The highlights of "Project FUBELT" were cited in both the newly released CIA documents and in papers uncovered by the 1975 congressional inquiry. Covert funds were funnelled into Chilean congressional campaigns; CIA agents stayed close to disgruntled Chilean military officers; to keep the military on edge, the CIA planted false propaganda suggesting that the Chilean left planned to take control of the armed forces; and the CIA secretly poured $1.5 million into one of Chile's leading newspapers, El Mercurio. Peter Kornbluh, "The Chile Coup - The U. S. Hand" , October 25, 1998.
Pinochet: An Image Problem
The administration fretted about an image problem in the United States, too, because two Americans -- Charles Horman and Frank Terruggi -- were among those executed at the National Stadium. Their deaths constituted a "difficult public relations situation," one cable reported on Oct. 21, 1973. The Kubisch report to Kissinger cited "heavy" media criticism and congressional inquiries on the two executions. In February 1974, Kubisch delicately raised the American deaths with Chilean Foreign Minister Manuel Huerta, according to a newly declassified memorandum of the conversation. The topic was broached "in the context of the need to be careful to keep relatively small issues in our relationship from making our cooperation more difficult," the memo said. Peter Kornbluh, "The Chile Coup - The U. S. Hand" , October 25, 1998.
But the first wave of executions was only the start of atrocities in Pinochet's Chile. Human rights violations kept complicating U.S.-Chilean relations, especially after Nixon's Watergate resignation in August 1974. By 1975, human rights advocates were challenging the Ford administration's continued support for Pinochet. A confidential NSC memorandum dated July 1, 1975, revealed a mutiny even inside the U.S. Embassy. "A number of officers in the Embassy at Santiago have written a dissent," according to the memo prepared for national security advisor Brent Scowcroft. The dissent was "strongly supported by the Policy Planning office in ARA [State's Latin American division], calling for cutting off all economic and military assistance to Chile until the human rights situation improved." The memo said the embassy staff was overruled by then-Ambassador David Popper who wanted to continue support for the junta while making stronger protests on human rights. Popper met with the Chilean minister of economic coordination, Raul Saez, on April 6, 1975, to discuss the concerns. Popper said "the most difficult problem we had in our embassy had to do with allegations of torture," according to an embassy cable. "The root of the problem seemed to me to be the absolute power of DINA [Chile's intelligence service] to do whatever it desired in detaining and handling suspects." Saez replied that "he had remonstrated with Pinochet about DINA, so far without much success." The minister then blamed "fascist advisors to the junta" for the atrocities. Peter Kornbluh, "The Chile Coup - The U. S. Hand" , October 25, 1998.
But the declassified documents portrayed DINA as anything but a rogue agency. Rather, it was an intelligence service which served at Pinochet's personal command. On April 15, 1975, the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency reported that since the decree "establishing DINA as the national intelligence arm of the government, Colonel [Manuel] Contreras has reported exclusively to, and received orders only from, President Pinochet." Peter Kornbluh, "The Chile Coup - The U. S. Hand" , October 25, 1998.
By summer 1975, human rights abuses forced the Ford administration to edge back from the Chilean junta. Pinochet requested a visit with President Ford in August, but White House officials feared the meeting "would stimulate criticism domestically in the United States and from Latin America." The NSC instructed Popper to "discourage it by saying that the President's schedule was already full." Peter Kornbluh, "The Chile Coup - The U. S. Hand" , October 25, 1998.
In 1976, U.S.-Chilean relations received another jolt when DINA agents traveled to Washington and exploded a bomb under a car carrying former Chilean diplomat Orlando Letelier and two Americans. Letelier and one of the Americans, Ronni Moffitt, died. A federal investigation traced the bombing back to DINA and some Cuban-American accomplices. A Senate investigation linked the Letelier bombing to a program of cross-border assassinations known as Operation Condor. That operation had attacked Pinochet critics in Spain, Italy and Argentina as well as the United States. But Pinochet and his coup makers would avoid prosecution at least in Chile. Before gradually returning the reins of government to civilians in 1990, Pinochet engineered an amnesty for himself and his senior officers. Only DINA chief Contreras was sentenced to seven years in prison, for his role in the Letelier bombing. In his defense, Contreras insisted that he was just following Pinochet's orders.... Peter Kornbluh, "The Chile Coup - The U. S. Hand" , October 25, 1998. The Media Consortium, Suite 102-231, 2200 Wilson Blvd. Arlington, VA 22201.
1998: Document Declassification
WASHINGTON, Sep 11 (IPS) - Declassified U.S. documents, made public Friday added new details to the Washington campaign of 25 years ago to destablise the government of President Salvador Allende of Chile which culminated in a bloody military coup. They also show the immediate U.S. support for Gen. Augusto Pinochet, who ousted Allende on Sep 11 1973, including orders to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to "assist the junta in gaining a more positive image, both at home and abroad." Jim Lobe, "U. S. Documents Confirm Destabilisation of Allende," 11 Sep 98; Copyright 1998 InterPress Service, all rights reserved. Worldwide distribution via the APC networks. The documents acknowledge the importance of the secret U.S. role in preparing the climate for the military coup. In one report, the agency notes that its 1.5 million-dollar subsidy and advice to the anti-Allende 'El Mercurio' newspaper "played a significant role in setting the stage for the military coup."Jim Lobe, "U. S. Documents Confirm Destabilisation of Allende," 11 Sep 98; Copyright 1998 InterPress Service, all rights reserved. Worldwide distribution via the APC networks.
The documents, which were obtained by the independent National Security Archive (NSA), make clear the falsity of the claims by President Richard Nixon and then-National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger that they had cancelled plans to foment a coup against Allende after his inauguration in November, 1970. In a top secret memorandum recounting a conversation between Kissinger, Gen. Alexander Haig, and two top officials of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) October 15, 1970, Kissinger ordered the CIA to "continue keeping the pressure on every Allende weak spot in sight - now, after the 24th of October (when his election was confirmed by the Chilean Congress) and into the future until such time as new marching orders are given." A secret cable sent out the very next day from CIA headquarters to the agency's station chief in Santiago ordered that, even if a military coup did not materialise before Allende's inauguration, "efforts in this regard will continue vigorously beyond this date." "We are to continue to generate maximum pressure toward this end utilizing every appropriate resource." the cable says.Jim Lobe, "U. S. Documents Confirm Destabilisation of Allende," 11 Sep 98; Copyright 1998 InterPress Service, all rights reserved. Worldwide distribution via the APC networks.
While the U.S. role in the destablisation campaign was first detailed in unprecedented Senate hearings in mid-1970s, the release of some 30 new documents - some of which are still heavily censored - help clarify the picture. Their release "begins to open the closet of national secrets in both Chile and the United States," according to Archive senior analyst Peter Kornbluh, who has written extensively about the Chile coup. "These documents provide a dramatic reminder of a dark history that the powers-that-be in both Santiago and Washington would prefer to forget." Jim Lobe, "U. S. Documents Confirm Destabilisation of Allende," 11 Sep 98; Copyright 1998 InterPress Service, all rights reserved. Worldwide distribution via the APC networks.
"On September 15," wrote the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, "President Nixon informed CIA Director Richard Helms that an Allende regime in Chile would not be acceptable to the United States and instructed the CIA to play a direct role in organizing a military coup d'etat in Chile to prevent Allende's accession to the Presidency." Kissinger later claimed that Track II had been "turned off" after the bungling of one October coup attempt sponsored by a general to whom the CIA had provided arms and advice. In his two- volume memoirs, less than two pages of which were devoted to Chile, Nixon said he "instructed the CIA to abandon the operation" in mid-October. In the same passage, he said the coup resulted from "three years of inefficient administration." But top CIA officials told Congress that Track II had never been cancelled. Altogether, the CIA spent at least eight million dollars between 1970 and 1973 on destabilisation activities. The new documents disclose that Track Two actually had a code name: 'Operation FUBELT'. The new documents confirm that Kissinger himself ordered the operation to continue beyond Allende's inauguration and that the CIA confirmed those orders immediately to its agents on the ground. They also include a memo by Helms dated Sep 16, 1970, in which he states "The President has asked the Agency to prevent Allende from coming to power or to unseat him." Jim Lobe, "U. S. Documents Confirm Destabilisation of Allende," 11 Sep 98; Copyright 1998 InterPress Service, all rights reserved. Worldwide distribution via the APC networks.
Among other revelations in the new documents are efforts to appeal to then-President Eduardo Frei's "machismo" to block Allende's installation and back a military coup. "Frei did manage to confide to several top-ranking military officers that he would not oppose a coup, with a guarded implication he might even welcome one," Helms reported to Kissinger. But Frei retreated after the botched attempt in mid-October.
They also include a secret report on US efforts to block Chile from receiving loans from international agencies, like the Inter- American Development Bank and the World Bank, and its consideration of a move to have Chile expelled from the Organisation of American States (OAS). Jim Lobe, "U. S. Documents Confirm Destabilisation of Allende," 11 Sep 98; Copyright 1998 InterPress Service, all rights reserved. Worldwide distribution via the APC networks.
Declassified U.S. embassy cables show that officials were well aware of the executions and torture by the junta but were concerned primarily with the execution of two U.S. nationals in the National Stadium. These killings posed "a difficult public relations situation," according to an Oct 21, 1973 cable.Jim Lobe, "U. S. Documents Confirm Destabilisation of Allende," 11 Sep 98; Copyright 1998 InterPress Service, all rights reserved. Worldwide distribution via the APC networks.
They also reveal that a number of embassy staff, backed by the Policy Planning office in the State Department's Latin America wing, called for an end of all U.S. economic and military aid to the junta in July, 1975, to press it to improve its human rights performance. Most aid was shut off by Congress the following year.Jim Lobe, "U. S. Documents Confirm Destabilisation of Allende," 11 Sep 98; Copyright 1998 InterPress Service, all rights reserved. Worldwide distribution via the APC networks.
September 11, 1998 marks the twenty-fifth anniversary of the military coup led by General Augusto Pinochet. The violent overthrow of the democratically-elected Popular Unity government of Salvador Allende changed the course of the country that Chilean poet Pablo Neruda described as "a long petal of sea, wine and snow"; because of CIA covert intervention in Chile, and the repressive character of General Pinochet's rule, the coup became the most notorious military takeover in the annals of Latin American history. Revelations that President Richard Nixon had ordered the CIA to "make the economy scream" in Chile to "prevent Allende from coming to power or to unseat him," prompted a major scandal in the mid-1970s, and a major investigation by the U.S. Senate. Since the coup, however, few U.S. documents relating to Chile have been actually declassified--until recently. Through Freedom of Information Act requests, and other avenues of declassification, the National Security Archive has been able to compile a collection of declassified records that shed light on events in Chile between 1970 and 1976. These documents include:
- Cables written by U.S. Ambassador Edward Korry after Allende's election, detailing conversations with President Eduardo Frei on how to block the president-elect from being inaugurated. The cables contain detailed descriptions and opinions on the various political forces in Chile, including the Chilean military, the Christian Democrat Party, and the U.S. business community.
- CIA memoranda and reports on "Project FUBELT"--the codename for covert operations to promote a military coup and undermine Allende's government. The documents, including minutes of meetings between Henry Kissinger and CIA officials, CIA cables to its Santiago station, and summaries of covert action in 1970, provide a clear paper trail to the decisions and operations against Allende's government
- National Security Council strategy papers which record efforts to "destabilize" Chile economically, and isolate Allende's government diplomatically, between 1970 and 1973.
- State Department and NSC memoranda and cables after the coup, providing evidence of human rights atrocities under the new military regime led by General Pinochet.
- FBI documents on Operation Condor--the state-sponsored terrorism of the Chilean secret police, DINA. The documents, including summaries of prison letters written by DINA agent Michael Townley, provide evidence on the carbombing assassination of Orlando Letelier and Ronni Moffitt in Washington D.C., and the murder of Chilean General Carlos Prats and his wife in Buenos Aires, among other operations.
American Involvement
National Public Radio news analyst Daniel Schorr pointed out on Oct. 19 that Pinochet seized control of Chile "after the CIA had organized a campaign to destabilize the democratically elected but left-leaning Salvador Allende." And Schorr identified another key orchestrator of the 1973 coup -- Henry Kissinger, who coordinated foreign policy for President Nixon. Norman Solomon, Media and Memory: The Arrest of a Dictator, From Newsgroup, misc.activism.progressive, October 22, 1998.
July 1, 1975: National Security Council, Disarray in Chile Policy: This memorandum, from Stephen Low to President Ford's National Security Advisor, General Brent Scowcroft, conveys concern about wavering U.S. policy toward Chile in light of reports of human rights violations. The memo reveals a division within the U.S. embassy over dealing with Chile, with a number of officials now believing that all U.S. military and economic assistance should be terminated until the regime's human rights record improves. According to Low, by reducing aid and sending "mixed signals" to the Chileans, the United States risks precipitating a crisis situation in Chile. Low concludes his memo by recommending that Scowcroft schedule a special meeting in which U.S. agencies can "clarify guidelines for future policy." Source: Peter Kornbluh, National Security Archive, CHILE: DECLASSIFIED U.S. DOCUMENTS ON PINOCHET AND THE 1973 COUP
August 8, 1975: National Security Council, Chilean President's visit to U.S.: This memorandum, written by Stephen Low of the National Security Council, calls Scowcroft's attention to Pinochet's plans to visit the United States, and his requested meeting with U.S. President Ford. The memo states that the NSC asked the U.S. Ambassador to Chile, David Popper, to discourage the meeting by telling the Chileans that President Ford's schedule is full. Fearing that such a visit would "stimulate criticism" and foster embarrassment, Low suggests an "informal talk" with Chile's Ambassador Trucco. Source: Peter Kornbluh, National Security Archive, CHILE: DECLASSIFIED U.S. DOCUMENTS ON PINOCHET AND THE 1973 COUP
January 21, 1982: FBI, Directorate of National Intelligence (DINA): This report provides a summary of information taken from prison letters written by Michael Townley, the DINA agent responsible for the assassination of Orlando Letelier. This report includes information not directly provided to the FBI by Townley, but drawn from analysis of his correspondence with his DINA handler: details about meetings between Chilean President Pinochet and Italian terrorists and spies, codenames and activities of DINA personnel, collaboration between DINA and anti-Castro Cubans; the creation of a fake terrorist organization to take the blame for a DINA kidnapping in Argentina; DINA involvement in relations between Great Britain and Northern Ireland; and Townley's fear that information about kidnappings and assassinations of prominent critics of Pinochet would somehow be traced back to him. Source: Peter Kornbluh, National Security Archive, CHILE: DECLASSIFIED U.S. DOCUMENTS ON PINOCHET AND THE 1973 COUPbr>
FBI Offered to Assist Pinochet Regime trace persons in the United States
Declassified US government documents released to the New York Times show that in at least one case the US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) collaborated with the 1973-1990 government of former Chilean dictator Gen. Augusto Pinochet by searching for two suspected leftists living in the US. According to the documents, the FBI's representative at the US embassy in Buenos Aires at the time, Robert Scherrer, was informed of the May 17, 1975 arrest of Jorge Isaac Fuentes in Asuncion, Paraguay. Fuentes was allegedly a courier for Chile's Revolutionary Left Movement (MIR); Paraguay turned him over to the Chilean government, and he is now listed among the more than 3,000 people killed by the Pinochet regime. At that time the Southern Cone nations shared intelligence in a program called Operation Condor.
On June 6, 1975, Scherrer wrote a letter to Gen. Ernest Baeza Michaelson, then director of Chile's General Office of Investigation and a graduate of the US Army's School of the Americas (SOA). Scherrer told Baeza that Fuentes' address book included two entries for people in the US: Margaret Sun of Manhattan and Sonia Bacicalupe of Dallas. "The FBI initiated an investigation in the United States of the afore-mentioned people and addresses," Scherrer wrote. "I will inform you of the results of the investigation as soon as I have them in hand." Later documents indicate that the FBI failed to find the two people. Unnamed FBI officials told the Times that this sort of cooperation is routine and traditional. "We would be remiss in not checking out these people," an official said. [NYT 2/10/99] From Weekly News Update on the Americas, Issue #472, February 14, 1999, published by Nicaragua Solidarity Network of Greater New York, 339 Lafayette St, NY, NY 10012 (212) 674-9499. Contact wnu@igc.apc.org
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