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From: Thomas Murrell Thornhill III
c/o Box 1755 U.S.P.S.
Nevada City, California, U.S.A.
January 28, 2000
To: THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA,
THE COUNTY OF NEVADA,
THE BOARD OF SUPERVISORS FOR THE COUNTY OF NEVADA,
being, in their Official Capacities:
BRUCE CONKLIN, CHAIRPERSON;
SAM DARDICK;
KAREN KNECHT;
ELIZABETH MARTIN;
PETER VAN ZANT.
950 MAIDU AVENUE
NEVADA CITY, CA 95959
Dear Ladies and Gentlemen of THE BOARD OF SUPERVISORS:
Frankly, I am very sorry to have to be here, but this effort seems to be part of that "eternal vigilance" which the framers of the Constitution for the United States of America require from "We, the People".
I wish I could say I was disappointed to learn that Mr. JAMES G. FLAGEOLLET, was leaving us, but I cannot; Mr. FLAGEOLLET still has unfinished business in this county.
Since Mr. FLAGEOLLET is resigning effective February 12/February 17 (depending on which newspaper reports the resignation), that means he is currently still an officer/employee of THE COUNTY OF NEVADA and is subject to THE BOARD's scrutiny.
Consequently, after much thought and soul-searching, I hereby bring before THE BOARD OF SUPERVISORS for THE COUNTY OF NEVADA this Accusation against THE COUNTY COUNSEL, Mr. JAMES G. FLAGEOLLET together with my initial Personnel Complaint against one B. PORTER.
These are both Agenda items and require timely action by THE BOARD.
I initiated this matter by my "Administrative Notice of Personnel Complaint." [copy attached and incorporated herein] against one B. PORTER, a purported SHERIFF's DEPUTY, for his questionable interference with my access to the courthouse for THE COUNTY OF NEVADA and THE OFFICE OF THE CLERK OF COURT, which I sent to THE COUNTY ADMINISTRATOR.
My reasonable expectation was that we [THE COUNTY ADMINISTRATOR, maybe THE COUNTY PERSONNEL MANAGER, THE SHERIFF and maybe his DEPUTY, and I] would sit down for half-an-hour/forty-five minutes or so, and resolve the problem based upon my Complaint as supported by this "Administrative Notice of Applicable Law concerning access to the Courts in California." [attached and incorporated herein] and this "Administrative Notice of Applicable Law concerning Pocketknives in California." [attached and incorporated herein] which I undersood had given me reasonable cause for my complaint.
Since the-then COUNTY ADMINISTRATOR, Mr. ROY PEDERSON, failed to deal with this matter, I hereby remove my first Personnel Complaint concerning B. PORTER, from the consideration of THE COUNTY ADMINISTRATOR and present that matter to THE BOARD.
According to 13 CALJUR 3D (REV) PART 1, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, section 289:
Due process of law requires an orderly proceeding, adapted to the nature of the case, in which the person has an opportunity to be heard, and to defend, enforce, and protect his or her rights. ... Absent a countervailing state interest of overriding significance, the opportunity to be heard must be tailored to the capacities and circumstances of those who are to be heard, and must be at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.But NO..., apparently that informal Process would have been too easy.
My continued research indicates that, according to 66 OPINIONS OF THE CALIFORNIA ATTORNEY GENERAL 163, I am supposed to bring both these matters to the BOARD OF SUPERVISORS as part of THE BOARD's "Duty of Supervision" of its officers/employees (THE GOVERNMENT CODE, section 25303) with THE BOARD sitting in a non-judicial forum as a quasi-judicial body (THE GOVERNMENT CODE, section 27641).
Since I have never done this, and I doubt that THE BOARD OF SUPERVISORS has either, I am attaching and incorporating herein photocopies of the appropriate statutes to serve as a guide for all of us.
Of course, I do not need to remind THE BOARD [based on "Administrative Notice of Applicable Law Concerning The Oath of Office in California." and "Notice of Judicial Duty" which I hand-delivered to THE BOARD on Tuesday, January 11, 2000, and which is herein incorporated] that their individual Oath of Office together with the applicable law, as well as Mr. FLAGEOLLET's Oath of Office, (if any of these required sworn, subscribed, and recorded Oaths actually exist) constitute the Standard for their handling of this matter.
So I am removing this, my second Personnel Complaint, from the consideration of THE COUNTY ADMINISTRATOR, and presenting it to THE BOARD OF SUPERVISORS.
That declaration/Complaint, hereby redirected to THE BOARD, shall embody and constitute this ACCUSATION.
Since the Remedies under THE GOVERNMENT CODE, section 27641, seem to be cumulative, I specifically Reserve the right to proceed under THE GOVERNMENT CODE, sections 3060 through 3074, should that become necessary.
In People v. Superior Court (Hanson) (1980) 110 CalApp.3d 396, 401 [168 Cal.Rptr. 21], the court observed, "The act or omission for which an officer may be removed does not necessarily imply corruption or criminal intent or the commission of a crime in the ordinary sense of that term. [Citations.]" ... The comment occurs in the court's discussion of the different purposes of section 3060 proceedings and criminal actions, where the court concluded those accused under section 3060 are not so similarly situtated with charged felons as to require a preliminary hearing. (Id. at pp. 400-401.) ...From 2 CALJUR 3D (REV) PART A, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, section 361:
... In People v. Tice (1956) 144 Cal.App.2d 750 [301 P.2d 588], ... In upholding the trial court's decision to grant a new trial, the Court of Appeal observed the concept of willfulness under section 3060 includes an element of knowledge: "[M]isconduct for which a public officer may be removed from office on accusation by a grand jury may be either wilful or corrupt. 'Wilfully,' in this connection, 'implies simply a purpose or willingness to commit the act, or make the omission referred to. It does not require an intent to violate law, or to injure another, or to acquire any advantage.' However, 'knowingly' requires 'knowledge that the facts exist which constitute the transgression.' [Citation.]" (144 Cal.App.2d at p. 754.) Steiner v. Superior Court (1996), 50 Cal.App.4th 1771, 1781, 58 Cal.Rptr.2d 668.
However, the constitutional provision vesting the courts with the judicial power in California means that the legislature cannot grant judicial power to a local agency, but such agencies, as with nonconstitutional state agencies, can exercise quasi-judicial powers.From 2 CALJUR 3D (REV) PART A, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, section 363:
Examples of quasi-judicial functions include the following: ... employee displinary proceedings; ...From 2 CALJUR 3D (REV) PART A, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, section 362:
Quasi-judicial powers are indicated by a requirement under the law of a hearing, the taking of evidence, and discretion to make a determination on the evidence. The exercise of quasi-judicial power requires an impartial decision maker.According to 13 CALJUR 3D (REV) PART 1, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, section 288:
Procedural due process requires that a tribunal must have jurisdiction over the parties and over the subject matter of the proceeding. ...I was reading a novel a while ago which described the instinctive behavior of a troop of baboons in massing to protect the weak and injured members of the troop against an outside threat. However, Mr. FLAGEOLLET is not injured, except maybe by his own actions; and I am not the attacker. The most appropriate analogy I could generate is that Mr. FLAGEOLLET figuratively entered my house without permission, dropped a huge load on my living room rug, slipped and fell back in it, and left me to clean up the mess. I know of no lawful reason why I should tolerate, or THE BOARD should condone, such behavior. So I am going to clean up the mess. Besides, we are not baboons; we claim to be rational beings governed by the Rule of Law, so we will abide by the Law.
Due process requires a fair trial before an impartial tribunal. It is a general rule of ethics that no person or body of persons should sit in judgment in cases and proceedings in which they are interested, and violation of this rule by persons presiding over causes triable in ordinary courts of justice amounts to a denial of due process of law to those who are injuriously affected. Thus, a trial before an unbiased judge is essential to due process, and an accused is unconstitutionally deprived of due process of law if his or her liberty and property are subjected to the judgment of a court the judge of which has a direct and substantial pecuniary interest in reaching a conclusion against him or her.
From CALIFORNIA BAR JOURNAL, DECEMBER 1999 (no page number):
DISBARMENTSMy personal opinion is that Mr. FLAGEOLLET stands in the same status as the person referred to immediately above.
{name omitted from courtesy}, 47, of Sun Valley was disbarred Sept. 17, 1999. ...
Judge Madge S. Watai recommended disbarment and wrote that {name omitted} "lacks the ability, or is unwilling, to be honest, straightforward and candid, as required of an officer of the court, and that gives this court serious doubt about her ability to practice law in accordance with the standards of professional conduct."
If The Union Opinion of Wednesday, January 11, 2000:
"Implicit in the district attorney's argument is this: People or corporations which break the law must be punished, no matter whether they are model citizens. Good character or good reputation may reduce the penalty--Ferguson says SPD's good character brought it a reduced fine--but it doesn't allow lawbreakers to escape punishment entirely."accurately reflects THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY's current position, then it seems reasonable for him to apply the laws equally to ALL the citizens of this county, his colleagues not excepted.
For the sake of clarity, I believe we can safely Stipulate that "Judicial officer" equals "officer of the court" equals "Attorney" equals "judge".
" "Attorneys and counselors at law have long been known as 'officers of the court' and as such they have for centuries been required to undergo certain courses of preparation and to assume certain solemn obligations relative to their training, character and conduct as such; and these not only with respect to their relation to the courts, but also with regard to their relation to the public at large. Thus it is that the profession and practice of the law, while in a limited sense a matter of private choice and concern in so far as it relates to its emoluments, is essentially and more largely a matter of public interest and concern, not only from the viewpoint of its relation to administration of civil and criminal law, but also from that of the contacts of its membership with the constituent membership of society at large, whose interest it is to be safeguarded against the ignorances or evil dispositions of those who may be masquerading beneath the cloak of the legal and supposedly learned and upright profession. It is to be noted also that from the body of the legal profession is required, by both the constitution and statutory law of this and most other states, the justices and judges of all courts of record and of certain other subordinate tribunals must be chosen. It is for each and all of these reasons that the membership, character and conduct of those entering and engaging in the legal profession have long been regarded as the proper subject of legislative regulation and control. ..." (State Bar of California v. Superior Court (1929) 207 Cal. 323, 331 [278 P. 432];" quoted in Lebbos v. State Bar (1991), 53 Cal.3d 37, 48-49, 278 Cal.Rptr. 845, 806 P.2d 317.I Declare and Affirm, under the penalties provided for the crime of Perjury in the Law of the United States of America and in the Law of the State of California, that the foregoing is True and Accurate, to the best of my knowledge, belief, and understanding at this time.
Verified by my hand, this Day, the ______________ day of ___________________month in the year of Our Lord, two thousand, in ____________________________city, _______________________county, ____________________________state, United States of America.
Signature: _______________________________________
Thomas Murrell Thornhill III
Attachments:
1. Copy of my "Administrative Notice of Personnel Complaint."
2. Original of "Administrative Notice of Applicable Law concerning access to the Courts in California."
3. Original of "Administrative Notice of Applicable Law concerning Pocketknives in California."
4. Copy of letter from JAMES G. FLAGEOLLET.
5. Copy of my "Administrative Notice of Second Citizen's Complaint against purported Personnel".
6. Photocopies of statutes from West's CALIFORNIA CODES ANNOTATED:
a. GOVERNMENT CODE, section 25303.
b. GOVERNMENT CODE, section 27641.
c. GOVERNMENT CODE, sections 3060 through 3074.
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