONOMIC OUTLOOK AND RISKS - The staff projects that the adjustment to the shocks and domestic imbalances will lead to a significant slowdown in Ethiopia�s economic growth in 2008/09. Tighter economic policies will restrain domestic demand and reduce overall GDP growth to 6.5 percent. Stepped-up donor assistance (see below) will help to soften the impact on the economy by providing financing for capital projects and foreign exchange for essential imports. This, along with lower import prices, would permit the rebuilding of foreign exchange reserves in line with the authorities� objective. On the assumption that food prices have reached a turning point (prices fell somewhat in October and November 2008 and, with the harvest reported to be good, further declines are expected in the next few months), 12-month inflation would decline to below 20 percent by the end of 2008/09. But given the steep price rises at the beginning of the fiscal year, average CPI inflation will be above 40 percent."

"EXTERNAL FINANCING NEEDS AND DONOR SUPPORT - Ethiopia�s international partners have recognized Ethiopia�s difficult situation and plan to raise their concessional project financing and budget support substantially in 2008/09. The staff estimates external financing could be up to US$750 million higher than loan and grant disbursements in 2007/08 . This includes recently approved emergency support for food and fertilizer purchases of US$275 million from the World Bank and US$64 million from the African Development Bank."

"The authorities� adjustment efforts are subject to significant risks:
� The commodity price shocks are unwinding rapidly but at the same time the global economic environment has deteriorated considerably. Thus, although improved terms of trade provide an opportunity to rebuild foreign exchange reserves, the balance of payments situation is likely to remain difficult in the coming year.
Poor control over the activities of the public enterprises threatens efforts to ensure fiscal discipline and risks crowding out private sector credit.
Money growth has yet to be reined in sufficiently. Liquidity control will require discipline in the use of central bank advances to the government.
� The rapid appreciation of the real effective exchange rate is a concern and requires greater exchange rate flexibility."

FEB 14 2009: What is the Good of this Judgement - A Birtukan Mideksa Article
Ethiopian News and Views, Feb 14, 2009

FEB 6 2009: Water Harvesting Revisted (scroll down) - New article examines TPLFs top-down strategy for mobilizing Tigrayan farmers to undertake government-decreed development programs.

    The case of Asefa [pseudonym], who combines the offices of sub-district administrator and health and hygiene programme committee member, clearly illustrates this point.
      "We dug our pond in 2005. We paid a few hundred birr to daily labourers, wasted money. As you know I am a village leader, and people complained to me. They said: 'You are telling everybody to dig a pond, but you do not have one yourself.' If I had had a good catchment near my land, I would have dug a pond before, but what is the use of a pond if it is impossible for water to enter it? Sub-district administrators constantly commented on me. They visited me in my house and I tried to convince them of the impossibility for a pond on my land to harvest rainwater, but they did not accept this. One day at a meeting in the district my case was brought up again. I was so tired of it that I decided to dig a pond anyway."

    --- K Segers, J. Dessein, S. Hagberg, P. Develtere, MITIKU HAILE, and J. Deckers, BE LIKE BEES � THE POLITICS OF MOBILIZING FARMERS FOR DEVELOPMENT IN TIGRAY, ETHIOPIA. African Affairs 108/430, 91�109, 2009

One of the authors of the above article is listed as Mitiku Haile, {President of Mekelle University). This may account for the subdued tone of the article and statements that the TPLF won all seats in the 2005 elections, without mentioning that half of these "elections" were one-party affairs where the people had no opportunity to select a party other than the TPLF. Regardless, this article may get Ato Mitiku into trouble, because underneath the praise of the TPLF is a pretty serious critique of its top-down control structures.

  • "In the field of rural development in Tigray, examples of low performance due to lack of meaningful participation by farmers are legion."

  • "When trying to understand development processes in Tigray we should therefore bear in mind that room for bottom-up development initiatives, for local government officials and citizens alike, is limited."

  • "Gemgam was incorporated into the state bureaucratic system and to date administrators are regularly taken to task through public gemgam hearings. However, research has already shown that gemgam has become a top-down process and a tool of party control in an electoral context."

Another interesting part of this paper is that it shines a light on the new "Rich Farmer" orientation of Revolutionary Democracy. According to Gebru Asrat's paper Problems of EPRDF's Revolutionary Democracy Meles has now identified the rich farmer as his revolution's strategic class. A strange twist in the ideology - these "rich farmers" apparently will be those that closely identify themselves with the TPLF.

Some Problems and Challenges of Birtukan Mideksa's Imprisonment - Introduction
Ethiopian News and Views, Feb 1, 2009

JAN 31 2009: About Five Million Ethiopians Need Food Aid. WHY? After 18 years of a supposedly pro-farmer government, why are we still here? Look at the figure below from the World Bank Report (2008): Ethiopia Agriculture and Rural Development Public Expenditure Review 1997/98 - 2005/06. The TPLF/EPRDF could not even restore per capita agricultural GDP to levels beyond that of the war-torn Mengistu era. This is despite a huge increase in spending (driven largely by foreign aid)


The problem with the Derg and the TPLF/EPRDF is the same. The world has known for many years now that socialized agriculture produces poor results. But the TPLF/EPRDF is intensifying its control of the countryside. Its cadre system controls fertilizer distribution. Its rural cadres control land distribution. Its party-affiliated companies control marketing. Its cadres control microfinance institutions. Private enterprises are squeezed out. Surplus from this agricultural "rent-seeking" goes to fund TPLF/EPRDF party work. Its a vicious cycle of control.

Even if the TPLFs monopoly control of agricultural inputs and outputs was a good idea, the centralized, top-down, Leninist organization of the TPLF limits the efficiency of the system.

    "Autocratic hierarchies have to contend with limitations on their performance because of weak accountability and insufficient flows of information. Their top-down, closed structure chokes off information from outside sources and distorts it, due to imperatives of political control."

    "Closed political systems are prone to policy mistakes arising from bad information. The historical record of tyrannies, despotisms, and dictatorships bears this out."

    --- D. Deudney and G.J. Ikenberry, The Myth of Autocratic Revival - Why Liberal Democracy Will Prevail. Foreign Policy, January/February 2009

But some people have lots of food. Ethiopia, the most starvation-prone country in the world, has probably the most obese president in the world. Obese leaders in a famine country - a fitting symbol of "revolutionary democracy".

JAN 27 2009: World Bank Launches Urban Local Government Development Project in Ethiopia Dec 8, 2008.

    "Through the provision of Performance Grants, the project will provide incentives to cities to improve their performance in key areas related to planning, citizens� participation in the planning process, financial management and service delivery"

COMMENT - The TPLF/EPRDF is supported by only about 15% of the urban population in Ethiopia. We know that from the 2005 vote, especially in Addis Abeba. The best way to improve performance to get rid of the unwanted TPLF/EPRDF cadres and their brutal repression.

This program makes no sense. Ethiopia's cities desperately need better infrastructure. But to hand out cash ($150 million) to those who are busy smashing civil society in Ethiopia is madness.

This program is just starting. Thus all is not lost. There is great opportunity to pressure the World Bank to force Ethiopia to reform or lose this grant. The performance objective should be free and fair local elections - annulling the recent sham elections. Unless this is done, the World Bank is simply funding renewal and expansion of the Derg-era kebele control/intimidation system. The World Bank has no business being a partner in extending TPLF politbureau control down to the level of each kebele.

The World Bank project is even more confusing if you read their own separate report from July 2008: Information Access, Governance, and Service Delivery in Key Sectors: Themes and Lessons from Kenya and Ethiopia.

    Questions of institutional autonomy and inadequate information provision also characterize the Ethiopian health sector, elaborated in the study on "Access to Information and Service Delivery in the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria."

    To draw from the Global Fund, the Ethiopian MOH created an agency, the HIV/AIDS Prevention and Control Office (NHAPCO) and regional counterparts. Although nominally autonomous, NHAPCO is controlled by the Ministry of Health (MOH), limiting its responsiveness to beneficiaries.

    Internally, it has not evolved better mechanisms to provide information about its services to nongovernmental institutions (NGOs), which are its major targets.

    Outside actors such as the media also cannot access information about its services and the agency�s performance in general. Like many other public agencies in Ethiopia NHAPCO has no requirements for public reporting, leading to a slow follow-through in implementing client scorecards or other surveys. Consequently, despite enormous resources, information asymmetries� persistence has severely hampered the ability of NHAPCO to reach vulnerable HIV/AIDS victims. These information problems are compounded by poor management of the agency and its counterparts in the regions.

    Equally vital is the absence of any organized, issue-based, demand-side pressure, even in urban centers in Ethiopia.

The TPLF/EPRDF created a sham "autonomous" agency in order to comply with requirements to get foreign aid. Once it got the money it used it in its own way and within its own cadre system, ignoring the local NGOs. The NGOs are, of course, defined by Meles Zenawi as enemies of the TPLF. So why on earth would one expect the TPLF to cooperate with them?

How can management improve when the TPLF/EPRDF has embarked on a huge nationwide project to politicize the civil service and pack it with its loyal, servile, but unqualified and incompetent cadres?

How can citizens demand performance from their local government when it simply invites repression?

Why is the World Bank providing "enormous resources" to gov't agencies that have been politicized and degraded by the TPLF instead of directly to the NGOs?

    Although public sector reform in Ethiopia gave priority to local governments, especially municipalities, these reforms have hardly generated meaningful changes in the way city governments and their agencies provide services. The studies on "Access to Information, Transparency, and Service Delivery: The Case of the Addis Ababa Sewage and Water Authority(AAWSA)", and "Information Flows and Service Delivery: The Case of the Addis Ababa Acts and Document Registration Office (AAADRO)" demonstrates that these agencies have top-down management systems that prevent information from reaching the beneficiaries. These agencies are also characterized by government interference, weak legal standing, and lack of professionalism.

We went through this already with the Derg. Now the TPLF, in reaction to the 2005 elections, is recreating the Derg system of control. Derg institutions, Derg mentality, and Derg style elections. Can anyone expect any other result but "government interference, weak legal standing, and lack of professionalism."

JAN 23 2009: IMF Executive Board Approves US$50 Million Disbursement to the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia Under the Exogenous Shocks Facility

COMMENT - The TPLF can survive a long time if it keeps getting no-strings-attached cash grants like this. This needs to be stopped. The TPLF will be back for more. We need to make sure that Mr. Takatoshi Kato, (Exec. Board Deputy Managing Director and Acting Chair) hears the concerns of the Ethiopian people.

IMF Civil Society Team
Tel: (+1) 202 623-9400
Fax: (+1) 202 623-6220
email: ngoliaison@imf.org

JAN 16 2009: IMF Executive Board Meeting to Discuss Ethiopian Government's Request for Money see the IMF executive board calendar (tentative)

    Country: Ethiopia, The Federal Democratic Republic of

    Title: Request for the Rapid Access Component of the Exogenous Shocks Facility

    "Review of Access to Financing in the Credit Tranches and Under the Extended Fund Facility, and Overall Access Limits Under the General Resources Account; Charges and Maturities - Proposals for Reform"

This will probably happen at the IMF Headquarters at 700 19th St NW, Washington DC. I'll be writing a letter this weekend. The IMF needs to carefully consider whether it is, in effect, promoting dictatorship in Ethiopia. It needs to realize that with the recent imprisonment of Birtukan Mideksa, any action will carry extra connotations. The IMF should consider the new law criminalizing most NGO activites. The IMF should consider the way the TPLF has ignored all advice on land reform, and on party-affiliated companies. It should consider reports by respected international organizations such as HRW, Amnesty International, the ICRC, Medecins sans Frontieres, the European Parliament and a host of others. The IMF needs to be made aware of the massive government organized corruption that has hobbled Ethiopia's economy. A small sample is provided in the recent report by the Indian Ocean Newsletter.

All these issues should give the IMF pause. They should stop and consult separately with Ethiopian Civil Society Organizations before deciding what to do.

JAN 13 2009: Ethiopia asks for $50 million IMF grant see Viability Wilts as Prices, Demand for Oils and Metal Plummets Fortune Newspaper, Jan 11, 2009

    The government has already been discussing with the IMF and the World Bank in particular, to find ways to solve its foreign currency problems. It has asked the former for a 50 million dollar grant under IMF�s External Grant Facility.

    "This money will be used to reduce the pressure due to foreign currency shortage," Fantahun Alemayehu, head of Macro Economy Policy and Management Department with MoFED, said.

There are several ways for the Ethiopian public to influence what the IMF does in Ethiopia:

  • The United States Congress periodically authorizes funding for the IMF. In the 1990s Congress attached several public consultation and transparency requirements to the bill that approved the US funding for the IMF. Ethiopians can carefully review this legislation and use it to require the IMF to openly explain what it is doing.

  • The IMF has a civil society website: The IMF and Civil Society and a "civil society team." The IMF claims that it has "become more transparent and has sought to become more accountable, not only to the governments that own it, but also to the broader public." Well, this is the time to demonstrate that - see IMF civil society fact sheet.

  • Educate ourselves about the relationship between democracy and the IMF. For example here is one paper to read: Conditional Credibility: Explaining the Impact of the IMF on Democratization S. Nelson and G. Wallace. 2005. Paper prepared for the 2005 American Political Science Association Meeting, September 1-5, Washington, D.C.
    "As the activities of the IMF turned away from the management of balance of payments crises toward economic development in less developed countries (LDCs), and as the diverse experiences of the post-socialist economies illuminated the links between political and economic reform, the Fund absorbed ideas linking democratization, economic liberalization, and economic growth (James, 1998). As a consequence, it attaches political conditions as well as the traditional economic targets to structural adjustment loans. These conditions have included limits on the role and size of the military (most notably in the IMF�s negotiations with Pakistan and Romania in the early 1990s); control of corruption and "cronyism"; human rights (Poland�s membership in the 1980s was rescinded after imposition of martial law and politically motivated arrests); and other elements linked to political liberalization."

    -- Obviously with regard to corruption, cronyism, militarization, and human rights, the Ethiopian people have a lot to say to the IMF. Here is another paper: The IMF, Economic Development, and the Promotion of Democratic Open Society T. Palley, 2003. Director, Globalization Reform Project Open Society Institute. The IMF Executive Board issued a statement in 1997 that "proclaims the IMF�s intent to promote good governance on the grounds that it is good for efficiency and growth identifying and notifying governments about areas of weak governance and their economic consequences, providing technical assistance to deal with the problems, and using conditionality where appropriate."

  • Form alliances with international civil society groups that have extensive experience in dealing with the IMF and World Bank such as IFI Watch: IFIwatchnet is a groundbreaking initiative in international NGO networking, currently in its sixth year of operation. It connects organisations worldwide which are monitoring international financial institutions (IFIs) such as the World Bank, the IMF, and regional development banks.

Note - the above quoted Fortune article also explains how the foreign currency shortage is delaying critical infrastructure projects (but not delaying the import of luxury buses for the TPLF bus company):

    Banks take up to three months to process the Letters of Credit (L/C) requests from their clients mainly because the nation�s foreign reserve is only enough to support five weeks of imports, according to an expert at the Ministry Finance and Economic Development (MoFEd).

    Government is facing challenges to supply foreign currency even to areas it prioritizes. The Bole International Airport primary and secondary surveillance radar installation project is a good illustration. Though SELEX Sistemi Integreti � an Italian company � has won the tender floated by the Ethiopian Civil Aviation Authority (ECAA), in collaboration with the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), the Authority has not awarded the project yet. The delay is because MoFED said it, currently, cannot supply the 76 million dollars of project cost and suggested the ECAA should look for other sources, according to the expert.

Another topic of this article is the economic squeeze caused by the need to fight Ethiopia's high inflation rate. Ethiopia's high inflation rate over the past few years is almost unique in the world - virtually every other country was experiencing relatively low inflation rates.

A consequence of this is that now, with a world financial crisis underway, most countries central banks are responding by trying to stimulate their economies by expanding the money supply. Ethiopia cannot do this without sending the inflation rate sky high. The TPLF already vastly expanded the money supply in the years 2005-08 in an attempt to stay in power and keep the servile ethnic parties allied to it viable. Thus the TPLF is now stuck in a dangerous position.

    In a bid to fight the double digit inflation, the National Bank of Ethiopia (NBE) has taken a number of measures including forcing all banks to increase their legal reserve and reduce loans. These measures were meant to check the 65.7 billion Br in circulation.

    The measures by NBE have restricted the lending capacity of banks, according to the 2007/2008 annual report of Nib International bank.

JAN 7 2009: ETHIOPIANS ABROAD SHOULD STOP THE COMING TPLF BAILOUT BY THE IMF AND WORLD BANK The IMF and World Bank are not bailing out Zimbabwe's Robert Mugabe. They should not bail out the TPLF either. The Ethiopian people need relief from the TPLF. IMF and World Bank should not enter talks with the TPLF government of Ethiopia unless:

  • Political prisoners, e.g. Birtukan Mideksa, are released
  • TPLF and other party-associated businesses are forced to pay back loans they took from the Commercial Bank of Ethiopia (loans were later transferred to the Dev. Bank). If they cannot pay, the enterprises should be sold or liquidated
  • TPLF gov't withdraws its new law criminalizing most NGO activities
  • TPLF gov't signs pact with opposition for free and fair elections in 2010 that includes independent, neutral election board, equal media access, independent observers, independent election officials, etc...

Ethiopia's Financial Crisis Can't be Hidden Anymore: see National Bank to Ask for Emergency Loans from International Finance Institutions Reporter Newspaper, Jan 4, 2009

Also see: ESL Demands Payment for Services in Dollars Fortune Newspaper, Dec 29, 2008:

    Observers say it is unlikely for the nation�s foreign exchange reserve to stabilize soon. The NBE is under immense pressure to allocate foreign currency to finance the increasing volume of the nation's imports. Importers, including state enterprises, are forced to wait for several weeks before their request for letters of credit is granted. There is an average waiting period of three to four weeks before the authorities approve requests for foreign currency, according to one study.

This crisis has been developing since the 2005 elections. In an effort to bolster its shaken followers and buy support, the government followed a highly inflationary, Zimbabwe-style, monetary policy. Money was printed and handed out to subsidize TPLF-associated political activites and business endeavours. That money generated demand for imports - a lot of which were luxury goods the country can't afford (SEE SELAM [TPLF] BUS COMPANY LUXURY BUSES BELOW). There was almost certainly illicit capital flows out of the country, as people turned the birr into dollars on the black market. Export growth was strong, but not enough to balance the gov't-stimulated import demand. Also the gov't used up a lot of reserves trying to keep the domestic oil price low.

What now? Almost certainly there will be a new IMF support package. It will come with conditions. The Ethiopian opposition better be prepared to make sure its voice is heard when these conditions are defined. After the IMF package, special World Bank support will follow. Again, all these loans, by law, require public consultation. But the Ethiopian public has never been able to effectively influence these negotiations. This time should be different.

The financial crisis is also likely to lead to an internal political crisis within the EPRDF. The issue is who gets the money? How much do the servile ethnic parties get as compared to the TPLF? The needs and demands of the servile ethnic parties increase with every passing year. They are shaky. They have no legitimacy other than what they obtain by controlling access to loans, business, land, jobs, etc. Now that the crisis is here, who takes the hits? Can this ethnic pyramid organization, which has lost all ideological rationale, continue to function on an austerity budget?

In a democratic society, the mass of the Ethiopian people would exert influence on the foreign currency and import policies of the government. For example, millions of Ethiopians are at risk of starvation because the government does not have enough foreign currency to import food. Why then is Ethioipa importing luxury buses? Shouldn't that foreign currency be reserved for desperate Ethiopians that are dying from hunger? Should't the TPLF bus company be restricted to buying economy, used buses?

Note - according to the article, the National Bank might start offering foreign currency bonds to Ethiopians living abroad to finance things like Electric Corporation projects. As it stands right now, Ethiopia's corporations are locked out from the international finance market. Only Ethiopian Airlines is allowed to borrow abroad. Why? Because Ethiopia is short on foreign currency (look at the current crisis)and the international market regards lending to Ethiopian companies as a suicidal risk.

Jan 6, 2009. A Telling Symbol of the Transformation of the TPLF see Selam Bus Company Introduces Luxury Coaches Fortune Newspaper, Jan 2009

The TPLF revolutionaries have quietly abandoned the effort to serve the poor and powerless people of Tigray. Now they will shamelessly strive to provide luxury services for rich people - a group that includes themselves. (By Ethiopian standards, all TPLF members in leadership positions are very rich.)

The Selam Bus Company was originally set up to provide Bus service to underserved areas of Tigray. In fact transportation is in desperately short supply in all rural areas of Ethiopia. A major hurdle for rural transport is obtaining the foreign currency to import the buses and paying the prohibitive import taxes. Secondly there is the poor quality of rural feeder roads that greatly reduces the productive life of vehicles. Third there is the poverty of the population and lack of capacity to pay the fees necessary to make a business investment in rural transport profitable.

The TPLF (or TDA) was going to solve these problems. Yet they have failed. The only real solution is broad-based economic growth and a dynamic, competitive private sector. This is the same story with all the TPLF-affiliated businesses. They start with revolutionary spirit and then collapse into inefficiency and bankruptcy. But TPLF businesses never go bankrupt. They took 2 billion birr in loans from the state-owned Commercial Bank of Ethiopia. What is the status of these loans? How much was paid back? Don't ask. Top officials of the CBE are dead (officially by suicide) or in exile. Meanwhile the TPLF appoints ever-younger persons to head the CBE. The previous 35-year old president was apparently not inexperienced enough. Now they have replaced him with a 31-year old. This person was still in school when the TPLF was defrauding the CBE and obtaining land, vehicles, factories, houses etc... with loans that should never have been made.

Back to the Selam Bus Company. It is now moving its headquarters to Addis Ababa and becoming a national bus company with luxury buses to service rich people. How about the poor peasants and others in rural Tigray? Forget it. The goal of the TPLF is to (a) generate cash for its members, and (b) raise cash to support the TPLF's political activities. Its a corrupt circle that depends on monopoly powers, import privileges, and access to foreign currency.

There is nothing wrong with a company providing such a service. But why does it have to be controlled by an ethnic political party - or even any party at all? What is going to happen when other political parties decide to start their own "luxury" bus companies? Or maybe a private group of businessmen not affiliated with the TPLF (e.g. Sky Bus? Will it survive?) None of them will be allowed foreign currency to import buses if they threaten the profits of Selam Bus. None of them wil be given licenses if they hurt the profits of Selam Bus. This is why the TPLF is able to charge the high prices and generate fat profits. When politically connected people use their connections to obtain advantages from the state it is called RENT SEEKING. Yes, the TPLF is the biggest rent seeking organization in Ethiopia today.

Dec 30 2008. The Punishment of Virtue Birtukan Mideksa - a brave human being who stood up for her rights and for the rights of all Ethiopians - has been arrested. Five or six TPLF goons roughly grabbed her and shoved her into a car. Mesfin Wolde Mariam - a 78 year old man - was bashed in the head with a gun for asking the TPLF operatives not to mistreat Birtukan. Three years earlier, these same goons executed the wife of an oppposition leader while he was being arrested. This is TPLF.

The Promotion of Vice: - If one had to look for a person who is the exact opposite of Birtukan Mideksa, look no further than Bereket Simon. A corrupt, servile thug who lost his seat in the 2005 election and then forced a rerun where he claimed to win with 99% turnout. He has nothing to do with the rural constituency he supposedly represents. In fact he represents no one except Meles Zenawi. He stands for no principle other than loyal service to powerful, armed people. He has no special interest in governance other than the opportunities it affords him to live the corrupt villa-and-landcruiser lifestyle of the Ethiopian elite. To hear this vile individual comment on Birtukan Mideksa's arrest recalls the theme of Sarah Chayes book on Afghanistan - "The Punishment of Virtue."

Sadly, today's comment by Berhanu Nega is a conclusion that I think most even-handed observers will agree with:

    "There is no other way to freedom and liberty in that country without getting rid of this government."

Anything short of violence should be done to get rid of the TPLF.

Dec 28 2008. Birtukan Mideksa issues a classy statement in response to TPLF intimidation see EthioPolitics website

Here is an excerpt from her statement where she describes her reaction when two policeman came to her house to tell her to report to the Federal Police on account of public statements regarding the 2007 pardon:

    "I asked them what authority the police have in this matter. They responded with surprise and smiled saying, 'this isn't an academic discussion, you'd better stop asking these types of questions.'"

    "What had surprised and amused them, is for me a fundamental principle that I will also live by, stand for, and risk imprisonment for: the rule of law, or constitutionalism."

COMMENT: Ethiopia needs Birtukan-calibre people to serve in positions of leadership and responsibility. People like this are a valuable resource. On the other we don't need a TPLF police force that after 18 years still doesn't know and doesn't care about the law, the constitution, and the rights of human beings.

BACKGROUND: The TPLF is intimidating the prominent leader of the Ethiopian opposition UDJ party, threatening her with imprisonment if she doesn't "clarify" certain public statements she made about the aftermath of the 2005 elections.

It will be remembered that the opposition parties almost certainly won a majority of seats in parliament during the 2005 elections, but the governing TPLF stopped the ballot counting and then declared itself winner weeks later. Peaceful protests such as strikes and demonstrations were declared illegal. Nevertheless, citizens of Addis Abeba peacefully exercised these inalienable human rights that belong to them. They engaged in a peaceful city-wide stay-at-home strike. They tried to organize peaceful (actually mild) demonstrations.

The TPLF reacted viciously with a campaign of beatings, arrests, and killings. An elected opposition member of parliament was killed while he was peacefully sitting and talking with friends. The situation degenerated into stone-throwing riots that the TPLF blamed on the opposition.

Major opposition leaders were arrested and sentenced to life in prison after a laughable show trial that attracted universal condemnation abroad. Meanwhile, the TPLF fraudsters, abusers, and killers have remained completely unaccountable.

The abuses of the TPLF resulted in severe cuts in aid from foreign donors. In order to get the money flowing again, the TPLF devised a face-saving negotiated "pardon" process that ended witht the opposition leaders freed from jail after two years.

I am using "TPLF" to refer to the Ethiopian government for two reasons (a)there is very little difference between the ruling party and the government - any visitor to Ethiopia will be able to discern that with little effort, and (b) , although the TPLF is only 25 percent of an ethnic coalition referred to as the EPRDF, the other three parties are not independent and were created by the TPLF in the late 1980s. These servile ethnic parties have not initiated a single policy of national importance in their 20 years of existence.

Nov 15 2008. The Somalia Intervention: Another Seyoum Mesfin Fiasco
Ethiopia's largely unsuccessful intervention in Somalia seems to be winding down. One has to ask why Ethiopia's diplomacy efforts, which were so crucial to this intervention, were so fruitless?

The answer lies with Ethiopia's unwritten "shadow" constitution, which requires a crony of Meles to be installed in every position of national importance in the government of Ethiopia. Ethiopia's foreign minister for life, Seyoum Mesfin, is a very important crony. So although he is producing fiasco after fiasco, he is secure in his position. Very few people could have kept their jobs after a performance as abysmal as Seyoum Mesfin delivered during/after the Badime war. His performance ranks as a first class international embarrassment with severe negative consequences for Ethiopia. The Ethiopia foreign ministry officially informed the Boundary Commission that "everybody knows that Tserona is in Eritrea."

Well, this same team of Meles cronies has been tasked with sorting out Somalia's internal politics, selecting allies for Ethiopia, guiding the IGAD negotiations, and securing support from the West and from regional powers for Somalia's transitional government.

What has been the result? Another first class fiasco. Seyoum Mesfin selected the obstinate and divisive Col Abdullahi Yusuf as Ethiopia's ally and helped get him selected as the transitional government's leader. Its been downhill from there. Western support has been tepid. Arab governments are hostile or at best indifferent. Ethiopia decided to break relations with Qatar. Meanwhile Abdullahi Yusuf has been a disaster as president.

Fiasco after fiasco. This is the result of Melesian cronyism that prevents talented Ethiopians from serving their country at the highest levels of government.

Links to Interesting Articles

Abstracts of papers presented at the 16th International Conference of Ethiopian Studies. Norway, 2007

Be Like Bees � The Politics of Mobilizing Farmers for Development in Tigray, Ethiopia. Segers et al., African Affairs, 2009

The 2008 Ethiopian Local Elections: the Return of Electoral Authoritarianism. L. Aalen and K. Tronvoll, African Affairs, 2009 - "As a TPLF cadre recently explained to the authors: �We have stopped pretending democracy any more; this is a struggle for our survival.�"

Ethiopia: Repression Sets Stage for Non-Competitive Elections Human Rights Watch, April 2008

Ethiopia: Reforming Land Tenure Review of African Political Economy - Vol. 35 No. 116, June 2008 - "it is very unlikely that the Ethiopian government departs from the dependence path in rural politics and the practices to govern the rural populace and gives up its most precious power resource in the rural realm � the power to distribute land."

The Problematic of Democratizing a Multi-cultural Society: The Ethiopian Experience Merera Gudina, 2007

Policies to Promote Cereal Intensification in Ethiopia: A Review of Evidence and Experience. International Food Policy Research Institute, 2007

The Politician, the Priest and the Anthropologist: Living Beyond Conflict in Southwestern Ethiopia David Turton, 2002



Somalia/Ogaden Background Articles

Somalia JNA Document Repository

Arms Monitoring Report --- Nov 2006 United Nations 85 pgs
Vulnerable Livelihoods in the Somali Region of Ethiopia S. Devereux April 2006 Inst. for Dev. Studies (UK) 200 pgs
Understanding Somalia unk. Sep 2006 Addis Fortune Newspaper html
Somalia: Spiraling Toward War K. Menkhaus. Sep 2006 CSIS Africa Policy Forum html
Grassroots Conflict Assessment Of the Somali Region, Ethiopia CHF Intl. Aug 2006 CHF Intl. 41 pgs
Can the Somali Crisis be Contained?

Somalia's Islamists

Counter-Terrorism in Somalia: Losing Hearts and Minds?

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Aug 2006

Dec 2005

July 2005

International Crisis Group

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27 pgs

Beyond clannishness and colonialism: understanding political disorder in Ethiopia's Somali Region, 1991-2004 T. Hagmann Dec 2005 Journal of Modern African Studies 28 pgs
Stateless Justice in Somalia: Formal and Informal Rule of Law Initiatives A. Le Sage Jul 2005 Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue 59 pgs
Human rights and security in central and southern Somalia --- Mar. 2004 Danish Immigration Service 61 pgs
Ethiopian Federalism: autonomy versus control in the Somali Region A.I. Samatar 2004 Third World Quarterly 24 pgs
Warlords and Landlords: Non-State Actors and Humanitarian Norms in Somalia K. Menkhaus. NOv 2003 Davidson College 38 pgs
On the Wrong Side of History in Somalia --- July 1999 Gundet Newsletter html
Somalia: A country study --- 1992 U.S. Library of Congress book


IDEOCOSM

Ideas and their role for Ethiopian Democratization (A Research Agenda)
Ethiopian News and Views, Nov 12, 2006

Dangerous Ideas: Five Beliefs That Propel Groups Toward Conflict

Papers Presented at the 4th International Conference on the Ethiopian Economy
June 10-12, 2006: Over 40 papers online; http://www.eeaecon.org call for papers for 5th Intl. conference in Addis Abeba, June 2007

Catechism for Ethiopian Nihilism
Sergey Nechayev (and M. Bakunin?), 1869

The Course Of True Nationalism Never Did Run Smooth
Ernest Gellner in Nations and Nationalism, 1983 (edited by J. Hutchinson and A.D. Smith); Pages 66-68

Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda, Propaganda and Practice
Human Rights Watch, 1999

"Never forget that the person on the other side is human"
Netiquette guide

Critical Thinking


Small Michelin Map of Southern Somalia

Larger (211K) Michelin Map of Southern Somalia

Map of Somali Clans
Somalia Clan Map

Southern Somalia
Somalia Country Map

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