The Battle For Hue

Notes from the 23 January 1998 Hue City Professional Military Education (PME) brief presented by LtGen Cheatham, then Commanding Officer 2nd Battalion 5th Marines (2/5); and LtGen Christmas, then Commanding Officer Hotel Company 2/5 (H 2/5); to the Urban Warrior Commander’s Conference at Marine Base, Quantico, Virginia. Notes source: The Basic School (TBS) Homepage.

Overview

Initially, the generals set the tone for the PME by giving a short overview of the events leading up to the battle and the conduct of the battle itself. A key point was that, 2/5 was engaged in a battle outside of Phu Bai just prior to the events at Hue. This battle was described as a battalion ambush on an advancing North Vietnamese Army (NVA) regiment. During the battle, 2/5 received march orders to Hue and had to piecemeal companies out of the current battle and head off to Hue. The generals stressed that "we don’t always get to choose our fate - Murphy is there - adjustments have to be made.

They then quickly described the terrain of Hue - part French city design with wide roads and elegant buildings; the Perfume River (running SW-NE through the city) separating the southern portion of the city from the rest of Hue; the northeast portion was in complete opposition with the south - close buildings and tight roads; the northwest had rice paddies, open terrain and farmland. The avenues of approach were Route 1 from the north to south and from the west from the highlands. The Perfume River also served as a main supply route (MSR) for the U.S. forces. Both generals felt that neither the NVA nor Marines ever isolated the city; thus, both sides could get forces in and out of Hue during the battle. If the NVA had sealed off the river and Route 1, they felt it would have been a different battle. Additionally, if the Marines had sealed off the city once occupied, the NVA would never have been able to escape. LtGen Cheatham said that he tried...but failed.

General Hue City Lessons Learned

1. The Marines utilized the Perfume River as a key MSR throughout the battle. The extensive use of LCUs (Landing Craft Utility) to move logistics and eventually, personnel was critical in turning the tide of the battle.

2. Initial footholds in Hue were the MACV (Military Assistance Command, Vietnam) and ARVN (Army of the Republic of Vietnam) compounds. These were not the two preferred footholds; however, they were required to be taken out of necessity. You do not always dictate when or where you will make your next move as higher headquarters may do it for you.

3. Both generals sought to parallel their experience and events in Hue with current Urban Warrior doctrinal terms: Urban Penetration, Urban Swarm, and Urban Thrust. The attack of 2/5 down the Le Loi road from MACV to the canal was compared to this concept; the battalion went down the road along several axis of advance, two companies up and one back. LtGen Cheatham stressed that they fought for seven days off the order "kill all to the canal (MACV to the canal)". He emphasized that sometimes the enemy will not do what you want him to - leave when given the chance. Sometimes he will stay and fight to the death, you have to be prepared for this in an urban fight. Logic may be completely against you.

Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) Learned at Hue

1. Immediate Action (IA) Drills: Rehearse all IA drills - LtGen Christmas stressed that the convoy drills which his company conducted prior to movement towards Route 1 were key to their success during that convoy. They did get hit...and the IA drills were instrumental in overcoming these incidents.

2. Battalion Commander "IA Drill": LtGen Cheatham reviewed reference manuals prior to going into the attack. The little things were re-emphasized thoroughly through these drills (MOUT Homepage Note: "Attention to Detail" - this is especially important during MOUT, as the battle often becomes a fragmented small unit action reliant on the skills and training of small unit leaders). As a result of his reading up on strong point operations (the best description of NVA defenses), he acquired all the 3.5 inch rockets which the battalion had (not normally carried in Vietnam's "bush"); 106mm recoilless rifles were mounted on "mules" (MOUT Homepage Note: The mule was a small mechanized wheeled vehicle that was easily maneuverable in close quarters and packed quite a punch with the mounted 106), and gas masks and CS were both collected and issued. These items were instrumental in fighting the "close-in" battles of MOUT in Hue.

3. Crossing a Street: The key is an initial penetration to wherever it is that you are going - creating a breach in a building, window, door, or whatever - and then moving in large groups to get mass into the penetration. (MOUT Homepage Note: Surprise followed by overwhelming, decisive action - no room for hesitation). The generals stressed that the enemy reads our doctrinal publications - an example is when ever the Marines at Hue threw smoke to cover their movement - the NVA fired into the smoke knowing that Marines were likely moving behind the screen and were now out of cover. The Marines at Hue then improvised, bringing up a tank or ONTOS, both with significant direct firepower - after firing - large Marine formations would move behind the weapons platform into the penetration. Both generals emphasized that urban tactics, techniques, and procedures must be very flexible to meet a constant change in the immediate close quarter combat situation.

End Notes

The last phase of the PME was a panel discussion. In addition to the generals, Col Jim Cooligan (ARVN advisor during the Battle for Hue), was a panel member. He led off with the following points:

1. Intelligence was absent during the battle.
2. There must be an overall task commander; Hue was fought piecemeal.
3. Apply “enemy” METT-T to the battle…it turns the tables and allows you to see the battle as he does.
4. Be prepared to think “outside the box” in urban fighting. Address the “sniper casualty” situation.

Key points of the panel included:

1. Ammunition Expenditures/Techniques: LCUs ensured a continuous flow of resupply. The expenditure rate was unreal. It was hard to teach fire discipline. The Marines got a certain comfort level out of firing their weapons; good small unit training can combat this tendency.
2. Future Weapons: Rounds with less ricochet, bunker busters, and munitions that form breaches.
3. Employment of Crew-served Weapons: The generals’ felt that they would have done this better if given the option. Use of tripods and employment techniques with all crew-served weapons would have been key in their opinion, there was too much assault mode.
4. Maps: 1:50,000 doesn’t cut it in urban fighting; need solid maps for future fighting. They used tourist type Shell gas station maps).
5. Flame Weapons: The ones that they used were too bulky and heavy to be utilized effectively.
6. Emphasis was placed on individual urban fighting skills. All felt that this is still the key to MOUT.
7. Finally, the Fatigue factor was addressed. Both forces were so exhausted after a long day fighting; that neither really did anything at night. The generals’ stressed that night operations be limited to key strikes to gain major objectives.