1 July, 1863
The 12th Corps division of BG Alpheus Williams was in the advance on the Baltimore Pike and halted at Two Taverns, five miles from Gettysburg, around mid-morning. By this time the morning's fight there had ended. A civilian brought news of the battle, followed at 2 p.m. by the arrival of a courier from MG O.O. Howard (in command of the field after the death of Reynolds) informing Slocum that the Left Wing was engaged with Hill's Corps and that Ewell was advancing from York. An hour later, a second message from Howard related the unfolding disaster on his right flank and entreated Slocum to bring his corps to Gettysburg. Slocum later insisted that he put his corps on the road to Gettysburg on his own volition after confirming the first reports of the battle. Williams seems to support Slocum's version, stating that it was an hour or two after halting at Two Taverns that he received word that the 1st and 11th Corps were engaged at Gettysburg, and that his division was "at once put in march."
As the regiment approached the town, the officers and men saw groups of fightened civilians heading in the opposite direction. All related grim but exaggerated stories of utter disaster. Before reaching the town itself, Williams was direced to seize a commanding position east of Gettysburg, while Geary's division continued up the Pike. The 2nd Massachusetts moved through the woods along a narrow, winding path southeast of Rock Creek. "As we marched on," said Maj. Charles Morse, "we came into broken country with considerable timber, which shut off all view of the movements of other parts of the army or the enemy; but all shared the feeling that the latter could not be far away." The path zig-zagged 1 1/2 miles to the Hanover Road.
Approaching Benner's Hill Morse could see a number of Confederate horsemen on the summit. Believing that the hill should and could be taken, Williams sent his skirmishers forward. These advanced within 300 yards of the crest when Slocum ordered Williams to fall back to the Baltimore Pike because the Rebels had occupied the town and the division was in danger of being cut off.
Ruger's brigade spent the night in some fields approximately 1/2 mile northeast of the Baltimore Pike. Nothing of consequence occured during the night, with the exception of a change in the 12th Corps command. With Slocum assuming the overall command of the army's "right wing," Williams stepped up into the role of corps commander. Taking over from Williams was Thomas Ruger, which then placed command of the brigade into the hands of 27th Indiana's Col. Silas Colgrove. This extra layer of command would have far-reaching consequences for the 2nd Massachusetts on July 3rd.
July 2nd, 1862
The 2nd Massachusettes spent a relatively quiet morning, aside from some minor skirmishing that broke out in front the position of the 27th Indiana. After a time, the division was moved across Rock Creek toward Gettysburg. Its path took it across a low green meadow at the southern base of lower Culp's Hill, with rocky woods on either side, and a spring (Spangler's Spring). A stone wall ran west along the edge of the meadow then turned northwest across the lower hill to the saddle between it and the higher portion of the hill. Ruger's right rested on Rock Creek. The 3rd Brigade (now under Colgrove) held the extreme right of the Union army. The 107th NY and 13th NJ held the ground between Col. Archibald McDougall's brigade and the meadow. The 2nd Massachusetts formed south of the meadow, among the rocks and trees of McAllister's Woods. Next came the 3rd WS and finally the 27th IN, facing east across Rock Creek. Geary's division, which had spent the night on Little Round Top, returned and moved into position on Ruger's left.
It was after 3 p.m. when Maj. Morse heard "the sound of a fierce battle" taking place on the Union left, "which, from the horse-shoe shape of our line, seemed almost in our rear." It was, of course, Longstreet's assault upon the 3rd Corps of Daniel Sickles. The thickness of the woods prevented Morse from seeing anything of the fight. "Every eye was of course turned toward these woods, fearing lest at any moment we should see our troops driven back and the enemy appear." It seemed like it was Chancellorsville all over again. For the non-participants, the anxiety of waiting was worse than the actual fighting. As time passed, the sounds of battle grew nearer and, remarked Lt. George Thayer, "the Southern yell could be more and more distinctly heard."
Finally, the orders arrived for the 12th Corps (minus the brigade of BG George S. Greene)to leave its position and double-quick to save the left flank. As dusk began to settle, Ruger's division with Lockwood's large brigade of Marylanders in the advance, filed across the Baltimore Pike toward the terrible clash of arms. The 2nd MA came under random artillery fire, but only one man from the regiment was injured. By the time Ruger's brigade reached the scene of the battle, it was all over. The Confederate attack had failed and the Federal line still held. Onyl Lockwood's brigade had become engaged from Ruger's division. He now received orders to counter-march back to Spangler's meadow.
In the darkness, Lt. Col. Mudge led the regiment back toward Spangler's Meadow. In their absence the Confederates had attempt to seize Culp's Hill, but had been repulsed by Greene and some timely reinforcements. Mudge proceeded cautiously and soon came to believe that the enemy had occupied the brigade's former position. The regiment was halted and Maj. Morse went forward to reconnoitre. "We crawled along cautiously and quietly, till we began to hear a confused sound of talking in front of us; we now halted. Not daring to do anything more without being certain what troops they were (for we knew our Second Division was trying to work down to us), I ordered two men to go forward and ask them. They walked up to within a few paces of the line; one of them said, 'Boys, what regiment do you belong to?' The reply was, 'Twenty-third.' 'Twenty-third what?' 'Twenty-third Virginia.' Then one of them cried out. 'Why, they are Yanks,' and seized one of my men; the other bolted back to me and escaped."
Mudge withdrew the regiment back beyond the meadow. The enemy was there, but how many? Capt. Thomas Fox and his company were sent forward to find out. Fox advanced noisily until challenged. "Surrender!", Fox called out. "Come into our lines." The reply was a heavy volley. Fox's men had to run for it, but all returned safely. There was no doubt that the enemy was present in force.
The 2nd Massachusetts remained in position along the rising ground of McAllister's Hill, along the edge of Soangler's Meadow and spent much of the night constructing breastworks. Capt. Tom Robeson's Company E spent a tension-filled night on picket duty within short rifle range of the Rebels. However, the night passed without incident.
July 3rd, 1863: "It's murder, but it's the order."
At the first streak of daylight, Morse was awakened During the night, the enemy strengthed its position, reinforced by Smith's Brigade of Early's Division, as well as the brigades of O'Neal and Rodes. Lee planned to launch his grand attack as Ewell made a diversionary strike against Meade's left, but Slocum wrecked his scheme by attacking first. At dawn, Morse was awakened by the sound of heavy musketry in the direction of Geary's division on the left. In front of the 2nd MA there was only minor skirmishing. Capt. Robeson and his pickets along the edge of the woods became engaged with some Virginians across the meadow. The range of fire was so short, said Morse, that Company E suffered a number of wounds. "One poor fellow, in a rather advanced position, fell tot he ground badly hurt. Captain Robeson, with the gallant courage which always distinguished him, stepped forward, and regardless of his own life, took the wounded man in his arms and carried him to a place of shelter." Later in the morning, Robeson would fall with a mortal wound.
Gen. Meade wanted the Rebels pushed off Culp's Hill. Without consulting Williams, who was still in temporary command of the 12th Corps, Slocum ordered Col. Ruger to assault the line in front of the 3rd Brigade and re-take its original position. The enemy, Slocum assured him was not there in force. To his credit, Ruger, who was in a better position to know, questioned the order. He argued that a blind charge would result in heavy losses and asked permission to first test the enemy's strength then, if practicable, force him out. Slocum agreed.
As Ruger later recalled, his verbal order called for Col. Colgrove to send two regiments forward to probe the breastworks across Spangler's Meadow, and if the enemy was not found in force, to attack. The message was delivered by Lt. William M. Snow, who insisted afterwards that he delivered it precisely as it was dictated to him. Somewhere along the line, the order was tragically garbled. By the time it got down to Lt. Col. Mudge (through Col. Colgrove), the order, according to George Thayer, was "Advance two regiments immediately, and dislodge the enemy from his works!" If Colgrove had any serious reservations about the suicidal nature of the order as he understood it, he did not ask Ruger for clarification. And so, the 2nd MA and 27th IN were called upon. Lt. Col. Mudge could only envision the destruction of his regiment as he questioned the messenger. "Are you sure that is the order." When assured that it was, he replied, "Well, it is murder, but it's the order."
Mudge led the 2nd MA across the meadow, bearing toward the left. The two regiments did not advance at the same time. The 2nd MA was already facing the field and all Mudge had to do was lead his men forward. The 27th Indiana, which was facing Rock Creek at a right angle to the enemy it was supposed to attack, was obliged to change front, then (according to unofficial accounts only) briefly got tangled up with the 13th New Jersey. This gave the 2nd MA a head start and was already under fire before the 27th could extend Colgrove's line of attack on its right. From the cover of the woods, the enemy blasted away at the 2nd MA. The regiment halted once to fire a volley, then continued on. Maj. Morse, who was on the left flank, observed that the right of the line was under heavier fire and began to move in that direction. As he neared the colors, he was met by Capt. James Francis, who asked him if he had seen Mudge. "I said, 'No,' and we knew he must have fallen." Both Mudge and Lt. Stone had been killed instantly about half-way between the two lines.
Command now fell to Morse. He looked over to his right expecting to find the 27th IN and saw only open ground. The regiment had made it about half-way across the field before coming into the range of the enemy's rifles. It took a withering volley, then paused twice to re-load and return fire. If Colgrove's intent was to carry the enemy's position by storming it, this was not going to accomplish his goal. The decision was made to call the regiment back.
Morse and the 2nd MA held on for a few momemnts longer, duelling "at the shortest range I have ever seen two lines engaged at." Morse recognized the futility of his situation. There was no way the 3rd Wisconsin could offer cover fire because they stood directly between their supports and the enemy. "Here we were, a mere handful of men, within pistol-shot of a formidable line which was raining an unmerciful fire into our still unbroken ranks, and with no probabilty that support would be sent us." Morse ordered the regiment to fall back. He faced his men around and led them back across the field, veering toward a stone wall on the south side of the meadow about 200 yards west of where they had started from. The Rebels followed, but now that the Massachusetts men were out of its line of fire, the rest of the brigade easily scattered the exposed Virginians.
Ordered by Colgrove to return to its original position, Morse requested (unsuccessfully) that a nearby regiment distract the enemy with a volley or two. The regiment set off at the double-quick and got back to McAllister's Woods, with the loss of a few more wounded. Adjutant Fox proceded to call the roll. All were present (hunkered down in the woods) or accounted for (lying in the meadow).
BG Williams, who had been left completely out of the chain of command on this day, wrote in 1864: "There are few if any Regts. in the service that could have stood the almost instantaneous loss of half its forces & mainatined as the 2nd Mass. did almost prefectly with the order & regularity of a battallion drill."
For the 2nd Massachusetts, the battle was over. It took no part in the repulse of Longstreet's Assault against the Union center, although Thayer recalled a stray shot or two sailing into their midst during the artillery barrage. "Whoever could find cover of a stout tree or a huge rock clung to it with determination, and prayed heartily that it might not fall upon him, as it seemed as if everything must tumble upon our heads." By the time an order arrived directing the 12th Corps to march to the Union center, Lee had been driven back at all points, his army shattered, but not defeated.
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