"Of
Battlefields and Bitter Feuds: The 96th Pennsylvania
Volunteers"
by David A.
Ward
This article was
published by Civil War Regiments, volume 3, number
3. 1993.
As the soldiers of
the 96th Pennsylvania Volunteers trudged back to their
camp near the Chickahominy River, on the morning of June
27, 1862, many of the men in the regiment sensed that
overnight the war on the Peninsula had somehow profoundly
changed. Tired from performing fatigue duty near Old
Tavern, where the Unionists assisted in the construction
of an earthen redoubt, the infantrymen were denied rest
upon reaching their destination. Instead of a much needed
halt, the weary volunteers were issued two days' rations
and ordered to march toward the Chickahominy crossings.
The booming of the artillery on the north side of the
river, which grew louder with each step, foreshadowed the
fury that awaited the soldiers of the 96th Pennsylvania
on the Union held heights above Woodbury's Bridge. At 3
p.m., after resting several hours in the vicinity of
Golding's farm, the Pennsylvanians were ordered to cross
the Chickahominy to support the beleaguered elements of
Fitz John Porter's V Corps, then under attack by elements
of R.E. Lee's Army of Northern Virginia.2
Slowly, the
soldiers of Brig. Gen. Henry Slocum's division marched
across the rickety span and up Turkey Hill toward the
battle raging across Boatswain's Swamp. Now, at last, the
green volunteers, mostly Irish, German and Welsh
immigrants from the southern anthracite coal fields of
Schuylkill County, were advancing to meet the foe in
battle. As the volunteers from Pennsylvania, commanded by
Col. Henry Lutz Cake, marched toward the battleground,
the men knew that the warm, humid Virginia weather would
soon give way to a storm of lead and iron. The maelstrom
of battle at Gaines' Mill would test the combat
effectiveness of the coal miners turned volunteer
soldiers.3
Nearly ten months
prior to the Battle of Gaines' Mill, Henry L. Cake,
former colonel of the 25th Pennsylvania Volunteers, one
of the ninety-day regiments formed in response to
Lincoln's initial call for volunteers, received
permission from the War Department to recruit and
organize a regiment of infantry. Cake, 33-years-old at
the outbreak of the rebellion, was a natural choice to
command the 96th Pennsylvania Volunteers. After moving to
Pottsville in 1847, he established a weekly newspaper,
the Mining Record, and quickly became a familiar face at
local political gatherings. As Cake's influence within
the community grew, he became a member, and later the
chief financial supporter, of one of the town's militia
companies, the National Light Infantry. Throughout the
1850's he also acquired interests in the booming
anthracite coal industry. By 1861, he was one of the
county's most successful businessmen as well as an
attractive political candidate, with lofty aspirations.
During the early days of the Civil War, Cake commanded
the 25th Pennsylvania, leading that unit through the
Rockville Expedition and later participating in Robert
Patterson's movements in the Shenandoah Valley. This
field experience secured for him the colonelcy of the
96th Pennsylvania from the "War Governor," Andrew Gregg
Curtin.4
Near the end of
September, Cake's new command was mustered into United
States service. Jacob G. Frick, a native of
Northumberland, Pennsylvania, was elected by the line
officers to serve as the regiment's lieutenant colonel.
Frick, 36-years-old at the start of the war, was a
logical choice for this important position. Unlike the
other volunteers, Frick served as a second lieutenant in
the Mexican War and later acted as an assistant
instructor of infantry tactics at Fort McHenry.
Certainly, Frick's military experience made him an
attractive officer for a regiment of untrained
citizens-turned-soldiers. Completing the field officer
staff of the 96th Pennsylvania was Major Lewis Martin, a
former junior officer with the 25th Pennsylvania. Now,
however, this civil engineer would confront the
formidable task of commanding volunteer soldiers in
battle. To Cake, Frick and Martin fell the arduous task
of training the volunteers of the 96th Pennsylvania in
the intricate maneuvers of nineteenth century warfare and
the rudiments of military drill and
discipline.5
During the crisp
October days, while Lieutenant Colonel Frick molded the
96th Pennsylvania into an effective fighting force,
Colonel Cake was preoccupied with other matters.
Throughout the late summer, and continuing into the
autumn, Cake was frequently absent from Camp Schuylkill,
the name given to the regiment's camp of instruction,
attempting to garner the necessary political backing
which would enable him to earn a seat in the Pennsylvania
State Senate. Cake's political campaign, in which he
failed to emerge victorious in the general election,
succeeded only in undermining his military relationship
with Lieutenant Colonel Frick. Before personality
differences and regimental politics could divide the
field and staff officers of the unit, however, the 96th
Pennsylvania Volunteers left Pottsville to join the Army
of the Potomac. Upon reaching Washington, the 96th
Pennsylvania was ordered to cross the Potomac and select
a suitable site for winter quarters.6
Like the winter
weather, officer relations, especially in the upper
echelon regimental staff, turned cold and stormy during
the long encampment in the Virginia countryside. At Camp
Northumberland, the senior line officer, Capt. Peter A.
Filbert, like Lieutenant Colonel Frick, began to
experience personal as well as procedural differences,
especially where military regulations were concerned,
with Colonel Cake. During the winter at Camp
Northumberland, Captain Filbert and Lieutenant Colonel
Frick emerged as harsh critics of Colonel Cake and the
spokesmen of the field and staff officers dissatisfied
with the colonel's leadership.7 Like his friend Jacob
Frick, Filbert scorned Cake for his disregard of military
procedure and the colonel's unorthodox management of the
regiment. In detailed letters to his father, Filbert
documented orders and directives issued by Cake which
circumvented military regulations and
procedures.8
According to
Filbert, Cake's first violation, and a most serious one,
of military regulations occurred at Camp Schuylkill. In
late September, when the 96th Pennsylvania was still in
its original camp of instruction at Pottsville, Cake, in
the judgment of Captain Filbert, illegally mustered under
strength companies into United States service. To muster
these companies, Cake temporarily transferred men from
companies above minimum strength to those that required
additional soldiers. This procedure violated Article LII,
Section 1642 of the Revised Regulations for the Army of
the United States, which stated that, "Officers mustering
in troops will be careful that men from one company or
detachment are not borrowed for the occasion to swell the
ranks of others about to be mustered." 9 Filbert's
allegation brought into question Cake's regard for
military protocol and his management of regimental
affairs. Such decisions by Cake only served to erode the
colonel's credibility with his chief
subordinates.
Along with problems
concerning mustering, Filbert also noted deficiencies
with many of the rank and file of the 96th Pennsylvania
in regard to routine camp duties. The senior captain
complained bitterly about the unprofessional conduct of
many of his brother officers. Throughout the winter,
while conducting inspection tours as officer-of-the-day,
Filbert noted that the sentries performing outpost duty
often failed to challenge him as he approached their
positions. In one report, written to Brigadier General
Slocum, Filbert, ". . .found the guard well instructed,
with the exception of the 96th Penn. Vol., in the Manual
of Arms." Filbert also noted in his journal that one of
the sentries was, ". . .taken up [with]
intoxicating liquors."10
In his diary and
letters, the senior captain also recorded the high rate
of officer absenteeism from camp, the disregard of
military regulations and the prevalent intoxication of
many of the officers. On January 14, 1862, Filbert wrote
in his journal, "Adjutant drunk in tent. Sgt. Major drunk
in the tent. Major. . .sick in tent." In addition to
expressing and documenting his dissatisfaction with
Colonel Cake and lamenting the misconduct of any of the
96th Pennsylvania's officers, Filbert was also
preoccupied with a problem regarding the regimental
sutler.11
As the winter winds
whipped through the company streets of the 96th
Pennsylvania's camp, a bitter feud developed between the
sutler and the line officers. This prolonged dispute,
which caused considerable unrest within the officer corps
of the regiment, further polarized Captain Filbert and
Colonel Cake. The sutler controversy originated during
the autumn of 1861, while the regiment was still
bivouacked at Camp Schuylkill. After the regiment was
organized, Cake ordered the line captains to purchase
caps, at what the officers deemed an inflated price, from
the regimental sutler. This directive provoked a great
deal of resentment toward Cake from the line officers
because the colonel forced them to pay for the headgear
out of their limited company funds.12 In late February,
1862, when company funds were dwindling and needed most
to procure food for the soldiers, Cake again enraged his
subordinates when he ordered each company commander to
purchase leggings from the sutler. This time, however,
the angry line officers actively opposed Cake's mandate.
In order to address the sutler problem the line captains
recommended that Colonel Cake refer the matter to the
regiment's Council of Administration. No doubt the
captains believed that only the Council could find a
solution to the controversy embroiling the sutler and the
field and staff officers of the regiment.13
The Civil War
sutler, according to Henry Castle, "ranked a trifle
higher than a corporal, [and] a fraction lower
than an army mule."14 Whatever his rank, he posed a
peculiar dilemma for the regiment he served. The sutler,
usually a civilian appointed to serve a particular
regiment, sold provisions to the soldiers not furnished
them by the government. In 1862, in order to prevent
sutlers from charging exorbitant prices for their goods,
Congress enacted legislation to regulate the business of
sutling. Article XXII, Section 198, of the Revised
Regulations also sought to regulate sutling by, "imposing
a tax. . .[upon the sutler payable to the regimental
fund] not to exceed ten cents a month for every
soldier of the command."15 While he might charge
excessive prices, the Civil War sutler was subject to
price ceilings and was required to pay a percentage of
his monthly business - in effect an operating tax - to
the unit he served. To insure that the sutler complied
with the monthly assessment, Civil War regiments
appointed and empowered a Council of Administration -
composed of the lieutenant colonel, major and senior
captain - to oversee the affairs of the sutler. The
Council, too, disbursed money from the regimental fund to
the various company funds.16 Thus, a sutler who did not
contribute to the regimental fund posed a serious threat
to the econometric scheme of a Civil War regiment. Such a
situation developed within the 96th Pennsylvania
Volunteers during the first winter of the war.
During the winter
at Camp Northumberland, the sutler, A.L. Gee, became the
scourge of the line officers by refusing to pay monthly
contributions to the regimental fund. Gee contended that
he was exempt from the operating tax by virtue of a
private agreement with Colonel Cake. Gee's defiance of
Army Regulations, coupled with Cake's orders to his
subordinates, directing them to purchase nonregulation
equipment from the sutler, posed serious financial
problems for the line captains who struggled to meet
their monthly expenses under adverse economic conditions.
Cake further exacerbated the sutler issue by refusing to
support the Council of Administration in its efforts to
collect the monthly operating tax from sutler
Gee.17
But before the
company commanders could present their grievances to
Colonel Cake, the grand army assembled under George
Brinton McClellan began to awaken from its winter
slumber. On a brisk spring morning the soldiers from
Schuylkill County tramped toward the wharves at
Alexandria to board transports. Soon the Federals from
Pennsylvania would exchange rifle fire with the
Secessionists charged with the defense of Richmond - the
symbol of the Confederacy - as participants in George B.
McClellan's ill-fated Peninsula Campaign.
Seven weeks after
their first encounter with the Confederates - at the
Battle of Eltham's Landing - the soldiers of the 96th
Pennsylvania prepared themselves for a general
engagement. In late June, after a cautious and deliberate
advance up the Virginia Peninsula , the Confederates were
ready to launch an offensive to drive the Bluecoats from
the immediate environs of Richmond. Now, the Confederates
would be led by R.E. Lee, who succeeded Gen. Joseph E.
Johnston after he fell wounded at the Battle of Seven
Pines (Fair Oaks) on May 31, 1862. After assuming
command, Lee moved quickly, and on June 26 assaulted
Brig. Gen. Fitz-John Porter's V Corps - the right wing of
McClellan's army - along Beaver Dam Creek near the hamlet
of Mechanicsville. After repulsing a series of poorly
coordinated attacks, Porters command fell back under the
cover of darkness to the heights near Gaines' Mill, where
Lee promptly struck again the following day.
Upon reaching the
battlefield near Gaines' Mill, the Schuylkill County
regiment, along with the other units of Col. Joseph
Jackson Bartlett's second brigade, marched to the extreme
right flank of the Union line. Bartlett's command was
ordered to support George Sykes' United States Regulars,
who were being hard pressed by Daniel Harvey Hill's
division.19 After arriving at Sykes' threatened sector,
Bartlett ordered his brigade to take shelter in a ravine,
while awaiting further orders. According to one officer
in the 96th Pennsylvania, the Schuylkill Countians,
"rested. . .while a perfect shower of shot, shell and
balls passed over our heads. It was intensely hot and
dusty, and the fatigue of the men rendered this
[halt] necessary."20 As the 96th Pennsylvania
awaited instructions from Bartlett, Southern artillery
fire enfiladed the position held by the Unionists. One
veteran recalled that, "A shell fell into the closed
masses of the regiment, but thank God! it did not
explode, but bounding from the ground flew hissing down
the ravine."21 In response to this incident, Cake moved
his column forward to take advantage of the relative
safety afforded by more favorable terrain. Late in the
afternoon, after Bartlett sent forth his three veteran
regiments, the New Yorker ordered forward the 96th
Pennsylvania. After deploying his command in line of
battle, in front of the McGehee farm house, Cake, on
horseback twenty yards in front of the regiment, waved
his hand and ordered the Pennsylvanians, "Forward! Double
quick!"22
As soon as Cake's
command pressed forward, casualties began to mount.
Lieut. Ernest Ellrich, "a brave and meritorious officer,"
was killed as he urged the men of Company B toward the
enemy. Another Schuylkill Countian noted that, "From the
beginning of the fight the Colonel was grand, cool,
thoughtful [and] careful of his men."23 Others in
the ranks believed Cake to be invincible in battle. As
the Pennsylvanians continued across the corn field, a
private in Company D told Lt. Zaccur P. Boyer to, "Listen
to the bullets." To this Boyer responded, "What of that."
The private then exclaimed, "Look! They don't hit the
Colonel!"24 One volunteer later recalled that as the 96th
Pennsylvania moved to support the Regulars, the regiment
advanced "across the field in fine style, the men coming
up square." 25 A mounted officer of the Regulars later
proclaimed that the movement of the 96th Pennsylvania was
"one of the best things of the action."
While holding their
position beyond the McGehee house, Cake ordered his men
to lie down, as Confederate infantry poured rifle fire
into the Schuylkill Countians from their right flank.
Minutes later, Cake ordered his troops to stand and
deliver a volley, which "silence[d] [the
fire] of the rebels for a short time." For the next
hour, the 96th Pennsylvania was locked in combat with the
5th and 26th Alabama regiments, part of Brig. Gen. Robert
E. Rodes' fragmented brigade.26
As the 96th
Pennsylvania blazed away at the Alabamians, Cake rode
along the battle line encouraging his soldiers and
insuring that his regiment maintained contact on the left
flank with the 5th Maine and the 16th New York, holding
the extreme right flank of the Federal position. Finally,
at 8:30 p.m., after the 96th Pennsylvania sustained 13
killed and 61 men wounded, Bartlett issued orders to
disengage and withdraw to the south side of the
Chickahominy.27 Upon crossing Woodbury Bridge, several
officers of the 3rd U. S. Regulars, according to one
witness, "were eulogistic in their praise of the
Ninety-sixth." The Regulars agreed that the Schuylkill
Countians, "had done nobly. . .in this. .
.[their] first general engagement, [and].
. .had established a reputation for coolness and
gallantry, which was only accorded to veteran
troops."28
Bartlett, in his
official after-action report, praised Cake for his
"military excellence." While general officers
complimented their subordinates, the soldiers spoke of
the reality of war. In a letter home, Maj. Lewis Martin
described the frightening lessons he learned at Gaines'
Mill. "I for one," Martin wrote to his wife, "always
hooted at the idea of 'Lead & Iron hail' but I saw
and heard. . .what I have no longer any curiosity to hear
and see."29 A week following the great battle at Gaines'
Mill, the men of the 96th Pennsylvania, enfeebled and
hausted, sought refuge at Harrison's Landing.
Gaines' Mill proved
to be the most deadly battle of the Seven Days'
engagements for the 96th Pennsylvania Volunteers.
Following the withdrawal of the Unionists south of the
Chickahominy, Lee continued to press his offensive, which
culminated in the Battle of Malvern Hill on July 1, 1862.
A week later, the 96th Pennsylvania, along with the
balance of McClellan's army, the Bluecoats sought refuge
along the banks of the James River at Harrison's
Landing.30
On July 13, while
the 96th Pennsylvania was encamped in the glue-like mud
of Camp Haeseler on Westover Plain, the line captains
confronted Colonel Cake on the unresolved sutler
issue.The officers submitted a petition to Cake demanding
that he instruct the sutler to reduce prices and pay the
monthly operating tax to the regimental fund. Upon
receipt of the document, Cake confiscated the swords of
the officers and placed them under arrest. In regard to
the incident, Captain Filbert recalled, "He [Col.
Cake]. . .placed us under arrest [and] asked
for an apology, which has not been given and far from
giving." A day after the nasty proceedings, Cake
reprimanded his officers and told them, "You can now take
your swords and go to your quarters [but] until
you apologize I can not respect you as officers of this
regiment."31 Two weeks later, perhaps sensing a mutiny
within his command, Cake granted approval for the Council
of Administration to convene, examine Gee, and find a
solution to the ongoing sutler problem. But before the
Council could meet, one of its members resigned from the
Pennsylvania regiment.32
In late July,
Lieutenant Colonel Frick, Filbert's friend and ally
throughout the sutler ordeal, tendered a letter of
resignation to Brig. Gen. Seth Williams, adjutant general
of the Army of the Potomac. Frick left the 96th
Pennsylvania in order to accept the colonelcy of the
newly formed 129th Pennsylvania Volunteers, a nine-month
regiment.33 While Frick returned to Schuylkill County to
assume command of his new regiment, Filbert decided that
he would vigorously pursue the sutler issue to a
conclusion. On August 1, after much unnecessary delay,
the Council of Administration finally met with sutler
Gee. After examining Gee, the Council resolved that the
sutler, in a compromise agreement, would pay the amount
due the regimental fund retroactive to November,
1861.34
After learning of
the Council's settlement with Gee, Cake told Filbert
that, "he would get rid of him and four other officers
whom he disliked." 35 The prolonged sutler squabble was
deemed by Cake to be a personal affront toward him by his
junior officers. He also considered the incident to be a
challenge to his authority and an assault upon his
character. The sutler affair, too, further alienated
Colonel Cake and Captain Filbert and thrust them closer
to a final confrontation. But before the closing act of
the Filbert - Cake feud could be played out, the 96th
Pennsylvania evacuated Harrison's Landing, destined to
confront elements of Lee's army in the shadow of South
Mountain. In late August, after returning to Alexandria
from the Union encampment at Harrison's Landing, the 96th
Pennsylvania, along with elements of the VI Corps, helped
cover the retreat of Maj. Gen. John Pope's Army of
Virginia and its defeat at Second Bull Run. Soon after
Pope's withdrawal to the environs of Washington, the VI
Corps marched northwestward into the Maryland countryside
toward an impending rendezvous with Lee's victorious
army.36
On September 14,
the vanguard of Maj. Gen. William B. Franklin's VI Corps
reached the village of Burkittsville, Maryland, situated
near the base of Crampton's Gap. The day before, a
confident McClellan issued orders to his VI Corps
commander. "My general idea," McClellan wrote, "is to cut
the enemy in two and beat him in detail ... You will move
at daybreak in the morning ... Having gained the pass
[Crampton's Gap] your duty will be first to cut
off, destroy, or capture McLaws' command and relieve
[the garrison at Harpers Ferry]."37 Ascertaining
that the Confederates were determined to hold this vital
pass over South Mountain, Franklin made preparations to
attack the Secessionists. After consulting his chief
subordinates, Franklin directed Major General Slocum,
commanding the first division, to deploy his command and
assault the Confederates arrayed in a line of battle at
the base of the mountain.38
After assessing the
tactical situation and determining that the enemy force
consisted of "four cavalry men, two guns and no
infantry," Slocum ordered Bartlett to send his brigade
across the farm fields toward the Secessionists. Arrayed
behind a stone wall, three small Virginia regiments from
William Mahone's Brigade, two dismounted cavalry regimens
from Col. Thomas Munford's Brigade, and a battery of
horse artillery, awaited the Unionist onslaught. Elements
of two additional regiments under Col. William T. Parham
joined the Confederate battle line soon after the
fighting began. This force, facing an entire Union
division, numbered no more than 1,000 men and was
commanded by Colonel Munford.39
Near 5:30 p.m.,
Cake received orders to draw in his skirmishers and march
his men behind the first division, to the extreme right
of the Federal position. Upon reaching their assigned
position and deploying in line of battle, Bartlett rode
up to the Schuylkill Countians and thundered, "Now
Pennsylvanians, do your duty!"40 After Bartlett inspired
the troops, Cake ordered the 96th Pennsylvania forward
and led his command across the rolling terrain toward the
Confederates posted along the Church Mountain Road at the
base of South Mountain. As the Pennsylvanians closed on
the Southerners, one of the line officers shouted,
"Forward into the road and give them the bayonet - it is
death for all to hesitate now!"41 Emerging from a
cornfield, 81 of the regiment were felled by a thunderous
volley from the 6th Virginia and 10th Georgia. It was at
this point that Major Martin, while attempting to push
forward the right wing of the regiment, was mortally
wounded.42 According to Colonel Cake, the murderous rifle
fire did not turn back the oncoming Federals. In his
after-action report Cake wrote, "Shocked but not
repulsed, the men bounded forward, determined to end it
with the bayonet." After the battle, Cake recalled that
the enemy fell back upon the mountain, and those, "...
who were not hurt, and who seemed too much surprised to
get away, begged lustily for mercy." As the Graycoats
scrambled up the mountain, additional Confederate units
were arriving at Crampton's Gap to support the fleeing
refugees.43
After overrunning
the Confederates at the stone wall, the Pennsylvania
regiment reformed its ranks for the final ascent up the
steep mountainside of Crampton's Gap. After firing a
volley into the refugees fleeing up the slope, the
Pennsylvanians continued their pursuit of the
disorganized Confederates. As the Schuylkill Countians
surged up the mountain they encountered the 15th North
Carolina and the 16th Georgia, elements of Brig. Gen.
Howell Cobb's Brigade who were trying desperately to hold
back the oncoming tide of Unionists. Cobb, however, was
too late. Not even a section of the Troup Artillery could
slow the Unionists as the reached the crest of the
mountain.44
As the Federals
reached the summit of the mountain, rifle fire from the
Confederates became sporadic. At this point the soldiers
of the 96th Pennsylvania knew that they were on the verge
of a decisive victory. As twilight descended upon
Crampton's Gap the Confederate commanders vainly
attempted to form one last line of battle to halt the
Unionists. But too many attackers caused the dispirited
Secessionists to break ranks and flee wildly down the
west side of the mountain. Recollecting the assault in
his after-action report, Cake wrote, "It was a most
exhausting charge. I let the men advance nearly as fast
as they could and wanted to."45
Writing in a
post-war memoir about the fighting at Crampton's Gap,
Henry Boyer stated that the Pennsylvanians advanced up
the steep mountainside, ". . .horribly killing or
wounding all we could of those who resisted or would not
stop, and mercifully sparing and capturing all who
manifested a disposition to surrender."46
As darkness cast
its shroud across the Catoctin Valley, the jubilant
Unionists celebrated their victory atop Crampton's Gap.
The next morning several members of the regiment returned
to the scene of the previous day's carnage. In his diary,
Capt. Jacob W. Haas, commanding Company G, boasted that,
"Where we advanced they [the Confederates] laid
the thickest."47 Walking along the stone wall, Henry
Boyer also surveyed the dead soldiers. During the battle,
Boyer believed that the men of the 96th Pennsylvania,
"bayoneted a hundred and fifty in that road, but when we
returned to bury them we found but twelve."48
After the battle,
Capt. Henry Royer informed his father that it was, "a
wonder that. . .[my] brave and gallant company
[H] were not annihilated." In recalling the
assault Royer wrote, "It required no skill. Our course
was plain, straight, onward and forward. Oh! how they did
fight, and how they did fall!"49
While members of
the regiment attended to their wounded comrades, formed
burial details and rested from the rigors of the battle
and campaign, Maj. Gen. Henry Slocum passed through the
camp of the 96th Pennsylvania. Spotting Colonel Cake, the
general pleasantly nodded and quipped, "Colonel, your
coal heavers did well!"50
After the Battle of
Antietam, the soldiers of the 96th Pennsylvania encamped
near Bakersville, where they rested from the rigors of
the Maryland campaign. While the Schuylkill Countians
enjoyed the respite from waging war near Baker's grist
mill, the nasty business of regimental politics once
again took center stage. In the aftermath of the battles
of South Mountain and the sanguinary day at Sharpsburg,
VI Corps headquarters directed Colonel Cake to fill the
two staff officer vacancies existing within his command.
Frick's lieutenant colonelcy was unfilled since his
resignation at the close of the Peninsula Campaign, while
Martin's mortal wounding at Crampton's Gap created the
need for a new major. Military Regulations prescribed
that, "vacancies in established regiments, to the rank of
colonel," should be "filled by promotion according to
seniority."51 What appeared as a simple matter -
promoting the two senior officers to fill the vacant
regimental officer positions - became a complicated
affair within the officer ranks of the 96th Pennsylvania.
The quest for these coveted offices would array Captain
Filbert and Colonel Cake directly against each other.
During the course of the next few months, both men would
wage a bitter dispute regarding these two important
appointments.52
Upon learning that
Cake had been ordered by VI Corps headquarters to fill
the vacant staff officer positions within the 96th
Pennsylvania, Filbert was excited at the prospect of
advancing to the grade of lieutenant colonel. Although
Filbert viewed the colonel with disdain and stated to his
father that the "Cake faction" was intent only on
"elevating and favoring Pottsville men of the regiment,"
he nonetheless believed that Frick's resignation and
Martin's death would end all political machinations
within the 96th Pennsylvania.53 The cautious Filbert,
however, constantly reminded himself of Cake's penchant
for promoting his cronies when vacancies arose, and for
dismissing his enemies when that avenue suited his needs.
The senior captain often recalled Cake's delight in
relating the story of how he "was rid of two of his
officers and would follow the other to the Gates of
Hell."54 While Filbert knew of Cake's past indiscretions
in regimental promotions, and the colonel's propensity
for violating military procedure, he believed that Cake
would not be able to influence the appointments of the
new lieutenant colonel and major. Filbert, however,
underestimated the malevolence of the regimental
commander.
On the evening of
September 29, Cake summoned the line officers to his tent
and informed them of an order from VI Corps headquarters
directing him to promote two men to fill the vacant staff
officer positions within the regiment. Cake also
explained that he did not wish to conduct these
promotions in accordance with Military Regulations. He
proposed that the line officers elect the new lieutenant
colonel, while reserving for him the privilege of
appointing the new major. After meeting with Cake,
Filbert and his brother officers unanimously agreed to
elect the senior captain to the lieutenant colonelcy and
to deny Colonel Cake the authority to appoint the officer
of his choice to the rank of major. After reflecting upon
the situation, Filbert told the company commanders that,
"he would stand by [them] and prefer to remain a
captain [than] to act dishonorable."55 The next
day, Filbert delivered the following message, on behalf
of the line officers, to Col. Cake: "Sir, In filling the
vacancies now existing in the regiment we respectfully
suggest that our preference is that it be done in regular
line of promotion according to seniority."56 Cake
responded to this declaration by issuing Regimental Order
Number 39, which altered the arrangement of the seniority
roster. Upon learning of Order 39, Filbert wrote lengthy
letters to Governor Andrew Curtin and Oliver Duff Greene,
Acting Adj. Gen. of the VI Corps, explaining the
situation within the camp of the 96th Pennsylvania. The
issuance of Filbert's letters, along with the disclosure
of army documents supporting his claim to the lieutenant
colonelcy, to Curtin and Greene, clearly indicated that
the senior captain and Colonel Cake were locked in a
power struggle from which neither could loosen his grip.
To insure that his commission as lieutenant colonel would
not fail, Filbert wrote to his father and asked for
political support in Harrisburg. In the same missive,
Filbert also stated that he would try to "make things
uncomfortable" for Colonel Cake, whom he referred to as
the "old war horse."57
In later October,
Filbert's father informed him that his commission as
lieutenant colonel had met with approval.58 On the last
day of the month, an optimistic Peter Filbert, believing
that at long last he and Colonel Cake could lay aside
their grievances, strode toward the colonel's tent to be
formally recognized as lieutenant colonel of the 96th
Pennsylvania. Cake, however, astonished Filbert by
refusing to honor his commission, stating that he had a
policy of not recognizing officers who did not obtain
their promotions through him. Failing to gain Cake's
approval, Filbert gathered his documentation and reported
to Lieutenant William Borrowe, mustering officer of the
first division, VI Corps. After examining Filbert's
supporting evidence, Borrowe mustered the former senior
captain in the grade of lieutenant colonel.59
Upon learning of
Filbert's resourcefulness, Cake informed him that "he
[Cake] had been beaten in his object." Further,
Cake threatened Filbert by telling him that "he could
control the military department and was going to have him
[Filbert] dismissed," from the service of the
United States. Filbert so infuriated Cake, that the
colonel told him "to take his [Cake's]
commission," as he intended "to resign at once."60 Cake,
however, was not about to renounce his colonelcy of the
regiment. Rather, he immediately began to design an
elaborate trap in which he hoped to snare Lieutenant
Colonel Filbert.
On the same day
that Filbert was mustered by Lieutenant Borrowe, Cake
penned a letter to VI Corps headquarters, requesting that
the new lieutenant colonel be called to appear before a
military board of examination.61 On November 11, while
the VI Corps was in the vicinity of Thoroughfare Gap,
Filbert underwent questioning before a military review
board.62 During the Civil War, a system of examining
boards was established to determine an officer's fitness
to command troops in the field. According to the
historian Stanley Swart, the examining board system was
established so that the "army could by-pass regular
court-martial proceedings in ridding itself of
unqualified volunteer officers through the rank of
colonel, using instead a faster and more informal
procedure." Filbert hoped that his appearance before the
board of examination would firmly establish him as the
regiment's lieutenant colonel and end his problems with
Colonel Cake. After his grueling session before the
board, where he was examined on tactics and army
administration as well as other matters, Filbert felt
confident that the turmoil surrounding his lieutenant
colonelcy could finally be pushed aside. He was eager to
meet the challenge of his new found duties.
As November turned
into December, the mighty Army of the Potomac, under its
new leader, Ambrose Burnside, marched toward a rendezvous
with the Army of Northern Virginia at Fredericksburg.
During the great battle along the Rappahannock, the 96th
Pennsylvania held a portion of the VI Corps line in the
Deep Run ravine sector.63 After the battle, the 96th
Pennsylvania went into winter quarters near White Oak
Church. Soon after the Pennsylvanians went into camp,
Lieutenant Colonel Filbert received a shattering dispatch
from VI Corps headquarters. Much to his dismay, he
learned that the military examination board had rendered
an adverse decision in his case. Effective immediately he
was dismissed from the service of the United States.64
Now, more than ever, Filbert felt the wrath of Colonel
Cake. The lieutenant colonel, perhaps humiliated in
losing his struggle with Cake, departed for home with
dignity and honor. Shortly after Filbert returned to
Schuylkill County, Cake also left the White Oak Church
encampment. Declining health forced Cake to return to
Pottsville, where he planned to convalesce under the care
of his personal physician. During the winter, although
Filbert and Cake were far from the battleground of
Virginia, the pair would engage in one last encounter
concerning regimental politics.
The departure of
Cake from Virginia did not bring an end to officer
politicking within the regiment. In early March 1863,
after ensuring that Lessig would receive command of the
regiment, Cake retired from military life. Upon his
promotion to major, Lessig devised a complex plan to
garner his colonel's eagle and elevate two of his close
associates to fill the vacant posts of lieutenant colonel
and major. In a letter to his brother, Captain Jacob Haas
described the plan. "Today," wrote Haas, "Lessig
forwarded my name for Major; Matt Richards for Lt.
Colonel and his own for Colonel, to the Governor.
Bartlett, Brooks and Sedgwick hace endorsed the
recommendation. ... I jump three other Captains, but they
can't win the way we have it put up."65
Lessig's intricate
promotional scheme, however, was not approved by Governor
Curtin. A month later, the new Federal commander, Maj.
Gen. Joseph Hooker, readied the Army of the Potomac to
march to the Rappahannock, where the Confederates were
reported to be "...as thick as lice," according to
Captain Haas.66 In a boldly conceived plan, Hooker
proposed to move most of his army west, along the
Rappahannock River, croos the Rapidan River and strike at
the left and rear of the Army of Northern Virginia. Maj.
Gen. John Sedgwick's VI Corps, was given the mission of
crossing the Rappahannock at Fredericksburg, thereby
preventing the Confederates from sending troops from that
area to defend against Hooker's primary envelopment
several miles to the west.67
Early on the
morning of April 28, the bell in the Episcopal Church, in
Fredericksburg, rang out the alarm that the Federal
columns were marching toward the Rappahannock. By early
afternoon, "Uncle" John Sedgwick, commanding the VI
Corps, had his infantry headed for the area known to the
Unionists as Franklin's Crossing &emdash; the spot used
by Major General Franklin to cross the river in the
December battle. The next day, after successfully
crossing the river and driving back the Confederate
pickets, the 96th Pennsylvania went into position in the
vicinity of the Bernard farm.68
On May 3, the
soldiers of the Greek Cross Corps marched by the right
flank, toward Fredericksburg, with orders to break the
Confederate position atop Marye's Heights. As the first
division of the VI Corps tramped along the Old Richmond
Stage Road, Bartlett ordered Maj. Lessig to lead his
regiment against a Confederate position near the
railroad, in the Deep Run sector, which posed a threat to
the flank march of the corps.69 Early in the morning,
after reconnoitering the ground his regiment was to
advance across, Lessig instructed his command, "to
unsling knapsacks, fix bayonets and [to] advance
at a double quick."70 As the 96th Pennsylvania moved
forward, a Secessionist battery positioned behind the
railroad line, sprayed the Federals with deadly grape and
canister charges. Suddenly, with a cheer, the Schuylkill
Countians,supported by the 5th Maine, surged toward the
Confederates, prompting Maj. Gen. William T.H. Brooks to
solemnly state, "that's the last we'll see of the
Ninety-sixth." Brigadier General Bartlett also shared
Brooks' sentiment. The New Yorker, astride his horse,
could only mutter, "Noble men, noble men." In this
assault, the 96th Pennsylvania lost four men killed and
19 wounded.71
By the time the
Schuylkill Countians reached Fredericksburg, the
Confederates had been driven from their fortified heights
and Sedgwick was preparing to march his troops toward the
Chancellorsville crossroads. It was quickly decided that
Brig. Gen. William T.H. Brooks' First Division would lead
the march of the VI Corps, following the Plank Road,
toward the fighting at Chancellorsville. Just west of
Fredericksburg, near Salem Church, Brooks' column was
slowed by artillery fire from Cadmus Wilcox's batteries
posted along the Salem Heights ridge. Not knowing the
strength of Wilcox's brigade, Brooks deployed a strong
skirmish line and unlimbered his artillery in an effort
to sweep aside the Secessionists. Bartlett instructed
Lessig to move the 96th Pennsylvania south of the Orange
Turnpike, and then to assault the 8th Alabama, already
deployed along the ridge west of Salem Church. Little did
Lessig know, as he ordered his regiment forward, that
"Brooks' Lambs" were advancing to their
slaughter.72
As the 96th
Pennsylvania formed on the extreme left wing of the
Federal line, Lessig prepared to move his tired command
against the Graycoats concealed by the belt of woods
running along Salem Heights.73 Bartlett formed his
brigade on the extreme left wing of the Federal line,
with the 5th Maine anchoring the Union flank, and the
96th Pennsylvania and 121st New York next in line.74 In a
lengthy letter written nine days after the battle,
Captain Haas, described the resultant clash of arms with
Wilcox's Alabamians.
As we got in the
edge of the woods I saw a few Rebel skirmishers popping
at our skirmishers. I told my men to take plenty of room
and leave a pace between each file. We passed on and when
within 30 paces of the field on the other side of the
woods, suddenly I saw two lines of battle of the "Rebs"
rise to their feet. I ordered my men to put in a volley
which they did with fine effect. . . . And then the
circus commenced. We fired as fast as we could and Johnny
Reb done the same.75
Although the
Pennsylvanians displayed great valor, they could not
break through the Confederate position. Slowly,
Bartlett's brigade yielded to the intense rifle fire and
began to give way and fall back. As Bartlett's line of
battle collapsed, Lessig sought to execute an orderly
withdrawal of the 96th Pennsylvania. With consummate
skill, the Pennsylvanians retreated, stopping at the
eastern edge of the woods to deliver a final volley. For
the 96th Pennsylvania this day proved to be their most
difficult under arms. First, they lost five killed and 18
wounded in the morning fight at Fredericksburg, followed
in the afternoon with 16 killed, 54 wounded and 29
missing in the combat at Salem Church.76 As nightfall
ended the fighting, the veterans of the 96th Pennsylvania
realized that there would be no linkage with Hooker's
beleaguered forces at Chancellorsville.
Though fatigued,
the Unionists were not dispirited. Shortly after the
close of the Chancellorsville operation, Pvt. Daniel
Faust, in a letter to his mother, spoke for the soldiers
in the 96th Pennsylvania when he wrote, "We had a nice
little dual with them [the Confederates] and I
think if we had stuck to it a little longer we would have
whipped them severely."77
Following the
Chancellorsville operation, the 96th Pennsylvania
returned to their winter camp site at White Oak Church.
In June, after R.E. Lee pushed his army northward, the VI
Corps, along with the balance of the Army of the Potomac,
abandoned its camps near Fredericksburg and started along
the road which would become the Gettysburg Campaign. For
the Schuylkill Countians, the great forced march
conducted on July 2 - which earned for the veterans of
the Greek Cross Corps the sobriquet "Sedgwick's Foot
Cavalry" - proved to be their brightest moment in the
operations in Pennsylvania. At Gettysburg, the VI Corps
was not heavily engaged, arriving on the battlefield in
the late afternoon of July 2. Sedgwick's command was
subsequently dispersed and sent to different sectors
along the Union line.79 In the autumn of 1863, after
pursuing the Confederates back across the Potomac, the
96th Pennsylvania moved down the line of the Orange and
Alexandria Railroad. In early November, the Schuylkill
Countians played a supportive role in the dramatic night
attack upon the Confederate works at Rappahannock
Station. After the aborted Mine Run Campaign, the 96th
Pennsylvania went into winter quarters in the vicinity of
Brandy Station, Virginia, where they camped until the
following spring.80
On May 4, 1864, the
96th Pennsylvania, along with the other elements of the
Army of the Potomac, tramped out of its winter quarters
toward the lower crossings of the Rapidan River. As the
soldiers marched away from Brandy Station, little did
they know what awaited them at a strange, fearful place
called the Wilderness. As the Bluecoats attempted to
march through the impenetrable thickets, Lee's army moved
quickly east and struck Grant's columns a savage blow.
Arriving on the battlefield several hours late, the 96th
Pennsylvania, along with the first division of the VI
Corps, deployed north of the Orange Turnpike along the
eastern edge of Sanders' Field. The carnage of the
fighting that had taken place several hours before could
be seen everywhere. After conducting a reconnaissance,
the 96th Pennsylvania held its sector of the Union line
and performed skirmish duty in its front during the
Wilderness fighting. Overnight, May 7-8, to the tune of a
camp ditty, Ain't I Glad to Get Out of the Wilderness,
the VI Corps marched toward the vital crossroad at
Spotsylvania Court House.81
Unable to win the
race to Spotsylvania, U.S. Grant sought to continue his
tactical offensive in hopes of achieving some breach in
Lee's defensive line. While the lieutenant general
assessed the grand tactical situation, a young West Point
trained colonel named Emory Upton submitted a bold,
innovative plan to army headquarters outlining a method
for assaulting the Secessionist works.82 Upton believed
that the Unionists could successfully storm an entrenched
position if the Bluecoats attacked on a narrow front,
four lines deep, without pausing to fire their weapons
until a limited penetration was achieved. After listening
to the proposal, Grant and Meade thought so highly of the
plan that they gave Upton twelve veteran regiments to use
in the attack and arranged to have a full division
standing by ready to exploit whatever success was
gained.83
After
reconnoitering the rebel works, Upton elected to strike
the Confederate entrenched line, known as the "Mule
Shoe," along the western face of the salient where three
Georgia regiments commanded by Brig. Gen. Robert Doles
were positioned. Late in the afternoon of May 10, as the
twelve Union regiments waited at the staging area for the
order to advance, Upton issued detailed instructions
concerning the assault to the unit commanders. Upton
directed Major Lessig to wheel the 96th Pennsylvania to
the right, along with the 121st New York, as soon as the
Unionists gained the Secessionist ramparts, and then to
overrun the Confederate batteries posted in that
sector.84 At 5 p.m. the soldiers were ordered to unsling
their knapsacks. From the staging area, the volunteers in
the first line of the assault column - the 5th Maine,
96th Pennsylvania and 121st New York - could peer across
the open terrain, which gradually sloped upward toward
the formidable Confederate position. In front of the
Secessionist entrenchments were lines of bristling
abates, sharpened branches pointing toward the oncoming
Federals.85 As the time for the attack drew near, Upton
reminded each regimental leader to repeatedly shout the
command "forward" throughout the assault in order to
prevent the troops from stopping as they advanced across
the ground. The West Pointer also admonished the Federals
not to cheer, nor to stop and render assistance to
wounded comrades.
Shortly after 6 p.
m. the Union artillery fell silent. At that point, Upton,
astride his horse, turned to his strike force, and
shattering the serenity of the pine forest, shouted,
"Attention battalions! Forward, double quick! Charge!" As
the VI Corps soldiers streamed out of the woods, one
volunteer recalled his immediate thoughts upon hearing
the order to advance.
I felt my gorge
rise, and my stomach and intestines shrink together in a
knot, and a thousand things rushed through my mind. I
fully realized the terrible peril I was to encounter. I
looked about in the faces of the boys around me, and they
told the tale of expected death.86
With a yell,
contrary to Upton's orders, the three lead regiments
rushed forward across the plain toward the Confederate
works. As the Northerners advanced, a sheet of flame
burst from the Rebel entrenchments, spraying a storm of
leaden hail across the slope up which the 96th
Pennsylvania charged. Canister from Confederate artillery
also crashed through the Unionist ranks at every step,
slowing the progress of the attack column. One historian
has suggested that it took the head of Upton's column -
with the 96th Pennsylvania spearheading the attack - "no
longer than sixty to ninety seconds to reach Doles'
works."87 Upon reaching the Secessionist ramparts, the
lead elements of the 96th Pennsylvania clambered over the
parapet and fired their weapons into the mass of
Southerners defending the rifle pit. Henry Keiser, of
Company G, later recalled that as the 96th Pennsylvania
stormed the Confederate line, "the
[Secessionists] were at our mercy as most of
[their] guns were empty while ours were
loaded."88 After breaching the Confederate position, the
engagement soon devolved into hand-to-hand combat.
Describing the action in his diary, Keiser stated that,
"they [the Secessionists] were very stubborn and
the bayonets and clubbed muskets were used freely before
the pit was fully in our possession."89
Within minutes, the
disorganized Graycoats sought refuge in a second rifle
pit. Unable to carry their success forward, due to
enfilading fire, to the new Confederate line, Upton was
compelled to abandon his assault. Shielded by the
darkness, the exhausted soldiers of the 96th Pennsylvania
retreated back across the ground to the safety of the
Federal line. Upton later estimated his casualties at
1,000 killed, wounded or missing.90 Little did the tired
volunteers of the 96th Pennsylvania know, as they rested
from the fury of the battle, that in less than 48 hours
they would spearhead another offensive against the deadly
"Mule Shoe."
Early on the
morning of May 12, the rainfall that soaked the soldiers
throughout the night gave way to misty drizzle and heavy
ground fog. The wet conditions and poor visibility,
however, did not alter the plans of the Union high
command. Near 7 a. m., two and one half hours after
Winfield Hancock's II Corps attacked the northern point
of the Confederate position, Emory Upton's brigade again
deployed in line of battle. After reconnoitering the
tactical situation, Upton ordered his command to advance
at the double-quick toward a point along the western face
of the salient, to be known forever after to the veterans
as the "Bloody Angle." Intense rifle fire from the Rebels
defending the salient disordered the oncoming Federals
and forced the Schuylkill County men to seek protection
from the fearful Confederate volleys behind a crest of
ground close to the Secessionist works. In a post-war
memoir, one volunteer recalled that he could not imagine
"how any of us survived the sharp fire that swept over us
at this point - a fire so keen that it split the blades
of grass all about us, the minies moaning as they picked
out victims by the score." Under heavy musketry from the
determined Confederate defenders, the veterans of the
96th Pennsylvania positioned themselves along one side of
the V shaped Bloody Angle - near the apex - and
throughout the afternoon exchanged rifle fire with the
Secessionists. Fighting face-to-face across the parapet,
the combatants struggled 16 hours for this sector of the
Confederate line. According to Henry Keiser, the tired,
wet, mud stained soldiers of the 96th Pennsylvania
"received a continual shower of lead over the
[rifle] pits," throughout the day.92 In the
afternoon, following a brief cease fire, the fighting at
the Bloody angle turned white hot.
As the rainfall
intensified, the Unionists surged forward in a vain
attempt to gain a foothold inside the enemy breastworks.
According to Lewis Luckenill, the soldiers of the 96th
Pennsylvania "were firing as fast as they could load." In
a desperate measure to support the infantry assault,
Upton ordered forward Battery C, 5th U. S. Artillery, and
instructed the gunners to wheel their pieces to the
Confederate ramparts and open fire at short range with
double charges of canister. This unprecedented use of
field artillery, although it temporarily stunned the
Confederate defenders, could not enable the Unionists to
dislodge and push back the southerners. Undaunted, Upton
then instructed the soldiers to concentrate their rifle
fire against the top, or head logs, of the Confederate
breastworks, which the Unionists "splintered like
brush-brooms." As darkness ended the fighting at the
angle, the battered remnants of the 96th Pennsylvania
withdrew from the firing line. While falling back across
the open ground, Henry Keiser overheard one Union captain
remark that, "The Devil couldn't stand it in
there."96
Following the
fighting at Spotsylvania, the 96th Pennsylvania marched
with the VI Corps to North Anna, and on June 1 supported
an infantry assault at Cold Harbor. Soon after, the Army
of the Potomac reached the suburbs of Petersburg, the
96th Pennsylvania - numbering slightly more than 100 men
- moving into position along the line of the Weldon
Railroad.97 In July, the VI Corps, under the command of
Maj. Gen. Horatio G. Wright, was transferred to
Washington, D.C., in response to Lt. Gen. Jubal Early's
incursion down the Shenandoah Valley.
For the 96th
Pennsylvania, however, its fighting days were numbered
and its feuding days were over. On September 19, 1864, at
Opequon Creek (Third Winchester), the 96th Pennsylvania
merely guarded the VI Corps wagon train along the
Berryville Pike, while the balance of the Greek Cross
Corps veterans attacked and routed Early's Secessionists.
Three days after the battle along Opequon Creek, their
term of service expired, the veterans of the 96th
Pennsylvania turned their backs on the valley and began
the journey back to Schuylkill County. Upon returning
home, a column in the Miners' Journal reported that,
"Three years before [the 96th Pennsylvania] left
Pottsville a thousand strong. The bullet and disease had
done their work, and many who left. . .in full health and
vigor, fill graves in Virginia hills." During its three
years of field service, the 96th Pennsylvania fought in
five battles, ably performing its duties in each
engagement. In sum, the unit forged a reputation as a
courageous, steadfast and dependable regiment of
infantry.
While the soldiers
of the 96th Pennsylvania forged a credible war record,
regimental politics, officer factionalism, and the
ongoing squabble with the unit's sutler, served only to
divide the regiment's field and staff officers. In
December of 1863, just as he had done nine months
earlier, Lessig sought to manipulate officer promotions
at the highest levels within the 96th Pennsylvania.
Governor Curtin again refused to approve Lessig's scheme
to promote him to the rank of colonel and to appoint two
junior officers as his chief subordinates. Finally, in
January 1864, the line officers recommended to Curtin
that Lessig be appointed lieutenant colonel and Levi
Huber, captain of Company B, be promoted to the rank of
major. The soldiers believed that this proposal would,
"...end all dispute and prove agreeable to all interested
as well as promote the good of the service." A month
later, a Regimental Council of Administration was
convened, "...for the purpose of assessing a tax on the
Sutler to raise a Post Fund."98
After the war,
Henry Cake returned to the anthracite coal industry and
later served two terms in the United States House of
Representatives. In 1869, Peter Filbert succeeded in
overturning his dismissal from the army and was
recommissioned in the grade of lieutenant colonel. The
men of the 96th Pennsylvania, like most veterans, held
reunions, erected monuments and marched in parades to
commemorate their service in the Army of the
Potomac.
Slowly, the
gray-bearded veterans passed through the Gilded Age and
into the cemeteries in Pottsville and the surrounding
towns. Perhaps, however, Emory Upton, at one of the
regiment's annual reunions, best characterized the
military career of the 96th Pennsylvania. The wiry,
red-haired general was asked, "Why was it you always
called on the Ninety-sixth Regiment?" To that Upton
snapped, "Why, we called on you because we could depend
on you. It was not very much, perhaps, to your comfort,
but it was very much to the service."99
ENDNOTES
1 David A. Ward is
Assistant Director, Technical Services at the Edsel Ford
Memorial Library, The Hotchkiss School, Lakeville,
Connecticut. He is Program Chairman of the Civil War
Round Table of the Northwest Corner. This article is
based on his master's thesis: "Amidst a Tempest of Shot
and Shell : A History of the Ninety-sixth Pennsylvania
Volunteers," (New Haven, Conn. : Southern Connecticut
State University, 1988).
2 Frak J. Welcher,
The Union Army, 1861-1865, Organization and Operations.
Vol.1 The Eastern Theater, (Bloomington, IN : Uni. Press,
1989), p.395.
3 Lewis Luckenbill,
Diary, June 27, 1862, Civil War Round Table of the
Northwest Corner Collection, United States Army Military
History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Penna.
4 For an incisive
biographical sketch of Cake see, "Colonel H.L. Cake Dead
at Northumberland," Pottsville Miners' Journal, August
28, 1899; U.S., Congress, House, The Biographical
Directory of the American Congress, 1774-1971
(Washington, D.C., 1971), 690; The National Cyclopaedia
of American Biography (New York, 1945), v.5, 352; Edmund
McDonald, "The First Defenders," Philadelphia Weekly
Press, March 24, 1886; Henry L. Cake, "The Dark Days of
'61 : How Schuylkill Responded to Lincoln's Call for
Aid," Pottsville Daily Republican, October 1, 1891;
Marvin W. Schlegel, "The Workingmen's Benevolent
Association : First Union of Anthracite Miners,"
Pennsylvania History, v.10 (October 1943),
243-267.
5 John T. Boyle,
"An Outline Sketch of the Ninety-Sixth Pennsylvania
Volunteers," Philadelphia Weekly Times, July 17, 1886;
Samuel P. Bates, Martial Deeds of
Pennsylvania(Philadelphia, 1876), 58-59.
6 Samuel P. Bates,
History of Pennsylvania Volunteers, 1861-5, (Harrisburg,
PA : B. Singerly, 1869-1871), v.3, p.382.
7 For evidence of
the personality rift between Filbert and Cake, see
Filbert to Father, March 4, 1862, Filbert Papers,
Harrisburg Civil War Round Table Collection, United
States Army Military History Institute, Carlisle
Barracks, Penna.
8 Filbert to
Brother, March 30, 1863, Filbert Papers.
9 Filbert, Diary,
November 2 and 4, 1861, Filbert Papers, documents the
transferral of troops for the purpose of mustering;
Filbert to Father, March 4, 1862, Filbert Papers. U.S.,
War Department, Revised Regulations for the Army of the
United States, 1861 (Philadelphia, 1861), 496.
10 Filbert, Diary,
December 9, 1861, Filbert Papers.
11 Ibid., January
14, 1862.
12 Filbert to
Father, September 30, 1862, Filbert Papers.
13 Filbert to
Father, July 26, 1862, Filbert Papers; See also, Filbert
to Thomas M. Vincent, [undated copy in Filbert
correspondence beginning, "The undersigned has...],
Filbert Papers.
14 Henry Anson
Castle, The Army Mule and Other War Sketches
(Indianapolis, 1897), 111.
15 Revised
Regulations, 34-36.
16 Donald P. Spear,
"The Sutler in the Union Army," Civil War History, v.16,
no.2, (June 1970), 121-138; James McCaffrey, "A Short
History of the Civil War Sutler," Civil War Times
Illustrated, v.24, no.4 (June 1985), 36-39; Waldo
Campbell Hibbs, "The Sutler," Blue and Gray v.3 (1894),
207-209; Francis A. Lord, Civil War Sutlers and Their
Wares (New York, 1969); See also, "An Act to Provide for
the Appointment of Sutlers in the Volunteer Service, and
to Define Their Duties," The Statutes at Large, Treaties,
and Proclamations of the United States of America
(Washington, D.C., 1859-1863), v.12, Chap. 47, 371-373;
Francis A. Lord, They Fought for the Union (New York,
1960), 130-131, 240.
17 Filbert to
Brother, March 30, 1863, Filbert Papers; Revised
Regulations, 34-36.
18 The engagement
at Eltaham's Landing is also referred to as the Battle of
West Point. See, Dwight E. Stinson, "Eltham's landing :
The End Run That Failed," Civil War Times Illustrated,
v.1, no.10 (February 1963), p.38-41.
19 Timothy J.
Reese, Sykes' Regular Infantry Division, 1861-1864 (North
Carolina : McFarland, 1990), 76-91.
20 Francis B.
Wallace, Memorial of the Patriotism of Schuylkill County,
in the American Slaveholder's Rebellion... (Pottsville,
Penna., 1865), 423.
21 Ibid,
426.
22 U.S., War
Department, The War of the Rebellion : A Compilation of
the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies,
70 vols. in 128 Parts (Washington, D.C., 1880-1901),
v.11, Pt.1, 455. Hereinafter cited as O.R.
23 Wallace,
Memorial of the Patriotism, 427.
24 Ibid.
25 Boyle, "Outline
Sketch," Weekly Times, July 17, 1886.
26 O.R. v.11, Pt.2,
p.446-450, 455; Wallace, Memorial of the Patriotism,
430.
27 Ibid.,
456.
28 Boyle, "Outline
Sketch," Weekly Times, July 17, 1886.
29 Ibid., p.449;
Lewis J. Martin to Folks at Home, July 5, 1862, Martin
Papers, James S. Schoff Civil War Collection, William
Clements Library.
30 William F. Fox,
Regimental Losses in the American Civil War, 1861-1865
(Dayton, OH : Morningside, 1985), p.286.
31 Filbert, Diary,
July 13-14, 1862, Filbert Papers.
32 John Fernsler,
Diary, in possession of Mrs. Marion Fernsler, Pottsville,
Penna.
33 Jacob G. Frick
to Seth Williams, July 25, 1862, Record Group 94, The
Adjutant General's Office - Compiled Union Service
Records, National Archives.
34 Filbert, Diary,
August 1, 1862, Filbert Papers; Filbert to H.L. Cake,
August 1, 1862, Filbert Papers.
35 Filbert to
[?], [undated copy of letter beginning, "I
left my situation...], Filbert Papers.
36 Welcher, The
Union Army, v.1, p.397.
37 George B.
McClellan to William B. Franklin, Letter, September 13,
1862, in The Civil War Papers of George B. McClellan, ed.
by Stephen W. Sears (New York, 1989),
p.454-455.
38 William B.
Franklin, "Notes on Crampton's Gap and Antietam," in
Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, ed. by R.U. Johnson
and C.C. Buel (New York, 1956), v.2, p.593.
39 Joseph J.
Bartlett, "Crampton's Pass," National Tribune, December
19, 1889; John M. Priest, Before Antietam : The Battle
for South Mountain (Shippensburg, 1992), p.276; O.R.,
v.19, Pt.1, p.826.
40 O.R., v.19,
Pt.1, p.394.
41 H.C. Boyer, "At
Crampton's Pass," Shenandoah (Penna.) Herald, August 31,
1886; Samuel Russell to Benjamin Bannan, October 4, 1862,
Miners' Journal; See also Joseph J. Bartlett, "Crampton's
Pass," National Tribune, December 19, 1889.
42 Boyer, "At
Crampton's Pass," Herald, August 31, 1886.
43 O.R., v.19,
Pt.1, p.393-396.
44 O.R., v.19,
Pt.1, p.827.
45 Douglas Southall
Freeman, Lee's Lieutenants : A Study in Command (New
York, 1943), v.2, 190; ); OR, v.19, Pt.1, 394-395;
J[oseph] F. von Deck, "Let Us Burn No More
Daylight," Lincoln Herald, v.88, no.2 (Summer 1986),
43-46; For a recent examination of the operations at
Crampton's Gap see, John M. Priest, Before Antietam: The
Battle for South Mountain (Shippensburg, Pa., 1992),
272-304.
46 H.C. Boyer, "At
Crampton's Pass," Shenandoah (Penna.) Herald, September
3, 1886.
47 Jacob W. Haas,
Diary, September 15, 1862, Haas Papers, Harrisburg Civil
War Round Table Collection, United States Army Military
History Institute.
48 Boyer, "At
Crampton's Pass," Herald, September 3, 1886.
49 Henry Royer to
Father, September 23, 1862, Norristown (Penna.)
Herald.
50 Boyer, "At
Crampton's Pass," Herald, September 3, 1862.
51 "The Survivors
of the 96th : A Red Letter Day for the Veterans," Miners'
Journal, September 17, 1886; Revised Regulations,
11.
52 Filbert to
Father, September 30, 1862, Filbert Papers.
53 Ibid., August 7,
1862, Filbert Papers.
54 Filbert to
Father, August 28, 1862, Filbert Papers.
55 Filbert, Diary,
September 29, 1862, Filbert Papers.
56 Ibid., September
30, 1862, Filbert Papers.
57 Filbert to O.D.
Greene, October 6, 1862, Filbert Papers; Filbert to A.G.
Curtin, October 13, 1862, Filbert Papers; Filbert to
Father, August 7, 1862, Filbert Papers.
58 Filbert, Diary,
October 23, 1862, Filbert Papers.
59 Ibid., November
2, 1862, Filbert Papers.
60 Filbert to
Brother, [undated letter headed, "Camp near
Burkittsville], Filbert Papers.
61 H.L. Cake to
R.P. Wilson, November 2, 1862, Record Group 94, The
Adjutant General's Office - Compiled Union Service
Records, National Archives.
62 Stanley Swart,
"Military Examination Boards in the Civil War : A Case
Study," Civil War History, v.16, no.3 (September 1970),
242; See also, John W. Powell, "How to Pick Out Bad
Officers," Civil War Times Illustrated, v.30, no.1
(March/April 1991), 46-49.
63 Welcher, The
Union Army, v.1, p.398.
64 Filbert, Diary,
December 29, 1862, Filbert Papers.
65 Haas to Brother,
March 16, 1863, Haas Papers.
66 Haas, Diary,
April 19, 1863.
67 Welcher, The
Union Army, v.1, p.399.
68 O.R., v.25,
Pt.1, 579-580.
69 Ibid., Wallace,
Memorial of the Patriotism, 248-249.
70 Ibid.,
p.249.
71 O.R., v.25,
Pt.1, p.581; George W. Bicknell, History of the Fifth
Regiment Maine Volunteers (Portland, Maine, 1871), 219.
After the battle, Lessig penned a long letter to the
Pottsville Miners' Journal describing the role of the
96th Pennsylvania in the battle of Salem Church. This
letter, slightly abridged, was reprinted in Wallace,
Memorial of the Patriotism, p.249, and offers details not
available in the after-action reports printed in the
Official Records.
72 O.R.AE)10, v.25,
Pt.1, 559-560, 567-568, 581-582; The appellation "Brooks'
Lambs," was taken from the back of a carte-de-visite
featuring W.T.H. Brooks, Jacob W. Haas, Civil War Photo
Album, estate of James F. Haas.
73 Ibid.,
p.581.
74 Ibid.
75 Haas to Brother,
May 12, 1863, Haas Papers.
76 O.R., v.25,
Pt.1, 189, 590; Lessig's appended list of casualties, set
forth in Wallace, Memorial of the Patriotism, p.242-244,
offers higher total losses (21 killed, 72 wounded and 29
missing).
77 Daniel Faust to
Sister, May 23, 1863, Faust Papers, Harrisburg Civil War
Round Table Collection, United States Army Military
History Institute; See also, Ralph Happel, Salem Church
Embattled ([Fredericksburg, Virginia]), 25-52;
Joseph G. Bilby, "Seeing the Elephant: The 15th New
Jersey Infantry at the Battle of Salem Church," Military
Images (Jan./Feb. 1984), 3-15.
78 The reference to
"Sedgwick's Foot Cavalry," can be found in, Dedication of
the Equestrian Statue of Major-General John Sedgwick
(Hartford, Conn., 1913), 56.
79 Welcher, The
Union Army, v.1, p.401.
80 Ibid.,
p.405.
81 Bruce Catton,
Grant Takes Command (Boston, 1968), 209.
82 Welcher, The
Union Army, v.1, p.408.
83 For a concise
sketch of Emory Upton, the assault at Spotsylvania and
his impact upon the evolution of Civil War infantry
tactics see, Stephen E. Ambrose, "A Theorist Fights :
Emory Upton in the Civil War," Civil War History, v.9,
no.4 (December 1963), 341-364.
84 O.R., v.36,
Pt.1, 667-668; William D. Matter, If it Takes All Aummer
: The Battle of Spotsylvania (Chapel Hill, 1988),
p.156.
85 Isaac O. Best,
History of the 121st New York State Infantry (Chicago,
Illinois, 1921), 134-136.
86 George T.
Stevens, Three Years in the Sixth Corps (Albany, New
York, 1866), 331-332; Best, History of the 121st New
York, 129.
87 Matter, If it
Takes All Summer, p.162.
88 Henry
Keiser,Diary, May 10, 1864, Keiser Papers, Harrisburg
Civil War Round Table Collection, United States Army
Military History Institute.
89 Ibid.
90 Matter, If It
Takes All Summer, 156-166.
91 G. Norton
Galloway, "Hand-to-Hand Fighting at Spotsylvania," essay
in, Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, ed. by Robert
U. Johnson and Clarence C. Buel (New York, 1956), v.4,
171.
92 Keiser, Diary,
May 12, 1864, Keiser Papers.
93 Luckenbill,
Diary, May 12, 1864, Luckenbill Papers.
94 Galloway,
"Hand-to-Hand Fighting," 173-174; O.R., v.36, Pt.1,
p.669.
95 Emory Upton to
G. Norton Galloway, quoted in, G. Norton Galloway,
"Capture of the Salient," Philadelphia Weekly Times,
November 18, 1882.
96 Keiser, Diary,
May 12, 1864, Keiser Papers.
97 Welcher, The
Union Army, v.1, p.411.
98 Lessig to
Curtin, December 2, 1863, RG 19, Records of Military
Affairs, Office of the Adjutant General, Muster Rolls and
Related Records, 1861-1866, Pennsylvania State Archives;
Ibid.; D. Webster Bland to Curtin, January 18, 1864;
Ibid., W.H. Lessig, "Regimental Order No. 69," February
25, 1864.
99 J.W. Conrad,
quoted in, "Proceedings and Speeches Made at the Transfer
of Battle Flags to the Historical Society of Schuylkill
County, December 14, 1913," Publications of the
Historical Society of Schuylkill County, v.5, no.2
(1932), 22.
We would sincerely
like to thank David A. Ward and the publishers of
Civil War Regiments for permission to use this
article.