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Geneva Agreement*Published in The Daily Khyber Mail Peshawar on May 24, 1988 Since the signing of the Geneva Agreement various statements of praise or condemnation have appeared from different groups of interested lobbies. The most elaborate explanation of the was given by the Foreign Minister of Pakistan Mr. Noorani himself who also mentioned the 'unnecessary criticism ' of such elements that he said may have reached Assemblies and Senate with the help of Afghan refugees and Afghan issue that has helped builds their political image. He also criticized the refugees turned politicians among Afghans who ' lack understanding of the game of politics'. Also, the statement of the President of Pakistan in an Iftar party of the Russian ambassador has been equally important in clarifying the Soviet viewpoint of the issue. There is still room, however, for a detailed analysis of the agreement with the clarification of the relevant terms of diplomacy to help the readers understand its historical nature and its future implications. As is well known the Geneva Agreement was the collection of four equally important agreements or instruments along with a fifth chapter called 'Memorandum of Understanding that dealt with the 'technical issues' that 'may arise in implementing the agreement'. I. Bilateral agreement between the Government of Republic of Afghanistan and Islamic Republic of Pakistan on the principles of mutual relations in particular of non-interference and non-intervention. This has five articles. Article 1 lists various rights and obligations of a recognized state under the contemporary international Law for the purpose of " normalizing relations," "good neighborliness", "cooperation", "peace and security in the region" etc. It has dealt within "good faith", the question of state "sovereignty" both external and internal for the realization of the right to choose its own system, with immunity from threat or use of force, ensuring that the state territory is not used in any manner prejudicial or harmful to other state or leading to armed or other intervention, including any attempt to destabilize or undermine the other state of its institutions, agreeing to refrain from promotion or encouragement of rebellious or secessionist activities in other states, or allowing to run, maintain or support mercenaries the other states, refraining to join hands with a third country against a state in agreement and refraining from defamatory campaigns, vilification or hostile propaganda. Articles: 2,3,4 and 5 mention respectively the date on enforcement of agreement i.e. 15th May 1988, references to the principles of UN charter and those relating to Pacific settlement of issues, the ensnares of all relevant steps for the purpose of enforcement of the contents of the agreement and finally the authentic of the text of agreement. In respect of mutual relations, the agreement establishes mutual recognition of the principle of "relation of voisinage" which governs the conduct of good neighborliness between two states sharing common boundaries. Keeping in view the traditional dispute of Durand Line between the two states, Pakistan appears to have earned both legal and political recognition of sovereignty over its own territory. This has helped eliminate once and for all future possibilities of Afghanistan's claim over our land & has stopped possible internal secessionists helped by Afghanistan in such a scheme. Also it has strengthened Pakistan's sovereignty over the Tribal area of Pakistan. This achievement of our diplomats has earned the federal government a very strong argument against possible objection in case she decides to merge the Tribal belt into the settled areas of Pakistan. Further the clauses of the agreement positively mentioned discontinuation of actions that may constitute 'hate propaganda'. Hence broadcasting at radio frequencies to each other territories that are not allowed by ITU and are not registered with International Frequency Registration Board need to be stopped. II. DECLARATION ON INTERNATIONAL GUARANTEE The declaration has three paragraphs where in both the Government of USSR and the USA have expressed support for the agreement, have set themselves to contribute to the achievements for ensuring their respective sovereignty, independence territorial integrity and non-alignment and have undertaken to refrain from any form of interference and intervention in the affairs of both the countries to respect the commitments contained in the their bilateral agreement. The possible objects of "guarantee treaties' like Geneva Accord, are numerous with political judicial and administrative implications. Under the Law of Treaties it is the responsibility of guarantors to do what is in their power to secure the objects of the agreement. In view of the rare joint declaration by both the super powers our foreign policy can be safely assured as being internationally recognized for the very reasons of forwarding our national interest safe from the rivalries of the big powers. The inclusion of the guarantee in the agreement legally constitutes a joint obligation of the two powers, that has helped Pakistan as well Afghanistan exercise its rights of handling its own internal and external decisions with freedom of choice of own system. However, the achievement of such a guarantee in the affairs of two neighboring countries by two super powers has clearly come on the expense of the norms and practice of regional international Relations. Here the role of OIC and SAARC may be seen on stake. Had the question of Afghanistan been considered regionally by allowing Afghanistan entry to these organizations the mutual talks would have promoted the regional international role of such organizations in settlement of local disputes without the direct involvement of the super powers. III: AGREEMENT ON THE INTERRELATIONSHIP FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF THE SITUATION RELATING TO AFGHANISTAN. The main contracting parties of Afghanistan and Pakistan sign this instrument. And is further countersigned as witnessed by the USSR and the USA. It consists of eight articles. Article: I is about the purpose of the negotiations. Article: II gives the description in details the history of development of the negotiation mentioning the original stand of the two states on the issues under consideration and the conduct of the personal representative of the UN Secretary General. Negotiating started on June 16, 1982 and the final text of the agreement was signed on April 14, 1988. During all this period a total of 190 days were exhausted in what is supposed to be a unique official business never witnessed before under the auspices of UNO. In the History of the international negotiation, the Vietnam negotiations held in Paris during the mid sixties used to be mentioned about as the longest with hardly yielding any visible achievements till the fall of Saigon. To many observers the fate of the Geneva negotiations was described to be the similar because to them Soviet Union's full commitments to Afghanistan were to spoil the show. Further the non-recognition of each other governments by Afghanistan and Pakistan was also a factor leading towards the prediction of the futility of the negotiation process. However thanks goodness that the six-year long negotiations could finally lead to plausible results. Here the successful outcome of the negotiations speaks highly of the achievements of peaceful negotiation for the purpose of solving international disputes. In this respect the conduct of the personal representative of the UN Secretary General is commendable as his untiring efforts has led to the reaffirming of faith in such diplomatic activities. In this first round of talks in Geneva, the Pakistani delegation was positively insistent upon its right of 'non-recognition' of the government in Kabul hence the choice of 'indirect' talks was the only way out. However, after Mr. Cordovez's first visit to area for consulting Islamabad, Kabul, and Tehran, the next round, though held under the same format proved melting a lot of ice as both the diplomats Mr.Dost and Sahibzada called it a "constructive atmosphere". Mr. Cardovez's second trip to the area produced a further positive change as the format was shifted to 'proximity talks' wherein the intermediary role was given more responsible and active chance. This stage of 'parallel talks' of Mr. Gordovez with both the parties did create a situation of "hopefullness"as the Afghan delegates informally presented for the first time a timetable for the Soviet withdrawal. Unfortunately they refused its 'formal' presentation till Pakistan agreed to direct talks. To resolve this crisis Mr. Cardovez paid a third visit to the area and met concerned official in Islamabad and Kabul. In Peshawar, he also gave the Afghan refugees and their leaders a chance to meet him. It would not be out of place to recall here the very early Soviet offer of withdrawal on the condition that Mujahideens should join the talks in early 1980, which they refused in 'contempt' of the soviets and their own Kabul regime. This led the entire scenario to reach a stage where under the international law the anti Afghan Govt. lobbies had no defacto legal status; hence Mr. Cardovez's Peshawar contact could hardly be of any influence over the pace of negotiations in Geneva or its results. After his 4th visit to the area amid the General Assembly having adopted Pakistani resolution by 122 votes that asked for the Soviet withdrawal, the 14th round of Geneva talks, from March 2 to April8, 1986 was held in a hopeful atmosphere as the international mass media were reporting on Soviet offer of unilateral withdrawal. The final round of talks, on April 14 was held to sign the agreement. Significantly this was a 'direct negotiation' format. Article: III reaffirms faith in the charter of the UNO as being the basis of the contemporary International affairs. Article: IV lists of names of the instruments forming part of the agreement. Article: V mentions the date of enforcement of the agreement. The phased withdrawal of foreign troops is stated to be effective by 15 August 1988 for the first half of the troops & the entire process to be completed within 9 months. Article: VI states that with affect from 15 May 1988 all types of interference and intervention in the affairs of each other will be stopped, repatriation of refugees will begin and withdrawal of forces will take place simultaneously. Article: VII provides that for the solution to any question that may arise, the two Govt. shall use the good offices of the Personal Representatives that will be provided for this purpose. Article: VIII ensures the registration of the agreement with the secretariat of the UNO as required under the Vienna convention. . IV. AGREEMENT BETWEEN PAKISTAN ABD AFGHANISTAN ON THE VOLUNTEER RETURN OF THE REFUGEES. This instrument has 8 articles. Article: I calls for the return of the refugees to their land. Article: II ask the parties to allow them the freedom of return, give them right of movement within Afghanistan, to enjoy the right to participate on equal basis in the civic affairs of their country, with rights to benefit from land water reforms and to enjoy equal rights as other citizens. Under Article: III relevant assistance in repatriation by both the governments is undertaken to be provided with accordingly. Articles: IV, V & VI deal with the supervision of the operation of repatriation with administrative needs and requirements along with the role of UNHCR in the matter. Article: VII gives the date of enforcement of the agreement with declaration of Art: 1V and V be effective for 18 months when after its validity be reviewed. Article: VIII gives language of text with authentic text to be in English. This agreement happens to be unique in respect of the function of the UNHCR, which under the UN mandates was created in 1951 to help define the status of refugees in distinction to the economic refugees and or displaced persons. Further in cases of mass displaced populations she could be asked for specific operations and in case of Afghanistan the UNHCR performance and involvement will be practically enlarging its relevancy to the international organization for humanitarian purposes. V: MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING. This is a special agreement constituting the fifth instrument of the Geneva agreement and deals with the various technical aspects of ways and means of implementation of the accord. POST AGREEMENT POLITICAL SITUATION: Many of those having had a lot of illusions and expectations about the outcome of the Geneva talks are found disappointed after going into details of the Geneva agreement. Their wish of invasion of Kabul, Moscow and victory on the Vietnam similitude has not materialized. And that is why all those gathered for Jihad are wondering as what to do next. But according to those knowledgeable circles on international law and state affairs Geneva agreement has been per the satisfaction of the International Jurists and is recognized to be as another achievement of the civilized means of settlement of issues. If it fails or is put aside as the sword waving Mujahedeen' keen for Jihad wants then the consequences would hardly be imaginable? The refugees turned politicians have turned down the very agreement because according to them it was concluded without them. Now negotiations between states joined by third party that is not an international entity like a state is beyond ones comprehension?
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