The 20th Century urban warfare experience has caused us to reevaluate old factors and consider new developments that affect the way we fight in this environment. The following discussion on historical analysis of the result of these select urban battles illustrates the importance of our maneuver warfare and combined arms philosophies. Factors that have impacted on the way urban warfare has been conducted are:
Intelligence:
The historical view of modern urban battles disclose that the attacker will win. Failures to win generally reflect classic military errors not characteristically unique to cities. However, of the battles studied, battles lost were attributed to errors in initial intelligence. The battles of Arnhem and Suez City probably would have never occurred had the attacker known the strength and locations of the defender's forces. At Stalingrad, the attacking German's were aware of the defending forces facing them in the Sixth Army's zone, but the build-up of Soviet forces in other areas of the front were incorrectly analyzed and resulted in tactical surprise at those points, diluting the German effort to seize the city.
Intelligence is imperative to success in warfare. Few subsequent tactical changes can overcome the far-reaching impact of a major intelligence error. The urban environment presents unique challenges to producing quality intelligence. Those challenges must be recognized, understood and overcome. Underestimating the defender's abilities and determination, rather than failures to identify the defender's material strength's and locations, were key errors at Ashrahfiyeh and Zahle. The Syrian Army twice incorrectly assumed that heavy firepower alone would break the will of the irregular defending forces. At Stalingrad, the German attackers detected a Soviet build-up of forces; however, this information was discounted as a series of localized operations rather than a major counteroffensive to surround the entire German Army and later to ensnare all German forces in the southern portion of the Soviet Union. The German senior commanders did not believe that their Soviet counterparts had the ability to conduct such an ambitious operation.
A lack of high-quality intelligence made operations more difficult and dangerous for Russian security forces in the battle for the Chechen city of Grozny (1994). During the pre-invasion phase, senior Russian officers were forced to rely on 1:50,000 and 1:100,000 scale maps because they lacked better suited 1:25,000 or 1:12,500 scale maps. Additionally, there was little current intelligence from aerial or satellite intelligence collection assets due to cost saving efforts on the part of the Russian government. Lower-level Russian commanders fared even worse. Many received neither maps or photographs while others received maps published up to ten years earlier. Pre-invasion intelligence assessments of Chechen military capabilities were apparently woefully inaccurate as both senior and troop-level commanders were shocked by the degree and intensity of Chechen resistance in Grozny. After the initial assault on Grozny, some Russian POWs did not even know where they were while others asked reporters "Can you please tell me who is fighting whom?"
Surprise:
Surprise can alter the course of combat. Surprise was achieved by the attacker at Aachen and Ban Me Thout and by the defender at Suez City. Surprise was also achieved in varying degrees at Beirut II, Jerusalem, Quang Tri I, Seoul, Sidon, and Tyre. Surprise can be an important asset; but, as the failure at Arnhem shows - not necessarily a decisive one. When surprise is employed as a means to overcome other disadvantages, it is especially important to maintain accurate intelligence. In urban areas tactical surprise by the attacker can be used to preempt effective defensive preparation of city. Surprise is much more difficult to achieve by the defender and often involves major failings in the collection, analysis, and/or the dissemination of intelligence.
Weapons:
Armor:
The role of armor in urban warfare can be significant. Of the 22 battles studied, armor participated in 21. In tree-fourths of the battles studied, organic tank support was a central element when special assault teams were employed. Overall, special assault units supported by tanks were more successful than any other task-organization.
Tanks have proven vital to the attacker inside the city as long as they were protected by infantry. Tanks, grouped with infantry for fighting within a city, act as an "assault gun" delivering concentrated, sustained fires to reduce stubbornly held strong points.
The U.S. experience in Hue City demonstrated the key role armor and fighting as a combined arms team play inside an urban environment. The Marine's most effective weapons during the battle were the M48A1 Patton tank and the M-50 Ontos. Both weapon systems were protected by infantry. The M48A1 with its 90mm main gun was used extensively to reduce fortified positions. The Ontos, an armored tracked vehicle mounted with six 106mm recoilless rifles, was very effective against concrete and steel structures. Thus, the munitions of these armored systems provided breaches that the infantry could exploit.
In contrast, during the Suez City battle, Israeli armored forces attacked on "armor thrust avenues" into the city, outpacing their paratroop/infantry support mounted in APCs. The irregular Egyptian defenders lacked organic artillery (except limited AAA and mortars) and had no air support and virtually no armor support. The Egyptians prepared "kill zones" on the principal avenues of approach into the city. As the lead Israeli armor battalion entered the second of the three road intersection objectives, it was met with devastating fire from all quarters. The Egyptians engaged the battalion with Sagger missiles, RPGs, ZSU-23 AAA guns, antitank grenades thrown from balconies and small arms. All the tank commanders in this lead battalion were killed or wounded. Moreover, disabled vehicles blocked the road inhibiting further maneuver. Vehicles veering into the narrow side streets became trapped and were destroyed. Lack of infantry to protect armor proved disastrous to the attacking armor battalion. Armor's mobility, lethality, and survivability make it the ideal force for operations on the urban perimeter, particularly in operations to isolate a city. Additionally, the defender may use tanks on the outer perimeter to delay of percent isolation.
World War II urban battles and the Israeli experience in Beirut II illustrate very clearly armor's value in conducting operations on the perimeter of an urban center for the purpose of isolating a city. In Beirut II, the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) used armor to first isolate the city, then conduct a combined arms attack on the city. In almost every other battle cited, armor was used either to isolate or prevent isolation of the urban area.
In Grozny, the Chechens fielded anti-tank hunter-killer teams, equipped with "massive amounts of antitank weapons". These teams keyed on the engine noise of Russian tanks and then converged upon their targets volleying fire from RPG-7 and RPG-18 anti-tank rocket propelled grenades from above, behind and the sides. As one Russian airborne commander noted after the battle, "without infantry cover, it was really senseless to bring into city."
Artillery:
Artillery has played an important role in most major urban conflicts. For example, at Aachen, U.S. forces combined infantry and antitank teams with artillery (in a direct fire role) down to the squad and fire team level. Also, artillery firing shells with delay fuzes in an indirect fire role were used to penetrate on or more floors before exploding, thus driving the enemy to the ground where infantry and armor could attack. Artillery was also positioned to fire perpendicular to the front of assaulting forces. Thus, fratricide from artillery range errors was eliminated.
Artillery, like armor, has two distinct roles: outside the built-up area to isolate or prevent isolation, and within to provide direct fire support.
Artillery employed in the indirect fire role has been significantly effective in disrupting defenders in 50 percent of the studied battles. However, artillery used as a bombardment weapon (an indirect fire siege), as was done at Ashrafiyeh and Zahle, proved neither efficient nor effective. Artillery proved best when used for interdicting supplies, enemy evacuation, and movement of reinforcements in the enemy's rear just outside the city and for the indiscriminate use of harassing the enemy. However, artillery may cause problems for the attacker. The rubble resulting from indirect artillery fires can create considerable obstacles for the attacker and at the same time providing the defender with obstacles, materials, and cover and concealment for his own defense. Finally, indirect artillery fire can be used for its psychological impact on defenders.
Artillery employed in the direct fire role proved to be extremely beneficial in the reduction of strong points. Self-propelled (SP) artillery was used effectively inside Aachen and Stalingrad and more recently by the IDF in Beirut II. The IDF made very effective use of their 155mm SP howitzer in the direct fire role and brought down seven and eight story structures with two or three carefully aimed shells.
Mortars:
The mortar is the most used indirect fire weapon in urban combat. The mortar's high angle of fire allows the round to reach the street level accurately without being masked by surrounding structures. During the battle for Hue City, the most effective fire support provided to Marines was the indirect fire from 60mm, 81mm, and 4.2-inch mortars. Approximately 20,000 rounds of high explosive (HE) 60mm and 81mm ammunition were expended during the battle. The 4.2 inch mortar was used primarily to deliver riot control agent (CS) munitions. It was discovered that 4.2 inch CS could be fired with great effectiveness into the tops of buildings to drive the enemy out. When the gas forced the enemy from his concealed position, HE rounds were fired to complete the attack.
Automatic Antiaircraft (AAA) Guns:
The AAA gun was extremely useful in a ground fire role using some urban battles. AAA was used only rarely in World War II, and then generally against assaulting personnel rather than against structures. It has been used more frequently in recent cases, but against buildings rather than people. The high rates of fire of modern AAA make it an excellent weapon in terms of shock and destructive potential. However, ammunition supply can be a problem since the volume of fire exacts a high toll in ammunition. During the battle for Hue City, the Duster, a AAA vehicle mounting twin 40mm guns, was provided to the Marines by the U.S. Army. These guns were extremely effective in the suppression of enemy positions due to the lethality of the 40mm round and the quantities in which it could be delivered. During the Suez City battle, the Egyptians used the ZSU-23 antiaircraft gun in the direct fire role against armored columns, which proved frightening and effective. Its high volume of explosive power created shock among IDF armor personnel akin to the shock the IDF armor thrust tactics were designed to create. During the battle of Sidron, the IDF used 20mm antiaircraft Vulcans in the direct fire role against ground targets with great success.
Aviation:
In many urban battles, aviation assets played an important role in helping to isolate the objective and interdicting the flow of the defender's supplies and reinforcements into the built-up area. Aviation has been relatively ineffective in the bombardment mission. Bombardment usually is intended to reduce the defender's will to resist and their physical capabilities. In the majority of both attacker-won and defender-won urban battles, aerial bombing did not erode the defender's will to resist. Additionally, it did not significantly erode the defender's military capabilities.
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