Legal notice that vehicular travel in California is a right.

Declarant, ___________________________________________, is a competent witness over the age of 18 years, has personal knowledge of the facts stated herein, and does Solemnly state that:

1.a. I am a natural born, adult white Man, one of the people of the United States of America and one of the people of California.

1.b. I am not a trained or licensed Attorney; of necessity, I am acting at all times within my fundamental right to defend my life, liberty, and property as set out in CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTION (2001), Art. 1, Sec. 1 (http://www.leginfo.ca.gov./.const/.article_1 [as of April 23, 2004]):

All people are by nature free and independent and have inalienable rights. Among these are enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy.

3. The Supreme Court of the United States has held (emphasis added):

The ordinary traveler, whether on foot or in a vehicle passes to and fro along the streets, and his use and occupation thereof are temporary and shifting. The space he occupies one moment he abandons the next to be occupied by any other traveler. This use is common to all members of the public, and it is a use open equally to citizens of other states with those of the state in which the street is situate.
City of St. Louis v. Western Union Telegraph Co. (1892), 148 U.S. 92, 37 L. Ed. 380, 13 S. Ct. 485.

First. It is well established law that the highways of the state are public property; that their primary and preferred use is for private purposes; and that their use for purposes of gain is special and extraordinary, which generally at least, the legislature may prohibit or condition as it sees fit. Packard v. Banton, 264 U. S. 140, 144, 68 L. ed. 596, 607, 44 S. Ct. 257, and cases cited; Frost & F. Trucking Co. v. Railroad Commission, 271 U. S. 583, 592, 70 L. ed. 1101, 1104, 1105, 47 A. L. R. 457, 46 S. Ct. 605; Hodge Drive-It-Yourself Co. v. Cincinnati, 284 U. S. 335, 337, 76 L. ed. 323, 326, 52 S. Ct. 144; Johnson Transfer & Freight Lines v. Perry (D.C.) 47 F.(2d) 900, 902; Southern Motorways v. Perry (D.C.) 39 F.(2d) 145, 147; People's Transit Co. v. Henshaw (C. C. A. 8th) 20 F.(2d) 87, 89; Weksler v. Collins, 317 Ill. 132, 138,139, 147 N.E. 797; Maine Motor Coaches v. Public Utilities Commission, 125 Me. 63, 65, 130 Atl. 866.
Stephenson v. Binford (1932), 287 U.S. 251, 264, 53 S.Ct. 181, 77 L.Ed. 288, 87 A.L.R. 721.

The terms "public highway" are most general in their meaning, and include all kinds of thoroughfares in which the public have a right of way or passage.
Parsons v. The City and County of San Francisco (1863), 23 Cal. 426, 463.

THOROUGHFARE. The term means, according to its derivation, a street or passage through which one can fare, (travel;) that is, a street or highway affording an unobstructed exit at each end into another street or public passage. If the passage is closed at one end, admitting no exit there, it is called a "cul de sac." Mankato v. Warren, 20 Minn. 150 (Gil. 128); Wiggins v. Tallmadge, 11 Barb. (N.Y.) 462; Morris v. Blunt, 49 Utah, 243, 161 P. 1127, 1130; Burnham v. Holmes, 137 Me. 183, 16 A.2d 476, 477.

The privilege which one person, or particular description of persons, may have of passing over the land of another in some particular line is termed a right of way.
It is an incorporeal hereditament (3 Kent's Com. 419; Washburn on Easements, 215; Boyce v. Brown, 7 Barb. 80), an easement which does not necessarily divest the owner of the fee of the land, and, for all other purposes except the servitude or use as a way, he owns it, and may have his action for an injury to his residuary interest as fully as he would be entitled to were it all his own. (Gidney v. Earl, 12 Wend. 98.
A right of way may be public or private.
Public ways, as applied to ways by land, are usually termed "highways" or "public roads," and are such ways as every citizen has a right to use. (3 Kent's Com. 32.)
(emphasis added) Kripp v. Curtis (1886), 71 Cal. 62, 63-64.

HEREDITAMENTS. Things capable of being inherited, be it corporeal or incorporeal, real, personal, or mixed, and including not only lands and everything thereon, but also heirlooms, and certain furniture which, by custom, may descend to the heir together with the land....
At common law, corporeal hereditaments were physical objects, comprehended under the term land, and were said to lie in livery, while incorporeal hereditaments existed only in contemplation of law, were said to lie in grant and were sffiliated with chattel interests. National Supply Co. v. McLeod, 116 Kan. 477, 227 P. 350.

The jury were informed by that instruction, that while the defendant has the right to run its cars upon a public street, where the public have an equal right to travel, and where it is presumed they will travel, It "must exercise such care and precaution for the purpose of avoiding accidents, endangering property or persons, as a reasonable prudence would suggest and which it was in their [its] power to employ." [pp. 426-427]
. . .
The company, however, as we understand the law, has only an equal right with the traveling public to the use of the street, with some few exceptions not material to the question, which arise entirely from the fact that the cars are designed to run only on the railroad track, such that when an oridinary vehicle meets a car on its track, it must give way to the car. [p. 428]
Shea v. Potrero & Bay View R.R. Co. (1872), 44 Cal. 414, 426-428.

But I am also of the opinion that the right of the plaintiff to have access to and use of the street did not depend in any degree upon the fact that it had been planked, so that it might conveniently be used. A street is not the less a street because it may need excavation, filling, or piling and planking, and the public have a right to its use whatever may be its condition;...
(Rhodes, concurring) Schulte v. North Pacific Transportation Co., (1875), 50 Cal. 592.

"Public highways," as defined by the code, "are roads, streets, alleys, lanes . . . . laid out or erected as such by the public, or if laid out and erected by others, dedicated or abandoned to the public." (Pol. Code, sec. 2618.)
A highway thus created continues to exist until it is vacated or abandoned by order of the board of supervisors of the county, or by operation of law or judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction. (Pol. Code, secs. 2619, 2621.)
Babcock v. Welsh (1886), 71 Cal. 400, 402.

In the present case if it can be said that the state holds the easement to all the highways within its boundaries, which under our statutes cannot, we think, be upheld, still, if it does so hold, it is as the representative of the people, and in trust for the objects of their creation, viz., to enable the people to pass and repass over the such roads at will, and such easements are not held in the same right as the title of the state to lands which it has purchased.
People v. County of Marin (1894), 103 Cal. 223, 231-232.

Being between the tracks of an electric railroad upon a public street is not negligence per se. The street is for the use of the public, although the car, which can be operated only on the track, has the better right to that part of the thoroughfare, to which pedestrians must yield when necessary. The rights of the company operating street cars are otherwise not superior to those of persons who may be walking in the street. (See Shea v. Potrero & Bay View R.R. Co., 44 Cal. 428; Clark v. Bennett, 123 Cal. 279, [55 Pac. 908]; Scott v. San Bernardino Valley Traction Co., 152 Cal. 610, [93 Pac. 677].)
Lawyer v. Los Angeles Pacific Co. (1911), 161 Cal. 53, 56.

The streets of a municipality are for the use of the traveling public and the right of a street-car company is only to use it in common with the public. The fact that the company has been granted a right to lay tracks and operate cars along the streets gives it no exclusive right to travel even over that portion of a street covered by its track. Other vehicles have a right to travel over the entire street, including the space between the tracks. Nor is this right restricted to the times when other portions of the street may be crowded or in bad condition. Nor is a traveler in doing so in any sense a trespasser. As a member of the public he is entitled as a matter of right to use the entire street subject to the limitation that, as the use of the street by the car company is confined to its tracks, a traveler may not unnecessarily interfere with or obstruct a car in its movement thereon.
O'Connor v. United Railroads of San Francisco (1914), 168 Cal. 43, 48.

As to foot passengers, the old common-law freedom of use of the king's highway has not been modified in this state by any positive enactment. So that it still remains the law that foot passengers have the right to use and traverse the highway at all its points, being chargeable only for the exercise of a due amount of care, which due amount of care, in its quantum, is governed by the circumstances attending the use which the pedestrian actually makes. Thus, in this state, even in populous streets of cities, pedestrians are not restricted to the crossings in traversing the street, but may cross it at any point. And the same is true of their right to walk along the roadbed of a highway.
Raymond v. Hill (1914), 168 Cal. 473, 482.

"The streets of a city belong to the people of the state, and every citizen of the state has a right to the use thereof, subject to legislative control .... The right of control over the street traffic is an exercise of a part of the sovereign power of the state .... " (Ex parte Daniels (1920) 183 Cal. 636, 639 [192 P. 442, 21 A.L.R. 1172].){fnt 3} "'The use of highways for purposes of travel and transportation is not a mere privilege, but a common and fundamental right, of which the public and individuals cannot rightfully be deprived ... [A]ll persons have an equal right to use them for the purposes of travel by proper means, and with due regard for the corresponding rights of others.'" (Escobedo v. State of California (1950) 35 Cal.2d 870, 875-876 [222 P.2d 1],{fnt. 4}, quoting 25 Am.Jur., Highways, § 163, p. 457; italics added.)
Rumford v. City of Berkeley (1982), 31 Cal.3d 545, 549-550, 183 Cal.Rptr. 73, 645 P.2d 124.

[quoting] Ex parte Dickey (W. Va.), 85 S. E. 781, wherein the court also said: "... The right of a citizen to travel upon the highway and transport his property thereon, in the ordinary course of life and business, differs radically and obviously from that of one who makes the highway his place of business and uses it for personal gain, in the running of a stage coach or omnibus. The former is the usual and ordinary right of a citizen, a common right, a right common to all, while the latter is special, unusual, and extraordinary. As to the former, the extent of legislative power is that of regulation; but as to the latter, its power is broader, the right may be wholly denied, or it may be permitted to some and denied to others, because of its extraordinary nature. This distinction, elementary and fundamental in character is recognized by all the authorities."
Matter of Application of Lee (1915), 28 Cal.App. 719, 726-727.

Nonetheless, the right of the citizen to drive on a public street with freedom from police interference, unless he is engaged in suspicious conduct associated in some manner with criminality, is a fundamental constitutional right which must be protected by the courts.
People v. Horton (1971), 14 Cal.App.3d 930, 934, 92 Cal.Rptr. 666.

"Cities of the first class are hereby authorized to require residents of such city to pay a tax for the privilege of keeping and using wheeled vehicles, except bicycles, but such tax shall be appropriated and used exclusively for repairing and improving the streets of such city." Acts of 1901, p. 113.
. . .
The act, we think, plainly shows that there was no intention to authorize a tax upon vehicles or other property. It authorizes only a tax upon the privilege of keeping and using vehicles upon the streets of the city, and it requires that this tax shall be used exclusively for repairing and maintaining the streets of the city.
. . .
The next question presented is whether the legislature has the power to authorize cities to impose a tax upon the privilege of driving vehicles upon the public streets. The contention on this point is that a resident of a city has a right to drive upon the public streets, and that the right to do so is not a privilege that can be taxed. It is no doubt true that the city could not impose a tax upon the privilege of using the streets for driving vehicles upon them without legislative permission to do so. The right to drive on the public streets could not be treated as a privilege but for the act of the legislature making it one. But the streets belong to the public, and are under the control of the legislature. Elliot on Roads (2d Ed.) § 21. It is within the power of the legislature not only to make needful regulations concerning the use of the public roads and streets, but also to provide means by which they may be improved and kept in repair. In order to effect that purpose, the legislature has, in effect, declared the use of the streets by wheeled vehicles to be a privilege, and has authorized the city to tax the privilege. We know of no limitation on the power of the legislature that prevents it from passing such an act, and thus authorizing the imposition of a reasonable tax for that purpose. "Everything," says Judge Cooley, "to which the legislative power extends may be the subject of taxation, whether it be person or property, or possession, franchise, or privilege, or occupation, or right. Nothing but express constitutional limitation upon legislative authority can exclude anything to which the authority extends from the grasp of the taxing power, if the legislature in its discretion shall at any time select it for revenue purposes." Cooley, Tax. (2d Ed.), p. 5. Again, he says: "The power to impose taxes is one so unlimited in force and so searching in extent that the courts scarcely venture to declare that it is subject to any restrictions whatever, except such as rest in the discretion of the authority which exercises it. It reaches to every trade or occupation; to every object of industry, use, or enjoyment; to every species of possession; and it imposes a burden which, in case of failure to discharge it, may be followed by seizure and sale or confiscation of property." Cooley, Const. Lim. (6th Ed.), 587.
These statements of the law by the learned author are well supported by decisions of our highest courts. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 4 Wheat. (U.S.) 316, 418, 4 L. Ed. 579; Kirtland v. Hotchkiss, 100 U.S. 491, 25 L. Ed. 558; Youngblood v. Sexton, 32 Mich. 406.
Fort Smith v. Scruggs (1902), 70 Ark. 549, 69 S.W. 679, 680-681, 1902 Ark. LEXIS 114.

It is important to consider what rights and privileges the owner of a motor-vehicle secures under the license issued by the State highway department. Section one of the Act of 1909 [Act of April 27, 1909, P.L. 265] expressly provides that motor vehicles shall not be operated or driven upon the public highways until they are duly registered and licensed. Section 13 defines the privilege to be enjoyed by the owner of a motor-vehicle thus licensed. Among other things it is provided, that: "The operator of any motor vehicle shall have the same rights and right to use all public streets or roads as the driver of any other vehicle, or any other user of the said street or highway possess." Motor-vehicles are not to be operated upon the streets and highways of the Commonwealth until they are registered and licensed as the act directs. When thus licensed the owners are given the same rights as those possessed by "the driver of any other vehicle, or any other user" of the public highways. The plain intention of the legislature was to give the owners of motor-vehicles rights equal with, but not greater than, those enjoyed by the drivers of wagons, carriages and other vehicles upon the public highways. This certainly means that when an automobile, or truck, or other motor-vehicle, is registered and licensed under the Act of 1909, the owner has the right to make use of the streets and highways of the Commonwealth in like manner as the driver of a carriage, or wagon, or truck, or other vehicle, drawn by horses, makes use of such streets and highways. Nor do we question the right of the owner of any kind of motor-vehicle thus licensed to make use of the streets and highways in every part of the Commonwealth for the usual and customary uses of motor-vehicles. The driver of a carriage, or wagon, or other vehicle drawn by horses may be subjected to a license fee when engaged in a particular kind of business which requires police regulation and subjects the borough authoriites to additional expenses as a protection to the public.
. . .
We agree with the learned court below that the license fees charged in the present case were imposed, not as a tax on persons or property, but as a police regulation relating to the business of carrying passengers for pay.
Borough of Applewood v. Dosch (1913), 239 Pa. 479, 483-485, 86 Atl. 1070, 1913 Pa. LEXIS 594.