1. Constitutionally Sanctioned Role of Military in Political System:
LOW: The new 1999 Constitution does not provide for a political role of the military. However, there is no article condemning the eventual politicization of the institution.
2. Military Relationship to the Chief Executive:
LOW: De Jure and de facto control of the Armed Force rests on President Chávez. Moreover, the Chief General of the institution is appointed directly by the president.
3.Coordinationof Defense Sector:
MODERATE: Although the ministry has been occupied by civilians in the past, de Jure and de Facto coordination is under President Chávez’s and the Defense Minister’s criteria.
4. Active-duty Military Participation in the Cabinet:
Most of the Ministers of President Chávez have been military officers who are given retirement to act as civilian ministers. At present, 5 ministers out of total 19 are military officials. Since 1999, 48% of all appointed ministers have been military officers.
5. Role of Legislature:
HIGH: By mid-2000 there were a total of 11 military deputies. As of June 2004 the National Assembly Presidency was held by former military rebel, Cap. Francisco Amelliach. Also, out of the 70 MVR deputies, 7 are military ex-rebels. Most of the Chiefs of Defense and Security Commission at the National Assembly have been retired military officers. However, major policy issues affecting military budgets, force structure, and mission are not monitored by the legislature, but instead directly controlled by the President and the military high command.
6. Role of career Civil servants or civilian Political Appointees:
HIGH: Active-duty and/or retired military officers fill almost all top defense sector staff roles. Civilian participants normally do so as employees of the four military services.
7. Role in Intelligence:
HIGH: Peak intelligence agency (DISIP) has been led by retired officers since 1999. Usually close friends or old comrades in arms of the President. As of June 2004, the post was held by active Colonel Miguel Rodríguez Torres.
8. Role in police:
HIGH: Venezuelan Police Corps were in the hands of civilians until Nov. 17, 2002 when the National Guard took over the Metropolitan Police (Caracas). During the last three years the National Guard has undertaken urban patrolling in the main cities as part of the “Citizens’ Security Plan.”
9. Role in Military Promotions:
HIGH: Depends on the President’s and the high Command’s criteria, by constitutional decree (art. 236)
10. Role in Legal System:
LOW: Military officers who revolted on April 11, 2002 were put on trial in the Country’s Supreme Court, but found innocent of all charges.
Source: "El Tema." Globovision.com 10 Nov. 2002. 17 Nov. 2002 ?www.globovision.com/eltema?; Ferrero, Mary 2002; Constitución Bolivariana de Venezuela, 1999; ?htpp://asambleanacional.gov.ve/ns2/lista-dip-partidos.asp?; ?htpp://asambleanacional.gov.ve/ns2/leyes.asp?id=266?; Subero, La Tercera Ola 2; Harnecker, Hugo Chávez 89; Hernández 1.
Although most of the military institution is under the president’s control, military contestation remains high. Since the April 11 failed coup, more officers have joined the dissident faction. They express increased discontent regarding the militarizing of the country’s politics (Ferrero 87). Yet prerogatives also remain high, which places Venezuelan regime in Coordinate 3: Unsustainable Position for Democratic Leaders. This coordinate comprises the possible breakdown of democracy if an effective alliance between the military and the government is not reached, thus reducing military prerogatives and later conflict. Stepan´s theory provides the proper framework for measuring the level of civil-military relations in Venezuela and contributes to answer the “how” question of military politicization in Venezuela. This scheme details military intervention in key state areas. More importantly, it exposes how the process of militarization of Venezuela’s political system evolved in the last five years.
IV. EVENTS OF APRIL 11th, 2002.
The second national strike under President Chávez’s government was called on December 10, 2001 and lasted four months. During this time, negotiations between the government and the opposition sectors did not advance. By April 4th 2002, PDVSA’s directorate launched the Zero Hour Strike to support the opposition. In response, President Chávez fired PDVSA’s major executives through his April 7th 2002 “Alo Presidente” TV allocution. The oil strike began on April 9th with the support of all opposition sectors. Two days later, on April 11th a massive march was heading to Miraflores Palace to demand Chávez’s resignation. In response, the President ordered the military to stop the mob and end the march (“Todos los Hechos” 3; “Tercer Paro” 1).
Army’s General Commandant Efraín Vásquez Velasco rejected Chávez’s orders and, joined by 14 high command officers, revoked military support for the President. It was called a “military coup;” however, General Vásquez assures that it was not (Méndez 4). In a personal interview Gen. Vásquez Velasco confirmed that “there was no intention to depose President Chávez, but simply to disobey his orders to shoot on unarmed civilians” (Vásquez Velasco). Snipers fired at the mob from a bridge near Miraflores Palace, and on the main street where the march was occurring. A video of these events was publicly transmitted. The shooting became known as the “Llaguno Bridge Massacre,” resulting in nearly 30 casualties. The Chief of the Navy’s Joint Command Admiral Héctor Ramírez Pérez, joined by a representation of each force appeared on national television later that day to express his rejection of violent repression in Llaguno. Like Vásquez Velasco, he demanded President Chávez’s resignation (“Todos los Hechos” 2; Pereira 48-50).
Conflict Between the Military and the State
Prior to analyzing the motivations for the military to intervene on April 11th, it is necessary to study the conflict between the military and the state in Venezuela. For this matter, Samuel Huntington identifies two sources of conflict: military obedience versus personal competence and military value of obedience versus non-military values. The first involves conflict between a subordinate and a superior in two types: operational and doctrinal. Once President Chávez came to power, the main source of conflict has been doctrinal. Military hierarchy has widely been used for non-professional purposes, prostituting the superiority of high ranks and the obedience of subordinates. In a personal interview, General Vásquez Velasco stresses that the numerous cases of corruption, the use of soldiers for personal favors, and the military involvement in acts of political propaganda are examples of this conflict (Vásquez Velasco). The second conflict, military value of obedience versus non-military values, refers to the responsibility of the officer when ordered by a head of state to follow a course of action that he knows may lead to a national disaster. Huntington proposes three conflict areas where military disobedience is justified. These three conflict areas will be utilized in order to analyze the reaction of the military to the April 11th, 2002 events:
- Between military competence and political threats to this competence: an encroachment of political power into the military realm justifies military disobedience based on professional standards unique to the military. One of the main reasons to withdraw military support from President Chávez on April 11, 2002 was the continued use of the armed forces as a political platform (Vásquez, Pronunciamiento 3). General Vásquez Velasco denounced the existence of political emissaries within the institution (Vásquez, Hechos de Abril 2). These are non-military individuals, deputies or members of the MVR present in the military high command’s meetings to approve or disapprove military courses of action (Vásquez, La Conspiración 2). Also he complained about decreasing resources for conventional training and the consequences that financial shortages had for military operational capacity. Another reason was the wide-known obligation among military soldiers to support the President’s revolution in order to qualify for a promotion (5). Altogether, these issues threatened the competence of the military institution and galvanized the interventions of the military’s high command to request Chávez’s resignation.
