DIANA HOME CAMEL JOCK STREET RACE HOSPITAL HELL DWI BS
JAMES BOND SWISSAIR 111 FIRE SALE DODI2DI4 CARMILLA POWMIA
CONGRESSIONAL HEARINGS: TRANSPORTATION SAFETY FOR SALE
by John Lee
"Kingdoms are but cares,
State is devoid of stay;
Riches are steady snares,
And hasten to decay."
—King Henry VI
Swissair Flight 111 from New York JFK to Switzerland spontaneously caught on fire and crashed into the dark North Atlantic Ocean, off the coast of Canada, a wholly owned subsidiary of the British Commonwealth, under control of the German Queen of England  |
The following transcript from the U.S. Congressional Record has nothing to do with DWI law, nor does it pertain to the crash of SwissAir 111. Yet it does reveal insight into the malignancy of corporate greed and of government corruption, and with the resultant degradation of public safety in the name of profit. In theory, useful lessons can still be learned from this battle of wills. If Flight 111 really was sabotaged by British secret police, then this corruption exhibited by this Congressional hearing aided the killers in their crime. This obvious corruption can be extrapolated to exhibit government's general disdain for any type of motor vehicle safety, from airliners to automobiles.
"Regarding those ever so elusive database records that FAA has continued to claim do not support any higher regulatory actions for wire insulations (Du Pont), cockpit smoke visibility or insulation blanket flammability standards? It's their records, figures lie and liars figure. Until they get their records straightened out, or this number is refuted, I'll refer to the former Department Of Transportation's Inspector General, Mary Schiavo when in Washington, on September 27, 1998, she said;
"Would it surprise you to learn that since 1994, just in the FAA publicly available internet data bases there are 783 reports of smoke in the cockpit, with about half of the reports concerning commercial carriers ? (Underlining added)."
Hearing Before The Subcommittee On Aviation
Of The Committee On Commerce Science, And Transportation United States Senate
One Hundred Third Congress First Session
November 8, 1993
Bertil Werjefelt, President, Vision Safe Corp
"Mr. Werjefelt. Thank you. Time and again, reports concerning these types of accidents show that pilot vision was either completely lost or severely impaired to the point where pilots could not see to safely control and land the planes. Many lives have been lost. In some cases, pilots managed to land the planes with the guidance of controllers on the ground or by sticking their heads out the windows to try to see. Aside from skillful piloting, more than anything else it seems lots of luck was the serendipitous and deciding factor that made the difference between a catastrophe and an emergency landing."
"It is important to consider that much money and effort is spent on ensuring pilot vision, from frequent pilot eye tests to very careful FAA certification of instruments and other costly equipment and design features, all for a single purpose, to ensure us and the pilots that they can see to safely control and land the plane. There must never be any question of whether there is too much smoke for the pilots to see to be able to land."
Shredded cockpit remains of Swissair Flight 111  |
"Now, in my testimony I have also included a letter from a former head of safety with Swissair. In addition to the dozen or so accidents listed, he points out that just 2 weeks ago there was another accident in Munich. That is the third time a DC-9 has been going down with virtually blind pilots on board, and strictly by luck they managed to land. The pilots could not see their instruments. They could not read their approach plates. The situation was extreme. Strictly with the guidance of the controllers on the ground and some good luck did they manage to put that plane on the ground."
"The same thing occurred a couple of years ago, and this one is listed in my list of accidents. It says pilot vision was severely impaired. Well, what does "severely impaired" mean to laymen? I will tell you what it means. I talked to the SAS staff involved in this, they told me that they feared that that plane would be lost, but as luck would have it, the captain on board happened to be from the area where the accident was occurring and managed to squeeze his face to the side window to watch the scenery go by, which he was very familiar with. He could not see where the plane was going but could only estimate and was guided in on the runway people on the ground."
"Now that is not the kind of safety we want. We have had a continuous long dispute with the FAA about these matters, and they seem to consistently deny that there is any problem whatsoever. And I would like to believe that summarizes our position and the safety problem that I am here to testify about."
"A review of a portion of the accident record confirms that loss of pilot vision in the cockpit is a serious safety problem. I call your attention to the attached list of "smoke related accidents". Moreover, Boeing has publicly stated to the Wall Street Journal (June 25, 91) that Boeing alone has lost seven (7) jets where smoke in the cockpit was a suspected cause."
"When reflecting on Legislative action on this matter I believe it is noteworthy to observe that much time. money and effort is spent on pilot vision. From frequent pilot eye tests, to very careful FAA certification of instruments and other costly equipment and design features, all for a single purpose, to ensure us and the pilots that they can see to safely control and land the plane. In other words the least the public (and the pilots) expect when hundreds of passenger lives are involved, is that they can see to land the plane. The standard and the basic safety requirement is: there shall never be any question of whether there is too much smoke for the pilot to see out the window to be able to land. To have to stick your head out the window (and hope you are not in clouds) to see to fly your plane because you can't see your instruments is unacceptable. Yet, as you note from the accident record (in the accidents with a more fortunate outcome), that is what is now going on. I believe everybody would be worried and alarmed if they found that was the safety standard on the plane they were flying. Even more alarmed, if you were actually facing a serious smoke emergency, only to find your pilots on your plane are unable to see to land! Well, this is the present safety standard. There are no provisions on any plane flying today to cope with dense continuous smoke. Yet, everybody knows that the ability to ensure pilots can see in such serious emergencies is what is absolutely essential and required."
"I believe the attached letter from Captain Otto Rentsch, former Head of Safety with Swissair, says it all (excerpt): 'We were again just reminded of the need to correct this serious safety problem as soon as possible. Last week a Swissair MD-81 made an emergency landing at Munich Airport due to extreme smoke in the cockpit. The smoke was caused by an electric cable bundle on fire in the cockpit. The situation was so serious that the pilots were unable to read the approach charts and the instruments. For example, the speed indication was estimated according to an approximate position of the needle. The Approach Center personnel had to provide assistance to the pilots on frequencies and directions. This level of safety is unquestionably unacceptable. Pilots must be able to see so the can safely control and land their aircraft. Having talked to the Chief of Accident Investigation at the Swiss Department of Transportation, it is clear that skillful piloting and lots of luck was the only difference between the successful emergency landing, versus a catastrophe. A very slight increase in smoke intensity would probably have totally blinded the pilots and might have changed the outcome. (There were 88 passengers and 7 crew on board). The need to ensure pilot vision in such emergencies is very clear. Hopefully the Authorities (and the Airlines) will now act quickly.'"
"It is also important for the Committee to note that European law would in all likelihood have brought criminal charges against the airline, manufacturer and others had the recent accident in Munich ended in tragedy. I have attached a news article from Aviation International News (July 93) - which shows that in similar cases, where known unsafe conditions have not been corrected, employees of the airline, manufacturer and even the Aviation Authorities were indicted on murder, manslaughter and homicide charges. Such actions have been taken several times."
"There isn't a pilot anywhere who would accept or expect to have his or her vision impaired while trying to land. Nor for a moment would he or she question whether they would be able to see to safely land the plane. It is a fundamental safety requirement which is never questioned. Yet, today when the emergency involves dense and continuous smoke, the likelihood is very great that the pilots will be totally blinded by the smoke and unable to see to control the airplane. Hundreds of lives may be needlessly lost in the next avoidable accident."
Tom McSweeny, Director of Aircraft Certification for the FAA:
"In our report, we estimated the costs of mandating either smoke chutes or EVAS. We project that the installation of smoke chutes would cost approximately $23.5 million over a 10-year period if all aircraft were retrofitted. The cost of EVAS, including maintenance and training, would be approximately $70 million. In our view, the costs of either of these technologies clearly outweighs any benefits that might be derived from their installation."
Senator Presser: "Now, Mr. McSweeny, in the Newsweek focus they talk about the cost of equipment. According to this, they will spend roughly $20,000 per plane to install twin units for the pilot and copilot and to train personnel. Do you use a cost-benefit ratio at the FAA, in regard to safety? I mean, is that too expensive."
Letter From CAPT. Ricky R. Davidson, Chairman, Accident Survival
Committee, Air Line Pilot's Association:
December 11, 1992
Federal Aviation Administration
Transport Standards Staff, ANM-110
Renton, WA. 98055-4056
Re. Draft Advisory Circular (AC) 25-9A
"Ladies And Gentleman: The Air Line Pilots Association, representing 42,000 pilots flying for 44 airlines, would like to comment on the proposed changes to the subject AC. We support the proposed changes and make further suggestions for change as outlined below."
"Accident experience supports the change to using continuous smoke in the cockpit smoke evacuation test. While the majority of the cockpit smoke incidents we have reviewed were controllable by disconnecting the damaged system, there appears to be several failure modes where it was not possible to disconnect the damaged system. Therefore, there is a need for the continuous smoke evacuation capability. Examples of this include the leaking of hydraulic lines onto hot components, some
electrical oompartment failures, bombs, illegal cargo, and engine failures."
Sincerely, Capt. Ricky R. Davidson,
Chairman, Accident Survival Committee
| 
