Afghanistan has always had a strategic and a unique geographical location for India. All invasions, in times gone by, came through this country. That the British realised this and fought a number of Afghan wars, is a testimony to this. That Afghanistan was difficult to conquer and to rule was also realised by the Empire, and thus a special relationship was created, which guarded its interests. After partition, Afghanistan ceased to have a border with India, and became Pakistan's close neighbour. The partition process very nearly resulted in the North Western Frontier Province not joining Pakistan, despite its more than 90 Muslim population. This was due to the influence of Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan-The Frontier Gandhi- and his Pakhtoon peoples' closeness to the ideals of Gandhi and secularism. Lack of contiguity and other factors made it a province of Pakistan, instead. The Frontier Gandhi, till his demise remained a close friend of India and is a Bharat Ratna.

I felt it necessary to mention this before proceeding further, because Indian Policy Makers have, perhaps, lost the significance of this factor, in their relationship with Pakistan in particular and Afghanistan generally. If the strong links and connections had been re-introduced, then surely we would have had a greater say in what has happened in that unfortunate country, in the last few years. We definitely would have had good and authentic prior knowledge of factors such as the Taliban and not been surprised by their advent and successes. Having had close relations, till Najibullah's removal from power, it should have been important for us to have a say in 'affairs' Afghanistan, post Najibullah also. It would also have been a great success if we could have saved him from his gory end. Charitably speaking, perhaps, we tried, but did not succeed!

Afghanistan Research Papers, is a very timely and a welcome addition to the scanty public knowledge regarding this strategically positioned nation. Given the poor relations that have existed between India and Pakistan for the past half a millennia, and the strong interest and presence by Pakistan, in Afghanistan, India has her own interests to safeguard. The Research Papers have gone into great detail considering the pros and cons of le affaire Afghanistan. The strategic importance of this land locked country, with borders, which are geographical, but not ethnic, in all directions has been clearly brought out. The dynamics of such a situation cannot be lost on India, where similar situations exist in many areas. The interest of the United States of America has been repeatedly stressed because of the potential oil and mineral wealth of the CIS States, which need massive capital for exploitation. Afghanistan is a key player in this scheme. The fall out of all this on the Russian, Chinese and Iranian interests has been lucidly brought out.

The author has also stressed that in the long term national interests India needs to shed some of her inherited inhibitions and become a seasoned player of real politick, even if it means a major change in the existing foreign policy parameters for that area. The business of being goody goody, and sitting on the fence is one image that India must totally avoid, if it desires to be a world power, commanding respect. If we carry on being obsessed with only Pakistan, on one hand, and the perceived insensibilities of the USA for our viewpoint, on the other, we are going to end up losing respect from others, and be considered a whining giant. There is always respect for those who are strong, know their own status, amongst others and do not hesitate to state what is against their national interests. Strategic thinking needs to be studiously cultivated and applied in practical terms. This should always be based on long term interests with medium and short term compulsions worked out for immediate use. In Afghanistan this has been woefully missing, resulting in national interests being compromised. To recoup the situation is always more difficult and definitely time consuming. The author has given two scenarios of what can be done. These are pragmatic, though by no means the only ones available. That a concerned academic can deduce these should act as an incentive for those who are in a position to influence issues to further research and analyse, and act on these findings.

Kuldip S. Ludra deserves to be complimented on this effort and I whole heartedly support and commend him.

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