Melberg, Hans O.: The information required for perfect prediction

[Note for bibliographic reference: Melberg, Hans Olav (1996),The Cultural Approach to Russian Politics: How Reliable?, http://www.oocities.org/hmelberg/papers/961109.htm]

The Cultural Approach
to Russian Politics:

How Reliable?

Table of Contents

1 Introduction
1.1 General
1.2 Specific

2. Definitions
2.1 The destructive phase I - What should not be included
--- 2.2 The destructive phase II - Distinctions and purposes
--- 2.3 The constructive phase - What should be included?

3 The cultural trait - How to convincingly demonstrate the existence a cultural trait?
3.1 Giving examples
--- 3.1.1 Qualitative examples
--- 3.1.2 Quantitative evidence
--- 3.1.3 Which is best, quantitative or qualitative evidence?
--- 3.1.4 The lessons
3.2 Demonstrating the cause of the cultural trait in question
--- 3.2.1 Conventional causes and the problem of transmission
--- 3.2.2 Internal psychological mechanisms as a cause of political cultures
3.3 Conclusion

4. The link - How to convincingly demonstrate the link between a cultural trait and its claimed consequences
4.1 Historical correlations as proof
4.2 Providing causal mechanisms to justify the link
4.3 Conclusion

5 Changability - Is it possible to change cultures intentionally?
5.1 A case study - The aim and the effort
5.2 Was it a success?

6 Conclusion

References
Endnotes

1 Introduction

1.1 General

Some questions cannot be decisively settled and the search for a key variable which explains history may be such a question. Max Weber, in his book The Protestant Ethic, argued for the importance of culture, while Karl Marx in Das Kapital, argued that technological change was the main causal force behind historical change. The academic community has still not agreed on who, if any, is right. 1 It would thus be excessively optimistic, not to say arrogant, to argue that I could answer the question. Nevertheless, within the limits of one paper it is possible to evaluate some of the weak points of one approach as it has been used in one country. It is also possible to give some ideas on how to improve the reliability. This is what I have tried to do.

1.2 Specific

Zbigniew Brzezinski, a well-known authority on Soviet affairs, has claimed that "Unlike the Russians, the Chinese people have a talent for entrepreneurship." 2 This assertion is then used to predict that it will be difficult to establish a market economy in Russia. Brzezinski's quote is only one example of a general class of arguments - hereafter termed the cultural approach - which attempts to explain and predict the course of history using cultural traits as explanatory variables. Another member of this class, is the argument that Russia cannot become a stable democracy because of their authoritarian culture. As Walter Laqueur writes: "The Russians never respected and loved democracy as they respected and loved autocracy". 3 A third example, is Francis Fukuyama claim that the Soviet Union collapsed because "the imperatives of industrial maturity eventually forced a breakdown of the political system" 4 i.e. the political system was not compatible with the culture created by industrialism. Given the prominent existence of this approach one is entitled to ask the question: How reliable is the cultural approach?

The answer, of course, varies from case to case. However, in general a reliable cultural explanation or prediction have to satisfy the following three questions. First, we have to ask how well the trait in question is established. Do the Russians really have less commercial talent than other nations? Second, even if we can prove that a certain trait is distinctive, we have to question the reliability of the link between the trait and its claimed consequences. Is it really true that the egalitarian culture of the Russians prevents the creation of a market economy? Third, even if we can give convincing answers to the first two questions, we still cannot predict that the attempt to create democracy and market economy will fail since the future culture may be different from today's culture. Thus, the third question concerns the degree to which a culture can be changed. These three questions - the believability of the claimed trait, the reliability of presumed link and the changeability of culture - indicates the structural frame of this paper. Within this frame I shall focus mainly, but not exclusively, on three issues which correspond to the quotes in the introduction: the cultural barriers to a market economy, the cultural barriers to democracy and the relationship between culture and political stability.

My own arguments relating to the three general questions are as follows. First, the literature I have read indicates that the standard of proof in all three categories is often low. This is a strong claim which I hope to justify by giving numerous examples. Second, the low standard only partly reflects inherent problems with the cultural approach. I believe it is possible in principle to give convincing answers to the first question, but less so to the second question. I shall also suggest some improvements which makes the arguments more convincing. Thus, the cultural approach should not be judged guilty by association i.e. by the fact that many have used it speculatively. Finally, I believe that many problems originate with imprecise and wrong definitions of culture. This explains and justifies the detailed discussion of the definition of culture to which I now turn. Hence, the following should not be read as a preamble or a preparation to the real critique. Rather, the problems in defining culture is itself a part of the discussion of the weak points in the cultural approach.

2. Definitions

In order to answer a question one must define the terms involved to avoid confusing the reader. Judged by this the students of culture and its sub-field - political culture - must be thoroughly confused individuals. In 1952 Kroeber and Kluckhohn presented 164 definitions of culture and the number has surely increased over the past forty years. 5 The great multiplicity of the definitions raises the question of whether it is possible at all to have a meaningful discussion involving the concept of culture. Clearly, if we all mean different things when we use the term, we are in danger of misunderstanding each other. Fortunately, the state of affairs is not quite as depressing. The definitions, though lexicographically different, are often semantically overlapping since they use different terms to capture the same meaning, and mutually inclusive since the definitions often present different but compatible aspects of the term culture. However, even if we adjust for this we are still left with some incompatible definitions. In the following I shall first focus on the incompatible definitions to find which variables I do not believe should be included in the definition of political culture. Specifically, I shall argue that behavioral variables should be excluded. Next, I shall discuss some commonly noted problems in defining culture. Finally, building on the two first sections, I shall attempt to create a definition wide enough to capture the many compatible meanings of the concept, but precise enough to be useful.

2.1 The destructive phase I - What should not be included

As a starting point I shall use Stephen White's definition of political culture. According to him "Political culture may be defined as the attitudinal and behavioural matrix within which the political system is located." 6 Initially, this may seems as a perfectly acceptable definition. It is certainly wide enough to encompass many of the other definitions. Yet, it is precisely its wide scope which makes it a weak definition. To understand this it is useful to quote a list of essential characteristics of the Russian political culture as identified by White using his definition. According to White the "essential features" of the "'traditional Russian' political culture" are:

"Representative institutions ... were weakly articulated and ineffective; levels of popular participation were low; and governing style was centralized, bureaucratic and authoritarian. Popular political attachments, in consequence, were highly personalized; and political knowledge and experience, outside an extremely limited circle, was virtually non-existent. The scope of government was unusually broad: it extended not only to those spheres of life in which other governments of the time were active such as public order and taxation, but also into economic entrepreneurship and control, religion and morals, and the detailed administration of justice. It was based, finally, upon a society of highly 'traditional', gemeinschaft character, in which there was strong traditions of group solidarity together with its converse, a suspicion of outsiders; a greater degree of reliance upon face-to-face relations than upon anonymous procedures; and in which it was accepted that every aspect of the life of the community, from agriculture and military service to beliefs and behavior, should be subject to the regulation of the community as a whole." 7

One might discuss whether all these features really were distinctively Russian, but that is not the issue here. 8 The important point is that White's list of essential features of the traditional Russian political culture includes a very wide group of traits. Some of the traits are features of an individual's belief system (such as suspicion of foreigners); Some are features of an individual's value system (group solidarity); Some may be characterized as a feature of individual behavior (low political participation); and finally some are characterizations of society as a whole (degree of centralization, weak representative institutions). The question is then whether it is useful to produce such a list of diverse features and call it political culture.

First, I would argue that it is not useful to include characterizations of societies as a whole (or behavioral variables) in the definition of political culture because these are precisely the variables we want to explain using culture as the independent variable. For example, a highly centralized state is a feature of the political system which we want to explain. One possible approach is then to explain the degree of centralization in terms of the authoritarian culture of the Russians. However, if characterizations of society as a whole is included in the definition of culture then political culture simply becomes a way of redescribing the political system and not an explanatory approach. 9 In short, the definition confuses the explanandum and the explananans. 10

To examine a second argument against the inclusion of behavioral variables we may use a concrete example, such as electoral participation. The statistical record shows that there has been a rise in electoral participation in the USSR and White consequently concludes that there has been a change in political culture. 11 However, when asked why there was an increase in electoral participation one part of the explanation must be that the cost of non-voting had increased after the Communists came to power. Non-voting was an obvious and visible sign of dissent and it was likely to adversely affect your career or your application for a larger flat. In this way the increased electoral participation can be explained as the result of rational adjustment by individuals. We now have two statements. On the one hand, that the increase was caused by rational adaptation to new circumstances. On the other hand, White states that the increase represents a change in the political culture, regardless of its causes. One might argue that these two statements are compatible and a useful way of looking at the political world. However, as I shall argue below, the inclusion strongly weakens the appeal of cultural explanations because it reduces its testability.

Falsifiability requires testability against rival theories which might explain the same phenomenon. In our example, the increase in the electoral participation could be explained either by a change in culture (attitudes) or a change in the reward structure. Empirical investigation could then be used in an attempt to falsify one of the explanatory strategies. To include behavior in the definition of political culture makes this kind of falsification impossible because the change in behavior then becomes by definition equal to a change in culture. Hence, to avoid that political culture becomes just another way of describing the system and to make the approach falsifiable, we should exclude behavioral variables from the definition of political culture. 12

One might argue that the exclusion of behavior means that we ignore a valuable source of information about culture. This argument is misguided because the attitudinal definition does not prevent us from using behavior as an indicator of beliefs. Of course, the inference is not simple since the same kind of behavior may indicate different beliefs. When a Soviet citizen joined the Communist Party it could be because he really believed in the ideals of the Party, but it could also be that he joined the party to promote his career. In other cases it is easier to reveal beliefs from behavior, such as the reasonably safe assertion that those who went to Church in the Soviet Union tended to believe in God. Thus, the analysis of behavior is still important to reveal the nature of a culture, but behavioral patterns are themselves not a part of the culture.

2.2 The destructive phase II - Distinctions and purposes

The definition of culture depends on our aim. This means that a definition which is wrong on one reading may be right on another because the authors have different conceptions of the very purpose of the term. For example Robert Tucker argues that the aim of the concept is not to explain political events causally. As he writes:

"Might not the central value of the concept like that of political culture be that it assists us to take our bearings in the study of the political life of a society, to focus on what is happening or not happening, to describe and analyze and order many significant data, and to raise fruitful questions for thought and research - without explaining anything?" 13

I find this approach problematic, but it is both unnecessary and impossible to follow up on this argument here. Unnecessary, because the critique in this paper is limited to those who use culture in a causal sense; Impossible, because the arguments would make this paper go well beyond the maximum length. Suffice to say that I believe an understanding of a historical event ultimately must be based on causal and intentional analyses. It is then false to create a dichotomy between hermeneutic interpretation and explanation because hermeneutic analysis (the analysis of intentions) is precisely the tool used to explain events. 14

Even if we focus on definitions of political culture that aim to explain, we might still ask exactly which culture we think is causally important. Is it the dominant culture or the sub-culture? Is it the real culture or the ideal culture? 15 Definitions of political culture have been criticized for not taking these distinctions into account. 16 Although the criticism is valid, it indicates two common academic phenomena: the flogging of dead horses and the destruction of straw men. It is to attack a straw man because no-one really argued that all the individuals in a country had all the same cultural traits. For example, in one of the early uses of the cultural approach (then called the national character approach), Henry Dicks spoke of "the modal Russian personality", not the Russian personality. 17 Moreover, even if some people initially made the mistake of assuming that cultures were monolithic, they were soon corrected 18 - and there should be no need to continue to point out an obvious mistake. Nevertheless, even in 1995 we continue to hear the critique that "The mainstream approach to political culture ... does not allow for the simultaneous existence of two competing political cultures within a single nationality." 19 Personally, I find this target rather lacking in life and I shall not spend more time on it in this paper.

A much more interesting and less noted problem, is that of defining cultural traits using essentially contestable terms. 20 An author may, for example, argue that the Russian culture is characterized by a strong desire for justice. The problem is that justice is itself a very ambiguous concept. Are we talking about end-state justice or equal opportunities? If we are talking about equality of something, then equality of what. 21 Unless the definition of culture forces us to be precise on this, it is likely to be of little value since the trait "desire for justice" can be used to predict a wide variety of conflicting outcomes depending on how we interpret justice. 22

2.3 The constructive phase - What should be included?

I have so far noted some mistakes, distinctions and common problems which should be taken into account when one defines culture. Armed with the lessons from the previous sections, I shall now make an attempt to construct my own definition of culture. My general approach is to seek culture inside the heads of individuals - in the aims, beliefs and norms that shape their actions. If one group of people on average exhibit a stable difference from another in some of these variables, then we have a cultural difference which may be important to explain why their political and economic situation is different. The following tries to make these statements more precise.

There are many factors which shape a decision to act, but two of the most commonly invoked variables are beliefs and aims. For example, my decision to go to the movies may depend upon my aims and my beliefs. If my aim is to meet a friend and I believe he is likely to go, I will go. This may all sound very obvious, but this kind of frame allows us to categorize different kinds of beliefs and aims which correspond to different cultural traits. Starting with preferences we find that some cultural traits fit naturally in this category i.e. as a desire for something which is thought to be a good in itself. The claimed Russian desire for equality is an example of such a preference. The supposed utopian, messianic and expansionist traits may also be classified as a preference (for more land, a bigger role in world politics).

Under the heading beliefs we may distinguish at least three types which each correspond to claimed cultural traits. First, the assertion that the Russians are more pessimistic about the nature of man than other cultures, 23 fits under the general category of beliefs about how things are (inherent properties). Not all beliefs are of this category, for example some beliefs are about causal connections i.e. how things are related. For example, assume Communism is defined as a life in material and spiritual abundance. The question is then how this state of affairs can be created and the answer may differ from culture to culture depending on their beliefs about how things are causally related. Some have argued that the culture of the Russians predisposed people to give authoritarian answers: That the best means to achieve abundance is through centralized government actions. 24 Other cultures, for example the American culture, may have the opposite tendency: to believe that the best means to create material and spiritual abundance is a system of decentralized and private actions. A third category of beliefs, is beliefs about beliefs (strategic beliefs). For example, I may believe that you believe that I will not give up power even if I loose an election. Once again it is sometimes claimed that the Russians tend to have pessimistic beliefs of this type - for instance that they have a tendency to believe in conspiracies 25 - which in turn means that they lack the interpersonal trust that is necessary to make democracy work.

I have so far defined culture as the dominant preferences and beliefs (of different kinds) of a group of people. However, beliefs and preferences are not the only possible variables that can explain actions. Sociologists, as opposed to economists, frequently use norms to explain why people act as they do. Norms are here defined as rules about behavior which are not outcome-oriented. 26 For example, "Do X" (Be honest) or "If X, then do Y" ("If you receive a gift, then you have to give a gift in return"). Different cultures have different kinds of norms and this, in turn, makes it necessary to include norms in the definition of political culture. For instance, Fritz Gaenslen argues that the Russian culture is characterized by authoritarian norms, such as "Do not question the decision of superiors in public". 27 Another example of a supposed typical Russian norm - strongly emphasized by Edward Keenan in his Muscovite Political Folkways - is that of secrecy as expressed in the saying: "Do not carry rubbish out of the hut". 28

Even with the inclusion of norms some traits seem to fall outside my definition of culture. One example is Lotman and Uspenskij's characterization of the Russian culture as bipolar. 29 The bipolarity is not a preference, nor is it a belief and it is certainly not a norm. If it is none of these, then what is it? In my opinion the trait is best characterized as a statement of how the preferences, beliefs and norms of the Russians change over time. Lotman and Uspenskij's basic argument is that the nature of these changes are discrete (not gradual or linear) and extreme. Thus, whereas the Russians previously believed that central planning was a good means to achieve an end, today they may believe the diametrically opposite - that an extreme free market economy is the best means to achieve the desired aim. In this way one may attempt to show that Russian preferences, beliefs and norms change according to the theories of Lotman and Uspenskij's.

We now have a clearer picture of what culture is. A culture may be different from another in that it has different goals, beliefs (factual, causal and strategic) and norms. These may be called first order cultural differences. In addition to this, there may be differences in how the goals, beliefs and norms change (the nature of the change and its frequency). These may be called second order cultural differences. Lastly, to avoid confusing differences in culture with temporary differences in public opinion, the term cultural should be restricted to those differences that are relatively stable over time. The reader should note that I do not claim that this is the definitive definition of culture. There may be problems in distinguishing between cultural beliefs and other beliefs and there may be some variables missing. 30 For example, if the average degree of weakness of will is different in one group from another this may be a cultural difference (or it may be the expression of such a difference), but it does not fit in my framework. Yet, although my definition of political culture is not complete, I believe it is adequate to enable further discussion since it captures most of the claimed cultural traits I have come across in the literature.

3. The cultural trait
- How to convincingly demonstrate the existence a cultural trait?

If we are faced with a statement such as the Russians "have a deeply held cultural fear of innovation" 31, we must ask why we should believe that this is the case. There are many examples in which this is poorly done, or even ignored - as I shall demonstrate. However, it is not impossible in principle to give convincing arguments as I shall also attempt to show. These arguments can take two main forms. First, we may give examples which demonstrate the existence of the cultural trait in question. Second, we may give a causal story which makes it plausible to believe that the trait exists. 32

3.1 Giving examples

Examples may be of two kinds, qualitative or quantitative. The qualitative method focuses on one or a few number of telling examples which are interpreted in depth. The quantitative method is based on statistical analysis of a large number of cases.33

3.1.1 Qualitative examples

The conventional qualitative method of proving that the Russians have a certain culture is to give examples of Russian behavior or written and spoken words. The specific source is often a poem, an excerpt from a work of fiction or simply a quote from a person of influence. Sometimes the more imaginative scholars use jokes, anecdotes, proverbs, name-giving practices, linguistic and semantic observations, the study of heroes and paintings and many other forms of human expression to prove a certain cultural trait. For example, to demonstrate that the Russians were not brainwashed into believing everything the official media claimed one might point to the following Russian joke: A daycare teacher is telling the children: "In the Soviet Union everyone eats well, dresses well, lives in fine apartments and all children have a lot of beautiful toys" Hearing this, one little boy begins to whimper: "Wanna ... wanna ... wanna go to the Soviet Union!"34

Given the abundance of possible sources one might believe that there is enough evidence to prove the that the Russians have a certain cultural trait. However, there are several reasons to be skeptical. First of all, the abundance of evidence is of little help is it is not used. For example, Barner-Barry and Hody in their book The Politics of Change repeatedly relies on cultural traits to explain and predict the course of Russian history while at the same time they provide scant, if any, evidence to convince the readers that the Russians really have the cultural traits they claim or that the claimed traits are distinctively Russian. In their book the typical Russian is portrayed as risk-averse, incapable of understanding politics in terms of institutions, strongly fearful of chaos and anarchy and always seeking to annihilate opposition rather than agree to compromises. 35 These claims may or may not be true, but with the evidence they provide we simply do not know. 36 We do not know because their evidence is largely build on quotes from "experts", but that is only slightly more convincing than buying a second copy of a newspaper to check a fact you read in the first copy. 37 Quotes from well established authorities can never replace primary evidence, especially when we upon further research find that the experts also disagree.

Second, it is precisely the abundance of evidence which makes it difficult to prove a cultural trait. One author may use a poem to prove that the Russians have a collectivist culture. Another may use proverbs to show that they are individualistic. Even worse, we may both use the same poem or painting but still reach different conclusions because the evidence requires interpretation. An example of this kind of problem is Per-Arne Bodin, a Swedish author, who uses Malevitj's black square to prove rather sweeping conclusions about Russian history. As he writes "Malevitj's black square contains both a European revolt against the whole bourgeoisie civilization and a Russian longing for God in the darkness ..." 38 In short, it seems to me a little doubtful whether a picture of a black square can be used to prove the nature of Russian culture.

Bodin may give several counterarguments: That he used the black square only as an illustration (not as a proof) of a cultural trait; That he provides much more convincing evidence elsewhere in the book; That I have unfairly singled out one over-interpretation from a book of more than one hundred pages. My reply would be that since Bodin does not present other kinds of evidence (quantitative data), he necessarily relies on the illustrations in order to convince. On the second and third point, I have to admit that he is more convincing in other places, but the problem I have pointed out is not isolated. 39

Another example of a trait which is insufficiently established, is the bipolar nature of the Russian mind. One might argue that Lotman and Uspenskij provide a wide variety of evidence, including a large number of literary quotes, to convince the reader that the Russians really have a bipolar mind. The problem, however, is that Lotman and Uspenskij's evidence can selected by simply searching for examples which confirm the initial argument. Evidence of this kind is less worth than evidence which is found by a methodology which does not allow the researcher to select the confirming instances. A second objection to Lotman and Uspenskij is that their research is largely focused on Russia. Thus, we do not know whether the Russians are more bipolar than others. This, of course, is required if we want to use the cultural traits to explain why Russia's history is different from the rest of the world.

The examples of insufficiently established and contradictory claims about the Russian culture can be multiplied. Against Brzezinski's claim in the introduction that the Russians culture is low on commercial talent, we may quote a review by Paul Gregory in which he writes that "Samuel Barron shows that, despite this obstacle, indigenous Russian entrepreneurs of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries did a remarkably good job of seeking out profit opportunities." 40 Against Walter Laqueur's claim that Russians love authoritarian rule more than democracy, we may cite Jeffrey Hahn who argues that there is "little support for the argument that Russian political culture today is dominated by the autocratic traditions of the past. Rather, the patterns that emerge suggest that Russian political thinking comes closer to what is found in Western Industrial Democracies." 41 Against Vera Tolz' claim that the Russians believe "a political opponent should be crushed rather than listened to and accommodated", we could cite Gerhard Simon who writes that "What has evolved in Russia is a consensus culture. Political decisions are to be taken in consensus". 42 In short, there are many examples of how we may arrive at contradictory claims about culture if we rely on simply giving a few quotes. 43

Given the above mentioned problems with the qualitative approach - the discriminate and interpretive use of evidence and the many examples of contradictory claims by experts - we might turn to the quantitative approach to see whether it is more reliable.

3.1.2 Quantitative evidence

To examine whether the Russians really desire a strong man above democracy, one might design a questionnaire designed to reveal this kind of preference structure. For example, Finifter and Mickiewicz found that 20% of the Russians in their survey "believed that public order was more important than free speech". 44 By using survey evidence of this kind one may hope to reduce the problem of discretion and interpretation. At least it is possible to get the opposite result of what one expects when one uses surveys, unlike when one selects a literary or academic quote to support your own argument. Unfortunately, there are also many well-known problems with surveys.

A survey has to be comparative in order to establish whether the Russians really are different from another culture. The need to do comparative research raises a large statistical problem because different countries do not only have different cultures; they also differ with respect to a number of other variables - the institutional environment, the emotional connotation of terms and the level of wealth. This, in turn, means that it is difficult to pin-point whether it is the culture which is really different or whether observed differences are due to some other variables. For example, surveys have showed that the Russians are more likely than Americans to dislike rich businessmen and to believe that they have gained their money dishonestly. Whereas 59% of the Russians in a telephone interview believed that those who tried to make money were often "not very honest people", 39% of the Americans had the same belief. 45 Does this indicate a Russian anti-mercantile culture? It may do so, but it may also be that institutional differences (the lack of clearly defined property rights) makes the difference in beliefs really true i.e. that rich people in Russia have gained their wealth dishonestly to a greater degree than rich people in the USA. 46 Similarly, a survey showing Russian risk aversiveness need not be culturally determined, but a function of their low relative wealth. Moreover, Russian support (and dislike) for democracy and market economy may be a function of the emotive connotations of these terms or a short term opinion related to the economic situation, not a deep cultural predisposition toward authoritarianism or democracy as we understand the terms in Western political science. In short, surveys are in no way perfect tools to measure cultural variables.

The problems mentioned above should not lead to the nihilistic conclusion that we cannot prove anything about the Russian culture using statistics. Some results are more reliable than others and Stepehen White has pointed out three sets of circumstances which make it more likely that the effects in questions indicate a stable cultural attitude and not other factors. 47 First, when the trait persist despite the wishes and efforts of the government, as religious beliefs in the Soviet Union. Second, when the differences persist despite similar institutional structures, such as political differences within Easter Europe during the Communist era. Third, when the trait can be found even when the individuals are outside the influences of the reward system set up by communist regimes. An example of this occurs when immigrants from Russia to Israel and the USA continue to exhibit collectivist and authoritarian attitudes. For example, in a study by Zvi Gitelman 49% of the American immigrants to Israel agreed that a "strong leader ... can do more for the state that all the discussions and the laws" while 67% of the Russian immigrants to Israel agreed to the same statement. 48 In sum, the mentioned problems with statistical evidence can at least be reduced under certain circumstances and quantitative evidence becomes more reliable.

3.1.3 Which is best, quantitative or qualitative evidence?

Given that both the quantitative and qualitative approach have weaknesses, how should we proceed to establish a cultural trait? To use a concrete statement: How much faith should we have in the proposition that "An independent judiciary and thus the implementation of the rule of law is even less compatible with the traditions of the Russian society than the division of power at legislative and executive levels". 49 An example of a qualitative piece of evidence to prove this occurred when Yeltsin was in Norway in the autumn of 1996 and he gave the following comment when asked about the Nikitin case (an environmental activist accused of spying): "I'm not a judge. ... I'm higher than a judge". 50 This is revealing because it indicates the political tradition within which Yeltsin operates - a tradition lacking the western notion of the rule of law and clear distinctions between the judiciary, the legislative and the administrative organs. However, it seems impossible to say exactly how revealing the statement is i.e. to say precisely - on a scale from 0 to 100 - how much more certain would I be that the Russian culture lacks the concept of the rule of law after hearing Yeltsin's statement.

The quantitative method of trying to prove the same question can be exemplified by Solomon who has used a variety of sources, including opinion polls, to determine whether the Russian culture is alien to the rule of law and the division of power.51 His conclusion is also that "public attachment to legal principles did not run deep". 52 However, once again I am at loss when asked exactly how much this should increase my confidence that the Russians culture is alien to the rule of law.

In fact, I doubt whether there can be a general answer to the question of whether one should try to prove the existence of a cultural trait using the quantitative or the qualitative method since there seems to be pockets of reliability within both methods (and oceans of unreliability). For instance, Kristian Gerner cites an example where a cartoon in the magazine Crocodil - picturing mountains of fertilizers outside a train station - is used to prove that the lack of growth in agricultural yield (despite the increase in fertilizer production) can be attributed to a failure in the transportation and distribution system. 53 This is an example of reliable qualitative evidence since this cartoon would not be used in the magazine if it was not thought to be funny - and it could not be funny unless it was a situation which many could recognize. In any case, the qualitative and the quantitative approaches are not mutually incompatible. The interview method combined with surveys as applied by the Harvard Refugee Project, the Soviet Interview Project and in Zvi Gitelman's study of Soviet �migr�s in Israel all use both qualitative and quantitative evidence. The issue is thus not which is best, but how each can be improved and used reliably. This is the topic of my next section.

3.1.4 The lessons

What are the lessons concerning the feasibility of establishing Russian cultural traits using examples. The main lesson is that it is not impossible, but the paragraphs above have pointed out some of the pitfalls to be avoided. First, it is not enough to cite one or a few examples from works of fiction to prove that the Russians are characterized by certain traits. Second, I believe the reliability of surveys increase when the questions avoid general concepts such as freedom and justice, and focus on concrete questions. Third, I believe one should explore a new avenue of research: to reveal cultures using experiments. In the next paragraphs I shall discuss these three improvements in more detail.

An excellent example of the possibility of using literature, while at the same time avoid the problem of simply picking the examples one wants, is Fritz Gaenslen's article "Culture and Decision Making in China, Japan, Russia and the USA". 54 In this article Ganslen uses statistical analysis of 1000 conflicts as described by 272 authors in 514 works of fiction. These conflicts are examined statistically, for example to see the extent to which the author describes it as acceptable that an individual stands up against the majority. One of the findings is that a public setting (as opposed to a small private setting) makes an American individual 6.2% worse off (in terms of whether the individual is successful in gaining acceptance for his argument), while a Russian is 12.3% worse off. Based on this kind of analysis Gaenslen concludes that the Russians dislike individualistic behavior more than the Americans.

A good example of a survey using concrete rather than grand concepts, is Schiller, Boycko and Korobov. By avoiding concepts like democracy and market economy, they increase the reliability of their results because they reduce the potential bias resulting from the fact that grand concepts often have very different meanings in different cultures. In their survey people were asked about how they would react to everyday situations, such as whether they would charge interest rates on a loan to a friend (6% of the Russians said yes while 29% of the Americans answered positively) or whether they think the government should regulate the price of flowers if the sellers raised the prices in response to a sudden shortage of flowers (54% of the Russians and 28% of the Americans agreed to price controls, though the proportion which thought the price increase was unfair was almost equal at 33%). 56 These kind of questions yield highly informative results and should be repeated at a larger scale than the Schiller, Boycko and Korobov study which only used telephone interviews with about one hundred respondents in each country.

Finally, my own suggestion would be to use experiments to reveal the cultures of people in many cases. 57 When Barner-Barry and Hody claim that the Russians have "a deeply held cultural fear of innovation" 58 (i.e. in the terminology of economist: risk-aversiveness) this can be studied experimentally. One simple example of this, is to make people choose between the following two options:
Alternative A: $100 for sure
Alternative B: $200 with the probability of 0.5 and $0 with the probability of 0.5
A risk-neutral person would be indifferent between the two options since the expected payoff from each is $100. If we change the probabilities in alternative B to $200 with the probability of 0.6 and $0 with the probability of 0.4, a risk-averse person would still choose alternative A despite the fact that the expected payoff from alternative B is higher. By varying the probabilities (and payoffs) and by presenting this kind of choice to a number of people, one finds a reliable picture of the average risk attitude of a group of people. Similar experiments, based on bargaining, can be conducted to reveal whether the Russians are more concerned with justice than other cultures and to reveal the degree to which people trust each (to determine whether it is true that the Russians really have a pessimistic view of man). In short, it is possible to measure some several cultural traits reliably because an experimental situation allows us to keep certain factors constant and only varying the variable we are interested in. 59

3.2 Demonstrating the cause of the cultural trait in question

In addition to giving examples, there is one other method of establishing the plausibility of a cultural trait - to demonstrate the causal mechanism that creates the culture. I shall consider three commonly mentioned causes of culture - geography, climate and historical experiences. I shall also consider whether cultures can be the result of intentional pressures and more originally, internal psychological mechanisms.

3.2.1 Conventional causes and the problem of transmission

The Russians are sometimes said to be excessively concerned with security. 60 One causal story used to justify this argument, is the lack of natural frontiers around Russia. This in turn, led to a history of repeated invasions and consequently to a concern with security. Another causal story, trying to establish the same point, is that because of the climatic conditions in Russia, the soil is not very fertile. Thus, the Russians became accustomed to living on the edge between survival and extinction. One single year of bad harvest could be fatal and this created a culture in which no risks, no innovations, nothing that could upset the delicate equilibrium was tried. In all these examples we see how geography, climate and historical experience may enter as a cause of a cultural trait.

There is one problem with the above proof of cultural traits: Why should we believe that a cause which affected the Russians more than one hundred years ago continue to affect the Russians of today? After all the Russians today are not he same Russians that experienced the Mongol invasion. Sometimes the continuity is simply assumed i.e. that a culture - once established - is automatically inherited from generation to generation. This, as Mary McAuley has pointed out, is not convincing because it ignores the question of how the culture is transmitted. 61 True, there are well established channels for the transmission of culture - by parents conveying norms and beliefs in the upbringing of the children, education and many other agents of socialization. Despite the obvious nature of these mechanism, we should still focus on the transmission because evidently not all culture is perfectly replicated in the next generation. Furthermore, the assumption of automatic transmission leads us to ignore a potentially important source of cultural traits - internal psychological mechanism.

3.2.2 Internal psychological mechanisms as a cause of political cultures

It is claimed that the Russians commonly believe that the Leader is just and good, while those around him are responsible for all the problems. 62 This myth appeared both under the Tsar and under Stalin. One might then be tempted to argue that the culture was simply inherited from the parents to their children. Yet, one might also explain the trait by internal psychological mechanisms without invoking inherited beliefs. The psychological mechanism being that humans have a tendency to adjust their beliefs and desires in order to live happy lives (cognitive dissonance). In hard times it is a comforting thought that all hope is not lost, that if the leader heard about your problems he would correct the mistakes. If this is the true causal story, then the belief in a just leader was not inherited. Instead, it was independently created by the circumstances of the two periods.

The Just Leader myth is not an isolated example of the fallacy of assuming that cultures simply are inherited. The cult of Lenin could also be presented as an inherited trait where Lenin simply became a substitute for what God or the Tsar had been before the Revolution. However, as Kristian Gerner points out, "the cult was also the outcome of deliberate actions by the Bolshevik leaders ..." 63 Thus the Lenin cult was not simply an automatic continuation of Russian traditions, there was a conscious decision to create the cult - to create Lenin-corners in public buildings and to make children in kindergarten sing songs to phrase Lenin. Without this intentional effort we do not know whether the myth would have continued to exist.

Thirdly, and maybe most importantly, it is important to focus on internal psychological mechanisms because it throws some doubt on the argument that the Russians culture is more bipolar than other cultures. There seems to be a universal tendency in the mind of humans that we dislike ambiguity and uncertainty and we like to have good reasons when we act. 64 Given the dislike to act on weak reasons we unconsciously tend to shape our beliefs (make them more extreme) so as to give us stronger justification for our actions than the weak justification gained from the objectively true beliefs. But, this tendency is universal, not specific to the Russians. To examine whether the Russians for some reason suffer from this more than others, empirical investigation is needed, not discretionary selection of literary quotes. 65

3.3 Conclusion

In order to prove a cultural trait we need to give empirical evidence that it exists and a plausible story as to why it exist. This needs to be done in a way which reduces the possibility of simply searching for evidence which proves your original claims. One such way is experiments which, to my knowledge, have not been used comparatively to measure Russian cultural traits. A second suggestion presented in this section, was to focus on internal psychological mechanisms as a cause of cultures.

4. The link
- How to convincingly demonstrate the link between a cultural trait and its claimed consequences

One may claim, as Stephen Wegren does, that the Russian cultural thirst for justice hinders the development of a well-functioning market economy. 66 However, to prove the argument it is not enough to show that the Russians really are more concerned about justice than other cultures. The author also needs to give some kind of argument as to why the cultural traits has the claimed consequences. This, I believe can be done in two ways. Either by demonstrating a causal connection between the trait and its consequences or by providing statistics which suggests that the two variables are connected even if you do not know exactly how.

4.1 Historical correlations as proof

To justify a link by historical correlation is simply to say that the statistical record shows - in general - that when a culture is highly concerned about justice, the economy does worse than when a culture is less concerned about justice. One may then use statistical techniques to establish the reliability of these statements. For example, one may find, as Almond and Verba did in their classic study The Civic Culture, that there is a positive correlation between civic culture (as they defined it) and a stable democracy. 67 Of the many well documented statistical and interpretive problems of this approach, 68 I shall focus on two with special relevance to Russia.

The first problem occurs when we misinterpret the causal direction of two variables that are correlated. As a concrete illustration we may use the prediction that Russia will not become democratic because it has a weak civic spirit. To justify the prediction one may point to a correlation - that those countries which are weak on civic spirit also are non-democratic. One then interprets this to mean that a civic spirit is causally important in creating democracies and, conversely, a weak civic spirit results in non-democratic regimes. The problem with this, as Brian Barry has pointed out, is that the causal direction may flow in the other direction. It may be the existence of a democratic institutions which foster the growth of a civic spirit. 69 Indeed, if we look at one of the great classics in political science Tocqueville's Democracy in America, we read that "I do not know whether a jury is useful to the litigants, but I am sure it is very good for those who have to decide the case. I regard it as one of the most effective means of popular education at society's disposal". 70 In other words, it is institutions (here: the jury system) which fosters democratic attitudes, not the opposite. 71 If the causal relationship goes from institutions to attitudes it is wrong to use the correlation to justify the original claim - that culture is the cause of well-functioning democracies. It would also be wrong to predict that a low civic spirit in Russia would prevent the establishment of democracy since one could create the culture by introducing democratic institutions.

The second problem is that a weak correlation does not necessarily imply the absence of a strong causal relationship. As an example we may return to the claim in the introduction - that the political system must be compatible with the political culture. Suppose an empirical investigation finds a weak correlation between changes in the political system and changes in the political culture. However, it is still possible that political culture is an important determinant of the political system since there may be inertia which makes change discrete. The figure below tries to illustrate this. The two lines represent respectively the degree of a democratic culture and the degree to which the system is democratic. We see that within a band these may go in opposite direction i.e. there is a low correlation. However, at some point the gap between the two is so large that a revolution occurs (by assumption). If this is a true story, then we have low correlation between two variables, but at the same time the change in the political system must be explained using precisely the two mentioned variables.

4.2 Providing causal mechanisms to justify the link

The second way to support an argument linking two variables, is by providing a plausible causal link between the two. Once again I shall focus on arguments relating to the Russian concern for justice and how this affects the effectiveness of an economy. How might these two variables be related in Russia today?

To be efficient a market economy requires goods and services to be traded at free market prices i.e. the price which makes the supply of a good equal to its demand. 72 A concern for justice may prevent that price from being realized because people demand government regulations to reduce what they consider to be unfair prices. Alternatively, some markets may fail to exist because people simply refuse to trade at prices they consider unfair. 73 I have tried to illustrate this situation in the figure below. The figure is a standard demand-supply diagram where supply raises as price increases, while demand falls as the price increases. The market price, p*, is given by the intersection of supply and demand which is the point where the amount supplied equals the amount demanded of that good. However, a concern for justice may cause the real price to be below this price, such as p**, which in turn creates an inefficient economy because its regulated cheapness may lead to inefficient uses of the resource. An example of this may be the price of bread in the Soviet Union which was so low that it was sometimes used to feed animals.

[fig. 1]

The above paragraph illustrates one possible causal link between a concern for justice and an inefficient market economy. By giving this story one increases the plausibility of the cultural explanation since one presents reasons to believe in a causal connection, not simply assuming that the link is obvious.

Unsurprisingly, the method of proving a consequence by pointing to a causal mechanism is not without problems. One such problem is that a trait may have contradictory consequences. Assume that the Russian elite is characterized by a culture which accepts brutality and authoritarian methods. We may then try to inquire what effects this trait has on the stability of the political system. 74 One plausible causal connection is that authoritarian rule makes a system more stable because it denies the potential opposition the opportunity to organize itself. However, another causal connection could be that the authoritarian methods alienates people, thus increasing the desire to revolt and thereby making the system unstable. We now have two causal chains both running out of one cultural trait but with two opposite consequences. It would be meaningless to ask which of these causal mechanisms is true since it is perfectly possible that both exist at the same time. 75 The important question is which effect is the strongest i.e. the net effect. However, questions of net effects are very difficult to answer (in advance of an event) because we do not have data on all the relevant variables. This means that predictions based on cultural traits are plagued with great uncertainty. However, there might still be room for cultural explanations after an event has occurred since we then know which effect was the strongest. To be specific, after the collapse of the Soviet Union we know that the causal chains producing instability were stronger than those producing stability. Thus, we may distinguish between the reliability of predictions and the reliability of explanations based on cultural traits.

A second, more obvious problem, is that there are many variables which affect the stability of a political system. To illustrate this problem I shall use Geoffrey Gorer and John Rickman's claim that Russian history may be largely explained by the practice of swaddling. 76 Admittedly this is a bit of a dead horse, but I do not intend to use the whip where it is commonly applied. Instead of criticizing the speculative link between swaddling and a culture of expansionism, I shall argue that there may be many other variables which also determine whether the Russians have an expansive culture. For example, the claimed culture of risk-aversiveness points to a culture of caution, not expansiveness. Moreover, non-cultural variables may also affect whether the Russians really are expansive or not, such as the strength of their military forces. Hence, the chain from one fact (swaddling) to a cultural trait (expansiveness) and finally to its societal consequences (an aggressive empire) is not possible even if there is an isolated and plausible link between the trait and the consequences. We must also consider all the other variables affecting the trait and its consequences i.e. we need to use general equilibrium analysis, not partial equilibrium analysis. Needless to say this is close to impossible since it requires a general theory of society - how preferences and beliefs are shaped, how these transform into actions, the aggregate consequences of all the actions and how this in turn affect belief and preferences (starting the circle all over again). In the words of Jon Elster we are light-years away from such a theory. 77

4.3 Conclusion

How reliably is it possible to establish a link between a trait and its supposed social consequences? The above discussion has pointed to many difficulties: The problems of using correlation as proof of causal connections between two variables and the problem of having to consider the net effect of all the variables that affect a relationship. These problems are more serious than the problems involved in proving that a cultural trait exist since the statistical problems in proving a causal relationship is greater and since using a link to predict requires a general theory of causal connections among all the relevant variables.

5. Changability - Is it possible to change cultures intentionally?

Assume, for the sake of argument, that we have solved the two issues discussed so far in this paper. To be concrete, even if you can prove that the Russians today lack a civic culture and that this causes problems for the quality of their democracy, the prediction that Russia will not develop into a stable democracy may be false. The prediction may be false because it relies on the implicit assumption that the culture cannot be changed. If it is possible to change the culture, then the relevant variable is not today's political culture, but the culture that will exist tomorrow. It is the incompatibility between tomorrow's culture and tomorrow's system which makes the prediction true. Thus, to examine to what extent the future culture can assumed to be the same as today's culture we must ask to what extent it is plausible to assume that cultures can be changed.

5.1 A case study - The aim and the effort

To assess this one might use the history of the Soviet Union. The victory of the Bolsheviks in 1917 started a massive attempt to change the culture of the Russians and a number of other nations. Over the next seventy years a systematic effort was made to develop what might be called the "Soviet Man". There is little doubt about the importance attached to this by Soviet leaders. For example, Chernenko wrote that the party "seeks to construct a new world" which in turn required "the constant concern for the development ... of the man of the new world, for his ideological and moral growth." 78 Furthermore, the Party program always emphasized the re-education of people as an important goals, as demonstrated by the 1985 program in which a chapter (ch. V) was devoted to "Ideological-Education Work, Public Education, Science and Culture". A typical statement from this chapter is "The CSPU considers the main task of its ideological work to be in education the working people in a spirit of high ideological integrity and dedication to communism ..." 79 Given this aim, how did the Soviet leaders try to achieve it?

In the very beginning the effort was directed through the Commissariat of the Enlightenment led by A. V. Lunacharsky. The main committee under this commissariat, Glavpolitprosvet (Chief Committee for Political Education) had 21 500 village reading room and 800 political schools with 265 000 enrolled students (in 1925). 80 By 1976, the effort was even more organized, with 1.3 million propagandists, 7000 rooms of political enlightenment and 3.7 million agitators. One organization, The All Union Knowledge Society (Znanie) had 3 million members in 1976 and delivered 24 million lectures that year to 1245 million listeners. 81 In addition there was a systematic effort to change beliefs by visual agitation, a systematic change of holidays and anniversaries, biased mass-media reports and ideological education at all levels of life - in kindergarten, schools, universities, the army and at the workplace. It was a truly gigantic attempt to change the beliefs and values of a whole country.

5.2 Was it a success?

To what degree did the Russian culture change? Despite a much quoted assertion by Samuel Huntington to the contrary, the answer must be that the Communists were not successful in creating the intended new Soviet Man. Today we know that nationalism, selfishness, alcoholism, laziness, religiosity and many other traits of human nature were not eradicated and the Marxist-Leninist ideology was never internalized (or even understood). This does not mean that the Communist system had no effect on the culture of the Russians. Some cultural traits may have been reinforced by the system, such as the possibly collectivist and authoritarian nature of the Russian culture. Finally, some new traits may have been created unintentionally, such as cynicism as the result of institutional hypocrisy, apathy as a consequence of the lack of political freedom and, maybe most importantly, fear and lack of trust resulting from the Stalin period.

Overall, based on the Soviet experiment it does not appear that cultures can be easily changed intentionally. However, cultures may change unintentionally and this invalidates the implicit assumption of cultural continuity underlying predictions based on cultural traits. Yet, I am reluctant to make this a strong criticism of cultural predictions since I am unsure exactly how big the problem is in practice. Theoretically the assumption is invalid as long as it is unargued, but the flaw is not fatal as long as there is a great deal of empirical continuity between yesterday's and tomorrow's culture (at least in the short run).

6. Conclusion

To avoid excessive repetition I shall not summarize my results as I have already done this in the conclusions in the sub-section. Instead I shall summarize my current position on the cultural approach to Russian politics.

It would be foolish to deny that cultural differences exist and that they affect the course of history. For example, Ronald Inglehart has demonstrated stable difference in interpersonal trust and life satisfaction between a large number of countries. 82 However, it is perfectly possible to know that something exist and plays a role, but at the same time admit that we simply do not have enough information to measure its precise role and importance. In some cases we may be lucky and find pockets of reliability - conditions that are particularly favorable to draw reliable conclusions. The general theme of my recommendations has been to actively seek to create these pockets (i.e. experiments). Yet, we may doubt whether predictions based on cultural trait can every become reliable. Even if we have a well established trait we do not have a general theory of society which allows prediction based on the trait. If there is a more general lesson in this it must be that we might be better off if we cancel the search for a master key to history and instead focus our attention on small scale phenomena. To claim that we can predict whether Russia will have a functioning democracy and an effective market economy is to deceive ourselves, to satisfy the human desire for certainty at the cost of intellectual honesty.

Endnotes

1 See, for example, Putnam (1993) who recently has argued in favour of the cultural approach and Tarrow (1996), who argues against Putnam. More specifically on the cultural approach to Soviet history, see Malia (1994) for a book- length argument against the culturalists and Pipes (1994) or Brzezinski (1989) for arguments in favour of the culturalists.

2 Brzezinski (1989), p. 177.

3 Cited in Hahn (1991), p. 398.

4 Fukuyama (1993), p. 16.

5 Cited in Tucker (1973), p. 174.

6 White, (1979), p. 1.

7 White, (1979), p 64.

8 White himself (see White (1984b)), admits that he might have exaggerated the difference between Russia and the rest of Europe on some accounts.

9 See also McAuley's (1984) comments on White, p. 16.

10 This critique, of course, does not affect those who believe that the aim of the cultural approach is to interpret history, not to exaplain events causally. This approach has become increasingly popular, see for examples Welch (1993) and my comments in section 2.2.

11 White (1979), p. 87-88.

12 For more arguments against the inclusion of behavioural variables, see Brown (1984) and Fleron (1996). My arguments are informed by, but not based on, these works.

13 Tucker (1973), p. 179.

14 I owe this view to Jon Elster. See Elster (1983a) especially p. 14-24 and Elster (1989c), pp. 145-156, 157-169 and 201-220.

15 The real culture is the values and beliefs indicated by actual behaviour, while the ideal culture is the values and beliefs we claim to have (expressed through opinion surveys). For example, in a famous survey by LaPiere (in 1934) 92% of the sampled hotels and resturants in the USA said they would not accept Chinese guests in their resturants, but only one resturant actually denied a Chinese couple admission when they were faced with the real situation (cited in Brown (1984), p. 159).

16 See, for exampe, Lane (1992), p. 364.

17 Dicks (1960), p. 637 (my emphasis).

18 According to Tucker (1973), p. 177 n.14, the distinction between real and ideal cultural pattern was introduced by Ralph Linton in 1967.

19 Petro (1995), p. 3. In direct contradiction one could cite Keenan's (1986) long discussion of the Novgorodian sub-culture of dissent and Brown (1984), p. 176ff, who makes precisely the distinction which Petro claims is missing.

20 I am indebted to Paal Kolstoe and the other seminar participants (University of Oslo, October 8, 1996) for bringing this problem to my attention.

21 See Sen (1982) for a discussion of this problem.

22 For more on the ambiguity of the concept of justice, see Melberg (1996a).

23 See, for example, Keenan (1986), p. 126.

24 Duch (1993), p. 598.

25 Simon (1995), p. 249.

26 This is based on Elster (1989b), p. 97-151.

27 Gaenslen (1986), p. 92. Note: This is not a direct quotation.

28 Keenan (1986), p. 119.

29 Lotman and Uspenskij (1984).

30 Academic honesty requires me to admit that upon reflection my definition of culture appears weak since not all stable differences in beliefs and values are normally described as cultural differences (see note46). I am not sure how to solve the problem except to abandon the concept of culture. This is not as drastic as it sounds because - as the anthropologist Adam Kuper has argued - when we by cultural differences mean differences in belief, we might simply write "differences in beliefs" or when we by cultural differences mean differences in ideology, we can talk about "differences in ideology."

31 Barner-Barry and Hody (1995), p. 46.

32 The distinction is inspired by Hume's discussion of proof by induction vs. deduction. More recently, I have been informed by the methodological debate between J. Elster and G. A. Cohen in Theory and Society 1982 (issues 11 and 12).

33 I am here indebted to Paal Kolstoe who made me think more closely about qualitative and quantitative analysis.

34 Corten (1992), p. 14.

35 Barner-Barry and Hody (1995), see, for example, p. 40, p. 46, p. 62, p. 212, p. 221.

36 Another example of similar scant treatment of evidence and the need for reference is Simon (1995).

37 The analogy is inspired by Wittgenstein (cited in Elster (1989c), p. 149).

38 Bodin, (1993), p. 131 (my translation).

39 For more on this see Melberg, Hans O. (1996c). In short, see Bodins interpretation of the importance of the centralistic perspective in Icon paintings (p. 23) and his interpretation of a poem on p. 104-5.

40 Gregory (1987), p. 77. Admittedly, these statements describe different time periods. This weakens the contradiction, but it is not eliminated since Brzezinski seems to think the lack of commerical talent is an old trait.

41 Hahn (1991), p. 393.

42 Simon (1995), p. 248.

43 Because I have made strong claims and promised numerous examples, the following disagreements between "experts" may be added to those already mentioned: Keenan (1986) vs. Bodin (1996) on the importance of the Church in forming the Russian political culture; Simon (1995), p. 147, vs. Pipes (1974) on the level of trust between the government and its citizens and Malia (1994) vs. Brzezinski (1989) or Pipes (1994) on the degree to which ideology or culture shaped the Soviet regime.

44 Finifter and Mickiewicz (1992), p. 860 (Survey from 1989).

45 Schiller & Boycko & Korobov (1991), p. 395.

46 The different attitude toward businessmen exemplifies the already mentioned problem of distinguishing between cultural beliefs and other kinds of beliefs. Intuitively I am reluctant to call the difference cultural as long as it is a true belief (true is here defined as rational given the evidence). If, however, the truth changed without a change in belief I would be more inclined to accept the difference in attitudes as a cultural difference.

47 White (1984a), p. 360.

48 Gitelman (1977), p. 559.

49 Simon (1995), p. 249.

50 Cited in Gomes (1996, p. 2.

51 I here rely on Fleron (1996).

52 Cited in Fleron (1996), p. 244.

53 Gerner (1984b), p. 103.

54 Gaenslen (1986).

55 Schiller & Boycko & Korobov (1991).

56 Schiller & Boycko & Korobov (1991), respectively p. 393 and p. 389.

57 This suggestion is not as novel as I initially though since I came across the same suggestion in Elkins and Simeon (1979), p. 138.

58 Barner-Barry and Hody (1995), p. 46.

59 See Bar-Hillel and Yaari (1984) for a good example of how this can be done (with American and Israeli respondents). To my knowledge no comparable research has been done on Russian subjects.

60 Barner, Barry and Hody (1995), p. 62.

61 McAuley (1984), p. 23.

62 This example is taken from McAuley (1984), p. 19-20.

63 Gerner (1986), p. 33.

64 For more on this see Elster (1993), p. 14. See also the famous Ellesberg paradox in the economic literature.

65 Zimmerman (1995) provides some data on the extremism of Russian beliefs (40% of the Russians agreed with the statement that there is only 'one right philosophy') which indirectly can be used to assess the bipolar theory if we could create comparative data from Wester countries.

66 Wegren (1994), pp. 222-229.

67 Almond and Verba (1963).

68 See Melberg (1996b), for a survey of the problems with correlation as proof.

69 Barry (1970), p. 93 ff.

70 Cited in Elster (1983b), p. 96.

71 We may, of course, also have a reciprocal relationship between institutions and culture in which case we could also have virtous and evil circles.

72 The optimality of a free market economy is only true under certain assumptions, such as no externalities, no economies of scale and many other technical ssumptions.

73 Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler (1986) for an interesting discussion of how norm of fairness can constrain profit seeking.

74 This example is inspired by Elster (1989a), pp. 16-17.

75 This is implicitly a critique of the search for laws in history. It is perfectly possible that there are no (simple) lawlike relationship between suppression and stability, while at the same time there are strong causal relationships between the two.

76 Cited in Pye (1991), p. 495.

77 Elster (1983a), p. 86.

78 Burant (1987), p. 273.

79 The Programme of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (draft) (1985), p. 72.

80 White (1979), p. 70.

81 White (1979), pp. 77-80.

82 Inglehart (1988).

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[Note for bibliographic reference: Melberg, Hans Olav (1996),The Cultural Approach to Russian Politics: How Reliable?, http://www.oocities.org/hmelberg/papers/961109.htm]