Between 10-11 p.m. on the 16th of September, Mansfield's Corps took up position in a wheatfield in rear of Hooker's Division. This placed the corps on the right of McClellan's line. Mansfield has approximately 7,200 troops--half of them had never been under fire. The fortunes of the day would depend upon the veterans, such as Gordon's 2MA, 3WS & 27IN.
Throughout the night, Lt. Charles Morse could hear the pickets of both sides popping away at each other and arose the next morning "with the full conviction that we were going to fight a batle that day." This being the case, there was only one thing for a Christian gentleman to do: eat a good breakfast. "I had scarcely finished before the cannonading began, followed quickly by heavy musketry volleys."
The battle of Antietam had begun.
As Hooker engaged the Confederate left held by Jackson, Chaplain Quint placed the time of commencement at 5 a.m. (Other placed it at 6). This rude wake up call, he mused sadly, broke the "last slumber of thousands."
Gordon's Brigade got under arms and took its place in the column. "Silently we moved forward," said Quint, "to no drum, no bugle, nothing but the word of command and the savage war pf artillery. We moved by brigades, in column by divisions, dark and heavy spots on the field."
The 12th Corps was halted as Hooker pressed the attack. Gordon's men promptly kindled their fires to make coffee. Hooker steadily pressed the Confederates back, driving them from the West Woods and the cornfield. Generals Richard Ewell & John R. Jones launched a savage counter-attack and when John B. Hood's division charged out of the West Woods, the 1st Corps fell back in confusion. Hooker called for assistance and Mansfield responded (7:30 a.m.).
Sadly, Mansfield's first battle was to be his last. Almost immediately he was felled by a bullet, mortally wounded. As ranking general, Williams assumed command, as he would do on so many occasions--to little recognition outside of his own corps. This placed Crawford in command of the 1st Division. Afterwards, Morse spoke well of Mansfield. "He had commanded us for three days only but we all felt his good influence."
The 12th Corps formed into an arc behind Hooker, its line extending from the Hagerstown Pike on the west, across the Miller farm and into the East Woods. Gordon moved his 3 veteran regiments by the flank at the double-quick and put them into line of battle just east of the Miller House. He described the scene:
The Rebel advance threatened to break the Union line, but Gordon's brigade proved impossible to move. Protected by the fence and the apple trees, the 2MA had at least some protection as three brigades of D. H. Hill battled for possession of the open fields of the Miller farm. The 3WS and 27IN were exposed in those killing fields. The Badgers, Lt. Robert Shaw observed, "lost as many as 200 killed and wounded in a short time."
Col. Thomas Ruger, commanding the 3WS, appealed to Col. Andrews for assistance. Andrews responed by forming his line at right angles to the Confederate advance and, said Morse, "poured a heavy cross-fire on the rebels...this continued about 10 minutes, when the rebel line broke, turned and ran." Shaw declared the maneuver "the prettiest thing we have ever done."
For more than an hour the fighting had surged back and forth. Now, at the command (apparently from Hooker), Morse led his company forward as the entire brigade charged with a cheer, pursuing the fleeing enemy through the cornfield. "[T]he whole field before us was literally covered with dead and dying." Shaw was astonished at the carnage. "I never saw such a terrible sight, and our men had to be very careful to avoid treading on them."
As they advanced, the 2MA captured the colors of the 11th Mississippi. The Federals pushed the Confederates back past the Dunkard Church when they were halted. As a lull fell over the battlefield, it was about 8:40 a.m. The enemy occupied the West Woods beyond the pike. Shortly after this, Hooker was wounded in the instep and was forced to retire from the battle. In 3 hours of fighting, 8,000 had been killed or wounded and 30 acres of grain ready for harvest was trampled to the ground.
Could Hooker have done more than fight the Confederates to a stalemate? It does not appear that he coordinated his attack with Mansfield effectively. No provision had been made for a joint attack. As a result, Hooker's corps was used up before Mansfield's had fired a shot. And when the 12th Corps did advance, with Crawford's brigade in the lead, its three huge green regiments hampered any rapid movement. A golden opportunity had been lost, although the men of the 2MA did not think so at the time. When Sumner's 2nd Corps arrived on the scene (9 a.m.) to continue the attack, everyone was confident of a great and total victory. But just as the chronic lack of generalship in the Army of the Potomac had been its Achille's Heal in the past, this day would be no different. Sumner's Corps had been held back too long, so when it did arrive, neither the 1st not 12th Corps were in much shape to join in the advance. Making matters worse, what should have been a corps turned out to be one division--Sedgwick's. French's division was nearly a mile behind and the remaining division had been held back by a nervous McClellan, who, us usual, had convinced himself the enemy outnumbered him and could not bring himself to commit the number of troops he needed. This piece-meal method of fighting proved a disaster.
Sumner then piled mistake upon mistake by failing to exploit what Hooker & Mansfield had gained at such a terrible cost, advancing his thinned lines into the West Woods without bothering to reconnoitre the enemy's position and strength. Nor did he coordinate with Williams, who tried to advise his superior to no avail. Sumner was met with a galling fire from a well-entrenched enemy (reinforments under McLaw's, Anderson & Walker had hurried up from Sharpsburg) which decimated his ranks.
At about 9:45 Williams was obliged to send assistance to Sumner. Two regiments from Gordon's brigade were dispatched. Because the 3WS and 27TH were in such bad shape, Gordon sent the 2MA and the green 13NJ.
Col. Andrews led the 2MA over the rail fence bordering the Hagerstown Pike, which placed the regiment within 50 yards of the West Woods. The 13NJ formed on their left. The ground before him was fairly open, and although his orders directed him to enter the woods, Andrews could find no evidence that Sumner's men were in the vicinity. It was Cedar Mountain all over again. The 2MA had arrived to support a battle line that no longer existed. Spying some soldiers in the woods, Andrews ordered Sgt. Lundy to show his colors. When the Stars & Striped was greeted with a shower of bullets, Andrews recalled Company B, which had actually scaled the second fence and entered the open field. Shaw credited Andrews with saving the 2MA, "for if we had gone as far as we were ordered, we should have probably been overwhelmed."
The Rebels in the woods were the brigades of Paul Semmes, Tige Andrews and the "Stonewall Brigade"--the old nemesis of the 2MA--along with elements of Barksdale's and McLaws' divisions. Morse saw them emerge from the woods "so near you could distinguish the features of the men. We gave them a volley which sent them back in quick time under cover of a natural breastwork they had there."
Then, for no apparent reason, the 13NJ bolted, leaving Andrews to face the enemy alone. At the same time, Lt. Col. Wilder Dwight's horse was shot and as he dismounted and tried to control the animal, a ball pierced his hip. He fell to the ground, telling Andrews. "They have done for me."
Morse reckoned that the 2MA stood alone for about 10 minutes before Andrews gave the order to fall back. "This we did in good order (though it was hard work getting over that high fence in our rear, with much appearance of dignity)." It grieved Andrews to leave his good friend behind, but Dwight would later be brought off the field by Dr. Lincoln Stone, who bravely went back for him with some volunteers.
The 2MA moved back about 100 yards to the shelter of the woods behind, uncovering the guns of Cothran and Woodruff which opened on the advancing enemy and sent them hastily back. For the 2MA and the 12th Corps, the fight on the bloodiest day of the Civil War was over. The fighting continued in the center and left of the battlefield, and by the end of the day, the two exhausted armies had fought each other to a standstill.
"To the left and front was a piece of woods, before reaching the pike road; and a cornfield, --the cornfield. Nearly in front of that was the 27th Indiana; on their right, the 3rd Wisconsin; then a battery; and then the 2nd Massachusetts. To the right and front of the battery was the orchard: a fence surrounding it ran directly forward from a point just to the right of the battery, and about 30 yards onward turned, alomost as a right angle, to the right again. Following the line of that fence, and in the edge of the orchard, was the 2nd, its line turning, so that its left was at right angles with the brigade line, its right facing the pike."