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At the turn of the 20th century, Malaya was the ‘Treasurehouse’ of the British Empire. Rich in natural resources like coal, iron
ore, manganese and bauxite, the tropical archipelago located at
the south-eastern end of Asia was producing 40 per cent of the
world’s rubber and nearly 60 per cent of its tin. During this
period, China was being invaded by Japan who was in need of vital
commodities such as rubber and tin for its war effort. With most
of Malaya’s tin and rubber resources going to America, Malaya
was therefore greatly desired by Japan, especially after America
threatened to impose a strategic blockade. Japan’s intent in Malaya
was known, but British defence planners assumed that the swamps
and jungles of Malaya would deter, if not obstruct, any overland
invasion.
From the 1920s, Japan had begun to emerge as a serious threat
to Britain’s outposts in the Far East. With drastic cuts in her
defence budget, the British could no longer maintain a strong
permanent naval presence in the area. It therefore decided to
implement the ‘Main Fleet to Singapore’ strategy, to defend not
only Singapore, but the rest of her empire in the Far East and
Australia. Singapore’s strategic location as the western gateway
to the Far East prompted Britain’s Overseas Defence Committee
to choose her in 1921 as the site for a naval base. A small diamond-shaped
island at the southern end of the Malay Peninsula, Singapore had
developed into the most flourishing international port in the
region, for it lay at the crossroads of the Pacific and Indian
Oceans and the South China Sea, with excellent connections to
Europe, China, Australia and the Americas.
The island has been described as the place to be, with plentiful
food for every palate and pleasure of all sorts. While the houses
of the Chinese, Indians and Malays were picturesque, they provided
a contrast to the orderliness and extravagance of the government,
business and residential districts of the city, with beautiful
lush landscaped green spaces, white 'plantation-style' villas
and mock-'Tudor' houses and their English gardens.
This bustling port, 150 kilometres north of the equator, was considered
a vital part of the British Empire and supposedly impregnable
as a fortress. The British saw it as the 'Gibraltar of the Far
East'. The main fleet would be based in Europe, sailing to Singapore
to protect Britain’s interests and possessions in the Far East
should they be threatened.
In November 1940, Air Marshal Sir Robert Brooke-Popham was sent
to Singapore as Commander-in-chief of land and air forces in the
Far East. Brooke-Popham saw the problems of not having enough
aircraft and tanks, and appealed for more. Britain had just suffered
losses at Dunkirk, and his needs could not be met. However, in
the last weeks of 1940, Indian and British infantry arrived in
Singapore, followed by a newly formed Australian 8th Division
in February 1941 and a second Indian division the next month.
However, because the Japanese were kept busy fighting with China,
Singapore got complacent and relaxed. There was lots of money
to be made in the rubber and tin industry, and production of these
was given priority over military training.
As allies, Britain, with her one hemisphere navy heavily involved
in the European theatre of war, wanted American warships stationed
at Singapore's brand new naval base, but the Americans preferred
their fleet to be at Pearl Harbour. Thus, because no fleet was
sent to Singapore, a void was created in the Far East which the
Japanese were quick to exploit. Things got even better for Japanese
ambitions when in June 1941 Germany invaded Russia. With the Russian
threat now eliminated, South East Asia looked ripe for the taking.
Japan’s hand was forced when in that same month, America, Britain
and the Netherlands East Indies froze Japanese assets, cutting
off her oil supplies while depriving her of iron, bauxite and
shipping interests in the peninsula. Even though Britain was now
busy fighting Rommel's Afrika Korps in the Middle East, Malaya
and Singapore were still safe from Japanese ambitions because
Japan lacked airfields and naval bases in Indo-China. Japan now
made her move. She occupied bases in southern Vichy French Indo-China,
thus gaining a naval base 750 miles from Singapore and airfields
only 300 miles from northern Malaya.
However, an air of complacency had built in regarding how strong
Singapore was especially if it was attacked by the Japanese.
When the Japanese did land at the beaches of Kota Bharu, in northern
Malaya, Singapore’s governor, Sir Shenton Thomas is alleged to
have said to the military authorities of Malaya Command,"Well, I suppose you’ll (the army) shove the little men off."
It was, of course, not to be. As Raymond Callahan puts it in his
book 'The Worst Disaster - The Fall of Singapore,' "By May 1942, the Japanese had stood on the frontiers of India.
In 6 incredible months they had humiliated the Western powers
militarily and in the eyes of their Asian subjects, and erased
their centuries-old colonial presence in East and Southeast Asia.
Even the subsequent defeat of japan could not undo the consequences.
The European powers, weakened by the war, their prestige gone,
came back in 1945 only to make preparations for a final departure;
reasonably decorous in the case of the British, bitter for the
Dutch, bloody and protracted for the French. In this collapse
of Western imperium in asia, one of the central historical facts
of our time, the fall of Singapore will always stand out - the
most spectacular event of the chain that brought to an end Asia's
dominance by the West."
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